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 This dissertation is an investigation of the position of British and Soviet music 
professionals (such as composers, concert agents, performers, and publishers) in the interchange 
of music and musicians between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1975. 
This study determines how they were able to circumvent the difficulties inherent in these 
exchanges in order to further their own goals, and not on behalf of their governments’ political or 
ideological aims (which were focused explicitly on reducing Cold War tensions, and implicitly 
on cultural competition). A significant portion of these professionals were interested in material 
gain, while others sought to gain access to foreign audiences, music, and musicians. After setting 
the historical context for the opening of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations in the mid-1950s, I 
present four case studies that explore different aspects of these exchanges: 1) the concept of 
compatibility between the musical style of British and Soviet composers, 2) how Soviet 
performers and theater directors negotiated with the Soviet system to acquire and utilize their 
agency, 3) the attempts of both British and Soviet parties to facilitate the exchange of intellectual 
property, and 4) the position of British concert agents who profited from the interchange of 
performers between the UK and the USSR. Through the study of such events, it is possible to 
uncover both the capabilities and limits in how professionals from the UK and the USSR were 
able to pursue their own interests despite the obstacles inherent in the diplomatic enterprise that 
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The basis for transliteration from Cyrillic to Latin for Russian terms 
follows primarily the American Libraries Association’s (ALA’s) 
method. However, certain names and terms have been altered to 
reflect what I believe has become common practice in American 
academic writing. For example, first names such as “Геннадий” 
(Gennadii) and “Валерий” (Valerii) have been altered to 
“Gennady” and “Valery.” The surname endings “-ский” (-skii) and 
“ская” (-skaia) have been transliterated as “-sky” and “-skaya.” 
Famous names have been transliterated to the most common 
spellings of these names. For example, “Чайковский” 
(Chaikovskii) has been altered to “Tchaikovsky.” Also, names have 
been transliterated according to the preferred transliteration of the 
personages referenced, when known. Citations and bibliographic 
entries, however, use the original spelling of the archived or 
published document (if in Latin), or the ALA transliteration system 
without alterations (if in Cyrillic). Russian terms, titles, and archive 
citations are followed by a translation into English.  
 
Passages quoted from Russian-language sources appear in the text 
as translations, and their original Russian texts are included in 
Cyrillic in the footnote. The original script is used so that Russian-
language readers would be able to read the original text without 
modifications or transliterations, and would be able to compare the 





CLASSICAL MUSIC IN ANGLO-SOVIET CULTURAL RELATIONS 
 
This dissertation seeks to unravel the historical complexities in the negotiation, 
performance, and reception of twentieth-century classical music in Anglo-Soviet cultural 
relations during the roughly twenty-year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.1 Cultural 
exchange in classical music is understood here as the interchange of musicians and intellectual 
property, such as scores, performance parts, and recordings, in order to improve relations and 
communication, prove national superiority, and/or simply turn a profit. During the Cold War, 
whether a particular piece of music was deemed appropriate for these exchanges relied on an 
overlapping set of values, which included the belief that classical music had great cultural 
prestige as high art, and that it could be produced by both sides and traded between them. 
Negotiations throughout this period were carried out between British and Soviet representatives 
of their respective governments, performance ensembles, concert agencies, and publishing firms. 
Performances in the form of participation in foreign tours, competitions, and festivals were 
exchanged, as well as material intellectual property in the form of musical scores, parts, and 
recordings. The success of these exchanges was made apparent in their critical and popular 
reception, as well as in both the publicly stated and privately held testimonies of the 
aforementioned negotiators. While the British and Soviet governments organized such exchanges 
 
1 In this dissertation, “classical music” is considered to be high or serious musical art according to British 
and Soviet contemporaneous definitions of the phrase and includes ballet, chamber music, opera, orchestral music, 
and vocal music. It also includes the contemporary music of the time, which was considered to be the continuation 
of the classical music tradition. However, it excludes so-called “popular music”—which consists of various genres 
of “light music” (dance and song), jazz, and rock—and folk music. The term “Anglo” follows standard usage and 
refers to the entire United Kingdom, and not only to England. 
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through international negotiations, they depended on music professionals such as composers, 
ensemble directors, concert agents, performers, and publishers to carry out their plans.2 
While the Soviet Union participated in cultural exchange with all of the member states of 
NATO, as well as with other so-called Western countries, I focus on the Cold War cultural 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.3 I decided to concentrate on Anglo-
Soviet cultural exchange because of the close personal and professional relationships cultivated 
between key British and Soviet musicians. In particular, the British composer Benjamin Britten 
formed close friendships with elite Soviet composers and musicians, encouraged the 
performance and publication of his pieces in the USSR, and maintained a rapport with the Soviet 
Ministry of Culture. Also, Anglo-Soviet Cold War relations have received far less scholarly 
attention than the study of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, postwar London asserted itself as a major player among the musical capitals of 
Western Europe. Historian Daniel Snowman argues that London’s rise in stature could be 
attributed to the following three points. Firstly, the Second World War disrupted Central 
Europe’s musical institutions; reduced Berlin and Vienna to rubble; and resulted in the death, 
disgrace (due to compliance with the Third Reich), and/or emigration of its major musical 
figures. London was never occupied, unlike Paris, and it became a refuge for those escaping 
Nazism. Secondly, the BBC became a major patron in supporting classical music performance 
with radio broadcasts of the Third Programme and the Promenade Concerts, and it became the 
largest employer of British classical musicians. Thirdly, the creation of the Iron Curtain placed 
 
2 Music professionals are here defined as those whose main source of income was from music. 
3 In this dissertation, the terms “West” and “Western” refer to the United States and Western Europe as 
capitalist countries that were in an industrial or post-industrial stage of economic development and were 
economically and militarily affiliated with each other.  
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Central Europe at the geographic periphery of the West, and London became the new center and 
the transatlantic hub for travel between Europe and the also ascendant US.4  
This dissertation considers the connections forged between British and Soviet 
governmental institutions (such as those in the areas of the arts, foreign affairs, and trade) and 
commercial institutions (such as concert agencies and publishers) involved in international 
cultural relations regarding musical performance and the exchange of musical intellectual 
property. The music professionals involved in this interchange wielded considerable agency and 
influence in shaping the Anglo-Soviet interchange of performers and intellectual property as 
cultural ambassadors, and that they also did so to suit their own purposes. This document is an 
investigation of the nature of Anglo-Soviet Cold War artistic exchange, specifically how 
musicians negotiated with a system to acquire agency, and the extent and limitations of what 
they were able to accomplish. In this introduction, I set out 1) to provide the historical context 
for my study of classical music’s place in the cultural Cold War; 2) to cover the theoretical 
frameworks and historical and musicological publications that shaped my research; 3) to explain 
my methodology in the collection and interpretation of archival sources, personal recollections 
(such as published interviews and memoirs), and contemporaneous performance reviews; as well 
as 4) to explain the structure of the dissertation as a whole. 
 
 
4 Snowman acknowledges that the third point on geographical centrality was also true of Paris, but that the 
political instability in the Fourth Republic prevented the city from reaching the same stature as London until the late 
1970s. Daniel Snowman, The Amadeus Quartet: The Men and the Music (London: Robson, 1981), 48-51. 
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Cultural Exchange during the Early Cold War 
The historical period of my investigation begins with the death of Josef Stalin in 1953,5 
which sparked a reevaluation of the Soviet relationship with the West and facilitated the opening 
of cultural contacts on the basis of reciprocal exchange. This period continued through First 
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev’s late 1950s and early 1960s 
doctrines of peaceful coexistence and ideological competition with the capitalist West,6 which 
coincided with the first cultural exchange agreements between the USSR and non-communist 
countries such as the US, UK, and their West European allies. These cultural exchanges 
continued for the rest of the USSR’s existence, but the period of my investigation ends in the 
mid-1970s for the following three reasons. First, in 1973, the Soviets7 joined the Universal 
Copyright Convention (UCC), and thus became integrated into the international legal network of 
copyright, performance rights, and mechanical rights, which meant that Soviet broadcasters, 
performers, and publishers were required by Soviet law to abide by foreign intellectual property 
protections. Second, the vast majority of British and Soviet music professionals who were 
instrumental in earlier Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges had either died or otherwise ceased their 
involvement. Third, by the mid-1970s, the contemporaneous discourse of the cultural Cold War 
 
5 Beginning in the last year of Vladimir Lenin’s life, Stalin was involved in a two-year long struggle of 
succession, which resulted in him becoming the undisputed head of the Soviet state in 1925 (one year after Lenin’s 
death). Stalin held this position until his death in 1953. Shelia Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 97-100. 
6 Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Communist Party from 1953 to 1964, and he was the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers and the undisputed head of state from 1958 to 1964. 
7 In this dissertation, the phrase “the Soviets” pertains to the people of the USSR, the Soviet government, or 
the USSR as a whole, and not the local, district, or national councils that existed within the Soviet Union. 
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seems to have shifted its attention from the demonstration of cultural prestige with classical 
music to the question of the acceptability of rock music.  
The Soviet opening of international cultural relations occurred largely in the mid-1950s 
as a result of intergovernmental negotiations and exchange agreements with nations unaffiliated 
with the USSR. This effort to reconnect with the nonsocialist world can be linked to 
Khrushchev’s policies of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence. Culturally, there was a very 
high demand in the USSR for contact with the West, which was expressed in the desire for 
Western consumer products, including music recordings, and in the unrestrained popular 
enthusiasm at international youth festivals and exhibitions within the USSR.8 In the late 1950s, 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) and Khrushchev set in motion a series of 
agreements between their two countries. These agreements initiated increases in the travel of 
students, professionals, and tourists, and also resulted in high-profile events such as the exchange 
of classical music ensembles and performers.9 After these international tours and festivals, 
interpersonal connections between participants sometimes remained. These connections were 
manifested usually by correspondence, the mutual dedication of compositions, and the advocacy 
by musicians for the performance of foreign composers’ pieces. Sometimes, these connections 
were strong enough to foster subsequent social visits during vacations, or excursions to the same 
destination. 
Historian Kiril Tomoff understands the cultural Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s as the 
competition for global hegemony between two political, economic, and legal imperial systems: 
 
8 See Natalya Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era (London: Routledge, 2013); 
Kristin Roth-Ey; Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); and “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose?: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 
Youth Festival,” in Women in the Khrushchev Era, eds. Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood 
(Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2004), 75-95. 
9 See Stephen Lovell, The Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present (Chichester, West 
Sussex: Wiley, 2010). 
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the American and the Soviet. He positions cultural exchange as an important facet of this 
competition alongside the economic and scientific spheres.10 The Soviets invested heavily in the 
education of musicians. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, when their orchestras were touring 
the world and virtuosi were dominating international performance competitions, it appeared as if 
they were winning the cultural Cold War. Tomoff argues that these victories contributed to 
Soviet leaders’ overconfidence in the Soviet system during the mid-1960s, when the Soviets and 
the Americans entered into explicit economic competition, which proved to become a major 
factor in the USSR’s eventual collapse.11  
In her investigation of the US government’s use of music in international diplomacy 
during the Cold War, Danielle Fosler-Lussier explains that cultural diplomacy served two major 
purposes: to propagate a positive image of the US abroad and to foster mutual understanding. 
The former was envisioned as a one-way flow of information from the Americans, which was 
then consumed by the rest of the world. The US government (particularly members of Congress 
outside of the artistic and diplomatic fields who sought to justify the expense of cultural 
diplomacy) saw these efforts as an investment to demonstrate artistic excellence, and persuade 
foreign audiences to accept the American perspective; such activities essentially promoted the 
use of artistic media to pursue political diplomatic goals. This position resonates with Tomoff’s 
explanation of musical competition, discussed above.12  
The view that cultural diplomacy fostered mutual understanding was related more to the 
experience of diplomats, who saw exchanges in the arts as a network of various institutions, local 
 
10 See Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 
1945-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
11 See David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad. 
12 Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 2015), 3-6. 
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contacts, and music professionals, who collaborated in carrying out the exchanges while 
furthering their own interests. For example, the performances of American musicians abroad for 
diplomatic purposes were organized by the US embassy. The embassy depended on local concert 
agents to secure venues for and advertise the performances. While the State Department was not 
concerned with how much money the performances made, they were aware that the concerts 
were only a worthwhile diplomatic endeavor if the concerts were well-attended. Meanwhile, the 
concert agents were concerned with the financial success of the performances and maintaining a 
good rapport with their American collaborators. Fosler-Lussier asserts that American cultural 
diplomacy was a combination of these two systems, and it was neither completely one nor the 
other.13 
In addition, Fosler-Lussier calls attention to the fact that Western musicians were not 
trained diplomats and were usually ambivalent to the particularities of international politics and 
diplomacy. She argues that their candidness and informality in their social interactions abroad 
contributed to the perception that were acting as normal citizens and not as government agents, 
which, in turn, led to people having the impression that the musicians were more “authentic” 
than professional diplomats. While such diplomatic informality often resulted in embarrassment 
for the musicians and their hosts,14 the performers were able to counter widespread negative 
perceptions of Westerners, foster informal interactions, share common interests in the arts, and 
serve as cultural ambassadors abroad.15 
 
13 Ibid., 6-9. 
14 In one instance, John Finley, director of the Westminister Singers, said in his introductory remarks at a 
concert in Cairo, “As I look at you girls here, with your eager intelligent faces looking at me, I can hardly realize 
that I am in Africa—why, you could almost be European!” Ibid., 9. 
15 Ibid., 13-16. 
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As stated above, my research considers cultural relations between the Soviets and the 
British. While the US was economically and militarily the most prominent of the Western 
powers, the West was not a unilateral entity and Western countries had different approaches in 
their interactions with the USSR. The postwar British perspective differed from the American 
due to its reliance on foreign (American) military support, a diminished position on the world 
stage, and a more leftist political orientation.16 Due to the transition from empire to 
commonwealth, which was a result of postwar decolonization, and the embarrassment of the 
Suez Crisis of 1956, when the country demonstrated weakness on the international stage and its 
dependence on American approval, British citizens began to recognize that the UK was no 
longer a great power on the global stage.17  
The postwar reality of the British international position was political and economic 
isolation from continental Europe, and dependence on American military hardware to maintain 
nuclear deterrence against the USSR. While clearly a part of the West, the UK’s weakened 
position as a post-imperial commonwealth situated between the emerging American and Soviet 
superpowers, as well as its adoption of postwar leftist policies, prevented it from falling into a 
simple “us versus them” Cold War dichotomy.18 While the UK was an important member of the 
capitalist West, the rise of the Labour Party after the Second World War incorporated several 
socialist aspects into British government policy. Subsequent Conservative and Labour 
governments maintained much of this innovation (including the welfare state) until the Margaret 
Thatcher administration (1979-1990). Moreover, during the Cold War, the UK was adjusting to a 
 
16  Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, MacMillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependency (Houndmills, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 16-17; and Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History 1945-1990 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 26-52. 
17 Ibid., 145-57. 
18 See Ashton. 
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new position in terms of foreign policy, which resulted in a more conciliatory and less 
confrontational stance toward the USSR.19 
 
Classical Music in Cultural Diplomacy 
The scope of this dissertation is further shaped by the aesthetic and political nature of the 
historical subjects discussed therein. In the UK and the USSR, the vast majority of the classical 
music repertoire consisted of works derived from the Austro-German tradition, nineteenth-
century French and Italian opera, and the contemporary music of national composers (British in 
the UK, Soviet in the USSR) who were experimenting within the bounds of tonality. Russian 
nineteenth-century music was frequently performed in the USSR, and its presence in British 
concert programs had steadily increased since the late nineteenth century. Older British music 
had its strongest following within the UK, but its influence was much weaker abroad. The 
modernist avant-garde also existed openly in the UK and in the Soviet unofficial sphere, but its 
composers had more specialized audiences outside of the general public. The British modernists 
active in the period included the serialist Elisabeth Lutyens and the Manchester School, which 
included the composers Harrison Birtwistle, Peter Maxwell Davies, and Alexander Goehr. 
Aesthetically, this study focuses on the performance and reception of the most frequently 
performed classical music by some of the most prominent British and Soviet composers who 
were active during this period. Such performances were normally given by major musical 
institutions (such as opera and ballet companies, symphonies, and chamber ensembles). This 
 
19 See ibid.  
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study also treats works discussed in and published and broadcast by major media outlets such as 
newspapers, journals, publishers, and broadcasters.20  
The phrase “prominent composers” is defined here as those most at the forefront in their 
countries’ musical establishments and those with the greatest degree of access to government 
subsidies, publishers, performers, broadcasting opportunities, and, as a result, audiences. Under 
this definition, the most prominent British composer in the generation following Ralph Vaughan 
Williams was Britten. After Prokofiev’s decline and death, the most prominent composer in the 
USSR was Dmitri Shostakovich.21 These composers were the de facto leaders of their respective 
countries’ musical communities. When the British and Soviet governments embarked on cultural 
exchange in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they became the apparent ambassadors for music.  
To declare that Britten and Shostakovich were more prominent than their contemporaries 
is not a judgement on the value of their music or on their significance as historical figures; it is 
an acknowledgement of their position as established composers of their time. Highly prominent 
people were typically the most likely to be known outside of their countries and to be considered 
highly valuable assets in cultural relations. This study concentrates on these composers because 
they were the de facto cultural ambassadors and the chosen representatives for the classical 
music traditions of each other’s countries. Classical music, as defined by the aesthetics of the 
time, is the focus of this study, because during the early Cold War, it was highly prominent in the 
 
20 British examples of such institutions and media outlets included Covent Garden, Sadler’s Wells, London 
Symphony Orchestra, The Times of London, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Soviet examples included the 
Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters, the Composers’ Union, the newspapers Sovetskaia muzyka and Pravda, and the state 
music publisher Muzyka. 
21 In 1948, Minister of Culture Andrei Zhdanov denounced the USSR’s most esteemed composers 
(including Prokofiev and Shostakovich). Shostakovich rebounded, while Prokofiev did not. Simon Morrison posits 
that the backlash to Prokofiev’s opera Story of a Real Man, Op. 117 (completed in 1948, publicly premiered in 
1960) and his general difficulties with the Secretary of the Composers’ Union, Tikhon Khrennikov, prolonged his 
tribulations with the Soviet musical establishment and, in 1953, he died before his reputation was allowed to 




middlebrow culture of both the UK and the USSR and it enjoyed a high amount of cultural 
prestige. As a result of these factors, it was given the highest priority in the cultural exchanges of 
this period. 
Christopher Chowrimootoo explains that in relation to the music of the early to mid-
twentieth century, the term “middlebrow” refers to an ambiguous concept, which was placed 
between highbrow elitism and lowbrow vulgarity. In the case of twentieth-century contemporary 
Western music, highbrow forms of art were defined as modernist because they were associated 
first with the Second Viennese School, the lowbrow with popular culture, and the middlebrow 
with a liminal stage in between, where music was intended to be sophisticated but also accessible 
to the general public, in order to encourage the cultural growth of that public. In other words, 
middlebrow music was between what people like, and what they ought to like.22  
Relatedly, Ross McKibbin explains that in the UK, a canon of middlebrow works formed 
shortly before the First World War, that it remained largely intact during the rest of the twentieth 
century, and that it was what the vast majority of British people considered to be classical 
music.23 This canon emerged from both religious and secular music, was bolstered by the cinema 
and the radio, shaped by participation in amateur choirs and music festivals, and reinforced by 
public concerts and broadcasting during the Second World War. This canon included works 
newly composed for the middlebrow market as well as selections of classical music from the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, such as the well-known works of 
Beethoven, Brahms, Handel, Haydn, Liszt, Mendelssohn, Mozart, Puccini, Rachmaninov, 
Rossini, Schubert, and Tchaikovsky. According to McKibbin, British composers of the early 
 
22 Christopher Chowrimootoo, Middlebrow Modernism: Britten’s Operas and the Great Divide (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2018), 9-11.  




twentieth century, which included Bliss, Elgar, Holst, Ireland, and Vaughan Williams, sought to 
create accessible works and contributed to this canon. He surmises that the middlebrow was 
relatively conservative and that its canon essentially became fixed in the 1950s. In addition, he 
posits that modernist contemporary music after the Second World War completely isolated itself 
from the middlebrow audience.24 While McKibbin describes the middlebrow canon as relatively 
stagnant in the postwar era, the British composers Arthur Bliss, Benjamin Britten, Michael 
Tippett, and William Walton continued to write contemporary music for the middlebrow 
audience. 
While debates waged between the three “brows” in the West, the Soviet Composers’ 
Union and the Ministry of Culture only conditionally allowed some aspects of the lowbrow in 
what were accepted genres of popular music and jazz, and they did not support atonal music that 
could have been considered a Soviet counterpart to Western highbrow modernism. In other 
words, the state stripped away what it considered to be the upper-class highbrow and much of the 
lower-class lowbrow, leaving the middlebrow of the cultural intelligentsia who remained in 
Russia following the October Revolution. The Soviet musical establishment’s values were very 
similar to those of the Western middlebrow in that they valued cultural prestige, musical 
tradition, and accessibility. An obvious difference, however, between the “two middlebrows,” 
was that the Soviet one was encouraged to promote socialism and lacked the market-driven 
processes of the Western middlebrow, because those processes had been stripped away by a state 
that nationalized all major forms of cultural production and dissemination.25 
 
24 Ibid., 386-90. 
25 Pauline Fairclough, “Was Soviet Music Middlebrow? Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony, Socialist 
Realism, and the Mass Listener in the 1930s,” Journal of Musicology 35, no. 3 (2018): 339-41. 
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Genres of music that lie outside of the primary focus of this dissertation are avant-
garde/modernist music, folk music, jazz, and types of popular music such as estrada26 and rock. 
The Western avant-garde of this time included aleatoric music, dodecaphonic serialism, 
electronic music, musical happenings, and fusion with free or abstract jazz.27 The Soviet musical 
establishment categorically rejected all of these genres, and only began to accept serialism to a 
limited extent in the 1970s. Before then, a generation of unofficial composers experimented with 
atonalism and serialism, but they did not gain acceptance by the establishment and thus were not 
able to achieve “prominence” within the USSR.28 The Soviets exported folk music ensembles 
internationally, and they were typically in high demand. Nonetheless, despite Soviet attempts to 
elevate folk music to the level of classical music through the use of formal education, the 
performance of folk music by specialized orchestras and choirs, and through government 
subsidy, it was considered to be middlebrow or light entertainment, but not high art, elsewhere in 
the West.29 Furthermore, there was very little Soviet demand for British folk music. Jazz 
meanwhile gained acceptance when performed by official Soviet ensembles at home, but 
 
26 Estrada is a genre of Russian and Ukrainian popular song that was derived from theater, literature, satire, 
comedy, folksong, dance, and the circus. It was in high demand during the Russian Civil War and acquired full 
strength during the New Economic Policy of the 1920s. Estrada endured under Stalinism, partly because Stalin 
favored some estrada songs and performers, but government oversight was a burden to several performers. Estrada 
continued as a form of popular music acceptable to the Soviet establishment for the rest of the USSR’s existence, 
and it continues in post-socialist Russia. See Introduction and Chapter 1 of David MacFadyen, Red Stars: 
Personality and the Soviet Popular Song, 1955-1991 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). 
27 Happenings were a form of performance art, which included the theatrical synthesis of visual projections, 
dance, and music that incorporated chance procedures. They often had nonlinear narrative structures and blurred the 
boundary between audience and performer. A major proponent of this genre was the American composer John Cage. 
28 In an interview with Peter J. Schmelz, percussionist Mark Pekarsky explained that the composition and 
performance of Soviet unofficial music was in itself an act of dissidence. While creating such music was not the 
same as participating in a political demonstration, it was still a risk for the musicians, which would adversely affect 
the trajectories of their professional careers. Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical: Unofficial Soviet 
Music during the Thaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13-15. 
29 Susannah Lockwood Smith discusses the professionalization and state patronage of Soviet folk 
ensembles following the institutions of the creative unions in 1932 in her dissertation on the Piatnitskii Russian Folk 
Choir. See Chapters 3 and 4 of Susannah Lockwood Smith, “Soviet Arts Policy, Folk Music, and National Identity: 
The Piatnitskii State Russian Folk Choir, 1927-1945,” PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 1997. 
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exchanges of jazz performers and ensembles were predominately a factor in American-Soviet, 
and not Anglo-Soviet, cultural relations. 
Moreover, the Western practice of broadcasting avant-garde music, jazz, and popular 
music directly to the USSR—at a time when the Soviets did not officially accept these forms of 
music—is outside the scope of this study, as it was an explicit attempt by the West to undermine 
Soviet cultural policy. The Soviet government’s efforts of radio jamming confirm that it viewed 
such broadcasts as an affront on its territorial sovereignty and cultural legitimacy.30 While 
mainstream cultural exchange was also a political exercise—in which both sides strove to 
encourage a political change in the other and demonstrate cultural ability, or even superiority—it 
operated on a more tacit level, under the guise of reducing Cold War tensions and facilitating 
understanding. In comparison, the performance of British communist work songs in London and 
the broadcasting of avant-garde and rock music in the USSR had a more explicit purpose in 
promoting a particular political ideology and is not included in this study.  
Likewise, Soviet music outside of the so-called mainstream—including serial music that 
was composed throughout the early and mid-1960s and the more open experimentation with 
atonal, aleatory, collage, and tonal elements that emerged in the later 1960s and 1970s—is 
beyond the scope of the dissertation. The composers of this music include Andrei Volkonsky, 
Alfred Schnittke, Avro Pärt, and Sofia Gubaidulina. Peter Schmelz demarcates these younger 
composers as “unofficial:” they were not in direct support or in opposition to Soviet cultural 
establishment and they were in many ways composing as a means of withdrawal from direct 
confrontation; they preferred instead to create an alternative space for new music.31 They made 
up a significant portion of the younger generation of Soviet composers, and they received less 
 
30 Yurchak, 175-81. 
31 Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical, 20-21. 
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access to publication and performance than their more established, older contemporaries.32 While 
they were able to present their music in a somewhat limited capacity in the USSR and at the 
Warsaw Autumn Festival, they did not play a role in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges. Only 
composers who gained acceptance among the cultural establishment, such as Shostakovich, 
Aram Khachaturian, and Tikhon Khrennikov, were able to contribute to Anglo-Soviet cultural 
relations during the first half of the Cold War to a meaningful degree. In this dissertation, I will 
demarcate these composers as “official.” Some of these official composers would also 
experiment with atonal and serial elements, but to a much lesser extent, in the 1970s. 
As indicated above, British popular music did not begin to gain official acceptance from 
the Soviets until the mid-1970s. This acceptance was very conditional and would only be 
awarded to certain performers and bands that were deemed admissible by both the British and 
Soviet governments for cultural exchange. The shift from classical to popular music is one of the 
factors that significantly changed the nature of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations.  
The performance of music intended to promote Soviet or communist ideology was 
neither supported by the British government nor by the majority of the British concert-going 
public. It was predominately a politically motivated form of artistic endeavor encouraged by the 
Soviets in order to promote regime change in the West. The British government (whether Labour 
or Conservative) categorically refused to include British communist and Soviet-backed cultural 
organizations in official Anglo-Soviet cultural relations, because such an action could have been 
interpreted as an endorsement of those institutions and the political ideology that they 
represented. The British communist composer Alan Bush was a tireless supporter of international 
socialism and the Soviet cause, a persistent critic of British capitalism and imperialism, a 
 
32 Peter J. Schmelz, “Shostakovich’s ‘Twelve-Tone’ Compositions and the Politics and Practice of Soviet 
Serialism,” in Shostakovich and His World, ed. Laurel E. Fay (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 321-23. 
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member of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural Relations between 
the Peoples of the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union, and the director of the Workers’ 
Music Association.33 Even though he served as a professor of the Royal College Music in 
London, both Conservative and Labour governments considered him to be a communist first, and 
a loyal British citizen second. For this reason, he was felt to be unsuitable for the government’s 
efforts to further cultural relations with the USSR. Bush’s activities were thus mostly outside the 
scope of mainstream Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange.34 Nevertheless, his attempts to have his 
operas performed by mainstream cultural institutions (such as the Royal Opera House in London 
and the Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters in Moscow and Leningrad, respectively) are within the 
purview of this dissertation and will be discussed in Chapter 3.35 
 
Classical Music’s Position in Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange 
Both the British and Soviet governments utilized cultural exchange to promote détente 
and serve as a field of international competition. The promotion of détente was a key point in 
Nikita Khrushchev’s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, which stressed that war between the 
USSR and the West was not inevitable. Nonetheless, the Soviet leader set the stage for 
competition by stressing that Soviet and capitalist ideologies could not coexist, and that the 
Soviets would overtake the West in economic, scientific, and cultural development. Both 
capitalist and socialist sides of the Cold War participated in this struggle to prove to each other, 
 
33 See Joanna Bullivant, Alan Bush, Modern Music, and the Cold War: The Cultural Left in Britain and the 
Communist Bloc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1-3. 
34 Bush’s support for the USSR covered the vast majority of his career as a composer and a professor, and 
his support for Soviet associations and his drive to lobby for closer cultural ties with the USSR are clearly evident in 
his correspondence with the Soviet musicologist Grigory Shneerson (MS Mus 440, British Library [hereafter cited 
as GB-Lbl]; and F. 375, no. 240-325, Russian National Museum of Music), with the Anglo-Soviet Friendship 
Society, and with the Society of Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union (MS Mus 668, GB-Lbl).  
35 The examination of Bush’s efforts is on Page 218. 
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themselves, and to the rest of the world that they had the superior system, were the true heirs of 
the Enlightenment, and the exemplars of human progress.36 
For cultural communication and competition to exist between two entities, there must be 
an agreement on what is culturally valuable and on overlapping criteria for judging excellence in 
it. During the Cold War, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, national governments around 
the globe, which included both the states under the Soviet sphere of influence and the Western 
powers, held the so-called high arts in high esteem.37 Classical music became a field of 
competitive cultural exchange; and, excellence in classical music was considered to be a marker 
of national development, sitting alongside other achievements and activities such as the space 
race, economic growth, the Olympics, and chess and film competitions. Western classical music 
was among the expressive fields perceived as a higher form of culture by both capitalist and 
socialist nations. Also, both sides had similar criteria for assessing excellence in performers’ 
technical virtuosity.38 As an institution, the international solo competition was considered to be 
an objective evaluation of national artistic development in music, and thus, high culture. 
(Examples include the International Chopin Piano Competition in Warsaw; the Henryk 
Wieniawski International Violin Competition in Poznań; the International Tchaikovsky Cello, 
Piano, and Violin Competitions in Moscow; the Eugène Ysaӱe [later the Queen Elizabeth] 
International Violin Concerto Competition in Brussels; the Marguerite Long-Jacques Thibaud 
[later the Long-Thibaud-Crespin] Competition in Paris; and several others.)39 Without some 
 
36 See Nigel Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 2 (April 
2003): 193-214. 
37 In this dissertation, the mention of the Soviet sphere of influence refers to countries with communist 
governments that held the USSR to be the model for their development or were under its hegemonic control. In 
Europe, this would include the nations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary, and Poland), but not Albania or Yugoslavia. 
38 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 46-50. 
39 Ibid., 47-49. 
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degree of common ground, cultural communication and competition would have been 
impossible.40 
The character of contemporary music during the Cold War sometimes highlighted 
ideological differences that were considered by each side to be indicative of their cultural 
superiority. Generally, Western countries promoted experimentalism in the arts with the claim 
that Western artists enjoyed greater creative freedom than their Soviet contemporaries. In 
addition, this experimentalism fits into the discourse of Western modernity: the avant-garde were 
seen as cultural pioneers who explored the newest techniques of musical composition, and, as a 
result, were the proponents of a more advanced musical culture. Milton Babbitt—who taught at 
both Princeton and Julliard and instituted a PhD program in composition and music theory at the 
former in the late 1950s—sought to propagate a more academic, rational, and “scientific” study 
of music. He pressed for composers to be integrated into the academic community, and felt that 
the university was the place to carry out musical “research and development,” which should be 
done in a similar vein to how academics in the engineering and medical fields operated.41 
The Soviet counterclaim to Western modernity dismissed the avant-garde’s claims of 
superiority as elitist and decadent. From the Soviet perspective, the modernists were producing 
music for an increasingly insular and specialized audience, while the general public were 
becoming alienated and disinterested in music of the so-called Ivory Tower. Instead, the Soviet 
preoccupation with realism and stylistic conservatism in music—while at times stifling 
experimentation among composers—sought a closer connection between contemporary music 
and the public than what happened in the West. Soviet ideologues also claimed that Soviet 
classical music, and other, similar trends that were present in other countries both within and 
 
40 Ibid., 10-15. 
41 Robert Morris, “What Milton Babbitt Enabled,” Music Theory Spectrum 34, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 19-20. 
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outside the Soviet sphere of influence, constituted a natural evolutionary development arising 
from nineteenth-century Romanticism and national compositional styles, while the Western 
avant-garde was dismissed as an aberration that indicated cultural degeneracy and decay. 
Generally speaking, this approach was largely successful in terms of keeping audiences 
interested, as the Soviet musical establishment generally enjoyed greater mainstream popularity 
than did the Western avant-garde. 
Many Western composers also rejected the path of high modernism and were instead 
dedicated to the task of exploring musical frontiers while still maintaining the interest of the 
middlebrow audience. As noted above, in the UK, these composers included Bliss, Britten, 
Tippett, and Walton. Also, some of them considered their compositions to be able to fulfill the 
role of public service. For example, Bliss served as the Master of the Queen’s Musick from 1953 
to his death in 1975, and Britten wrote extensively on the importance of classical music and the 
responsibility of the composer to serve society.42  
 
Secondary Literature 
In this section, I cover the theoretical frameworks and historiography that informed my 
research. My work is deeply indebted to the historical and musicological literature on Soviet 
music history and Cold War cultural relations. The publications of Joanna Bullivant, Pauline 
Fairclough, Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Marina Frolova-Walker, Levon Hakobian, Paul Kildea, 
Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, Donald Mitchell, Simon Morrison, Cameron Pyke, Peter Schmelz, 
Richard Taruskin, Kiril Tomoff, Elizabeth Wilson, and Alexei Yurchak, in particular, form the 
foundation of my doctoral research and I draw some of their findings into the narrative at 
 
42 See Paul Kildea, ed., Britten on Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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appropriate points. Also, the post-structuralist theory of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, 
Anthony Giddens, Antonio Gramsci, and Stuart Hall form the conceptual basis for my 
investigation of the agency of British and Soviet professionals.  
There is a significant amount of musicological research on the cultural connections 
between the UK and the USSR. Pauline Fairclough has chronicled the multiple British attempts 
to facilitate the Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange of performers during late Stalinism (1945-1953), 
and how every one of these attempts fell through. She shows that it had not even been possible 
for the British Communist Party to successfully invite Soviet musicians or ensembles to the UK 
during this period. The British government considered communist-affiliated institutions and 
friendship societies to be acting as spreaders of Soviet propaganda and preferred to handle 
possible Soviet exchanges through its own means: the British Council. These terms were not 
acceptable to the Soviets, and cultural exchange largely froze during the late Stalinist period.43 It 
is possible that Stalin’s death allowed the Soviet leadership the opportunity to reassess the 
relationship between the USSR and the West, which resulted in allowing cultural exchanges with 
the British government that did not involve the participation of communist-affiliated 
organizations. 
In the existing secondary literature on Anglo-Soviet cultural relations, Britten and 
Shostakovich are at the center of the discourse. This it is not surprising. As discussed earlier, 
they were very prolific composers in their respective countries and abroad. They both dedicated 
a piece for the other, corresponded, and visited each other’s homes when such travel was 
possible. Britten also struck collaborative relationships with several famous Soviet performers, 
 
43 Pauline Fairclough, “Détente to Cold War: Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchanges in the Late Stalin Period,” 
in Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds, ed. Pauline Fairclough (Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 38-50. 
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and composed music for a few of them. Donald Mitchell’s series of lectures on Britten’s 1936 
diaries provides valuable insight on this formative year in Britten’s life (when he was more open 
about his political position as a left-leaning intellectual), as well as on Britten’s view of the 
USSR as a bulwark against European fascism, and his beliefs that one can educate the public 
through music.44 These views would have an important influence on Britten once he came into 
direct contact with the USSR and its artists roughly twenty-four years later.  
Limited discussion of Britten’s Soviet connections has also appeared in studies of the 
composer’s life such as Humphrey Carpenter’s biography, and to a lesser extent Paul Kildea’s. 
The focus of these authors largely relates to their “life and works” approach, in which Britten’s 
relationship with the USSR is largely indicated through the retelling of well-known stories and 
anecdotes regarding his interactions with Soviet musicians and the composition of pieces for 
Soviet performers.45 Laurel Fay’s biography of Shostakovich acknowledges the Soviet 
composer’s professional respect for Britten,46 and the British composer has a strong presence in 
Elizabeth Wilson’s biography of Britten’s friend and collaborator, Rostropovich.47  
Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, Cameron Pyke, and Eric Roseberry have drawn connections 
between Shostakovich’s and Britten’s compositional styles.48 Furthermore, Pyke’s monograph 
Benjamin Britten and Russia painstakingly chronicles Britten’s interest in Russian and, later, 
 
44 Donald Mitchell, Britten and Auden in the Thirties: The Year 1936 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 
2000), 20-49. 
45 See Humphrey Carpenter, Benjamin Britten: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992); and Paul Kildea, 
Benjamin Britten: A Life in the Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 2013). 
46 Laurel E. Fay, Shostakovich: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 215. 
47 See Elizabeth Wilson, Rostropovich: The Musical Life of the Great Cellist, Teacher, and Legend 
(Chicago: Dee, 2008). 
48 See Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “Shostakovich and Britten: Some Parallels,” in Shostakovich in Context, ed. 
Rosamund Bartlett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 175-90; Cameron Pyke, Benjamin Britten and Russia 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2016); and Eric Roseberry, “A Debt Repaid? Some Observations on Shostakovich 
and his Late-Period Recognition of Britten,” in Shostakovich Studies, ed. David Fanning (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 229-53. 
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Soviet musical culture, and his travels to the USSR.49 While Pyke concentrates primarily on the 
influence of Russian musical culture on Britten’s compositional style, I focus more on Britten’s 
agency as a prominent British composer and as a valued cultural diplomat, as well as the agency 
of Soviet musicians interested in advocating for Britten’s music in the USSR. Kovnatskaya’s 
article on the Kirov Theater’s production of Peter Grimes traces director Djemal Dalgat’s efforts 
to shepherd the opera through many obstacles that arose on the Soviet side.50 I instead focus on 
the difficulties inherent in transferring British intellectual property (such as the copyrighted 
opera score) to a Soviet theater at a time when the Soviets did not acknowledge British copyright 
law. 
In her recent book on Shostakovich, Fairclough explains that the Western perspective on 
the composer after his death was shaped largely by Cold War politics, and that the purported 
memoirs of the composer compiled by émigré Solomon Volkov were a major influence on 
Western interpretations of his life.51 The success of these memoirs was partly because they 
conveniently confirmed Western suspicions that the greatest Soviet musical figures feared and 
hated Soviet power. Volkov’s book also boosted the popularity of Shostakovich’s music in the 
West by presenting the composer as a heroic secret dissident who defied the Stalinist regime. 
While these memoirs have since been debunked by musicologists, namely Laurel Fay, they still 
carry a great deal of influence over Western perceptions of the composer.52  
 In her article “The ‘Old Shostakovich,’” Fairclough studies and maps out trends in the 
British critical reception of Shostakovich’s music during his lifetime. Fairclough demonstrates 
 
49 See Pyke. 
50 Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “’Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” trans. Nick Winter, Melos 19/20 (5 
August 1997): 64-71. 
51 Solomon Volkov, Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1979). 
52 Pauline Fairclough, Dmitry Shostakovich (London: Reaktion, 2019), 9-10. I will discuss the controversy 
surrounding Testimony on Page 162. 
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that the British critical reception was largely indifferent to the Soviet cultural establishment’s 
treatment of the composer in instances such as the suppression of his works. Furthermore, she 
shows that several British critics considered Shostakovich’s music to be pretentious, dull, and 
lacking in real artistic substance; that they refused to mention (or showed no interest in) the 
Stalinist purges; and that some even agreed with the Soviet regime’s actions to “reign in” the 
composer’s artistic impulses in 1948. Also, Fairclough demonstrates that Ian MacDonald’s and 
Solomon Volkov’s assertations that Western critical opinion considered Shostakovich to be a 
perfectly loyal communist before the publication of Testimony were demonstrably false.53  
Since Alan Bush joined the British Communist Party in 1934, he actively involved 
himself in Soviet musical life, sought to build closer ties between the British and Soviet musical 
communities, and encouraged the performance of his music in the USSR.54 Joanna Bullivant has 
written extensively on Bush, his relationship with the USSR, and his efforts to personally 
integrate Soviet cultural ideology into his own compositional style. After the Stalinist regime 
attacked formalism in Soviet music in 1948, Bush modified his own style to reflect Soviet 
dictates. His first opera Wat Tyler (composed in 1951) was a direct result of this effort.55 
Bullivant’s monograph Alan Bush, Modern Music, and the Cold War discusses Bush’s political 
activism in the UK as well as his connections with East German opera.56 Her study of Bush’s 
 
53 See Pauline Fairclough, “The ‘Old Shostakovich’: Reception in the British Press,” Music & Letters 88, 
no. 2 (May 2007): 266-96. MacDonald’s monograph is an application of the heavily disputed interpretation of 
Shostakovich’s life from the composer’s purported memoirs that were published by Volkov. Ian MacDonald, The 
New Shostakovich (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990). 
54 Louise Wiggins, “‘Story of a Friendship’: Alan Bush, Grigorii Shneerson and Cultural Diplomacy before 
and during the Cold War,” Russian Journal of Communication 8, no. 3 (2016): 256-57. 
55 See Joanna Bullivant, “‘A World of Marxist Orthodoxy’? Alan Bush’s Wat Tyler in Great Britain and the 
German Democratic Republic,” in Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds, ed. 
Pauline Fairclough (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 7-21. 
56 Bullivant, Alan Bush, Modern Music, and the Cold War. 
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relations with East German opera theaters from the 1950s to the 1970s provided a very useful 
model for my discussion of Bush’s efforts to have his operas performed in the USSR.  
In the article “Friendship of the Musicians,” Fairclough and Louise Wiggins discuss 
Bush’s relationship with the USSR from 1938 to 1948. Their essay treats his travels there, the 
beginning of his friendship with Soviet critic and theorist Grigory Shneerson, and the pair’s 
efforts to exchange British and Soviet scores and recordings. Fairclough and Wiggins argue that, 
while the British government fixated on this connection as a political relationship, it was 
primarily a musical one to Bush and Shneerson.57 Both this article and Fairclough’s “Détente to 
Cold War: Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchanges in the Late Stalin Period” indicate that cultural 
relations and cooperation froze after the Second World War during the period known as late 
Stalinism.58  
The essay collections Red Strains: Music and Communism Outside the Communist Bloc 
and Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interaction and the Cold War provide 
detailed studies of the cultural relations between the USSR and several other countries from 1945 
to the early 1980s. Red Strains covers the connections between the USSR and communist 
musicians in non-communist countries in Western Europe, North America, and the British 
Commonwealth, as well as in the non-aligned powers.59 Also, Red Strains includes Bullivant’s 
article on Bush’s activities as an anti-colonial musical activist.60 My research is something of a 
 
57 Pauline Fairclough and Louise Wiggins, “Friendship of the Musicians: Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchanges 
1938-1948,” in Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War, eds. Simo Mikkonen 
and Pekka Suutari (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2016), 29-47. 
58 Fairclough, “Détente to Cold War,” 37-56. 
59 See Robert Adlington, ed., Red Strains: Music and Communism Outside the Communist Bloc (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
60 Joanna Bullivant, “Black, White, and Red: Communism and Anti-Colonialism in Alan Bush’s The Sugar 
Reapers,” in Red Strains: Music and Communism Outside the Communist Bloc, ed. Robert Adlington (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 193-211. Red Strains also includes the following four articles, which discuss 
various aspects of communism and music in the UK: Chris Cutler, “The Multiple Politics of Henry Cow,” interview 
by Benjamin Piekut; Georgina Born, “On Music and Politics: Henry Cow, Avant-Gardism and its Discontents;” Ben 
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departure from this study of relations between the USSR and non-Soviet communists, because it 
emphasizes the connections between members of the cultural establishments of the UK and the 
USSR. The British cultural establishment largely excluded outspoken communists from its ranks 
and from its exchanges with the USSR. Music, Art and Diplomacy considers the Cold War as an 
era involving multiple participating countries, in which cultural engagement, cooperation, and 
competition moved to the forefront because direct military conflict would have only led to 
mutual annihilation. It shows that the resulting cultural Cold War was fought by both the West 
and the USSR in order to win hearts and minds both at home and abroad. Both sides considered 
high culture (which included classical music) to be politically transcendent as a sign of progress 
in cultural competition. In this edited volume, Stéphanie Gonçalves’s article is a study of Soviet 
ballet performances in London and Paris, which examines them as demonstrations of soft power 
and cultural prestige, as well as considers their cultural impact in the UK and France.61 The 
volume’s contributors also explore the interplay between the arts and international Cold War 
politics, and how artists and performers could sometimes shape and pursue their own creative 
goals in cultural diplomacy.62 My research utilizes the above framework of Music, Art and 
Diplomacy as a point of departure, to pursue my own case studies on the agency of British and 
Soviet music professionals engaged in the cultural Cold War. 
In his monograph on the everyday experience of Soviet citizens during late socialism and 
the collapse of the USSR, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More, anthropologist Alexei 
 
Harker, “‘Workers’ Music’: Communism and the British Folk Revival;” and Jeremy Tranmer, “Rocking Against 
Racism: Trotskyism, Communism, and Punk in Britain;” in Red Strains: Music and Communism Outside the 
Communist Bloc; ed. Robert Adlington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 43-53, 55-64, 89-104, and 267-81, 
respectively. 
61 See Stéphanie Gonçalves, “Ballet as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War: Soviet Ballets in 
Paris and London,” in Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War, eds. Simo 
Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2016), 139-53. 
62 Susan E. Reid, “Foreword,” in Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold 
War, edited by Simo Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2016), xi-xx. 
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Yurchak discusses the existence of imagined others, which explains how Soviet demand for 
performers from across the Iron Curtain was so high.63 It is not too far a departure to consider 
that the occidental imaginaries of Soviet audiences were paralleled by the oriental imaginaries 
held by Western audiences. Tomoff’s study of the Soviet Composers’ Union (Creative Union) 
outlines the aforementioned concept that Soviet composers were able to carve out professional 
agency in the USSR; however, it focuses only on the Stalinist period.64 As a result, it does not 
discuss the opening of cultural relations with other countries during the so-called thaw. In 
Chapter 3, I consider Tomoff’s conception of agency in the framework of the post-structuralist 
theorists mentioned above. Tomoff’s monograph, Virtuosi Abroad, does cover the early cultural 
Cold War in addition to Stalinism, and it provides the conceptual framework of the cultural 
competition that is discussed above. Tomoff’s primary thesis in this book focuses on the 
resolution of the cultural Cold War: that the Soviet cultural apparatus lost by submitting to a 
series of compromises with the West that weakened its autonomy.65 
To sum up, my work is informed by Wilson’s biographic studies of Rostropovich and 
Shostakovich; by Carpenter’s, Kildea’s, and Pyke’s research on Britten; Kovnatskaya’s and 
Pyke’s investigation of Britten’s connections with the Soviets; and Bullivant’s biographic work 
on Bush. The work of Fairclough, Tomoff, and Yurchak provided me with a foundation to 
 
63 See Yurchak. 
64 The creative unions were created under decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party 
in 1932. At this time, several regional and municipal composers’ unions formed, and these unions were combined in 
1939 during the foundation of the all-USSR Organizational Committee of the Union of Soviet Composers. Kiril 
Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 13-14. Tomoff defines “agency” as the ability to act within a complicated system of 
restraints. He explains that musicians were about to acquire agency by leveraging their expertise (which the political 
leadership lacked), but that their ability to act was still restrained to such an extent that it could not be considered 
absolute autonomy. Ibid., 3-4. 
65 See Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad. 
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discuss the role of musicians in Cold War cultural relations, and, in many ways, this dissertation 
is a continuation of that research. 
 
Research Questions 
In the course of this dissertation on Anglo-Soviet musical exchange from the mid-1950s to the 
mid-1970s, I strive to answer the following questions:  
 
Musicians and the State: What was the relationship between British musicians and the state? 
What was the relationship between Soviet musicians and the Soviet government? How did these 
four entities interact with each other? Did musicians and governments communicate directly with 
each other, or did they do so through intermediaries?  
 
Prestige and Cultural Capital: What was the position of British and Soviet musicians in their own  
countries? Why were they valued? What did the musicians provide the state, and vice-versa? 
Why did the British and Soviet states encourage or require their musicians to participate in Cold 
War cultural exchange? What did the governments hope to achieve or demonstrate to the rest of 
the world?  
 
Agency and Access: How did musicians leverage their value to gain agency over their careers 
and their involvement in the international exchange of music? Why did musicians involve 
themselves in cultural exchange? To what did they stand to gain access? What were musicians 




Obstacles and Solutions: What administrative, financial, and legal difficulties needed to be 
overcome in order to make cultural exchange possible? Who were in the positions of power that 
prevented or allowed these exchanges to occur? What solutions did musicians discover to either 
negotiate with people in power, or circumvent their authority altogether? 
 
Objectives, Methodology, and Primary Sources 
My methodology engages various lines of inquiry, based around the archival study of 
British and Soviet foreign policy through the analysis of surviving government records, the 
investigation of Soviet perceptions of the West and vice-versa through the examination of 
contemporaneous newspaper and journal articles, and the study of personal papers and 
correspondence to understand the motivations of music professionals. Given the political 
polarization present in both primary accounts and secondary sources, which is a challenge to any 
Cold War study, it is essential to corroborate sources to provide confirmation for factual 
information and to obtain multiple Anglophone and Russophone perspectives on particular 
polarizing historical issues, such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Communist Party mouthpiece Pravda [Truth], and Cold War cultural relations in general.  
Four research trips to Britain proved central to my work. In the summers of 2011 and 
2013, I examined the personal papers of Britten and Peter Pears as well as the records of the 
English Opera Group at the Britten-Pears Foundation Archives in Aldeburgh. In 2018, I 
completed my fourth summer research trip to the British National Archives (GB-Lna) and the 
British Library (GB-Lbl) in London, where I examined an extensive collection of archival 
documents detailing the deliberations and actions of the Board of Trade, the British Council, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Prime Minister’s Office, all of which were 
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involved in Anglo-Soviet cultural relations.66 At the British Library, I also examined the personal 
papers of Bush and the British conductor Henry Wood.  
In the summers of 2016 and 2017 and during the 2017-18 academic year as a Fulbright 
Fellow, I undertook research at the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI), the 
Russian State Archive of Sound Recordings in Moscow (RGAFD), and the Central State Archive 
of Literature and Art of St. Petersburg (TsGALI-SPb). There, I studied correspondence, minutes, 
contracts, and records of Soviet governmental and performance institutions that were involved in 
cultural exchange. These archival materials include the documents of the Ministry of Culture, the 
Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo kul’turnoi sviazi s zagranitsei [All-Union Society for Cultural 
Relations Abroad] (VOKS), the state concert agency (Goskontsert), the state agency entrusted 
with the foreign trade of IP (Mezhknig), and the Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters. I also studied 
Shneerson’s personal papers at the Russian National Museum of Music (RNMM) in Moscow. 
The breadth of this study was affected by the unavailability of some archival collections 
in Russia and in the UK between 2013 and 2018. Such gaps resulted from having limited access 
to some collections of personal papers. The personal archives of Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya 
were closed to the public at the time of research, on the order of their family’s estate. The 
majority of Dalgat’s personal papers were destroyed in the same apartment fire that took his life 
on December 30, 1991.67 Also, some of the records of Soviet venues such as the Kirov Theater 
are still being held in their own institutional libraries and access to these materials is restricted.  
However, difficulties in gathering archival and special collection materials were not 
limited to private institutions. Due to the relatively recent chronological scope of this study (from 
 
66 The Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office merged to become the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office in 1968. 
67 Kovnatskaya, “’Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 66. 
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the 1950s to the 1970s), I had some difficulty gaining access to personal files held by Russian 
state archives. For example, the Bolshoi Theater’s files on the director Mikhail Chulaki, who was 
instrumental in the Soviet premiere of Britten’s opera A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Op. 64 
(1960), the director Vasily Pakhomov, who negotiated the loan of Peter Grimes, Op. 33 (1945) 
to the theater, and the soprano soloist Galina Vishnevskaya, who was a major collaborator of 
Britten, are currently held by RGALI and are closed to the public for a total period of seventy-
five years after their deaths.68 Sometimes, it was possible for me to obtain alternative sources by 
consulting publicly accessible papers of personages or the records of state institutions that 
collaborated or corresponded with individuals and groups whose materials were otherwise 
inaccessible.  
In addition, some but not all of the official state catalogs of Soviet publications are 
currently held by Russian state libraries. The state-issued catalogs for sound recordings at the 
Russian State Library in Moscow are missing several volumes. Also, the Russian State Archives 
of Sound Recordings (RGAFD) preserved catalogs for only three years. The format of the sound 
recording catalogs changed throughout the historical period of study, and these changes 
complicated my efforts to determine which volumes were missing. It might be possible in the 
future to investigate the holdings of the national library in St. Petersburg in order to compile a 
more complete record of the sound recordings catalogs, but I did not have the resources for an 
additional trip to this city to investigate this possibility. Meanwhile, the complete catalog for 
published sheet music issued by the State Bibliographic Body of the Soviet Union, Notnaia 
 
68 F. 648, op. 13, d. 874 Chulaki Mikhail Ivanovich, 1908 g.r., direktor [Chulaki, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1908 
(date of birth), director], Russian State Archives of Literature and Art (hereafter cited as RGALI); f. 648, op. 13, d. 
580 Pakhomov Vasilii Ivanovich, 1909 g.r., direktor [Pakhomov, Vasily Ivanovich, 1909 (date of birth), director], 
RGALI; and f. 648, op. 14, d. 6, Vishnevskaia Galina Pavlovna, 1926 g.r., solistka opery [Vishnevskaya, Galina 
Pavlovna, 1926 (date of birth), opera soloist], RGALI. 
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letopis’, is held at the Russian State Library in St. Petersburg, so I was able to determine what 
was published, and what was not.69 These comprehensive records enabled me to create a 
quantitative analysis of the Soviet republication of British sheet music from the 1950s to the 
1970s (discussed in Chapter 4). The evidence that I gathered on the Soviet publication of sound 
recordings, however, only provided information on the pieces listed in the libraries’ incomplete 
catalogs. These records did not provide any information on whether other pieces were recorded, 
or on the pieces that were excluded. In response to the incompleteness of the evidence, no 
exhaustive quantitative analyses of Soviet sound recordings were attempted.  
Personal recollections in the form of memoirs, and contemporaneous accounts in the 
form of travel diaries and performance reviews, comprise an important part of the research for 
this dissertation. The autobiographical accounts of Mikhail Chulaki’s, Gennady 
Rozhdestvensky’s, and Galina Vishnevskaya’s experiences as elite Soviet musicians involved in 
the cultural exchanges with the UK provide us with valuable insight into their lives. Also, the 
reminiscences of British musicians in the USSR, which include accounts by Arthur Bliss, Peter 
Pears, William Walton, and Elizabeth Wilson, shed light on British perceptions of the USSR.70 
Both British and Soviet critics assessed the value of the other side’s music, while using the 
aesthetic criteria of their own side. It should be noted that all of the above sources were heavily 
affected by the political climate of the Cold War, which resulted in prejudice and impatience 
with the other and/or their own side. Also, the life experiences of these figures affected the tone 
of their recollections. For example, Vishnevskaya’s memoirs were written after the Soviet 
 
69 For the purposes for this dissertation, I consulted only publication records from 1953 to 1979. See Organ 
gosudarstvennoi bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the USSR], Letopis’ muzykal’noi literatury 
[Catalog of Musical Literature] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vsesiuznoi knizhnoi palaty [All-Union Book Chamber 
Publishing], 1953-66); and Organ gosudarstvennoi bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the USSR], 
Notnaia letopis’ [Musical Catalog] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo kniga [Book Publishing], 1967-79). 
70 William Walton’s statements about the USSR were preserved in his widow’s biography of the composer. 
See Susana Walton, William Walton: Behind the Façade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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government stripped away her citizenship following her support of the disgraced writer 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn. As a result, her position on the Soviet political regime is damning. 
Likewise, Elizabeth Wilson’s recollections of the USSR in Rostropovich: The Musical Life of the 
Great Cellist, Teacher, and Legend were strongly impacted by the Soviet treatment of her cello 
professor during his fall from grace in the early 1970s and of her fellow students at the Moscow 
Conservatory. Meanwhile, Chulaki and Rozhdestvensky, who never defected or lost their 
citizenship, recall some of the frustrating instances of Soviet existence in a much more benign 
manner even though their autobiographical accounts were written after the collapse of the USSR. 
In summation, I sought to present these documents (as with any sources) in the context of their 
embedded biases.  
 
Dissertation Structure 
My dissertation consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter explores an 
aspect of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations and draws from findings from both British and Russian 
archives. Chapter 1 demarcates the historical context for Anglo-Soviet cultural relations by 
tracing the development of the Soviet and British musical establishments and the difficulties 
inherent in the interchange of musicians and intellectual property. Chapter 2 explores the concept 
of an acceptable common musical style between the UK and the USSR, as well as the notion of a 
musical diplomat. Chapter 3 focuses on the professional agency of British and Soviet elite 
musicians and directors, which enabled them to shape their involvement in Anglo-Soviet musical 
exchange. Chapter 4 covers music professionals’ attempts to sidestep the impasse between 
British and Soviet intellectual property law to transfer British copyrighted musical works to the 
Soviets. Chapter 5 discusses the British concert agents Lilian and Victor Hochhauser’s de facto 
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monopoly over the interchange of British and Soviet musicians and ensembles, and their efforts 
to maintain their position. The dissertation’s conclusion outlines the various factors that 
collectively demarcate the end of this project’s timeline, and I argue that these factors changed 
the climate of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations to such an extent that further research into this later 





OPENING THE IRON CURTAIN: ANGLO-SOVIET CULTURAL RELATIONS 
DURING THE 1950s 
 
Introduction 
 Anglo-Soviet cultural relations in the field of classical music during the early Cold War 
were shaped by the relationships between the British and Soviet musical communities and their 
respective governments, the critical and popular perception of each other’s music, and the 
obstacles that needed to be overcome in order to facilitate artistic exchange. Many differences 
existed between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in domestic cultural policy; and, the 
musical institutions of each country developed along contrasting lines due to differences in 
government support and involvement. The Anglo-Soviet cultural relationship after the Second 
World War was deeply affected by the emerging Cold War political dynamic, late Stalinism, the 
Soviet 1956 intervention in Hungary, and the British involvement in the Suez Crisis of the same 
year. Eventually, political issues subsided for the most part and allowed for the opening of 
cultural relations during the late 1950s. This chapter provides the contextual background to the 
relationship between the arts and the state in the UK and the USSR. It also surveys the major 
institutional and aesthetic developments in the British and Soviet musical establishments, their 
relationship with each other, as well as the development of formal Anglo-Soviet cultural 




Soviet Cultural Politics: Socialist Realism and Authoritative Discourse 
 The development of Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange, and of cultural relations between 
the USSR and the West in general, was very much dependent on the state of Soviet politics. The 
impact of British politics will be discussed later in this chapter. As mentioned earlier, the end of 
late Stalinist isolationism and the emergence of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policy and his 
doctrine of peaceful coexistence and competition made such exchanges across the so-called Iron 
Curtain feasible. Nonetheless, it is important to note that such changes were limited by the fact 
that most of the Soviet leadership in both political and cultural fields remained in their positions 
after Stalin’s death.1 Furthermore, the political leadership continued to use authoritative 
discourse in order to define its position and as a means of control. Yurchak, in his study of 
Communist Party and state records, defines the Soviet state’s use of authoritative discourse as a 
stylized form of communication, which professed to possess objective truth on the meaning of 
any given subject within the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism.2  
Russian musicologist Tatyana Naumenko explains that this language was often used in 
music criticism, particularly when ideologically problematic issues such as Western high 
modernism and hostile foreign influences were being discussed.3 She argues that these criticisms 
labeled aspects of compositions as misguided, decadent, and diseased in a context that referred to 
their poor quality and negative influence as simple, commonly agreed upon facts. In other words, 
this language was a means for the Soviet hegemony to present itself as popular common sense. 
These dictates were not intended to argue for a particular point or to persuade the reader, they 
 
1 The leadership of the Composers’ Union, including its general secretary, Khrennikov, remained largely 
unchanged by de-Stalinization. Tatyana Naumenko, Textological Aspects of Musicology in Russia and the Former 
Soviet Union (Moscow: Progress, 2017), 28-29. 
2 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 14-16. 
3 Naumenko, 84-90. 
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were designed to simply inform the reader of the official position on artistic matters by 
reportedly relaying commonly held knowledge.  
Perhaps the most famous example of such pronouncements was “Muddle Instead of 
Music,” the 1936 Pravda denouncement of Shostakovich’s opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk 
District. The following is an excerpt from Naumenko’s translation, which describes the opera’s 
musical sound.  
From the very first minute, the listener is overwhelmed by an artificially disharmonious, 
chaotic stream of sounds. Melodies get swamped after barely starting, then break 
through, then disappear again in the overall roar, grinding, and screeching. This “music” 
is difficult to follow and impossible to memorize. This goes on throughout the opera. It is 
yelling and not singing that comes from the stage. If the composer manages to get on a 
path of a simple and clear melody, he seems to be scared by his misfortune and 
immediately rushes into the depths of musical chaos, which at times turns into 
cacophony.4 
 
Naumenko then calls attention to Evgeny Dobrenko’s work on Soviet authoritative discourse in 
artistic matters. Dobrenko notices similarities in the anonymous Pravda reviewer’s rejections of 
Shostakovich’s Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District, Op. 29 (completed in 1932 and premiered 
in 1934) and his ballet The Limpid Stream, Op. 39 (1935) in 1936, and Minister of Culture 
Andrei Zhdanov’s denouncement of Vano Muradeli’s opera The Great Friendship (1947) in 
1948, an excerpt of which is provided below.5  
There is not a single tune in the music of the opera that one would remember. The music 
never reaches its listener… Because of the replacement of melodiousness with dissonant 
 
4 Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District was revised and retitled Katerina Izmailova by Shostakovich in 
1962. The Russian word “сумбур (sumbur)” can translate into English as “chaos,” “confusion,” and “muddle.” The 
term “muddle” is the most common translation used in Anglophone musicology. “Sumbur vmesto muzyki: ob opere 
‘Ledi Makbet Mtsenkogo uezda’” [“Muddle Instead of Music: About the Opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk 
District”], Pravda [Truth] no. 27 (28 January 1936), 3; quoted and translated in ibid, 85-86. 
5 Evgeny Dobrenko, “Reala Stnetik, ili Narod v bukval’nom smysle” [“Realaesthetik, or The People in the 
Literal Sense”], Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye [New Literary Review] no. 82, 2006, accessed 30 January 2020, 
http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2006/82/. The denouncement of Muradeli’s opera sparked Zhdanov’s large-scale 
intervention in classical music, which charged many of the most esteemed Soviet composers (including Aram 
Khachaturian, Nikolai Myaskovsky, Prokofiev, Vissarion Shebalin, and Shostakovich) with formalism and forced 
them to recant in 1948. Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-
1953 (Ithaca, New York Cornell University Press, 2006), 122-23. 
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but noisy improvisations, the opera is for the most part a chaotic set of clamorous 
combinations of sounds… violent and dissonant, often cacophonic orchestral 
interventions that jangle the nerves of the listener and agitate him… oppressive 
disharmony… music that makes little sense, is tedious, and has much less substance and 
beauty to it than ordinary folk music.6 
 
Later in Zhdanov’s attack on Muradeli (who was a relatively conformist Soviet composer), the 
Minister of Culture compares The Great Friendship to a construction site. Dobrenko notices that 
both of these commentaries avoid musicological jargon, and opt instead for everyday vocabulary 
and Soviet economic and industrial language (i.e. the failure of composers to utilize the true 
wealth of Soviet music or to harness the potential of the orchestra’s resources).7 Naumenko adds 
that the authoritative discourse of such pronouncements as the 1948 denouncement tended to be 
modelled on earlier pronouncements such as “Muddle Instead of Music,” and that these 
statements were framed as interventions to save the poor listener who was subjected to 
cacophony and screeching, shrill noises.8  
Yurchak describes such recycling and formalizing of authoritative discourse in the 
context of Lefort’s Paradox: that a “master” in an authoritarian state was the only one capable of 
introducing new knowledge into a system, because this figure had access to secret, uncontestable 
knowledge.9 Once this master ceased to exist, the paradox opened: no one had access to this 
knowledge anymore, and, as a result, no new uncontestable interpretations could be introduced. 
 
6 Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party On the Opera The 
Great Friendship by Vano Muradeli, quoted and translated in Naumenko, 84. 
7 See Dobrenko. 
8 Naumenko, 84-90. 
9 Named for French post-Marxist philosopher and political theorist Claude Lefort (1924-2010), who studied 
totalitarianism and how it functioned in fascist and socialist political systems. He described a general paradox of 
modernity to have been the split between Enlightenment ideals and the practical concerns of the modern state. The 
paradox exists because in order to “fulfill its political function of reproducing power,” ideological discourse must 
claim access to objective truth, but this truth cannot be completely explained by that discourse. This inability to fully 
articulate this truth results in the gradual decline and inevitable collapse of the regime. This paradox can be 
concealed by someone serving as the “master,” that is, a figure that stands outside of ideological discourse and 
claims to have external knowledge and is the only one who has the capacity to completely understand, yet only 
selectively articulate, utopian truth. Once this figure is removed, however, the paradox is revealed, and the regime’s 
decline continues. Yurchak, 10-11. 
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Yurchak applies this concept to the USSR. Stalin, with his unrivaled position as leader, was 
considered in his time to be the only authoritative voice in the interpretation of Marxism, 
Leninism, and socialism; the rest of the political apparatus disseminated and propagated his 
views. He left no clear successor, and after his death, no one took the place of the “master,” 
which led his successors to endlessly recycle this old knowledge.10 It is possible that the 
repetitions that were noticed by Naumenko fit into the model of the propagation of Stalin’s views 
during his life. 
In his article on socialist realism, the official state ideology for the Soviet arts, Malcolm 
H. Brown provides the following translation of the definition listed in the Soviet 
Entsiklopedicheskii muzykal’nyi slovar’ [Encyclopedic Music Dictionary]:11  
A Doctrine of artistic creation founded on the truthful, historically valid representation of 
reality in its revolutionary development…. Socialist Realism combines a feeling for 
contemporary reality with a leap of the imagination into the future [translation by 
Malcom H. Brown].12 
 
Generally, the musical style of socialist realism was a continuation of the Western classical 
music tradition, and, more specifically, the composers of the Russian nineteenth-century canon 
such as Mikhail Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Modest Mussorgsky, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov. 
There was also a clear line of development to subsequent generations, since both Tchaikovsky 
and Rimsky-Korsakov had taught composition at the conservatories in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, respectively. The musical realists of the Mighty Handful (notably Mussorgsky), who 
promoted nationalism through a compositional style that drew from Russian folksong and 
history, was an important precursor to socialist realism in music.  
 
10 See Chapter 2 of Yurchak. 
11 B.S. Shteinpress and I.M. Iampol’skii, eds., Entsiklopedicheskii muzykal’nyi slovar’ [Encyclopedic 
Music Dictionary] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia [Soviet Encyclopedia]: 1966). 
12 Malcolm H. Brown, “The Soviet Russian Concepts of ‘Intonazia’ and “Musical Imagery,’” Musical 
Quarterly 60, no. 4 (October 1967): 557. 
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Essentially, the musical style of socialist realism from the 1930s to the early 1950s was 
tonal, tied to Russian romanticism, and was enforced by the Composers’ Union, which in turn 
was under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture. Socialist realist music was often accessible, 
nationalistic, programmatic, and included folkloric elements and optimistic subject matter.13 
Musical material was connected to extramusical political content through the Soviet-Russian 
concepts of intonazia and musical imagery, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter.14 Perceived deviations from this standard, including formalism and excessive Western 
influences, were attacked in the aforementioned “Muddle versus Music” controversy in 1936 and 
in Zhdanov’s denouncements in 1948. Nonetheless, the Composers’ Union had a great deal of 
agency in the definition and enforcement of socialist realism.15  
I interpret the intended purpose of socialist realism was to present an objective 
demonstration of the building of socialism in the arts. In other words, it was intended to 
artistically confirm and to inspire political socialist progress. Simon Morrison explains that 
socialist realism sought to depict the perfect reality of the communist future in its process of 
becoming, rather than truthfully illustrating the actual lived experience of Soviet citizens. Flaws 
in the present and in the past could be depicted, but only for them to be eventually overcome by 
revolution and socialist progress. In Soviet literature, heroic protagonists lived by strict moral 
codes and had the ability to detect and rectify these flaws, and thus to aid socialist progress.16 In 
the visual arts, socialist realism was tied directly to a very orthodox, representational style, which 
 
13 See Chapters 6 and 7 of Boris Schwarz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1983). 
14 Brown, “The Soviet Russian Concepts of ‘Intonazia’ and “Musical Imagery,” 558-59. 
15 See Chapters 6 and 7 of Schwarz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia. 




depicted idealizations of historical and current Soviet leaders as well as archetypal workers and 
collective farm workers creating a utopian society.17  
Unlike the fields of visual art and literature—which are respectively representational of 
visual and textual reality and can explicitly depict the socialist teleological progression through 
visual or textual mediums—music is less inherently representational and thus cannot obviously 
depict a singular explicit interpretation. Ambiguity of meaning can be and is present to various 
degrees in a work of any artistic medium, regardless of its explicit, stated, or official meaning. 
An interpretation of meaning is inherently the personal experience of either the producer or 
audience/recipient of the work. Yet, it is possible for any artist to shape a work of art so that its 
intended meaning is more or less clear to the audience. For literary and some visual mediums, it 
was possible for the socialist realist author or visual artist (such as Maxim Gorky and Isaak 
Brodsky, respectively) to convey a clear ideological message, in a way that promoted a 
straightforward interpretation of the work as a depiction of a distinctively socialist optimism. 
While other interpretations were (and are) possible, there was at least a clearly indicated 
“correct” way to interpret the various details and facets of the work (the political slogans, happy 
faces of the workers, gestures to the future, etc.) in order to reach the interpretation that the 
author or artist intended.  
The challenges in portraying a “correct” musical interpretation were derived from the 
limitations arising from the transmission of any textual or visual message, political or otherwise, 
through pure musical expression. Of course, literary text can be present in music through the use 
of a chorus in a symphonic work or through the presence of a libretto in an operatic work. 
However, merely adding words to music does not address the question: what does socialism 
 
17 Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical: Unofficial Soviet Music during the Thaw (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 6-7,  
41 
 
sound like musically? It is possible for a librettist to describe the socialist progression through 
textual depictions of industrialization, collectivization, the teleological progress of socialism, and 
the defeat of capitalism; and for a composer to write a piece based on that libretto. However, if 
the music itself is only connected to socialist ideology through the text, is it still socialist when 
divorced from its libretto? Moreover, how can purely instrumental music become socialist? How 
does a composer instill political ideology into what appears to be a less-representational artistic 
medium?  
These questions are difficult, but not rhetorical. Cultural conditioning plays an important 
role in providing an answer. Schmelz argues that the solution to this problem was found in the 
use of mimetic music, which is also representational. Also, the connection to extramusical 
content can exist without a sung text or libretto. Schmelz indicates that throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries both mimetic and more abstract music flourished in Western classical 
traditions and he points to the 1950s as a crucial turning point when Western modernists actively 
avoided mimesis in music. At this time, the USSR and its allies were among the few proponents 
of mimetic music, as a result of their dedication to socialist realism. Thus, the battle between 
Western abstraction and Soviet mimesis became another front in the cultural Cold War.18 Even 
without explicitly stated textual clues, Soviet composers were able to devise several 
compositional techniques to instill their works with extramusical meaning. The Russian 
programmatic musical tradition of the nineteenth century, as well as the classical music tradition 
in general, provided Soviet composers with a wide variety of extramusical associations that they 
could utilize.  
 
18 Ibid., 10-11. 
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Central to the depiction or referencing of extramusical content in a purely musical form 
are the Soviet-Russian concepts of intonazia and musical imagery. Brown considers the works of 
the Soviet composer, critic, and theorist Boris Asafiev to be the key to understanding how 
socialist realism functioned in practice. In Asafiev’s seminal works, Muzykal’naia forma kak 
protsess [Musical Form as Process] and Intonazia (published in 1930 and 1947, respectively), he 
defined intonazia as a phonic manifestation of reality, which metaphorically carries meaning. 
Asafiev explained that a composer would weave a network of musical references and 
associations, which he called “musical imagery,” in order to create a new reality.19 He also 
posited that this process is associative and symbolic, but not illustrative.20 Brown argued in 1967 
that Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 7 in C major (premiered in 1942), otherwise known as the 
Leningrad Symphony, is a powerful example for how these concepts work. While the piece does 
not include an official program, its dedication, “To our battle with Fascism, to our future victory 
over the enemy, to my native city Leningrad I dedicate my Seventh Symphony,” obviously 
serves as one.21  
Brown lists the prominent musical imagery in the first movement; he notes that: the 
octave doubling and “sprawling” melodic range associates with the spacious landscape, the 
theme’s contour is similar to Mussorgsky’s “Promenade” theme from Pictures at an Exhibition 
(1874) and can be associated with the Russian musical tradition and Russianness in general, the 
Lydian fourth can be associated with the modality of Russian folk music, and the use of drones 
in the lower strings is connected to more general perceptions of folk music. These pastoral 
Russian elements are later displaced in the symphony by musical imagery associated with jazz, 
 
19 Boris Asaf’ev, Muzykal’naia forma kak protsess [Musical Form as Process] (Leningrad: Muzgiz, 1930); 
and Boris Asaf’ev, Intonaziia (Moscow: Muzgiz, 1947). 
20 Brown, “The Soviet Russian Concepts of ‘Intonazia’ and “Musical Imagery,” 558-59. 
21 Ibid., 561-62. 
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the German military, and conflict. According to Brown, these examples of musical imagery are 
combined in the imagination of the intended audience to weave a new phonic reality. In this case, 
it was used to evoke the German invasion and the siege of Leningrad.22 However, the difficulty 
with analyses such as Brown’s arises from whether or not they accurately reflect the composer’s 
intent. Brown’s major point that Shostakovich sought to evoke the German invasion through 
musical references in his symphony could very well be correct, but it is harder to argue which 
particular elements of the symphony were supposed to be linked to which extramusical details of 
the invasion. It is also possible that some musical characteristics were only part of the 
composer’s general style (such as the use of modal elements) and were not necessarily intended 
to be a deliberate point of reference.  
While it is possible that the use of intonazia can draw connections between the musical 
and the extramusical in the mind’s eye of the listener, this still does not enforce the idea that 
there is only one correct or true interpretation. As Richard Taruskin explains, music can be 
evocative, but meaning and the listener’s interpretation are multivalent, fluid, and based on every 
audience member’s individual subjectivity. He insists that this multiplicity of meaning is 
precisely what gives music its value and any attempt to nail down a definitive meaning 
impoverishes it. While ideologues preferred ideological clarity in socialist realist art, it is 
possible that artists and composers sought more ambiguous ground that allowed for multiple 
readings of particular works in order to serve as a safe harbor from ideological critique, as well 
as to create works of enduring interest to themselves and their publics. Shostakovich, for 
example, avoided setting definitive interpretations by rarely discussing his own works in detail, 
which in turn encouraged listeners to devise their own subjective interpretations. Taruskin 
 
22 Ibid., 561-67. 
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suggests that this might be a reason why the composer was equally claimed as an ally by both the 
Soviet establishment and non-conformists at various times throughout his career.23 
It is important at this point to note that composers, performers, and critics were best 
qualified to understand how musical conventions and intonazia functioned, and to shape music in 
such a way that would facilitate the inclusion of such extramusical references. While political 
elites could easily criticize the spoken or written word or the painted image for deviating from or 
dishonestly depicting a realistic depiction of socialist progress, it was difficult for them to do the 
same for musical art, especially music without sung or spoken text.24 Furthermore, the political 
elites’ lack of specialized musical training resulted in their inability to define and police socialist 
realism beyond a very superficial level. The most famous example of the leadership’s judgement 
on musical aesthetics concerned the Pravda article “Muddle instead of Music.” In contrast to the 
fate of Lady Macbeth, Ivan Dzerzhinsky’s Quiet Flows the Don (1935)—an opera on an uplifting 
ideological subject—was lauded by Stalin and the political establishment as the future of Soviet 
opera.25 
Zhdanov was only capable of discussing ideology in political terms; for him, it was 
simpler to make criticisms about what musical development should avoid, rather than providing 
examples on how exactly music should develop. For example, in 1948, he famously attacked 
formalism and a lack of socialist realism in the music of the most prominent Soviet composers, 
which included Aram Khachaturian, Dmitri Kabalevsky, Sergei Prokofiev, and Shostakovich.26 
However, he provided no clear plan for socialist realism’s future aesthetic development. The use 
 
23 Richard Taruskin, “Shostakovich and the Inhuman: Shostakovich and Us,” in Defining Russia Musically: 
Historical and Hermeneutical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 476-83. 
24 Tomoff, Creative Union, 1-5. 
25 Schwarz, 142-45. 
26 When used as a criticism in Soviet critical discourse, the term “formalism” is usually defined as an 
obsessive attention to structural problems in composition, leading to the production of overly complex, self-
indulgent works intended for a small audience of connoisseurs and unintelligible to the general population. 
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of authoritative discourse was not limited to the political leadership such as the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and the Ministry of Culture, it was also the default form of 
official communication among the cultural institutions, which included the primary creative 
union for musical affairs: the Composers’ Union. The government expected Secretary Tikhon 
Khrennikov and the rest of the creative unions’ leadership to provide guidance on what 
formalism and socialist realism meant in practice.27  
In the general production of music, the members of the Composers’ Union’s leadership 
were implicitly tasked with defining and interpreting a political ideology through the acts of 
composition, communicating their own dictates to other Soviet composers, and shaping the 
education of Soviet conservatories. In other words, while the political ideologues determined 
what political concepts music should express, the composers determined what these concepts 
sounded like musically. Moreover, in comparison with the other creative unions, the Composers’ 
Union generally faced fewer instances of political intervention, due to the political elites’ 
aforementioned discomfort with the musical sphere.28 Authoritative discourse in music, 
characterized by the subjective position of the author or the collective being presented as 
objective and well-known truth, became the standard style of writing in professional musical 
criticism and in the dictates of the Composers’ Union. Examples of this discourse include the 
music criticism of Soviet musicologist and critic Grigory Shneerson, the official speeches given 
at the Second Composers’ Union Congress in 1957, and a 1960 Pravda article attributed to 
Shostakovich.29 These examples—which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter—
 
27 Tomoff, Creative Union, 129-41. 
28 Ibid., 143-50. 
29 D. Shostakovich, “O khudozhnike nashikh dnei” [“About the Artist in Our Time”], Pravda no. 251 (7 
September 1960), 2. 
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were given by members of the Soviet cultural leadership (composers, critics, and musicologists) 
in the same form of authoritative discourse utilized by the political leaders. 
As the most prolific Soviet composer after Prokofiev’s and Stalin’s deaths, Shostakovich 
was often presented by the Soviet government as the country’s foremost musical representative 
in both domestic and international spheres. Moreover, the composer created both controversial 
pieces of music and others that were agreeable to state interests, and he was considered to be 
both a decadent formalist and a leader of the musical establishment at various points in his life. 
As a result, he was engaged in many of the apparent paradoxes that emanated from the creative 
intelligentsia’s complicated relationship with its patron: the state. In the peculiar circumstances 
of Soviet life, these differences were not seen by many citizens as being contradictory or 
hypocritical. While it is not clear whether the composer’s public pronouncements were indicative 
of his own beliefs, they invariably represented the official Soviet aesthetic position. In addition, 
Shostakovich’s compositional style, which was somewhat open to unofficial compositional 
techniques, was able to provide a model for what could be aesthetically acceptable from foreign 
composers.30 
 
Soviet Union and the West: Thaw as Opportunity for Cultural Relations 
Official Soviet attitudes toward the Western arts changed dramatically throughout the 
USSR’s existence. These shifts resulted largely in political changes within the state and in the 
aesthetic values of its leaders. However, the Composers’ Union was not a homogenous entity. In 
the mid-1950s, Shostakovich and Khachaturian pressed for the loosening of restrictions on 
 
30 For a detailed overview of Shostakovich’s life, work, and place in Soviet society, see Laurel E. Fay, 
Shostakovich: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Elizabeth Wilson, Shostakovich: A Life 
Remembered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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stylistic creativity. Also, there was much debate among Soviet composers as international 
cultural contacts were being reopened regarding the possibility of being more receptive to 
Western artistic culture. Meanwhile, Dzerzhinsky, the composer of Quiet Flows the Don, warned 
against a resurgence of formalism.31 Disagreements such as these dispel the notion that Soviet 
institutions such as the Composers’ Union were monolithic entities that strictly enforced official 
ideology. 
Soviet cultural politics in the post-Stalinist era can be described as a series of small thaws 
and refreezes that shaped governmental involvement in the arts and its aesthetic tolerance of 
various forms of foreign art. One can argue that one such thaw began with the Twentieth 
Communist Party Congress in 1956, during which Khrushchev denounced Stalin and the cult of 
personality formed around him. Khrushchev’s action heralded a loosening of ideological controls 
in cultural matters, began the process of de-Stalinization, and resulted in increased contact with 
foreign cultures. This small thaw ended with the infamous Manezh Gallery incident in 1962, 
during which Khrushchev reportedly became enraged when viewing an exhibition of Soviet 
abstract art. This incident triggered state repression against Western influences in Soviet visual 
art, and later catalyzed state intervention in poetry, literature, and, eventually, classical music. 
Nonetheless, this brief description of this six-year period is a simplification of historical reality. 
This period can easily be misinterpreted as a unilateral withdrawal from Stalinist repression, 
when it is more accurate to say that it opened a heated debate regarding the reinterpretation of 
the Stalinist past that was resisted by conservative elements in the government and press.32  
 
31 Schwarz, 274-87. 
32 See Polly Jones, “The Personal and the Political: Opposition to the Thaw and the Politics of Literary 
Identity in the 1950s and 1960s,” in The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s, eds. Denis 
Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 232-42. 
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At the end of the Second World War, the fascist and imperial regimes of Germany, Italy, 
and Japan fell, and the postwar incarnations of those countries were forced to come to terms with 
their actions. Meanwhile, the Stalinist regime survived. Even after Stalin’s death, the government 
still based its legitimacy on the Stalinist policies of forced collectivization, industrialization, and 
unconditional loyalty. This reality complicated the reevaluation of the past, since the Soviet state 
still oversaw cultural production and placed limits on Soviet self-reflection. Generally, the Party 
would allow critics to paint Stalin as an aberration of Leninist ideals and even a tyrant, but would 
not allow criticism of the Party or of Lenin.33 One interpretation of the Russian word for “thaw” 
focuses on mud and unpredictable weather, which evokes the concepts of ambiguity and 
temporality. The former concept refers to the uncertainty regarding the extent and end results of 
a thaw, and the latter questions how much time will elapse until the next freeze. According to 
Stephen V. Bittner, this metaphor was realized in the experiences of Soviet citizens, who were 
unsure what the thaw entailed as they were living in it, and it often catalyzed generational 
conflict between cautious elders and impulsive youngsters.34  
In terms of the arts, the thaw was both a period of loosening Party controls over artistic 
expression and renewed government intervention. Furthermore, creative communities, as well as 
the artists themselves, were split between more and less restrictive constituencies. As a result of 
the institution of the creative unions, Soviet artists, composers, authors, filmmakers, and poets 
were largely self-governing. After Stalin’s death, the Party leadership would still periodically 
involve itself in cultural matters, but these interventions would only be in the form of short-lived, 
and sometimes draconian, punitive initiatives. The definition of the appropriate Soviet aesthetic 
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was for the most part in the hands of the creative unions (such as the Artists’ Union, the 
Composers’ Union, the Writers’ Union, etc.). On the one hand, the musical establishment, for 
example, enjoyed a great deal of agency in defining, shaping, and enforcing socialist realism—
the state-mandated artistic ideology—after the establishment of the Composers’ Union by 
government decree in 1932. The Ministry of Culture and the Communist Party leadership 
depended on the expertise of this musical establishment in order to define socialist realism and to 
produce socialist realist music. In return, the musical establishment enjoyed high esteem, 
material rewards, and the generous support of the state. However, on the other hand, the political 
and musical establishments were not entirely distinct. Some Composers’ Union members, 
particularly the leadership, were also Party members either by choice or because they were 
pressured to join. The Party, therefore, did not exclusively govern from outside the Union, it also 
governed from within. As a result, music professionals were able to carve out a degree of 
agency, but they could not act autonomously or independently from the Party. 
However, this symbiotic relationship became strained when the political elite got directly 
involved in Soviet creative production in the form of powerful, yet short-lived, initiatives. These 
interventions punctuate the historiography of the Soviet arts and the biographies of their artists.35 
Notable Stalinist episodes include the scandal sparked by the 1936 Pravda article, 
Zhdanovshchina in 1948, and the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign from 1948 to 1953.36 The 
Manezh Gallery Scandal of 1962 sparked the first major governmental intervention in the Soviet 
 
35 See Fay; Simon Morrison, The People’s Artist; Harlow Robinson, Sergei Prokofiev: A Biography (New 
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arts after Stalin’s death. (These instances indicated the direct intervention of either the Minister 
of Culture and/or the Party leadership in the affairs of the Composers’ Union as well as the other 
creative unions.) The goals of these interventions were largely political in nature, either striving 
to pressure apparently wayward artists to return to the strict adherence of socialist realist art, or 
to purge Soviet art of harmful foreign and/or non-socialist influences.  
Socialist realism was still the ideological framework for the composition of classical 
music; however, its definition continued to be presented in somewhat vague terms. This 
ambiguity was both a blessing and a curse to composers: the vagueness allowed for various 
interpretations for what socialist realism meant in practice. Taruskin explains that richly codified 
works which can be linked to a variety of references and ideas allow every listener the 
opportunity to devise a completely individual and subjective reading.37 However, this openness 
also meant that composers often moved with excessive caution so as not to inadvertently violate 
the party line. Without a clearly articulated distinction on what was socialist realist and what was 
not, composers were unsure about what was the unacceptable until they had crossed the line. It is 
possible that this uncertainty was both a source of anxiety and a safe harbor for limited 
experimentalism for many Soviet musicians. This vagueness could have also provided an 
opportunity for the tolerance of foreign contemporary music, as long as it appeared to have a few 
superficial similarities to socialist realism (as with music of a national character) and avoided the 
styles that were obviously incompatible with it (such as serialism or chance music). 
In her investigation of the Stalin Prize, Marina Frolova-Walker argues that despite the 
inconsistency and ambiguity surrounding the definition of socialist realism, Soviet composers 
had an implicit understanding what was and was not socialist realism in music. She differentiates 
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between works that were obviously not expressions of socialist realism, those that were, and 
those that were on the margins of acceptability. Frolova-Walker envisions these distinctions as a 
sphere in which the core consisted of the more conservative forms of socialist realism, while the 
outer layers of the sphere were more liberal musical compositions. The core largely consisted of 
tonal classical music and popular and mass songs, which could include subject matter drawn 
from national folk traditions and Soviet revolutionary history. In many ways, these works were 
heavily influenced by the legacy of the nineteenth-century composers of the Kuchka or Mighty 
Handful. Music that did not reference national and Soviet themes and exhibited a greater degree 
of harmonic dissonance or adhered to modernist styles such as neoclassicism were on the 
margins of acceptability.38 
By taking note of the musical works that received Stalin Prizes from 1941 to 1952, 
Frolova-Walker posits that they indicate which works received official approval and thus provide 
us with an indicator of how the working definition of socialist realism changed over time. During 
times of high governmental intervention in the arts, such as Zhdanovshchina in 1948, socialist 
realism was restricted to the core of more conservative works. During more open periods, this 
definition was permitted to include more marginally acceptable styles. For example, 
Shostakovich’s Piano Quintet in G minor, Op. 57 (1940), which was stylistically neoclassical, 
won the Prize in 1941, well before the ideological tightening that would occur seven years later.  
Frolova-Walker notices that both Shostakovich and Prokofiev reacted to the 1948 
decrees, made adjustments to their compositional styles, and chose more ideologically suitable 
topics for the former’s Song of the Forests, Op. 81 (which was composed in 1949, and was a 
first-class Stalin Prize winner in 1949) and the latter’s On Guard for Peace, Op. 124 (which was 
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composed in 1950, and was a second-class Stalin Prize winner in 1951). She explains that the 
both composers “diluted” the problematic (i.e. formalist) characteristics of their quintessential 
compositional styles in order to improve their chances of gaining official approval. In addition, 
Soviet composers who were influenced by these two composers incorporated “diluted” elements 
of Shostakovich’s and Prokofiev’s idioms into their styles. Frolova-Walker suggests that Dmitri 
Kabalevsky’s Violin Concerto in C major, Op. 48 (composed in 1948, and a winner of the 
second-class award in 1949) was an officially acceptable dilution of Prokofiev’s idiom. In the 
case of Grigor Kiladze’s symphonic poem The Hermit (written in 1936, and a second-class 
winner in 1941), she argues that stylistically controversial elements, such as the use of stark 
melodies in unison possibly derived from Shostakovich’s style and presented as Azeri folk 
monody, could be rendered officially acceptable if they were set in an ideologically suitable 
context.39  
Frolova-Walker’s assertion that Soviet composers had a clear understanding of what was 
socialist realism, what was on the margins of acceptability, and what was not acceptable enables 
us to view these composers as active participants who had the knowledge to maneuver within a 
societal system.40 In other words, they were usually not just passive victims of draconian state 
oversight. It should be noted, however, that there were still sudden shifts in Soviet cultural policy 
that sparked renewed government intervention—such as the “Muddle Instead of Music” 
controversy, the 1948 denouncement of The Great Friendship, and the Manezh Gallery 
incident—caught several members of the cultural intelligentsia by surprise. Nonetheless, shortly 
after these tumultuous events, Soviet composers adjusted to the situation and were able to decide 
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on how much to risk in their compositions. Sometimes, they were able to safely evade 
government oversight and receive support and rewards from the state, while at other times they 
miscalculated and faced censure after straying too far from the core of socialist realism.  
The Second Congress of the Composers’ Union in 1957, roughly a decade after 
Zhdanovshchina, can be viewed as a case study for how much cultural politics had changed, and 
how much they stayed the same during the transition from Stalin’s era to Khrushchev’s. The 
leadership of the Union had not altered much since the First Congress in 1948, and Khrennikov 
was still its secretary. This lack of change confirms Naumenko’s aforementioned observations of 
de-Stalinization.41 The conference occurred during de-Stalinization, a little over a year after the 
Twentieth Party Congress, in which Khrushchev denounced the cult of personality. At the 
Composers’ Union sessions, there were some cautionary mentions of the cult of personality, and 
the ideological fanaticism of Stalinism, but only as abstract concepts that were in the process of 
being resolved. Some cautionary references to hostile foreign influences and formalist 
temptations remained in the discourse.42 In Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party D.T. Shepilov’s address at the Composers’ Union Congress, Zhdanovshchina 
and the years that followed were even referred to as a success resulting from Soviet vigilance 
against formalism and Western cosmopolitan influence; the composers chastised by Zhdanov 
were said to have all made great strides to right their errors in the meantime.43  
Interestingly, there was little mention of the deceased leader, which served as an indicator 
that the Composers’ Union preferred not to broach such a subject in more specific terms. 
 
41 Naumenko, 28-29. 
42 See f. 2077, op. 1, d. 1288-96 Stenogramma zasedaniia Vtorogo c”ezda sovetskikh kompozitorov 
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Moreover, no specific examples of composers or pieces, past or present, were chastised for being 
overly Stalinist or fanatical. At the same time, there are no explicit criticisms of Soviet 
composers or compositions in the stenographic record after the aforementioned Stalinist 
crackdowns.44 It is possible that a loosening of ideological oversight can be inferred from this 
lack of explicit criticism; however, the same vagueness pertaining to the cult of personality 
suggests that the leadership of the Composers’ Union and its political overseers in the Council of 
Ministers and the Central Committee were paying only lip-service to de-Stalinization. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that de-Stalinization provided the Soviet musical establishment, in the 
form of both the Ministry of Culture and the Composers’ Union, with the opportunity to reassess 
whether some types of Western contemporary music would be viable for performance within the 
USSR. 
 
The Acceptability of Western Contemporary Music in the Soviet Union 
At this point, we should consider Soviet positions on Western contemporary classical 
music. After Stalin’s death, Narodnost’, the connection to national or folk traditions, was still 
deemed to be a fundamental pillar of this ideological system, and thus became an important 
criterion for the evaluation of both domestic and foreign music.45 This concept can be understood 
as an emphasis on continuity in the development of musical style. At the time, positive 
assessment usually resulted from the argument that the style of a contemporary composer was 
rooted in older iterations of a national style or in the Western classical music tradition more 
generally. Such forms of composition were considered to be more “progressive,” while musical 
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styles that were deemed to be deviations from narodnost’ were branded as “regressive.” Both 
“progressive” and “regressive” were umbrella statements that included more specific judgements 
on musical value. For example, narodnost’ was a progressive characteristic, while formalism 
was a regressive one. 
Earlier, during the late Stalinist era, foreign contemporary music in general was viewed 
very negatively by the establishment, especially if it did not explicitly promote socialism. As 
noted above, there occurred a paradigm shift in opinion after Stalin’s death, with the result that 
some forms of Western contemporary music—which were primarily in a tonal idiom and derived 
from national traditions—were not deemed decadent or harmful, even if they did not have 
socialist elements. An important change in the musical establishment’s position toward Western 
contemporary music was evident in Khrennikov’s address at the Second Composers’ Union 
Congress in 1957. It must be taken into account that he gave this speech in the context of being 
the Union’s Secretary. Thus, he was speaking as the mouthpiece of the Union’s leadership and 
was not necessarily voicing his own personal views. Nonetheless, this address did describe the 
change in the Union’s official position regarding foreign contemporary music.  
Khrennikov described the world of contemporary music in Western Europe and the US as 
embroiled in a conflict between progressive and regressive tendencies. While he remained 
outspoken against the negative influence of Western modernism, atonalism, serialism, and 
dodecaphony on Soviet musical culture, Khrennikov did argue that some Western composers 
(such as Béla Bartók, Georges Enescu, Jean Sibelius, and Ralph Vaughan Williams) were 
composing or had composed acceptable music that was both connected to their national 
traditions and was comprehensible to their audiences. High modernism, on the other hand, was 
determined to be a cosmopolitan aberration that was divorced from narodnost’, 
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incomprehensible, and corrosive to healthy cultural values.46 In his address at the Second 
Composers’ Union Congress, Soviet composer Dmitri Kabalevsky added that the formalists Igor 
Stravinsky, Arnold Schoenberg, and Paul Hindemith had built the foundations for the bourgeois 
modernist musical styles of neoclassicism and atonalism.47 
It is important to note that a significant number of the “progressive” Western composers 
Khrennikov mentioned were not ideologically aligned with the USSR and were not communists. 
This shift in Soviet thinking represents a recognition of the rising importance of aesthetic 
considerations in evaluating Western music. Foreign contemporary composers could at this time 
receive official praise from the Soviet musical establishment on purely aesthetic grounds that 
arguably resonated with the ideological tenets of socialist realism without attempting to 
explicitly adhere to it. Moreover, these composers did not need to be members of the Communist 
Party, politically sympathetic to the USSR, or affiliated with the friendship societies that 
furthered Soviet interests abroad in order to receive such praise. Nevertheless, such a shift only 
benefited left-leaning and apolitical composers, and not those who had taken a political or 
aesthetic stance opposed to the USSR. 
 While several of the speakers at the Second Composers’ Union’s Congress cautioned its 
members against “regressive” tendencies and mentioned the influence of high modernism on 
Soviet composers, they did not mention a specific example. It appears that instead of criticizing 
these Soviet modernists outright in the style of Zhdanovshchina, the Union preferred to ignore 
and neglect them. The Soviet composer Andrei Volkonsky, who emerged as a serialist in the late 
1950s after Stalin’s death, was ridiculed for his twelve-tone compositions in the Soviet press but 
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was ignored at the Congress. His piece for soprano and instrumental ensemble Suite of Mirrors 
(1960), attracted much criticism from Soviet critics.48 Nonetheless, Volkonsky’s serialism 
eventually became a model for Soviet composers of the younger generation, and provided the 
inspiration for Edison Denisov’s Sun of the Incas (1964). Volkonsky and the so-called younger 
generation were kept out of the Soviet mainstream and faced great difficulties in arranging for 
performances of their own music.49 The Soviet press branded them as “immature, 
impressionable, [and] misguided,” and their pieces as derivative of earlier Western serialism.50 In 
his public remarks and interviews throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Shostakovich 
publicly attacked the concept of serialist music as a passing fad. The American musicologist 
Peter J. Schmelz observes that these statements were consonant with the Party’s efforts to 
discourage the use of serial techniques by younger Soviet composers.51 
  Schmelz indicates that the mid- and late 1960s was a period when the majority of 
unofficial composers began transitioning from the restrictions of serialism to the incorporation of 
aleatory, tonal, and more representative, mimetic elements into their musical style. By the time 
Sofia Gubaidulina composed the piece (which was one of her last serialist works) Night in 
Memphis (1968), she considered row-derived composition to already be a historical style like 
sixteenth- and eighteenth-century counterpoint.52 The period when the younger generation turned 
away from the exclusive use of serialism was followed by the belated experimentation of the 
 
48 Peter J. Schmelz, “Andrey Volkonsky and the Beginnings of Unofficial Music in the Soviet Union,” 
Journal of the American Musicological Society 58, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 139-45. 
49 Ibid., 196-99.  
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older generation. For example, in 1971, Khrennikov included twelve-tone rows in his Piano 
Concerto No. 2, Op. 21.53 
 
Postwar United Kingdom, Consensus Politics, and the Commonwealth 
 The Second World War had a profound effect in shaping British domestic and foreign 
policies in the decades that followed. As Kenneth O. Morgan explains in his monograph on 
British postwar history, enduring and, ultimately, winning the war was perceived by many 
British citizens as a shared experience. Morgan indicates that in classical music, this solidarity 
was made manifest in the lunch-time concerts of Myra Hess at the National Gallery, the 
audiences of which, as the story goes, drew from all Londoners in a public display of class 
solidarity.54 Also, part of this perception of shared experience was the belief that the political 
parties of the British parliament buried their differences and worked together to create a welfare 
state. Meanwhile, the UK’s Keynesian economic policy sought sustained growth and full 
employment through currency control and the selected nationalization of industrial enterprises. 
Much of this system was already in place during the war, which had necessitated a high amount 
of government control over the economy. Also enshrined in this postwar framework were public 
education reform, the National Health Service, Social Security, and the general concept that 
citizens had the social right to have comprehensive support from the British government from the 
cradle to the grave.55 The result of these programs was to create a relatively high level of 
government management in the spheres of medicine, education, and the economy, which 
selectively incorporated socialist elements in order to form a welfare state to raise the citizenry’s 
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standard of living and wellbeing. Importantly, even at its height, this pragmatic agenda never 
approached the full socialism of the USSR and, later, China, which placed the entirety of these 
spheres within governmental control.  
Near the end of the war, the Yalta Conference brought together the leaders of the three 
allies that were expected to win it in order to decide upon the new world order after its 
conclusion: Winston Churchill (1940-1945 and 1951-1955) of the UK, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (1933-1945) of the US, and Josef Stalin of the USSR. Morgan indicates that in terms 
of foreign policy, the British government maintained that the UK was still on par with the rising 
American and Soviet superpowers. The UK was the only major European power that had 
survived the war without being invaded; however, its major cities and ports were devastated by 
German bombardment and thus in dire need of reconstruction. Moreover, the war heavily taxed 
the British economy, which resulted in shortages and the rationing of consumer goods. 
Nonetheless, it still had dominion over a vast empire, and still had great influence on the world 
stage. It had also scored the diplomatic victory of bringing the United States into a permanent 
military alliance with Western Europe to prevent Soviet expansion.56  
 However, as would become obvious over the next two decades, the British argument that 
it was one of the three great superpowers was weakening. Morgan explains that the huge 
advances made by British industry during the war were based on old models, and British 
industrial production and technological innovation both went into decline in the decades 
following.57 Many of the remaining possessions of the British Empire, would soon transition into 
independence, and most of them voluntarily entered the ambiguous status of the Commonwealth 
of Nations. To add insult to injury, its strongest ally, the US, was actively promoting British 
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decolonization of South Asia and the Middle East.58 For the two decades following 1945, the 
continued loss of imperial territories, the uncertain economic viability of the Commonwealth to 
replace the effectiveness of the Empire, and the demonstration of economic cohesion and 
cooperation on the European Continent, which culminated in the creation of the European 
Economic Community (which included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and West Germany) in 1957, all led to the decline of the UK’s stature as a great power in both 
the global and European fields. 
 The UK’s growing economic and military dependence on the US would gradually 
undermine claims that the two countries were equal partners. The British took on multibillion-
dollar loans and received the largest Marshall Plan disbursements from the Americans for their 
economic recovery.59 In addition, Nigel Ashton explains that during the Second World War, the 
British and the Americans had cooperated in the development of the first nuclear weapons; 
however, the US used its categorically greater resources to surpass the British effort. Then, one 
year after the conclusion of the war, the McMahon Act effectively cut off the possibility that the 
Americans would share their nuclear secrets with any other country, including their old British 
allies. The British were able to independently develop their own nuclear and hydrogen bombs (in 
1952 and 1957, respectively), which were capable of being deployed by a new bomber force. 
However, they had done so while the Americans and Soviets were developing the next stage of 
military technology: land-, aircraft-, and submarine-based rockets with nuclear warheads, which 
could be deployed faster and had second-strike capabilities thus rendering the British effort 
obsolete.60  
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The Suez Crisis of 1956 proved to be an indicator of the UK’s retreat from empire, its 
loss of “Big Three” superpower status, and of its subservience to the US. According to Morgan, 
relations between the British and their former colony Egypt had soured considerably after Gamel 
Abdel Nasser overthrew the British-friendly local monarchy in a 1952 coup, instituted a republic, 
and was elected to be president in 1956. At this time, the British government was growing 
concerned that Egypt was developing closer ties with the USSR, and it prepared to intervene 
militarily when Nasser revealed his intentions to nationalize the Suez Canal. In response, the UK 
both publicly formed a coalition with France and secretly colluded with the Israeli government in 
an attack on the Sinai region. Meanwhile, the Americans urged the British to address their 
grievances through the United Nations, and warned that a military intervention would invariably 
shift third-world opinion away from the UK. The Israeli military attacked, followed by a Franco-
British ultimatum to Egypt to forfeit canal nationalization. Nasser refused, and the British and 
French militaries intervened. American President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) declared the 
UK to be belligerent and in violation of international law and he threatened to take punitive 
measures against the value of British currency,61 the United Nations General Assembly 
denounced the British in a vote of sixty-four against five, and there was an outcry that the British 
and French attacks had diverted the world’s attention from the Soviet intervention in Hungary 
that had occurred earlier that year. The British and the French immediately pledged to withdraw 
from Egypt, which resulted in both a great political victory for Nasser and a convenient diversion 
for the USSR. For the UK, the aftermath of the Suez Crisis also meant realizing that the Anglo-
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American “special relationship” was not unconditional, that the British should come to terms 
with second-rate power status, and that it should consider pooling its resources with Western 
Europe to collectively create a third superpower between the US and the USSR.62 
The above narrative maps out the particularities of the British position on the world stage 
from the ending of the Second World War to the opening of cultural relations between the British 
and the Soviets, which would occur in the mid-1950s. Over the next few decades the British 
Empire decolonized, leaving behind a group of commonwealth states or, in the case of Nasser’s 
Egypt, countries that had severed ties with the UK. Morgan argues that after the Suez Crisis, the 
alliance with the US also transitioned from an equal partnership to British dependency on 
American economic and military support. Moreover, the Suez Crisis demonstrated that the 
British could not act independently or against American interests. Decolonization, the 
embarrassment of the Suez Crisis, the ascendency of the US to the so-called role of world 
policeman, and the conceptual transition from conventional military preparedness to nuclear 
deterrence led to the reduction of British military spending.63 
 As Ashton explains, the launching of the Sputnik probe in October 1957 proved that the 
Soviets were capable of sending an object to any location on earth and caused a paradigm shift in 
the Anglo-American alliance. This event resulted in greater transatlantic cooperation in the 
maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. The US began selling its rockets to the UK, and the British 
were able to create their own warheads. This arrangement provided the British with a viable 
deterrent and would be in place in one form or another during the remainder of the Cold War, but 
it also meant that they would become entirely dependent on American military hardware. While 
the language of the alliance treaties and intergovernmental communication described the US and 
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the UK as equal, interdependent partners, it was clear from the unbalanced dynamics of that 
alliance that the UK was dependent on the US for its defense and that the Americans required 
little from the British.64 
 
The British Government’s Patronage of Classical Music 
 In contrast to the complete governmental support of the arts in the USSR, the British 
government’s involvement in the arts before the Second World War was generally very low. As 
a result, the support of pre-war British cultural institutions was typically left to private patronage 
and to the whims of the free market as it had been for generations. For example, Cyril Ehrlich 
notes that public assistance for the newly founded Royal College of Music in 1883 amounted to 
£110,000, but the government itself did not contribute any of its own funds.65 This situation had 
not improved much fifty years later, when government grants were only £500 for the Royal 
Academy of Music and the Royal College Music during the 1930s.66 This lack of significant 
governmental support was arguably a contributing factor in the UK’s lack of a strong tradition of 
opera composition compared with other European nations such as France, Germany, Italy, and 
Russia. The two major governmental institutions that were instrumental in the public patronage 
of the arts after the war were the Arts Council and the BBC. The Arts Council was formed in 
1946 to dispense government support to artistic endeavors of its choosing. While the BBC was 
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established in the 1920s, its influence increased dramatically in the years leading up to the war, 
and it would maintain a monopoly in television until 1955.67  
 Wartime patronage of the arts, in the form of the Council for the Encouragement of 
Music and the Arts (CEMA), formed the basis of state subsidy after the war, under the aegis of 
the Arts Council.68 This new institution was intended to serve as the conduit for governmental 
support of the arts. It was also the closest that the British government came to creating a Ministry 
of Culture. However, the primary difference between these institutions was the Arts Council’s 
lack of oversight over the creative endeavors it supported. The Council primarily operated as a 
sponsor and an arbiter of a competitive process: it provided certain artistic institutions and 
projects with subsidies, grants, and guarantees against losses. The vast majority of these artistic 
enterprises received only partial funding from the state, and the limitations in Arts Council 
funding meant that some programs were prioritized above others.69 
 The Arts Council’s priorities can be easily demarcated through their budget decisions: 
large London opera theaters such as Covent Garden and Sadler’s Wells received the bulk of the 
resources, while smaller companies and those with stable private patronage competed amongst 
themselves for categorically smaller amounts. Musicologist Paul Kildea’s study Selling Britten 
provides a detailed analysis of both the quantitative data of the Arts Council budget, and of the 
qualitative accounts of the Arts Council’s internal correspondence and published reports. He 
demonstrates that the Council had two primary goals upon its inception: to generally raise the 
level of British cultural institutions to the standard established by other, predominantly 
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continental, nations through governmental support, and, more specifically, to do so by pooling its 
resources to support a national opera house on a grand scale.70  
 As a result, supporting the Covent Garden theater—which through the efforts and funds 
of the British publisher Boosey & Hawkes transitioned from being the home of the wartime 
Mecca’s Dance Hall to the base of operations of the Royal Opera71—became the center of the 
Arts Council’s efforts. While the Council provided limited support to existing and newly created 
orchestras (which amounted to roughly fifteen percent of the 1946-51 budget), the support for 
British opera proved to be approximately a quarter of the Council’s resources (twenty percent to 
Covent Garden and four percent to Sadler’s Wells).72 Glyndebourne, which was privately 
supported by John Christie, and the English Opera Group, which was an independent company 
managed by Britten and his colleagues and supporters, also received small grants. However, the 
English Opera Group and its performance of newly composed chamber operas fell outside of the 
Arts Council’s goals to raise the UK’s stature in the realm of large-scale grand opera.73 As a 
result, it would only receive roughly a twentieth of the support given to larger companies in the 
form of small grants and guarantees against loss,74 which would amount to only roughly a tenth 
of the company’s annual operating budget.75 
 The Arts Council’s fixation on the funding of large-scale opera in the greater London 
metropolitan area made the government body a target for criticism. The rise of the Edinburgh 
and the Aldeburgh Festivals in the late 1940s provided the Council with other, more 
geographically diverse programs to fund to mitigate this disapproval. The Edinburgh Festival 
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gained a reputation for innovation and cosmopolitanism, the Cheltenham Festival focused on 
contemporary music, and the Aldeburgh Festival was a composer-based endeavor, which 
featured premieres of Britten’s music and would, in the 1960s and 1970s, include performances 
of his internationally famous Soviet friends: Sviatoslav Richter, Mstislav Rostropovich, and 
Galina Vishnevskaya. While Council support of provincial festivals was intended to facilitate 
wider access to the arts, the festivals’ relative isolation (the Aldeburgh Festival, in particular, did 
not have easily accessible rail links) privileged the local and the mobile. Also, the high cost of 
the tickets for the festivals encouraged the participation of those of a certain class who were both 
able to travel and already appreciated classical music.76 
 
The BBC’s Efforts to Increase Cultural Literacy 
 Radio broadcasting in the UK developed as a public service.77 The BBC was founded in 
1922 and became a state-owned corporation five years later. It greatly expanded before the 
Second World War, and it aimed to cultivate an appreciation for the high arts, which included 
classical music, among the British public. The BBC employed its own musical ensembles and 
sought to present a varied repertoire to its listeners. Moreover, the radio series The Foundations 
of Music was explicitly intended to be a music appreciation course for adult listeners.78 In her 
monograph, The BBC and Ultra-Modern Music, Jennifer Doctor chronicles the efforts of the 
BBC to introduce their listeners to the atonal music of the Second Viennese School (including 
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the early expressionist and more recent serialist music of Schoenberg, Alban Berg, and Anton 
Webern), and to invite these three composers to conduct and perform their works for broadcasts 
during the interwar period.79 Jazz at this time, on the other hand, was seen as a lowbrow 
American import and was excluded from programming. Dance music was tolerated as 
commercially successful, so-called “light” music.80 
 Briggs explains that in 1945, the BBC split its programming among three different 
channels: the Light Programme, the Home Service, and the Third Programme. The original BBC 
channel continued as the Home Service, so-called less serious programming became the focus of 
the Light Programme, while more serious arts programming became the domain of the Third 
Programme. Dance music, variety shows, dramas, comedies, and sports broadcasts provided the 
bulk of the Light Programme’s offerings, but it also included a small sampling of classical 
music, so-called high drama, and discussions of literature. Meanwhile, the Third Programme 
focused on classical music, literature, and theater. The Home Service covered the majority of the 
news and sought a middle ground between the music offerings of the Light and Third 
Programmes. In this way, state support of the arts maintained many of the classist distinctions 
that were enshrined before the war. Briggs explains that this was illustrated by the three channels 
of the BBC, which differentiated between the so-called “lower” forms of popular culture for the 
less affluent in the programming for the first channel, and reserved the third channel for the 
broadcasting of the “higher arts” for the more culturally “literate.” The Home Service 
broadcasted music that was considered to be in the “middlebrow” cultural level between the 
offerings of the other two channels in terms of sophistication.81 Briggs outlines the class 
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distinctions between the BBC’s 1949 audiences using the following statistics that he gleaned 
from the BBC’s own research on its listeners: 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of BBC Audiences According to Socio-Economic Class in 194982 
 
 Light Programme Home Service Third Programme 
Working Class 79 % 69 % 35 % 
Lower Middle Class 18 % 24 % 37 % 
Upper Middle Class 3 % 7 % 28 % 
 
Briggs’s findings indicate that socio-economic class—which affected both an individual’s access 
to education and leisure as well as societal expectations for that person’s aesthetic taste—had an 
observable effect on the listening habits of audiences. He argues that the upper middle class 
preferred the Third Programme, that working-class listeners dominated the Light Programme and 
Home Service audiences, and that the lower middle class was positioned between these two 
extremes. It is also possible to interpret these data in a slightly different light and argue that the 
proportion of Third Programme listeners from the working and lower middle classes was 
actually quite high (over a third of the number of listeners each).  
 It should be noted that a crucial element is missing from Briggs’s data: the number of 
listeners in each socio-economic class. While it might be assumed that listeners from the lower 
classes were much more numerous than those from the upper middle class, the relatively high 
number of Third Programme listeners from the working and lower middle classes still possibly 
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bears the mark of what Jonathan Rose considers to be the drive of the British working classes to 
pursue self-education and intellectual independence in order to resist ideologies imposed by the 
higher classes.83 Relatedly, the work of Alison Garnham demonstrates that the BBC’s system of 
three channels was intended to have been a tiered sequence to incrementally uplift the cultural 
level of their listeners. In other words, listeners at the lowest level were encouraged to raise their 
level of taste to appreciate the programming of the Third Programme, and in doing so, the BBC 
was fulfilling their state-mandated purpose of educating the British public.84  
Both British and Soviet cultural institutions, such as the BBC and the Soviet Ministry of 
Culture, sought to provide cultural education for their respective citizenries. However, in contrast 
to similar initiatives to raise the cultural literacy of the public in the USSR, the BBC’s education 
initiative also included the aforementioned drive to familiarize at least some of the British public 
with the music of the Second Viennese School. As discussed earlier, once socialist realism 
became the government-mandated artistic ideology of the USSR, Soviet artists were tasked with 
creating art that promoted the socialist cause while being accessible to the general audience. 
Atonality was rejected as being incomprehensible to the public and was thus against the people. 
The BBC took the opposite stance; it sought to cultivate an appreciation for music of the Second 
Viennese School, which was difficult for listeners lacking specialized training, and it set such 
appreciation as a marker of cultural sophistication. It should be noted that such efforts to promote 
modernist music appreciation continued from the 1960s to the 1980s, and that they had a 
polarizing effect on listeners: some believed that modernism had a revitalizing impact on 
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classical music, while others interpreted the BBC’s focus on modernism as driving a wedge 
between the cultural establishment and the public.85  
 
The British Perspective on the Soviet Union 
Between the post-revolutionary Russian Civil War (1917-1922) and the Second World 
War, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad (VOKS) sought to influence Western 
public opinion through Western left-leaning intellectuals. It was VOKS’s strategy to court these 
intellectuals by inviting them to take part in guided tours in the USSR, where they could view 
socialist progress firsthand. Historian Michael David-Fox indicates that it was expected that the 
intellectuals would return to their respective countries and advocate for socialism and Soviet 
interests. Due to great restrictions on the exchange of people and information, the USSR had 
great control over the image it projected to the West. As a result, details about the darker side of 
Stalinist socialism—the suppression of cultural and religious expression;86 ethnic cleansing 
through forced migration; mass famine resulting from forced collectivization and the seizure and 
export of needed grain; mass arrests and executions through purges in the political, cultural, and 
military spheres; and a prison camp system that provided the USSR with de facto slave labor—
were less likely to reach the Western public. He explains that the USSR was able to portray itself 
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as a socialist paradise immune to fascism and economic depression, in which the state had 
liberated the people from bourgeois tyranny and provided its workers with the opportunity to 
reach a better quality of life through their labor. Many intellectuals gravitated to this image 
because it confirmed their long-standing beliefs on social reform, and it led to the swelling of the 
ranks of international friendship societies sponsored by the USSR and of communist parties in 
Western countries.87 
In the UK, the positions of left-leaning intellectuals in relation to the USSR in the 1930s 
were spread over a continuum from ambivalence to steadfast loyalty. Donald Mitchell explains 
that in this period, participation in the British Communist Party did not necessitate adhering to 
the official Soviet party line. Artists and intellectuals were free to determine what left-wing 
politics meant to them and could decide which projects they felt illustrated what they themselves 
believed to be socialism. Also, these were intellectuals who believed that socialist forces were 
the world’s best hope against fascism.88 The USSR was aware of the disillusionment of Western 
intellectuals, which was the result of the Great Depression and the rise of European fascism, and 
it sought to idealize the portrayal of the Soviet Five-Year Plan as an unprecedented utopian 
project.89 The concept that the Soviets were leading a Popular Front that consolidated leftists 
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from around the world (even if they were not socialist)—in order to combat fascism in Europe 
and also to oppose the appeasement of fascists by right-wing European governments—was 
strongest in the years leading up to the Second World War, and particularly during the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-1939). 
However, during the mid- to late 1930s, news of political purges, show trials, and famine 
in the USSR became public knowledge in the West. This led some intellectuals who still 
considered themselves friends of the USSR to evade publicly commenting on these matters by 
neither confirming nor denying them to the press.90 Meanwhile, others directly advocated for the 
USSR by publishing accounts of the socialist struggle against fascism throughout Europe and 
relayed Soviet news regarding positive accounts of collectivization and industrialization; 
negative reports about the mistreatment of Soviet citizens were usually ignored or denied 
outright as hostile Western propaganda.91  
Nonetheless, the effects of this new information about the Stalinist regime on British 
popular opinion appears to have been quite limited—especially in the musical sphere—and the 
British government adopted a non-interventionist stance on Soviet domestic matters. Fairclough 
reports that throughout the 1930s, both pro- and anti-Communist literature continued to be 
published in the UK, and music critics strove to keep political concerns and connections to real-
life events separate from music. The political environment and popular opinion shifted to 
becoming pro-Soviet during the Anglo-Soviet alliance during the Second World War, which 
resulted in a reappraisal of Shostakovich’s previously performed music and a more positive 
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reception of his recent pieces. However, such popular demand quickly faded after the conclusion 
of the war.92 
It should be noted that the majority of the political left in Britain—many of whom had 
considered the USSR a model state for social reform in the 1930s—turned away from the USSR 
after Stalin’s atrocities gained greater international attention after the war and his death. The 
membership of the British Communist Party—which was formed in 1920 and existed until the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991—and the sympathies of left-leaning intellectuals toward the 
Soviets were heavily impacted by Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin and the cult of 
personality at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, and by the Soviet army’s suppression of the 
Hungarian Revolution later that year. These events dispelled any prospects that the USSR could 
be a model for governance for the vast majority of left-leaning political parties abroad. In 1960, 
the New Left Review was founded in the UK by left-leaning historians and intellectuals who 
spurned Soviet-style communism in favor of applying Marxist principles to Western styles of 
governance and reconciling Marxism to constructions of British national identity. Both of these 
concepts were anathema to Soviet governance.93  
The Labour Party, the most prominent British leftist party—which rose to prominence 
after the war and was a major driving force behind the policies of the postwar government—
were among Khrushchev’s most outspoken critics during his 1956 visit. In addition, there was an 
important distinction between the Communist Party, which looked to the Soviets for guidance, 
and the British socialists in the Labour Party, who generally sought the selective implementation 
of leftist policies through standard parliamentary procedure. The British Communist Party sought 
to expose the perceived hypocrisy of the British sociopolitical structure and to encourage a 
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massive restructuring along Marxist-Leninist lines, while the socialists in the Labour Party 
sought to work within the existing political system in order to encourage reforms that drew on 
particular aspects of communism. Furthermore, the British socialists were closer to the political 
middle and less partisan, while the communists were loyal to the USSR and considered it the 
exemplar of international communism. The Labour Party, however, was very critical of Soviet 
governance. Morgan notes that after being questioned by Labour Party leaders about political 
prisoners and the state of civil liberties in the USSR during his visit to the UK, Khrushchev 
sarcastically exclaimed, “If these are your socialists, I am for the Conservatives!”94 
Throughout the postwar period, communist-front institutions sought to influence British 
public opinion to be more sympathetic to the USSR and to Russian culture by calling attention to 
Soviet triumphs, defending the USSR during political scandals, declaring accusations of Soviet 
tyranny and brutality to be fabricated propaganda, calling attention to Western imperialism and 
barbarism (particularly in regard to the Vietnam War), and arranging the transfer of musicians 
and intellectual property between the UK and the USSR.95 Some communist composers, such as 
Alan Bush, were also members and co-founders of non-communist associations such as the 
Composers’ Guild, and used their participation in these organizations to promote cultural 
relations with the USSR. Bush used his influence in this organization to encourage Anglo-Soviet 
exchanges of composers and musicologists outside of the purview of the British government.  
However, it should be understood that the ability of these communist- and/or Soviet-
affiliated organizations to carry out cultural exchange and to influence the larger British 
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community, without the involvement of the British government or major British cultural 
institutions, was very limited. These organizations did not have direct access to broadcasting via 
the government-owned BBC. Mainstream British performers, venues, and ensembles were 
connected to more traditional forms of patronage—that is, to profit-oriented concert agents, 
publishers, and record labels—and to the British government via Arts Council funding. Also, 
Soviet government-sponsored associations were underfunded, bureaucratically inefficient, and 
too unfamiliar with Western business practices to organize international tours and ensure that the 
Soviet state did not pass over opportunities to make a profit in Western currency.96 Tomoff 
explains that after Stalin’s death, these associations declined in influence, and their explicit 
political connection to the USSR was often perceived as a liability. Meanwhile, from the Soviet 
perspective, involvement with such an institution was seen as a political and, thus, risky act, 
which could draw unnecessary attention from Western anti-communist activists and press. As a 
result, the Soviet government generally avoided sending its own elite performers to collaborate 
with British communists.97 In addition, it can be assumed that the Soviet authorities realized that 
sending their star musicians to the mainstream British public was more effective as a display of 
Soviet cultural power, than was having their virtuosi perform for a handful of already loyal 
sympathizers and communists. 
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Henry Wood and the British Reception of Soviet Musical Culture 
The British postwar reception of Soviet culture was largely affected by the political 
sphere, especially during the late Stalinist period, which included the eight years between the end 
of the Second World War and Stalin’s death in 1953. From the Western European perspective, 
the victorious and powerful USSR was rapidly increasing its sphere of influence, and isolating 
itself from the international community; many people thought it likely that a third world war 
between the capitalist West and the socialist East would occur within a generation. Fairclough 
explains that the UK was becoming more wary of the USSR due to the latter’s growing influence 
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Stalin, who distrusted both American 
President Harry Truman (1945-1953) and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (1945-1951), 
proceeded to remilitarize the USSR after the American nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945. Both sides fretted about the other’s influence in their own countries: the 
British government distrusted the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural 
Relations with the Soviet Union, which were sponsored by VOKS, while the Soviet government 
sought to purge the arts of foreign influences through Zhdanov’s anti-formalist and anti-
cosmopolitan campaigns. These factors resulted in an environment inhospitable to international 
cultural exchanges during the late Stalinist period.98 
In the field of classical music, the British public largely came into contact with pre-
revolutionary Russian music around the turn of the twentieth century, and with contemporary 
Soviet music in the 1920s and 30s, through live performance, broadcasts, and recordings. The 
presentation of Russian and Soviet music in the UK generally was not in a political context, and 
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it is possible that for many British citizens (those not interested in socialism or the Soviet state), 
an interest in Russian or Soviet music was not politically motivated or indicative of an attraction 
to communism. Communist-affiliated British ensembles, however, such as the Workers’ Musical 
Association led by Bush, did seek to promote the Soviet state and the socialist system, but they 
reached only a very small number of people who were already receptive to their political 
ideology. 
Henry Wood conducted the British premiere of Tchaikovsky’s Eugene Onegin, Op. 24 
(1879) in 1892. Sergei Diaghilev’s company the Ballets Russes performed in London throughout 
the 1910s and 1920s, and Cameron Pyke argues that these performances reshaped the British 
perception of ballet from a French cultural import to a Russian one.99 The London Promenade 
Concerts, soon to be broadcast by the BBC, were also part of this effort. The Proms presented 
both well-known favorites, such as the music of Giuseppe Verdi and Richard Wagner, and 
novelties (unfamiliar or new works) of classical music, which included the 1912 Proms premiere 
of Schoenberg’s Five Pieces for Orchestra, Op. 16 (1909).100 Several of these novelties 
represented some of the British public’s first exposure to Russian and Soviet music. With the 
exception of the Anglo-Soviet alliance during the Second World War (which focused on the 
common struggle against Germany), the Proms presentations of Russian and Soviet music were 
primarily made in order to promote an appreciation of this music among the general concert-
going public, to make a profit, and were not obviously tied to a political agenda.  
From its beginnings in 1895, the Promenade Concerts under the management of Robert 
Newman and the musical directorship of Henry Wood had sought to use the newly constructed 
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Queen’s Hall to create and harness the buying power of an emerging listening public by 
providing inexpensive tickets and democratizing access to the heart of the concert venue (rather 
than placing the more affordable seats far from the stage). Moreover, Kildea suggests that the 
concerts allowed middle- and working-class London citizens access to classical music, the 
nominal cultural domain of the upper classes and aristocracy.101 After Newman’s death in 1926, 
the BBC—which was interested in how the Proms’ mission of civic cultural education resonated 
with its own—brought the concerts under government subsidy. It began broadcasting the Proms, 
still under Wood’s baton, in the following year and the concerts transitioned from a London 
institution to a national one.102  
From 1895 to his death in 1944, Wood became a strong advocate for British and foreign 
contemporary music and, particularly, for the performance of Russian, and later Soviet, music at 
the Proms. He was partly responsible for familiarizing the British public with Tchaikovsky’s 
music and ensuring the Russian composer a place in the British performance canon. In the first 
two decades of the Proms between 1895 and 1914, works by Wagner (2,383 performances), 
Beethoven (681), and Tchaikovsky (611) were the most frequently performed.103 During his 
tenure, Wood introduced British audiences to several operas, concerti, and orchestral pieces by 
the Russian composers Anton Arensky, Mily Balakirev, Alexander Borodin, Alexander 
Glazunov, Reinhold Glière, Mussorgsky, Prokofiev (before his return to the USSR), Sergei 
Rachmaninov, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, Alexander Skryabin, Igor Stravinsky, and the Soviet 
composers Alexander Mosolov, Nikolai Myaskovsky, Prokofiev (after his return), and 
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Shostakovich. He also orchestrated some of the above composers’ works so that they could be 
presented by his ensemble for the Proms audience.104  
The changing reception of Shostakovich's music in the UK serves as an indicator of the 
relationship between the British musical establishment and the most recognizable Soviet 
composer. In her study of the British critical reception of Shostakovich throughout the twentieth 
century, Fairclough notes that after the death of Stalin, he became the best known Soviet 
composer in the UK, the performances of his music increased significantly, and the critical 
opinion of his music improved greatly.105 At this time, British critics considered Shostakovich to 
be the aesthetic leader of the Soviet musical establishment, which was a questionable notion that 
resulted from their underestimation of Shostakovich’s difficulties under Stalinism. While 
Prokofiev had greater international standing when both composers were alive, Shostakovich was 
viewed as quintessentially Soviet because he had spent his entire education and career in the 
USSR, while Prokofiev (due to his years of residency abroad) was viewed as a more 
cosmopolitan—and less a strictly Soviet—figure. 
Fairclough explains that early in his career, British critical opinion of Shostakovich’s 
music was not uniformly positive, and was characterized by a lack of understanding regarding 
the pressures faced by Soviet composers, particularly the lack of artistic autonomy and the risk of 
government intervention. His early rise to international recognition with his Symphony No. 1 in 
F minor, Op. 10 (completed in 1925 and premiered in 1926), Concerto for Piano, Trumpet, and 
String Orchestra in C minor,106 Op. 35 (1933), and opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District 
was often described as meteoric by British critics in the 1930s. Yet outside of the efforts of 
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advocates such as the directors Nikolai Mal’ko and Henry Wood, Shostakovich’s early works 
were not often performed in the UK before the Second World War.107  
Fairclough notes that while most British commentators acknowledged his technical skill, 
they found Shostakovich’s satire (particularly of the waltz rhythms used in Lady Macbeth) 
immature, his style derivative, and his taste vulgar. Critic Ernest Newman considered the opera 
Lady Macbeth to be a waste of BBC resources and he surmised that its success in the USSR to be 
indicative of inferior musical judgement.108 The British reception of Shostakovich’s Symphony 
No. 5 in D minor, Op. 47 (1937) was also predominately negative, and several critics found it to 
be a pale imitation of Mahler and overly derivative of the German symphonic style in general. 
Fairclough notes that some critics expressed their political hostility toward the USSR through 
reviews of its apparent musical representative: Shostakovich. Such critiques called attention to 
the USSR’s professed attempts to be at the forefront of international musical development and to 
create music for the masses, and they mocked the results of these efforts as crude and 
regressive.109 
In 1942, Wood had presented the first performance of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony 
outside of the USSR with the London Symphony Orchestra for a live BBC broadcast. Wood was 
seventy-three, and this performance served as the culmination of his advocacy of Russian and 
Soviet music.110 A week after the radio premiere, Wood presented the symphony for a live 
audience in concert.111 He had considered the British premiere to be a great success, and reported 
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to the Soviet cultural establishment his admiration for Soviet music and his belief that both the 
UK and the USSR were close allies both in war and in culture: 
I need hardly say how pleased I am personally to be so closely associated with this 
important event, following up performances of works for the first time in England by 
many of your distinguished composers during the past fifty years of my work for 
furthering the interests of music among the people, via these famous concerts, and the 
continuation of this policy and close association in the midst of a gigantic war in which 
we fight side by side as Allies, affords me the deepest personal and musical satisfaction.  
 
You in Russia as we ourselves here, are helping to keep great music alive, and the need 
was never greater. It is a positive contribution at this time to that unshakable morale on 
which our mutual hopes of final victory are firmly based.112 
 
The performance of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony was soon followed by letters of gratitude 
and requests for the further performances of Soviet music in the UK from the Presidium of the 
Soviet Composers’ Union and the Rubinstein Museum of Musical Culture.113 In his responses to 
these letters, Wood gave assurances that he was planning on including more Soviet pieces in the 
repertoire of the Proms in future seasons.114 It should also be noted that there is a considerable 
amount of correspondence between Wood and the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
Ivan Maisky, who served from 1932 to 1943. Wood and Maisky communicated as close friends, 
and the latter often wrote to the former in admiration of his efforts in popularizing Russian and 
Soviet music, as well as encouraging camaraderie between their respective countries.115 Wood 
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died on August 19, 1944. His advocacy of Russian and Soviet music began with the British 
premiere of Eugene Onegin in 1892 and ended with the British premiere of Shostakovich’s 
Symphony No. 8 in C minor, Op. 65 (1943) slightly over a month before his death.116 
In contrast to Wood’s lifelong advocacy for Russian and Soviet musical culture, the 
British musical press was largely ambivalent towards, or dismissive of, Soviet works. While 
Shostakovich’s symphonies (particularly the first, fifth, and seventh) continued to be performed 
from Wood’s to Stalin’s death, most British critics were for the most part unsympathetic to 
Shostakovich’s position and physical well-being during his denouncements by Soviet authorities 
in 1936 and 1948. Their responses to Soviet government intervention in the arts predominately 
ranged from indifference to agreeing with state efforts to aesthetically rein in an impulsive 
artist.117  
A reappraisal of Shostakovich and his music began in the year following Stalin’s death. 
Fairclough argues that the positive shift in British reception was due in part to a generational 
change in the critics to the well-received British premieres of his Symphony No. 10 in E minor, 
Op. 93 (1953), Violin Concerto No. 1 in A minor, Op. 77 (first version completed in 1948, 
premiered in 1955), Piano Concerto No. 2 in F major, Op. 102 (1957), Symphony No. 11, Op. 
103 (titled The Year 1905, completed and premiered in 1957), and Cello Concerto No. 1 in E-flat 
major, Op. 107 (1959);118 as well as to the reopening of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations.119  
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Obstacles to Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange 
As discussed earlier, cultural exchange between the UK and the USSR had essentially 
frozen following the end of the Second World War, and this impasse continued until a couple of 
years after Stalin’s death in 1953. Up to 1955, the exchange of British and Soviet performers was 
carried out on a very limited basis by communist associations and so-called “fellow-travelers” 
backed by the Soviet Embassy in London.120 The impact of such groups was limited in the 
political climate of the Cold War, which had begun immediately after the Second World War, 
and it only reached those men and women already sympathetic to Soviet politics and ideology. In 
the mid-1950s, however, the Soviet Ministry of Culture adjusted its stance towards the West by 
allowing vetted elite Soviet artists to travel abroad in order to promote a more sympathetic 
perception of the state, and to earn highly valuable Western currency that could be taken back to 
the USSR.  
The travel of performers and ensembles between the UK and the USSR was dramatically 
affected by these two countries’ different economic systems. While the British economy was and 
is open to the rest of the world, the Soviets placed stringent controls on the international transfer 
of their currency. This closed economic model was devised largely to protect the Soviet market 
from the ebb and flow of the international market dominated by the capitalist West, in order to 
stabilize the ruble and to facilitate the Soviet planned economy. These controls stipulated that 
only state-approved Soviet organizations could transfer Soviet currency abroad or buy foreign 
currency. Moreover, only certain institutions were allowed to participate in international trade.121 
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These differences created a situation in which Soviet currency was practically inconvertible. 
Moreover, the import of foreign currency strengthened the Soviet state economy by providing 
the state with the means to purchase foreign materials without having to export its own raw 
materials, but the export of foreign currency weakened the Soviet ability to make these 
purchases. In other words, if the Soviet state allowed the free payment of foreign bodies in 
foreign currency, it would have less money in its coffers to buy Western consumer goods and 
industrial equipment. It would then need to sell more of its raw materials to be able to afford 
these products. Thus, the government encouraged the import of foreign currency and discouraged 
its export.  
The USSR’s closed economic system and its refusal to take part in international 
copyright conventions resulted in asymmetrical cultural exchange. These economic and legal 
differences allowed for the Soviet import of Western currency in exchange for Soviet cultural 
material (such as performers and intellectual property), but they discouraged the flow of British 
cultural material in the opposite direction. British currency was usable in both the UK and the 
USSR, but Soviet currency could only be used in the USSR. Once the late Stalinist freeze on 
international travel began to fade, the select Soviet performers who were allowed to travel were 
sent to tour in the UK to earn British currency, while British musicians had nothing financial to 
gain from Soviet tours.122 Moreover, the aforementioned Soviet non-involvement in international 
intellectual property law discouraged British publishers from working with Soviet performers.123 
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As a result, British musicians performing in the USSR would usually receive Soviet 
currency that could not be exchanged for British currency and no, or insufficient, payment in 
British currency. Meanwhile, Soviet musicians in the UK earned British currency, which could 
be used to purchase high-quality goods at special state-run shops back at home. However, the 
majority of this currency was paid to the Soviet government, and the Soviet state had tight 
control over the international travel of its citizens. Nonetheless, many Soviet musicians 
considered the opportunity to perform in the West to have been a much-desired experience.124 
Therefore, there was a high financial incentive for the Soviet state to send its musicians to 
perform in the UK, but little incentive for British musicians to perform in the USSR. To correct 
this imbalance, cultural exchange agreements—which were negotiated at the government level—
arranged for the reciprocal exchange of performers and ensembles and for these performers’ 
remuneration in full or in part in convertible currency. The remainder of this chapter will discuss 
the historical and economic context of these exchanges, the negotiation process, as well as a 
selection of the exchanges themselves.  
 
Initial Musical Exchanges and the First Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement 
In 1955, the British Council established the Soviet Relations Committee (SRC), which 
strove to directly subsidize Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange.125 In the following year, the SRC 
and VOKS invited the British composer and Master of the Queen’s Music Arthur Bliss to lead a 
delegation of British musicians to the USSR. Gregory Roscow posits that Bliss’s position, which 
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he acquired in 1953, made him the obvious musical ambassador of the UK to the USSR.126 The 
tour included performances by the British violinist Alfredo Campoli, oboist Leon Goossens, 
accompanist Gerald Moore, conductor Clarence Raybould, and pianists Phyllis Sellick and Cyril 
Smith in Moscow and Leningrad in Soviet Russia, and in Kiev and Kharkov in Soviet 
Ukraine.127 There, they performed and broadcast recitals of twentieth-century British music 
(including compositions of Malcolm Arnold, Arnold Bax, Lennox Berkeley, Bliss, Britten, 
Thomas Frederick Dunhill, Howard Ferguson, Gustav Holst, John Ireland, William Walton, and 
Ralph Vaughan Williams), attended performances of Russian and Soviet works, and met with the 
Soviet composers Glière, Kabalevsky, Khachaturian, Shaporin, and Shostakovich. The huge 
significance of the British delegation’s final concert with the Moscow State Symphony Orchestra 
was made apparent by the performance of both Russian and British music as a demonstration of 
international friendship, the fact that the concert hall was decorated with both British and Soviet 
flags, and the presence of Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, who were 
present in the company of British Ambassador William Hayter.128 Campoli’s biographer David 
Tunley indicates that Campoli’s rendition of Bliss’s Concerto for Violin and Orchestra (1955) 
under the baton of the composer had the greatest impact in the concert.129 
As one of the first Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges in the postwar era, Bliss’s tour set a 
precedent for future exchanges (including the tours discussed later in this dissertation). As the 
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hosts, the Soviets agreed to pay for international transportation,130 travel within the USSR, and—
as a result of the inconvertibility of Soviet currency—a daily allowance of pocket money for 
each performer in rubles, and a lump sum to compensate every performer in pounds. This 
amount was sent directly to the artists’ agents and divided among the performers upon their 
return to the UK.131 In Tunley’s biographical account, Campoli considered the Soviet daily 
stipend to have been very generous, and he regretted that he was not able to take it home. His 
solution was to purchase a 144-piece collection of glassware and gifts for his wife, Joy, and the 
Soviet ambassador arranged to have these items flown to Heathrow duty-free along with the 
purchases of the other British delegation members.132  
A portion of the lump sum also reimbursed the British Council, which had already paid 
the publishers for the rental costs and permissions of the music performed on tour. Also, the fee 
reimbursed the concert agent Ian Hunter of Harold Holt, Ltd., who had traveled to the USSR 
beforehand to make tour preparations.133 Bliss’s delegation also began a practice in Anglo-Soviet 
cultural exchange that would eventually become the norm: the performance of British soloists 
accompanied by Soviet ensembles in the USSR, and Soviet artists performing with British 
ensembles in the UK. This practice would be used consistently throughout the next thirty years, 
in order to demonstrate international cooperation and to reduce the overall expense of the touring 
party. The touring of large orchestral, ballet, and opera ensembles was reserved for large-scale 
and high-profile cultural exchanges due to the expense involved.134 
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Earlier, in 1954, Bliss had become the president of the Performing Right Society (PRS) 
and he considered the tour to be an opportunity to ease Soviet restrictions regarding the travel of 
future performers to and from the USSR, as well as the Anglo-Soviet exchange of intellectual 
property (such as published scores and parts). During the final banquet of the tour, he was seated 
next to Nikolai Mikhailov (who served as Minister of Culture from 1950 to 1960). Bliss used the 
dinner as an opportunity to convey to the minister the difficulties inherent in Anglo-Soviet 
cultural exchange and his hope that the minister would use his influence to remove some of these 
barriers.135 Later, Bliss addressed the Soviet Composers’ Union in his capacity as PRS president 
and attempted to sway the Soviets from the position of not participating in international 
copyright protections. While his attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, he later commented that 
the Soviet Composers’ Union bristled at the British delegation’s insinuation that the USSR was 
“losing prestige throughout the world by their attitude to international copyright relations.”136 
Another large-scale cultural exchange was the London Philharmonic Orchestra’s (LPO’s) 
tour of the USSR in the following year. The LPO was the first British professional orchestra to 
perform in the USSR. It performed lesser-known British and contemporary Soviet music in 
thirteen concerts between September 19 and October 3, 1956.137 These selections were outside of 
the orchestra’s standard repertoire, required additional rehearsal time, and, as a result, increased 
the already high expenditure for the tour.138 The tour conductors included Adrian Boult, George 
Hurst, and Anatole Fistoulari. The two soloists were the pianist Moura Lympani and Campoli; 
the latter performed Walton’s Violin Concerto (1939). Tunley reports that all of the concerts 
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were sold out in advance. Despite its great popular success, the venture was a financial 
disaster.139 The tour was not considered to be commercial in nature, as it accrued high costs for 
both the British and Soviet governments in covering the LPO’s operational and travel expenses. 
According to the British Council, the Soviet side bore a significantly higher financial burden 
than the British. Soviet expenses were estimated at roughly £22,000, only half of which was 
expected to be recovered through ticket sales. Meanwhile the British Council was prepared to 
contribute only £7,500 to cover related expenses on their side.140 The aim of this very expensive 
venture was primarily political: a grand cultural gesture at a moment when relations with the 
post-Stalinist USSR were appearing to improve. However, these hopes for détente were soon 
dashed. Twenty days after the conclusion of the LPO’s tour, the SCR’s work in particular and 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations as a whole froze as a result of the Soviet suppression of the 
Hungarian uprising in late October and early November of 1956.  
The consolidation of Khrushchev’s hold over the Soviet Communist Party in the late 
1950s facilitated a reopening of cultural ties with the West. The member states of NATO were 
encouraged by the Soviets’ apparent paradigm shift and decided to formally develop cultural 
relations with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. The British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, during his 1959 visit to the USSR, requested that the British and Soviet governments 
draft a bilateral cultural agreement that would ensure a scheduled series of exchanges in the 
scientific, technological, medical, educational, and cultural fields over a period of two years.141 
In the field of the arts, these intergovernmental cultural exchange agreements were intended to 
balance the flow of artists and performers between both sides by entrusting the British and Soviet 
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governments with the task of circumventing the aforementioned difficulties resulting from the 
conversion of Soviet currency, and by setting a minimum number of exchanges in order to 
encourage the organic development of Anglo-Soviet cultural interchange. 
According to a 1975 retrospective report of the Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange 
Agreements, the FCO stated that since their inception, the British government’s goal for the 
agreements were: 
1) to project Britain and British achievements, 2) to enable actual or potential men of 
standing in all fields to find out firsthand about Britain and the Soviet Union, 3) to 
encourage personal contacts between people with common interests, [and] 4) to promote 
the flow of Western ideas into the Soviet Union.142 
 
According to the report, British participation in these exchanges was expected to reduce tensions 
between the UK and the USSR, but also to guide the latter in becoming less oppositional to the 
West. It is very possible that such efforts were ultimately aimed at pacifying and democratizing 
the USSR, or, in other words, at westernizing it. Meanwhile, the FCO viewed the rationale for 
Soviet participation as more pragmatic and oriented toward more short-term goals:  
1) to acquire scientific and technological know-how at minimum cost to themselves, 2) to 
export their achievements in music, the theatre and the arts, [and] 3) to convey a 
favorable image of Soviet policies and life.143 
 
The FCO report also claimed that the Soviets were faced with reconciling their need to gain 
access to Western currency and technological expertise on the one hand, with the concern that an 
excess of contact with the West would weaken the Soviet population’s ideological resolve on the 
other.144 
In a memorandum to Ambassador Frank Roberts, Cultural Attaché to the British 
Embassy in Moscow C.M. James explained that the tours of theatrical and musical companies to 
 





the USSR were well worth the considerable expense because they were essentially an exercise in 
soft power: 
These major cultural occasions are important because they bring the British name before 
a wide section of the Soviet public and enhance our artistic prestige – this in a country, 
which whatever its shortcomings, attaches great importance to achievements in the 
performing arts: they keep windows open [onto] Western ideas and traditions and thus 
encourage artistic experiment in the Soviet Union; and they provide a major occasion 
around which much other useful activity can be built.145 
  
In November 1958, before Macmillan’s aforementioned visit to the USSR, the SRC sent a 
message to VOKS to propose talks about an agreement to exchange professionals and students in 
the fields of education, science, and culture. Georgy Zhukov, the chairman of VOKS, agreed; in 
March 1959, the SRC sent a delegation of its own members as well as its parent organization, the 
British Council, to Moscow to begin negotiations for the first Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange 
Agreement. This meeting was intended to follow Macmillan’s visit.146 The negotiations were 
successful, and the first Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement was completed and put into force. 
Later in 1959, the UK-USSR Association was formed by the British Council to include 
volunteers from the public who were interested in cultural exchange. A few months later, it 
became apparent that negotiations with the Soviets should be conducted on a more official basis, 
and that the creation of the UK-USSR Association had made the SRC redundant. The executive 
committee of the SRC then decided that the British Council itself should conduct future official 
negotiations with the USSR and the SRC disbanded.147 
 
145 James, Memorandum on Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, BW 64/43, GB-Lna. 
146 British Council, Press Release: Soviet Relations Committee Delegation to Moscow, 19 February 1959, 
BW 2/573, GB-Lna. 
147 British Council, Draft for Executive Committee Meeting [on] 3 November 1959, 19 October 1959, BW 
2/573, GB-Lna. In this citation, the former was the date of the meeting, and the latter is date of the draft that was 
written in advance of it. 
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The cultural exchange agreements were based on the concept of reciprocity, meaning that 
similar numbers of professionals and students were sent and received by both sides. In the sphere 
of classical music, the assumption was that the travel of a large ensemble from one side should 
be followed by a comparable ensemble sent in the other direction; or, that the exchanges should 
be conducted simultaneously. The principle of reciprocity was intended to ensure that both sides 
dedicated their financial resources and shouldered comparable monetary risks. Importantly 
though, the agreements only mandated the minimum requirements for either country; further 
exchanges negotiated between Goskontsert and Western concert agents were also encouraged. 
Similar agreements were also being implemented between the US and the USSR, as well as other 
Western European nations.  
The major musical manifestations in the first Anglo-Soviet agreement were tours by the 
Royal Philharmonic Orchestra and the Leningrad Philharmonic in each other’s country. The 
Leningrad Philharmonic tour was scheduled to coincide with the Edinburgh Festival, and it was 
intended that the ensemble would appear in both Edinburgh and London in September 1960. The 
British Council also expected that the British concert agent Victor Hochhauser would be the 
primary negotiator for the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra’s Soviet tour.148 According to a Foreign 
Office report, the negotiations ran into some unspecified difficulties,149 and the Royal 
Philharmonic’s tour was rescheduled for 1963.150 The cultural exchange agreements were on the 
whole successful, and further iterations were agreed upon for the remainder of the USSR’s 
existence. 
 
148 British Council, SRC Programme for 1960/61, 1 July 1959, BW 2/573, GB-Lna. The position of British 
concert agents in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
149 Foreign Office, Quarterly Progress Report on Anglo-Soviet Exchanges, March 1960, BW 2/573, GB-
Lna. 




 The British and Soviet musical establishments developed along very different lines in the 
decades before the renewal of their cultural relations after the death of Stalin. One major field of 
difference was the extent of the involvement and patronage of their respective governments in 
cultural matters. Overall, the Soviet government, particularly after the cultural revolution and the 
institution of creative unions, was categorically more involved in the cultivation of the high arts. 
The government gave substantial subsidies for the education of performers and composers, 
supported performance ensembles throughout the USSR, provided remuneration to composers, 
and published their music. However, this level of patronage was only intended for elite 
musicians and was not available to every citizen. This extensive governmental support was put in 
place namely because the Soviets considered the high arts to be essential in demonstrating 
prestige, improving (or at least appearing to improve) the cultural literacy of its citizenry, and 
fulfilling a specific ideological purpose: the creation of socialist realist art. This ideology 
inevitably resulted in the necessity to control the arts to ensure that they were proponents of 
socialist realism and not subversions of it. As Tomoff explains, this task was largely left to the 
leadership of the cultural intelligentsia (in classical music, this role was played by the 
Composers’ Union). Meanwhile, their administrative overseers (the Ministry of Culture and the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party) periodically intervened to lead short-lived 
ideological campaigns.  
 The development of British classical music institutions, on the other hand, developed 
along very different lines. Historically, the British government took little interest in the subsidy 
of British music and left the task of support largely to the free market and private patronage. In 
the twentieth century, government patronage emerged through two different avenues: the rise of 
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the BBC as the chief broadcaster and employer of British musicians, and the subsidizing of 
classical music through the wartime CEMA. After the Second World War, the coalition 
government formed between the Labour and Conservative Parties made education more 
accessible to the citizenry and upgraded the relatively limited CEMA to the more robust Arts 
Council. With the support of the Arts Council, the British finally developed a stable state-
supported national opera, as well as support for some opera, orchestral, and contemporary music 
enterprises in the regions. 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations were shaped largely by the drastic political shifts 
throughout the twentieth century. Before the Second World War, the USSR, through the state 
organ VOKS, sought to position itself as a socialist model state to sway left-leaning Western 
intellectuals to its side and for them to use their influence to encourage more sympathy for the 
USSR in their own countries. Cultural exchange between the USSR and the West was hampered 
largely by the outbreak of World War II, but relations between the Soviets and their Western 
allies improved considerably at this time, and a procedure was implemented for the sale of Soviet 
intellectual property to the West soon after the war’s conclusion. At this point, two supranational 
hegemonic systems emerged: the American, British, and Western European states on one side, 
and the Soviet and Eastern European states on the other.  
One major result of this reassessment was the opening of cultural relations with the 
USSR’s supposed rivals: the capitalist world of the US and Western Europe. In the mid- to late 
1950s, the framework for Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange was being put into place; it included 
the exploratory tours of important political leaders, as well as musicians, scholars, and concert 
agents. By the end of the decade, formal intergovernmental agreements formalized cultural 
exchange and allowed for long term planning of the tours of large ensembles and festivals in 
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both the UK and the USSR. The brief history discussed in this chapter provides the background 
for the accounts that follow, which are four case studies that demonstrate how British and Soviet 
music professionals participated in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange, and how they were able to 




BRITTEN, SHOSTAKOVICH, AND THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING ANGLO-
SOVIET MUSICAL STYLE 
 
I must admit that right up to my departure for the Soviet Union, I was beset with doubts 
whether our musical art—which had developed in national traditions different from those 
of Russia—would be understandable and acceptable to Soviet audiences. I am glad that 
my anxieties were dissolved at the very first concert. Soviet audiences are unusually 
musical—this I knew beforehand—but are also remarkable for the enviable breadth of 
their musical appreciation. They are a wonderful public. [emphasis mine] 
 
- Benjamin Britten describing the positive reception of his music at the Days of British 
Music Festival in Moscow in an interview with Pravda, 18 March 19631   
 
 
International cultural competition is made possible where at least two countries value 
certain areas of expression, have similar methods in judging value in these areas, and have 
common criteria for evaluating the prowess of the participating countries. Value in the arts can 
be assessed according to culturally constructed criteria that are dependent on the aesthetic values 
of groups of people. In many cases, aesthetic values are not shared across different groups, 
particularly if they are closely associated with the cultural manifestations of only one of them. 
While international and aesthetic commonalities have developed and flourished throughout 
global history, they are less evident between nations that erect barriers that impede international 
communication. Furthermore, governments usually only invest in cultural manifestations that 
they consider worthy of their support. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1950s was a 
 
1 “The Artist—to the People,” trans. unknown, Pravda [Truth], in Britten on Music, ed. Paul Kildea 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 233. The original Russian text is as follows: Должен признаться, что до 
самого приезда в СССР я был озабочен сомнениями, будет ли понято и принято советскими слушателями 
наше музькальное искусство, развивавшееся в иных национальных традициях, чем русское. Я счастлив, что 
мои опасения развеялись на первом же концерте. Советские слушатели не только на редкость музыкальны – 
об этом я знал и раньше, – но и отличаются завидной широтой художественного восприятия. Это чудесная 
публика! It appears in “Khudozknik—narodu” [“The Artist for the People”], Pravda no. 77, 18 March 1963, 3. 
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period when the Soviet cultural establishment began opening itself to musicians that it 
aesthetically appreciated, and not only to the performers and composers it politically valued. In 
other words, it became more likely that Western composers could be complimented in an official 
setting, even if they were not affiliated with the Communist Party or furthering Soviet interests.  
According to proponents of cultural competition, it is possible for countries to argue that 
they are more cultured than others by demonstrating excellence in mutually valued cultural fields 
(such as athletics, chess, film, etc.), and they will thus invest large amounts of resources in these 
fields accordingly. David Caute posits that both the Soviet Union and the West shared an 
appreciation of classical music as a marker of artistic success and sought to demonstrate their 
own superiority and modernity through the demonstration of musical excellence.2 The Soviets 
invested heavily in the education of promising young musicians in order for them to compete in 
international solo competitions, and in awarding generous state support to composers, musicians, 
and ensembles.3 From the Soviet perspective, achievement in the arts was intended to be an 
indicator that the USSR was the torchbearer of the world.4 Importantly, any attempt to evaluate 
such prowess is ultimately subjective, but it is rooted in a shared subjectivity. In other words, 
cultural competition is only possible when both sides agree on its importance and decide upon 
common rules of engagement.  
The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were two countries where classical music still 
enjoyed a large amount of hegemonic power for much of the twentieth century. Throughout 
much of the Cold War, knowledge in classical music was seen as a sign of cultured-ness and was 
 
2 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-6. 
3 Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945-
1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 49-50. 
4 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 
and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 54-58. 
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encouraged by both governments for their respective citizenries.5 As we have seen, the BBC was 
an educational public service, which instituted sponsorship of the Proms at the Queen’s Hall, 
London, in 1927 in order to raise the cultural literacy of the British people.6 Meanwhile, the 
cultivation of high culture was an important part of Soviet ideology throughout the entire Soviet 
period, and the appreciation of the arts held an important position in both young people’s and 
adult education in the USSR.  
However, just because classical music was valued in these two countries, it does not 
automatically follow that both nations valued the same kind of music. If the Soviets had 
produced only socialist propaganda and the British high modernist serialism, then both musical 
cultures might as well have been trying to communicate in two different languages. However, 
there is ample evidence to suggest not only that they did find common ground, but also that this 
point of compatibility was already inherent in the mainstream of both of their musical 
establishments, which had their roots in the same Western classical music tradition. Patrick Zuk 
calls attention to many similarities between the ideals of many British and Soviet composers. He 
posits that many of them avoided excessive experimentation for its own sake, sought to compose 
music accessible to their publics, and that some British composers coincidentally agreed with 
some of the tenents of socialist realism. For example, Ralph Vaughan Williams’s dedication to 
composing music rooted in a national style derived from folk music closely resembled the 
socialist realist principles of narodnost’ and massovost’.7  
 
5 Arguably, the cultural hegemony and prestige of classical music and other forms of the high arts gradually 
eroded throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout this period, these arts had a diminishing presence in Anglo-
Soviet cultural exchange. 
6 Asa Briggs, The BBC: The First Fifty Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 253-60; and Jenny 
Doctor, “A New Dimension: The BBC Takes on the Proms, 1920-44,” in The Proms: A New History, eds. Jenny 
Doctor, David Wright, and Nicholas Kenyon (London: Thames, 2007), 76-89. 
7 Patrick Zuk, “Soviet Music Studies Outside: Glasnost’ and After,” in Russian Music Since 1917: 
Reappraisal and Rediscovery, eds. Patrick Zuk and Marina Frolova-Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 71-74. The concept of narodnost’ was discussed on Page 54. 
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Why Britten?  
Benjamin Britten was involved in two of the intergovernmental Anglo-Soviet cultural 
exchanges of the early 1960s: The Days of British Music Festival held in Moscow and Leningrad 
in March 1963, and the English Opera Group’s (EOG’s) 1964 tour of the USSR. Britten’s active 
involvement in these performances exhibited the composer’s cultural importance to both 
countries, as well as the high appreciation that the composer had for Soviet musicians and 
audiences. While both Bush and Bliss arrived in the Soviet music scene earlier than Britten (the 
former during the 1930s and the latter in the 1950s), neither reached the same level of 
prominence that Britten attained among Soviet audiences, performers, and ensembles. Britten 
had been developing fruitful collaborations and close friendships with elite Soviet musicians 
since 1960—without ever being prompted to do so by either the British or Soviet governments—
and the high esteem that this Soviet elite placed on the composer made ensuring his involvement 
in Anglo-Soviet cultural relations a high priority for the British administration.  
In order to open an international dialogue with the Soviets through cultural exchange, the 
British government sought to find a musical representative. Musicologist Cameron Pyke 
indicates that Britten’s acceptability as a traditionalist (defined against Western atonal composers 
such as Arnold Schoenberg) and his status as an elite British composer meant that his 
participation in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges was desired by both the British and Soviet 
governments.8 I will show below that statements made by the British diplomats who promoted 
the use of large-scale exchanges in the arts between the UK and the USSR indicate that they 
surmised that Britten would be ideal for this purpose. The aim of this chapter is to suggest that 
both the British and Soviet governments considered Britten to be an ideal cultural diplomat, that 
 
8 Pyke, 156-57. 
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this status made his participation in the 1963 Days of British Music Festival in the USSR a 
necessity for the event’s success, and that this prestige enabled the composer to negotiate directly 
with the Soviet authorities for favorable performance conditions for the EOG’s tour. 
It is not surprising that as Anglo-Soviet cultural relations opened in the mid-1950s and 
early 1960s, the Soviet musical community would seek out their British counterparts and begin 
collaborative professional relationships, arrange reciprocal visits, and exchange their intellectual 
property with them. After Stalinist restrictions on the travel of musicians and music during the 
1930s, the Second World War, and in the late Stalinist period, it is likely that Soviet musicians 
found these limits to be very constraining. Yurchak explains that inaccessibility only increased 
the appeal of travel, and Soviet citizens generally constructed elaborate imaginary versions of 
unreachable places through the cultural objects (such as consumables, rock music, literature, 
etc.), to which they had access.9 It is not too far a departure to utilize Yurchak’s framework to 
suggest that printed scores and recordings of classical music contributed to the Western 
imaginary. As a newly reaccessible Western capitalist country, the UK held appeal for Soviet 
musicians simply because it was a part of the West and was connected to consumer goods (such 
as blue jeans) and popular music. For Russian Anglophiles, England held a place of particular 
interest due to its quintessential cultural monuments of Shakespeare, Hogarth, and Dickens.10  
 
9 See Chapter 5 of Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
10 Eleanory Gilburd explains that the Ministry of Culture in the mid-1950s began sending Soviet 
representatives to the UK to write travel diaries and film documentaries for dissemination in the USSR. Sergei 
Obraztov, in particular, used his own subjective experience and the novels of Dickens as frames for his books and 
films. His audience consisted primarily of intellectuals who had already “traveled” to London through Dickens’s 
novels. Eleanory Gilburd, “Books and Borders: Sergei Obraztsov and Soviet Travels to London in the 1950s,” in 
Turzism: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism, eds. Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane 
P. Koenker (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 237-45. In her memoirs, the soprano Galina Vishnevskaya 
reminisced that since her childhood reading of Dickens, she had been fond of the English people, and she compared 
Britten’s appearance to her mental image of David Copperfield. Also, she referred to Aldeburgh as an “enchanting 
nook on the seashore where the spirit of Old England is still preserved” and “where people are so friendly and 
simple.” Vishnevskaya, 364-65. 
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However, only a few British musicians were able to garner popular success, professional 
respect, and some degree of ideological acceptance in the USSR. Of the British composers 
involved in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange, Britten was perhaps the most successful in each of 
these areas.11 From the 1950s to his death in 1976, Britten was considered to be one of most 
influential living British composers in the UK. This high level of prestige, in addition to his 
feeling of responsibility for serving society with his post-tonal music,12 made Britten an ideal 
musical ambassador to the USSR. In the following sections, I will discuss a series of events in 
which Britten’s suitability as an Anglo-Soviet cultural diplomat was demonstrated by both 
British and Soviet actors. 
It is very possible that Russian, and perhaps even more recent Soviet, music had a 
considerable impact on Britten. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the position of Russian 
 
11 Other British composers involved in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange from 1953 to 1975 include Arthur 
Bliss, who made aforementioned trips to the USSR, and William Walton, who briefly visited for a performance of 
his music at the Days of British Music Festival in 1971. A selection of both Michael Tippett’s and Walton’s music 
was performed at the Days of British Music Festival in 1963. While these were largely isolated events, Britten’s 
music was consistently performed in the USSR, and some of his works (such as the Cello Suites Nos. 1, Op. 72 
(1964), 2, Op. 80 (1967), and 3, Op. 87 (1971) and the song cycle Poet’s Echo, Op. 76 (1965)) were written 
specifically for Soviet performers. Alan Bush also developed a close relationship with the USSR, and his efforts to 
have his operas performed there will be discussed in greater depth later in Chapter 3. Bush traveled to the USSR 
several times to perform and attend performances of his music and to participate as a foreign guest in the Second 
Composers’ Union Congress, and he did so as a member of the British Communist Party. 
12 The following quote is one example that illustrates Britten’s belief that the composer should serve 
society. “I am first and foremost an artist—and as an artist I want to serve the community. In other days, artists were 
the servants of institutions like the Church, or of Society in the sense of private patrons. In these days, with a few 
notable exceptions, the Church seems indifferent to serious art, and taxation has largely ruled out private patrons. 
And the artist today has become the servant of the whole community. It is the State that commissions large 
paintings, and Grand Operas; it is the guarantors of five guineas or less who keep out Festivals or small Music 
Societies alive. Today it is the community, or all of us in our own small ways, that orders the artist about. And I do 
not think that is such a bad thing either. It is not a bad thing for an artist to try to serve all sorts of different people.” 
Benjamin Britten, “Freeman of Lowestoft,” Tempo 21 (Autumn 1951): 3-5. This speech was later republished in 
Paul Kildea, ed. Britten on Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 108-11. Further examples include the 
following: Benjamin Britten, “Speech on Receiving Honorary Degree at Hull University,” in Kildea, ed., Britten on 
Music, 214-16. Examples of such pieces of music include his works for children: The Young Person’s Guide to the 
Orchestra, Let’s Make an Opera, Op. 45 (1949), and Noye’s Fludde, Op. 59 (1958), as well as his incidental music 
for film, radio, and theater. See Philip Reed, “The Instrumental Music of Benjamin Britten: A Study and Catalogue 
of his Music for Film, Theatre and Radio,” PhD diss. University of East Anglia, 1987. In this dissertation, the term 




music in the repertoire of British ensembles had become more commonplace in part because of 
the advocacy of Proms conductor Henry Wood. However, it is possible that a more direct 
connection between Russia and the young Britten can be drawn. Cameron Pyke demonstrates 
that the composer had a lifelong admiration for Russian music—particularly that of 
Tchaikovsky—and that this music had a profound influence on his musical style.13 This aesthetic 
affinity was also evident in Britten’s review of the 1936 London performance of Shostakovich’s 
Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District,14 as well as in his defense of the work against the 
dismissive reactions of the allegedly conservative composers of the previous generation and his 
own colleagues.15 
As a young man in the 1930s, Britten had been a left-leaning intellectual and artist, who 
was both socially and professionally involved with other, and more outspoken, young leftist 
intellectuals.16 This community considered capitalism to be responsible for the global economic 
depression, fascism to be barbaric, and socialism to be the only political means for progress. In 
1935, the young composer joined the Peace Pledge Union, which was the most prominent 
pacifist organization in the UK. He wrote the film score for the 1936 anti-war film Peace of 
Britain, and he wrote the Peace Pledge Union’s anthem, the “Pacifist March” (1937).17 The 
USSR—and the socialist revolution it fostered—was a striking contrast to a politically 
conservative Europe that appeased Adolf Hitler’s greed. It became a beacon of hope for these 
young artists in its domestic reforms (government subsidized education, medical care, and the 
 
13 See Chapter 1 of Cameron Pyke, Benjamin Britten and Russia (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2016). 
14 Benjamin Britten, “Soviet Opera at B.B.C.: Shostakovich’s ‘Lady Macbeth,’” in Kildea, ed., Britten on 
Music, 17. 
15 Humphrey Carpenter, Benjamin Britten: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 74-75; and Pauline 
Fairclough, “The ‘Old Shostakovich’: Reception in the British Press,” Music & Letters 88, no. 2 (May 2007): 268. 
16 Donald Mitchell, Britten and Auden in the Thirties: The Year 1936 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 
2000), 20-32. 
17 Brian McMahon, “Why did Benjamin Britten Return to Wartime England?” in Benjamin Britten: New 
Perspectives on His Life and Work, ed. Lucy Walker (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2009), 175-77. 
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arts), as well as its strictly anti-fascist stance. Britten’s friend and publisher, Donald Mitchell, 
argued that the anti-fascism of the composer and his immediate circle were clearly evident in the 
political subtext of the song cycle Our Hunting Fathers, Op. 8 (1936).18 Mitchell also noted that 
Britten believed in the arts’ ability to educate and persuade throughout his entire creative life. 
This belief of music’s power to change people’s viewpoints—which is a practice some 
commentators would define as propaganda—had a powerful effect on Britten’s music after his 
involvement in the General Post Office (GPO) Film Unit in the 1930s,19 and would culminate in 
large-scale public works such as the War Requiem, Op. 66 (1961).20 It is possible that this belief 
resonated with Soviet perceptions of the artist as the people’s guide to progress. In summation, it 
is very possible that his aesthetic appreciation of Russian and Soviet music and his political 
admiration for the Soviet support for education and the arts endured to the time he came into 
contact with the USSR firsthand. 
The Soviet music critic and theorist Grigory Shneerson (1901-1982) was one of the 
primary aesthetic authorities for the Soviet musical establishment from the 1940s until the 1970s. 
As the primary foreign music critic of Sovetskaia muzyka, the journal of the Composers’ Union, 
he was one of the major shapers of aesthetic policy in classical music.21 As Tomoff explains in 
Creative Union, music professionals such as Shneerson did not have complete ideological 
autonomy, and, as a result, there were limits to what they could express in print. These limits 
meant that musical education still had to meet certain political criteria, and that Soviet music 
 
18 Mitchell, Britten and Auden in the Thirties, 32-49. 
19 Ibid., 57-63. 
20 Ibid., 133. 
21 From 1931 to 1935, Shneerson served as general secretary of the International Music Bureau in Moscow; 
he later became head of the foreign bureau of the Composers’ Union from 1935 to 1940, and he was appointed the 
head of the music department of VOKS from 1942 to 1948. He was editor of Sovetskayia muzyka from 1948 to 
1961, and from 1968 he was the president of the Soviet committee for RILM abstracts. Louise Wiggins, “‘Story of a 
Friendship’: Alan Bush, Grigorii Shneerson and Cultural Diplomacy before and during the Cold War,” Russian 
Journal of Communication 8, no. 3 (2016): 259-60. 
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scholars could not directly oppose the party line. Yet within those limitations, Shneerson and 
other critics and musicologists were able to use their creative expertise, itself derived from their 
education in music (which their political superiors lacked), to shape aesthetic policy within those 
limits that were imposed from above.22  
In his monograph O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi (About Music Alive and Dead)—which was 
published in 1960 and, in a revised and enlarged edition, in 1964—Shneerson argued against the 
Western position on high modernism and its place in history. This monograph consolidated years 
of his Sovetskaia muzyka criticism into one volume. According to Shneerson, twentieth-century 
music in Western Europe and the United States was suffering from a crisis, which had resulted 
from divergent routes of harmonic development. While he did place Schoenberg and his atonal 
theories and compositional practice in the context of nineteenth-century developments in musical 
style and further placed him at the dawn of the twentieth century, Shneerson explained that 
Schoenberg’s “emancipation of dissonance” had set the stage for harmful developments in the 
so-called “avant-garde.” He charged that such modernisms as pointillism and musique concrète 
resulted in music that was incomprehensible to the listener. He then raised the question of 
whether this music was written for or against the people, and answered that modernist music was 
a result of composers’ self-indulgent stylistic experimentation (i.e. formalism). In these circles, 
Western critics reveled in these experiments in their pursuit of whatever was fashionable at the 
moment. Meanwhile, the actual audiences were forgotten. However, Shneerson maintained that 
in socialist countries, the people had seized power and had, as a result, ensured that music was 
 
22 Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composer, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 1-5. 
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being written for the masses and was being protected from the aforementioned harmful 
bourgeois influences.23  
Shneerson criticized the claim that high modernism was the ultimate stage of a 
teleological progression of musical eras (i.e. the sequence of Baroque, Classicism, Romanticism, 
Impressionism, and Modernism) demarcated in Paul Collaer’s monograph La musique moderne 
(1955). In Collaer’s framework, modernism developed within three historical periods: 1) open 
experimentation in rhythm and harmony between 1909 and 1923; 2) distancing from harmonic 
and orchestral traditions starting in 1923; and 3) the emergence of electronic music starting in the 
1940s.24 Shneerson protested that this model only referenced a small portion of the musical 
creativity of the twentieth century, and ignored the music of composers Manuel de Falla, Sergei 
Rachmaninov, Ottorino Respighi, Ralph Vaughan Williams, and many others who were still 
composing in a tonal idiom at the same time as the so-called high modernists.25 Shneerson also 
took issue with Karl H. Wörner’s position that high modernism and more conventionally tonal 
contemporary music were locked in the latest of a series of conflicts between progressives and 
conservatives in musical history, which in the distant past included the emergence of Phillipe de 
Vitry’s Ars Nova in the fourteenth century and Claudio Monteverdi’s Seconda Prattica at the 
turn of the seventeenth century. Wörner then positioned the dichotomy of Classicism and 
Romanticism in Germany during the nineteenth century: Felix Mendelssohn versus Robert 
Schumann, Johannes Brahms versus Richard Wagner, Paul Hindemith versus Schoenberg, etc. 
Moreover, Wörner posited that the primary contemporaneous musical conflict was between the 
 
23 Grigorii Shneerson, O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi [About Music, Alive and Dead] (Moscow: Muzyka 
[Music], 1964), 6-15. 
24 See Chapter 1 of Paul Collaer, La musique moderne, 1905-1955 [Modern Music, 1905-1955] (Brussels: 
Elsevier, 1955). 
25 Shneerson, O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi, 9-10. 
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tonalism of the conservatives and the atonalism of the progressives, and that they were the two 
poles of musical evolution.26 Shneerson protested that reducing the history of musical 
development along the lines of conservatives versus progressives was a gross simplification that 
ignored the unique characteristics of the different nationalities and audiences of these composers 
throughout history, which in turn caused differences in how musical aesthetics developed among 
various groups of people. Instead, he interpreted the tonal vs. atonal conflict in the context of 
accessibility, arguing that it was a case of whether music was for or against the interests of the 
people.27  
It is important to note that Shneerson’s rejection of high modernism was not a 
postmodernist critique of the fundamental viability of a teleological modernist narrative. 
Shneerson was still a modernist in the sense that he believed that the arts progressed through 
time, and that they continuously evolved into something objectively higher than they were 
before. However, he believed that the Western high modernists were developing along the wrong 
path, were becoming more distant from the listening public, and were becoming more entrenched 
in the capitalist world. From a Marxist perspective, capitalism was the stage of socio-economic 
development before socialism, and therefore capitalist music was considered to be regressive by 
Shneerson, Khrennikov, and the speakers at the Second Composers’ Union Congress discussed 
above because it had failed to progress to socialism. This line of reasoning led to parallel, 
incompatible modernisms—the Western and the Soviet—the proponents of which considered 
only their own version to be the objectively correct one.28  
 
26 See Karl H. Wörner, Neue Musik in der Entscheidung [New Music in the Decision] (Mainz: Schott, 
1954). 
27 Shneerson, O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi, 10-14. 
28 Joanna Bullivant also discusses the presence of competing modernisms during the Cold War. She 
theorizes that that Bush’s composition efforts, after the 1948 Zhdanov decrees, constituted his search for a form of 
politically activist modernism that was separated from Western high modernism and aligned with Soviet cultural 
ideology. See Joanna Bullivant, “‘A World of Marxist Orthodoxy’? Alan Bush’s Wat Tyler in Great Britain and the 
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Shneerson also rejected the view that the musical center of the world was France, (West) 
Germany, and Austria, and that it was the harmonic experiments of the Austrian Schoenberg and 
the rhythmic innovations of the Russian émigré Igor Stravinsky that had opened the new stage of 
musical development. Instead, he pointed to the ideologically significant October Revolution, the 
moment when the Russian people took control of cultural production, as the crucial turning 
point, and argued that the music of composers such as Shostakovich was truly the most advanced 
because it emerged from this liberated society. In this view, Leningrad and Moscow, and not 
Paris and Vienna, had become the musical centers of the world. While this view adhered strictly 
to the exceptionalism prevalent in Soviet ideology, it also argued that Soviet modernism, as 
opposed to its Western counterpart, was in the service of society.  
A major development in Soviet criticism regarding Western contemporary music after the 
death of Stalin was the aesthetic demarcation of progressive and regressive Western composers. 
During the height of Stalinist isolationism, the “progressive-ness” of Western composers was 
determined primarily by their political affiliation. For example, communist intellectuals and, to a 
lesser extent, left-leaning intellectuals were considered progressive enough for their art to enter 
the USSR. Later, during the 1950s, Western composers who composed within a generally tonal 
idiom and within a national style were also deemed acceptable by the Soviet cultural 
establishment, as long as they did not voice anti-Soviet or anti-socialist political sentiments. 
Shneerson referred to these composers as musical patriots, and he rejected serialists, considering 
them to be anti-nationalist and misanthropic.29 
 
German Democratic Republic,” in Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds, ed. 
Pauline Fairclough (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), 7-21. 
29 Shneerson, O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi, 46. 
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In the 1964 edition of O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi, Shneerson credited Ralph Vaughan 
Williams with embodying progressive qualities in British classical music. Vaughan Williams’s 
primarily tonal musical idiom, his activities as a collector and arranger of folk music, his use of 
folk music as a point of inspiration to help develop a national school of composition, and his 
belief in the need to compose music that was useful for society all coincided with the Soviet 
interpretation of modernism. Shneerson also indicated that Vaughan Williams had inspired a new 
generation of progressive English composers that included Arnold Bax, Frank Bridge, John 
Ireland, Arthur Bliss, Michael Tippett, Arthur Benjamin, William Walton, Alan Bush, and 
Britten.30 Shneerson then singled out Britten as an exemplar of the current English national 
school for his revival of and contributions to the English operatic tradition, his arrangements of 
English folk songs, his tackling of complicated dramatic and psychological concepts in Peter 
Grimes, and his composition of music useful to society (such as pieces written for children and 
amateurs). Shneerson described Britten as a multitalented composer who demonstrated mastery 
over multiple spheres of musical composition. He drew parallels between Britten’s A Young 
Person’s Guide to the Orchestra: Variations and Fugue on a Theme of Henry Purcell, Op. 34 
(1946) and Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf, Op. 67 (1936); analyzed Britten’s Sinfonia da 
Requiem, Op. 20 (1940);31 admired his vocal settings in English, French, and Italian; and called 
special attention to Ballad of Heroes, Op. 14 (1939)—which commemorated the struggle against 
fascism during the Spanish Civil War—and to Britten’s orchestral wit in Simple Symphony, Op. 
4 (1934).32  
 
30 Ibid., 67-73. 
31 I would like to highlight the fact that Shneerson included an analysis of the Sinfonia da Requiem in O 
muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi to call attention to its progressive aesthetic value. In this context, Shneerson considered the 
requiem a genre of Western classical music for the concert hall. The position of requiems in the USSR will be 
further discussed on Page 201. 
32 Ibid., 73-77. 
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Britten’s Sea Interludes in Moscow (1955) 
After Stalin’s death, the British Council and the Foreign Office closely monitored the 
developing political climate in the USSR. In March 1955, the UK Embassy in Moscow noticed a 
possible indication that the Soviet state was changing its stance to Western culture. At this time, 
the Soviet conductor Nikolai Anosov presented a symphonic concert in the House of the Soviets 
in Moscow which included Britten’s Four Sea Interludes from “Peter Grimes,” Op. 33a 
(1945),33 George Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue (1924), Carl Nielsen’s Symphony No. 2 (titled 
The Four Temperaments), Op. 16 (1902), and Yasushi Akutagawa’s Triptyque for String 
Orchestra (1953). Even though the concert was broadcast, it was so poorly advertised that the 
British diplomatic corps was not aware of it in advance. In a short report to the Foreign Office, a 
representative of the British Embassy in Moscow indicated that they were informed of the 
concert after the fact by a Soviet official, who happened upon the concert by chance:34 
A senior official in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us that he saw the notice 
outside the hall and took a ticket for the concert. He said it was well attended and that the 
music was well received. His reaction to Britten’s music was very favorable.35 
 
The embassy representative then interpreted the programmed compositions—which would have 
been rejected as formalistic a few years earlier—as an indication that the Soviet cultural 
establishment was considering loosening late Stalinist restrictions on acceptable musical 
expression.36 Roughly a week later, the embassy reported that the Soviet critic Konstantin Sakva 
had published an enthusiastically positive review of Britten’s Four Sea Interludes. Sakva 
acknowledged that Britten possessed “considerable technical skill and a remarkable ability to 
 
33 Pyke, 146-47. 
34 Chancery, British Embassy, Moscow to Northern Department, Foreign Office, 30 March 1955, NS 
1751/3 At a recent symphony concert, contemporary works of Western composers were played (hereafter cited as 
NS 1751/3), in FO 371/116811 Cultural Exchanges between UK and Soviet Union in the field of music, 1955 





hear the voices of nature (the waves of the sea beating on the shore, the sound of the shingle, and 
the raging elements in the fourth interlude – ‘Storm’).”37 It seems that the Soviet critic was 
receptive to Britten’s musical ability to depict the sea extramusically through the interludes, and 
that Sakva viewed this ability as an example of his skill with intonazia and musical imagery. 
The embassy representative also pointed out that the very same critic had written in 1949 
a scathing description of Peter Grimes for the book Young Musicians—saying that the opera 
reeked of “putrefaction” and that the opera’s protagonist was only of “clinical interest”—during 
the anti-cosmopolitan campaign.38 It is possible that the change in Sakva’s assessment was 
related to changes regarding the reception of foreign influences in the Soviet political 
environment.39 The Foreign Office forwarded this information regarding the concert and the 
change in Sakva’s position to the newly formed Soviet Relations Committee (discussed in the 
previous chapter).40 Pauline Fairclough notes that the British government had been unsuccessful 
in its attempts to broker the exchange of performers during late Stalinism.41 From the evidence I 
have cited, it seems very possible that the Foreign Office considered both the staging of a concert 
and its positive official reception to be a sign that the Soviets were opening up to the prospect of 
cultural exchange with the West generally, and with the British in particular.  
 
 
37 Chancery to Northern Department, 7 April 1955, NS 1751/4 Continuation of the favourable reception of 
a concert of western music including works by Britten & Gershwin (hereafter cited as NS 1751/4), in FO 
371/116811, GB-Lna. 
38 Ibid. 
39 It should also be noted that the root cause change of Sakva’s position may have been based in the 
difference of genre of the Sea Interludes and Peter Grimes, that he positively assessed the former’s evocation of 
nature and dismissed the pathological title character of the latter, and that these assessments were not connected to 
the changes that took place in the USSR after 1953. Even if this was the case, I would still argue that the change of 
political leadership in the mid-1950s triggered a paradigm shift in the cultural establishment, which allowed for the 
general reassessment of Western contemporary music. 
40 Northern Department of Foreign Office, 16 May 1955, NS 1751/4, in FO 371/116811, GB-Lna. 
41 Pauline Fairclough, “Détente to Cold War: Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchanges in the Late Stalin Period,” 
in Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds, ed. Pauline Fairclough (Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 37-38. 
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Pravda on Progressive and Regressive Tendencies in Western Music (1960, 1962) 
An attack on atonalism and Western modernism—which was attributed in print to 
Shostakovich—was published in Pravda in 1960.42 This commentary was very similar to the 
party line set by Shneerson’s aforementioned criticism of the period: the demarcation of 
progressive and regressive Western composers, the denouncement of serialism and other 
modernist trends, and the approval of nationalist compositional styles. Determining the 
authorship of such a statement can be a difficult task, as it is unclear whether Shostakovich wrote 
the article of his own volition, merely signed an article penned by someone else, was pressured 
to write or approve it, or even had any part at all in its drafting and publication.43 In a 
conversation with Rostropovich, Shostakovich admitted that he sometimes signed official 
statements without reading them, in order to be left alone to compose in peace.44 It is important 
to notice that the content of the article followed the example set by the remarks of Khrennikov 
and the other speakers at the Composers’ Union meeting in 1957. The musicologist Laurel E. 
Fay suggests that Shostakovich mastered the pragmatic use of Soviet official language, and that 
the presence of his signature effectively does not confirm or deny whether the composer actually 
agreed or disagreed with the position above that signature.45 While one can question the nature of 
the authorship and the authenticity of the Pravda article, it is clear that Shostakovich (or an 
anonymous author speaking as him) was representing the Soviet musical establishment and, by 
extension, the Soviet government in stating the official party line regarding Western modernism. 
 
42 D. Shostakovich, “O khudozhnike nashikh dnei” [“About the Artist in Our Time”], Pravda no. 251, 7 
September 1960, 2. 
43 Later in this chapter, I will reference this article as Shostakovich’s publication; nevertheless, the 
ambiguity surrounding the authorship of this article still stands. At the end of the article, Shostakovich’s name is 
given in print as its author. 
44 David Conway, “A New Year’s Message from Dmitri Shostakovich,” Slavonic and East European 
Review 80, no. 2 (April 2002): 291. 
45 Laurel E. Fay, Shostakovich: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 173. 
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Moreover, the Pravda article is thematically consistent with Shostakovich’s other disparaging 
public statements regarding serialism at that time.46 Incidentally, statements such as these could 
have been interpreted as a sign of compliance with the regime, since Shostakovich was admitted 
into the Soviet Communist Party less than a week after the publication of the Pravda article.47 
According to Pauline Fairclough, Shostakovich had avoided joining the Party for as long 
as could.48 However by 1960, his non-party status was no longer tenable. According to Isaac 
Glikman, careerist officials seeking promotion in the Party’s hierarchy pressured Shostakovich to 
join, and the beleaguered composer eventually relented and immediately regretted his decision.49 
Fairclough notes that Shostakovich’s family and friends witnessed Shostakovich weeping and 
contemplating suicide. It is possible that his String Quartet No. 8 in C minor, Op. 110 (1960)—
which was derived from the DSCH motive, and uses quotations from the composer’s earlier 
pieces, the revolutionary song “Tormented by Grievous Bondage,” as well as excerpts from 
Tchaikovsky and Wagner—was an introspective testament that resulted from his trauma and 
regret. Soon after the quartet, however, his new position yielded great practical benefits in 
getting his works through the red tape of Soviet bureaucracy. Katerina Izmailova, his revision of 
Lady Macbeth, was rejected by the Composers’ Union in 1956 and the Kirov Theater scheduled 
it for the 1958 season, but the production did not materialize. In 1961, however, the revision was 
approved by the Union and it was staged in 1963.50 
Peter Schmelz explains that Shostakovich’s Pravda article was seen by several Soviet 
composers as a betrayal of the younger generation. For instance, Soviet composer Edison 
 
46 Peter J. Schmelz, “Shostakovich’s ‘Twelve-Tone’ Compositions and the Politics and Practice of Soviet 
Serialism,” in Shostakovich and His World, ed. Laurel E. Fay (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 303-04. 
47 “Shostakovich as Party Aspirant,” Times, 15 September 1960, 11. 
48 Pauline Fairclough, Dmitry Shostakovich (London: Reaktion, 2019), 118-21. 
49 Isaac Glikman, Story of a Friendship: The Letters of Dmitry Shostakovich to Isaac Glikman with a 
Commentary by Isaac Glikman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 91-93. 
50 Fairclough, Dmitry Shostakovich, 119-22. 
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Denisov indicated that this article was one of many public statements that the composer signed 
without reading, and that both Denisov and Sofia Gubaidulina considered this practice to be a 
moral failing of the composer.51 Furthermore, the scholar and cellist Elizabeth Wilson, who 
studied with Rostropovich between 1964 and 1971, states that Gubaidulina and her colleagues 
could not understand why Shostakovich appeared to curry favor by promoting the party line, 
attacked younger and more vulnerable unofficial composers, and—by far the most damning—
joined the Soviet Communist Party. This episode occurred in the early 1960s, a time when 
ideological control over the arts was loosening, and several young composers concluded that 
Shostakovich was not coerced into signing. The Stalinist purges, when Soviet citizens 
disappeared without warning, were of a past epoch and no longer possible in a Soviet Union 
undergoing de-Stalinization.52 Also, it is possible that Shostakovich sought to improve the 
financial situation of himself and his family after the difficulties that he faced in the aftermath of 
Zhdanovshchina. What remains unclear is whether Shostakovich made statements such as those 
in the Pravda article in order to appear to cooperate with the aesthetics of the musical 
establishment and the Party, or to voice his own concerns regarding the direction of the younger 
generation’s musical expression. Musicians who lived through the Stalinist purges tended to 
have a more compliant attitude toward the Soviet regime as they aged. It is possible that 
Shostakovich was conditioned to stay in line. 
Shostakovich’s 1960 attacks on atonalism and the Western avant-garde in Pravda had a 
transnational impact, since the article was republished in The Times of London. It is unclear 
 
51 Peter J. Schmelz, “What Was ‘Shostakovich,’ and What Came Next?” Journal of Musicology 24, no. 3 
(Summer 2007): 307. 
52 Elizabeth Wilson, Shostakovich: A Life Remembered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 348; 
and Schmelz, “What Was ‘Shostakovich,’” 307. The Soviet government still punished its citizens for political 
crimes, but nowhere near to the same harsh, and largely draconian, extent as in the Stalinist era. 
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whether this republication was done on the initiative of the Soviet Communist Party as an 
international announcement, or on the initiative of The Times as an effort to report the official 
Soviet position on musical aesthetics. Regardless, it is more pressing to note that this article was 
essentially both a message to the Soviet music world and an official pronouncement by the most 
internationally influential Soviet composer, who was speaking on behalf of the Communist 
Party. 
Mr. Dmitri Shostakovich, the Russian composer, today praised the composers Benjamin 
Britten, Béla Bartók, Arthur Honegger and Heitor Villa-Lobos for defying the “noisy 
musical vogue” and standing for “the principles of real art.” He condemned the atonal 
modernists, that [Anton] Webern, [Karlheinz] Stockhausen, [Pierre] Boulez and [Pierre] 
Schaeffer were “all of one pattern,” and [declared], “I find it impossible to distinguish 
one from the other.”53  
 
Boris Schwarz explains that the Soviet musical establishment was generally selective in what 
foreign styles it deemed tolerable or suitable for emulation.54 All of the approved composers 
listed above wrote in an accessible tonal or post-tonal idiom and incorporated characteristics of 
national styles in their compositions. Incidentally, it is clear that Britten’s compositional style 
was accepted by the Soviet musical establishment, especially because of the article’s initial 
publication in the USSR’s primary governmental mouthpiece. 
 The Shostakovich Pravda article can be seen as a microcosm for the official consensus of 
the musical establishment: that atonal modernism was the antithesis of real socialist art. 
Nonetheless, the problem with ideological restrictions on musical style is twofold: that 
composers can essentially and pragmatically say one thing and do another, and that ideological 
restrictions tend to erode gradually over time. The former is illustrated by the fact that the Soviet 
musical elite were routinely outspoken in their distaste for Western modernism, while the latter 
 
53 “Noisy Music of the Moderns: Shostakovich States His Preferences,” Times, 8 September 1960, 12. 




is evident in the fact that many established Soviet composers would gradually incorporate atonal 
aspects into their own compositional style. Eventually, ideological restrictions on music began to 
loosen, as established and unofficial composers continued to experiment. Indeed, Shostakovich 
and the musical establishment would begin to incorporate serial techniques into their 
compositional style throughout the late 1960s. A notable example of this new approach was 
Shostakovich’s Fourteenth Symphony.55 For Shostakovich, atonal passages and pitch collections, 
twelve-tone rows, and the superimposition of multiple rows in this work served as markers of 
harmonic instability and ambiguity, which did not abide by Schoenberg’s method and could be 
tonally resolved (Schmelz refers to this more open use of tone rows as “twelvetoneness,” derived 
from the Russian theorist Iurii Kholopov’s term dvenadtsatitionovost’). Shostakovich’s use of 
and his stance on atonal techniques increased as he aged. As evident in later examples such as his 
String Quartets No. 13 in B-flat minor, Op. 138 (1970) and No. 14 in F-sharp major, Op. 142 
(1972), Shostakovich’s atonal writing, which stopped short of strict serialist procedures, 
generally became more intricate, the passages more prolonged, and its connections to tonality 
more tenuous.56 Also, Shostakovich’s atonality was often interpreted programmatically as a 
negative emotion such as fear, terror, or confusion.57 Both of the above applications of atonality 
(as a reference to a negative emotion or as problem to be resolved tonally) fall neatly into the 
aforementioned Soviet/Russian concepts of intonazia and musical imagery, as well as within a 
tonal framework. 
  With many prominent Soviet composers incorporating atonal and twelve-tone 
techniques, a serious difference emerged for some high-ranking figures between the ideology 
 
55 Ibid., 486-93. 
56 Schmelz, “Shostakovich’s ‘Twelve-Tone’ Compositions,” 306-13 and 324-26. 
57 Ibid., 315-18. 
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they pronounced and the nature of the music that they composed. Denisov recalls the 
Composers’ Union’s double standard in their evaluations of the use of atonal techniques by 
Soviet composers, which primarily depended on whether the composers discussed were among 
the older and more established generation of the Composers’ Union. In the 1960s, composers 
such as those in the Union leadership were generally subjected to far less criticism than were the 
composers of the younger generation. Official composers such as Shostakovich and 
Khachaturian were sometimes praised for exploring the frontiers of musical style, while their 
younger contemporaries—which included Volkonsky and Gubaidulina—were censured for using 
similar compositional techniques. They enjoyed far less support from the state, and their music 
was performed in less prestigious, more unofficial venues. Moreover, they were perceived by 
audiences, the musical establishment, and possibly even by themselves to be outsiders.58 
 Alexei Yurchak provides an explanation for both the existence of what at first appears to 
be hypocritical behavior regarding the public denouncement of modernism paired with its use in 
practice, as well as the apparent double standard between official and unofficial composers’ uses 
of atonal techniques. He reconsiders the concept that Soviet citizens outwardly conformed to 
Soviet ideology while they inwardly thought something else. That concept rests on the 
assumption that there was a clear binary between the mask and the truth behind it. Instead, 
Yurchak takes the position that citizens engaged in ritualized acts that had performative meaning 
in themselves. Moreover, these ritualized acts were becoming increasingly detached from the 
constative ideology that was becoming increasingly fixed and stagnant. The constative meaning 
of an act is its originally or explicitly intended purpose. In this way, Yurchak’s framework is 
 
58 Ibid., 321-23. 
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similar to Antonio Gramsci’s and Anthony Giddens’, who both described ways that people in a 
restrictive system learn how live and pursue their interests within it.59 
 In order to explain the difference between constative and performative meaning, Yurchak 
uses the example of two elections: a multi-candidate one and a single-candidate one. Under 
normal circumstances, candidates compete for the support of the voters, and the voters explicitly 
choose one of several competitors. Elections are also performative acts, in which the populace 
implicitly perform their roles as citizens in their selection of and support for their governmental 
representatives. As a result of participating in the election, another meaning arises: voters can 
feel that they are a part of a larger collective community through the shared experience of 
voting.60 However, in single-candidate elections, the voters’ decision does not matter in the 
direct constative sense. Nonetheless, the voters still participate in the performative act and 
perform the role of Soviet citizens even though the constative meaning of the election (the 
voters’ selection of a candidate) is of little importance, since the candidate will be elected 
whether or not the voters actually vote. As the result’s constative meaning becomes increasingly 
irrelevant to the performative act of voting, and the voters become free to reinterpret or create 
new meanings out of the voting experience. At this point, the original constative meaning of such 
a single-candidate election—the unanimous result of the vote as display of solidarity—becomes 
irrelevant to the voter, and is surpassed by the performative act of being part of a larger 
community brought together by a shared experience.61 Taruskin explains that by the end of his 
life, Shostakovich had achieved a close emotional connection with his listeners. Throughout his 
 
59 Gramsci and Giddens will be discussed on Pages 154 and 156, respectively. 
60 Yurchak, 14-27. 
61 Ibid., 14-27. 
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life, he had experienced many indignities from the Soviet state and had become a fellow citizen 
and sufferer who had succeeded in forging “a mutually sustaining relationship with his public.”62   
 The performative experience of such acts is an important part of what Yurchak defines as 
svoi: the collective mentality of most Soviet citizens. This concept connotes a position between 
those who actively refused to participate in the performative acts such as dissidents, and the 
activists who sincerely believed in the original constative meaning of the acts. Both activists and 
dissidents were distrusted by many Soviet citizens, who fell somewhere in the middle (in svoi). 
Moreover, inclusion in svoi was more meaningful to Soviet society than official ideologies and 
slogans.63 Thus, if Shostakovich wrote or signed the article denouncing atonalism, that can be 
considered one of countless performative acts of what Fay termed “officialese” and what 
Yurchak termed “ritualistic acts” that connected him to the collective experience of his fellow 
Soviet citizens. In both of Fay’s and Yurchak’s conceptual frameworks, Shostakovich’s outward 
ideological stance might be explained as the performance of the composer as a loyal member of 
the Soviet musical establishment and as a part of the Soviet collective citizenry (svoi). In other 
words, it was possible to both perform the role of an established composer adhering to the party 
line who publicly criticized modernist experimentalism, and still partake in modernist 
experiments to a limited degree. Yurchak discussed this type of duality in the following example: 
Komsomol members who considered themselves to be good communists, while wearing blue 
jeans and listening to Western rock music.64 Meanwhile, as a result of the disconnect between 
the performative act and the official constative meaning of that act, the latter can be 
 
62 Taruskin recounts that at the premiere of Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 15 in A major, Op. 141 (1971), 
the reception of the symphony was mixed, yet the “outpouring of love” for the elderly and ill composer was 
unmistakable. Richard Taruskin, “When Serious Music Mattered,” in On Russian Music (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009), 300-02. 
63 Yurchak, 102-21. 
64 See Chapter 6 of ibid. The Komsomol was the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. 
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reinterpreted. In this respect, we can say, similar to single-election voters, that Shostakovich was 
free to create his own constative meaning: which arguably was manifested in his openness to the 
use of atonal techniques (or “twelvetoneness”) in his later compositional practice.  
 Levon Hakobian also attributes these apparent contradictions in behavior to the common 
experience of the Soviet citizen, suggesting that it was commonplace for an artist to create both 
conformist and non-conformist music, and that one did not invalidate the other. In making these 
everyday compromises, Hakobian explains that Shostakovich was neither more nor less 
principled than those typical Soviet citizens “of a sound mind.”65 Hakobian explains that 
Shostakovich, like any Soviet resident, was critical of Soviet power, feared it, and referred to it 
ironically. However, he and his fellow citizens knew that they had to live within that system. To 
illustrate this point, Hakobian quotes the Russian proverb: “To live with wolves means to howl 
as a wolf.”66 The Soviet experience allowed one to be both conformist and non-conformist and to 
exist in a shared collective experience with other Soviet people of a so-called sound mind. 
Shostakovich positioned himself as an advocate for traditional tonal techniques, but he also 
demonstrated an openness to new atonal techniques. This divide between constative meaning and 
performative act can in part explain the coexistence of an openness to modernism and pragmatic 
flexibility toward new compositional techniques despite the outspoken ideological attacks 
against it. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Shostakovich’s actions had consequences and 
alienated Soviet modernists, many Soviet composers of the next generation, and many 
modernists abroad. At face value, Shostakovich, knowingly or not, publicly picked sides with the 
 
65 Levon Hakobian, “The Reception of Soviet Music in the West: A History of Sympathy and 
Misunderstandings,” Musicology: Journal of the Institute of Musicology of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, no. 13 (2012): 129-31. 
66 Levon Hakobian, “The Adventures of Soviet Music in the West: Historical Highlights,” in Russian Music 
Since 1917: Reappraisal and Rediscovery, eds. Patrick Zuk and Marina Frolova-Walker (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 84.  
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tonal/post-tonal music of the Soviet musical establishment, as well as the tonal/post-tonal music 
of the West, over the serial experimentation of Soviet unofficial composers and Western 
modernists. 
Later, a Pravda article (January 2, 1962) attributed to the Soviet ballet dancer Galina 
Ulanova championed Khrushchev’s efforts to denounce harmful forms of art while promoting 
international cultural exchanges and upheld the Soviet public’s ability to recognize “art which is 
natural and excellent.” British examples of these so-called “natural and excellent” manifestations 
included the dancers of the Royal Ballet, the engravings of Hogarth, the novels of Dickens, and 
the music of Britten. Later in the article, Britten’s Serenade for Tenor, Horn, and Strings, Op. 31 
(1943) is referred to positively as “a most difficult vocal cycle written by the outstanding British 
composer.” The author placed these “good” works of art in opposition to the “decadence” and 
“pessimism” of abstract painting and musique concrète, which she indicated were born from 
misanthropic Western artists. Moreover, she declared these corrupt artists dependent on catering 
to the perverse tastes of the wealthy few, and did not serve the people.67 It should be noted that 
the British Foreign Office discussed this article and noticed that, once again, Pravda had 
endorsed Britten as a champion of ideologically acceptable musical composition.68 
 
Uncertain Limits of Expression in the Thaw and the Manezh Gallery Scandal (1962) 
Throughout the late 1950s, the British government had continued its attempts to discern 
official Soviet attitudes toward British and Western culture remotely. One indication of change 
 
67 As with the above article attributed to Shostakovich, Ulanova’s name is given in print, and the 
aforementioned questions regarding the authorship of the Shostakovich article are relevant to Ulanova’s article as 
well. Galina Ulanova, “Nad kartoi mira” [“Above the Map of the World”], Pravda no. 2, 2 January 1962, 2. 
68 James to Speaight, 3 January 1962, CR 13820/3 Discusses article by Ulanova (hereafter cited as CR 
13820/3), in FO 924/1423 Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement (hereafter cited as FO 924/1423), GB-Lna. 
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was the 1955 concert, and another was Shostakovich’s 1960 Pravda denouncement of serialism 
and the avant-garde (both discussed above). While it appeared to the Soviet citizenry that state 
control was generally loosening, Soviet people could only find the limits of what was and was 
not acceptable through actively testing these boundaries. For example, the students of the Gnesin 
Music School in Moscow pressed for curricular reforms after Khrushchev’s denunciations of 
Stalin in the late 1950s, while the academy’s professors resisted the students’ demands for 
reform due to concerns that the government would reject these efforts and intervene.69  
Denis Kozlov argues in The Readers of “Novyi Mir” that a new literary and poetic 
language had to develop in order to critically and adequately reassess the past, present, and 
future of the USSR. Authors and journalists such as Vladimir Dudintsev, Ilya Ehrenburg, Boris 
Pasternak, Vladimir Pomerantsev, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Aleksander Tvardovsky spurred 
reflection and reinterpretation of the Soviet past and the Soviet way of life, particularly during 
Stalinism.70 However, even during the so-called thaw, some Soviet literary works were refused 
publication on ideological grounds. These limits on publication forced Pasternak to publish his 
novel Doctor Zhivago (1957) in the West. The novel gained international recognition, was 
awarded a Nobel Prize in 1958, which resulted in the Soviet Writers’ Union denouncement of 
Pasternak, and the writer retreated to his dacha for the last two years of his life.71 Events such as 
this brought the plight of Soviet authors to the attention of the Western public. 
The search for new forms of expression also occurred in the other fields of the arts. 
Josephine Woll notes that in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Soviet films began to diverge 
 
69 See Chapter 2 of Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in 
Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
70 See Denis Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
71 See Chapter 4 of ibid. 
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from the late Stalinist focus on the optimistic and heroic Soviet protagonist, and instead explored 
pessimist and indecisive characters and set their plots in the everyday as opposed to the epic. 
Films such as Cranes Are Flying (1957) and Ivan’s Childhood (1962) were among the first to 
portray the trauma of ordinary citizens in the Second World War, and to acknowledge the 
contributions of these citizens to the war effort (and, by doing so, deemphasizing the role of the 
Kremlin’s leadership).72 As mentioned earlier, a group of predominately younger composers on 
the margins of the musical establishment began their search for a new musical style by exploring 
serial composition techniques. Likewise, in the visual arts, a similar collection of artists such as 
those in the studio of Eli Belyutin had begun to adhere to non-conventional idioms, the most 
notable being abstractionism.73  
The Soviet government’s relationship with the arts shifted unexpectedly between 
permissiveness and censure throughout the uncertain de-Stalinization process, and its Western 
counterparts closely monitored the mercurial Soviet position in order to tailor their proposals for 
cultural exchanges. Experimentation in the arts sometimes sparked a strong reaction from the 
Soviet political establishment, which then called upon the various creative unions to take action. 
In Khrushchev and the Arts, Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz chronicle the Manezh Gallery 
scandal and its aftermath. In November 1962, Khrushchev unexpectedly appeared at a small 
exhibition of Soviet abstract art at the Manezh Gallery in Moscow, where he unleashed a tirade 
at the gallery and complained of the influence of Western formalism on Soviet visual art. Up to 
that point, he had been generally publicly sympathetic to the more liberal artists and authors—he 
had even supported the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s book One Day in the Life of Ivan 
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Denisovich in the literary journal Novyi mir—but, privately, he hated modern art. As the story 
goes, his infamous tirade set off the Party leadership’s campaign against ideological impurity in 
visual art, which spread to the other artistic fields over the next two years.74  
Poetry and literature were targeted next, particularly authors and poets of the younger 
generation who strayed away from socialist realist aesthetics and enjoyed significant popularity 
abroad. Notably, the Soviet poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko was targeted throughout this two-year 
period by conservative critics, by his colleagues who were predominately among the older 
generation of the Writers’ Union, and by Khrushchev himself, especially for his poem “Babi 
Yar,” which focused on the German atrocities committed against the Jewish population in Soviet 
Ukraine during the Second World War. The poet also implied that anti-Semitism was still very 
strong in the USSR, and Khrushchev considered the position that Soviet anti-Semitism existed 
and persisted to be ideologically unacceptable.75 Shostakovich was himself implicated in these 
attacks when he set Yevtushenko’s poetry, including “Babi Yar,” to music in his Symphony No. 
13 in B-flat minor, Op. 113 (1962).76 Both the poet and the composer were pressured to 
apologize to the Party in 1963.77 
Khrushchev’s campaign against Western influences in the early 1960s continued the 
differentiation between the positive and the harmful. As before, high modernist serialism, 
aleatoric techniques, and experimentation in electronic music were described as harmful, 
decadent, and pessimistic. However, a completely anti-Western stance was impossible. The 
Soviet government was already completely invested in the concepts of peaceful coexistence and 
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competition and had begun its involvement in cultural exchange agreements with several 
Western countries, including the UK. Moreover, intergovernmental negotiations regarding the 
Days of British Music Festival—which involved the visit of a British delegation of important 
musicians to give British music performances in collaboration with Soviet orchestras and 
musicians in Moscow and Leningrad—were already underway. At that time, the Soviet 
government and cultural organs reached an informal consensus on which aspects of Western 
culture to accept and which to reject. Meanwhile, Khrushchev’s, Shostakovich’s, and Ulanova’s 
pronouncements on artistic value and their rejection of abstractionism and serialism, 
respectively, were noted by the British government. 
 
The Days of British Music Festival (1963) 
 One would expect that the British ambassador to the Soviet Union Frank Roberts was 
keenly aware of the Soviet government’s long-standing hostile stance toward abstract art and the 
negative influence of Western high modernism in all spheres of Soviet creative cultural activity. 
It can be assumed that the entire British diplomatic corps in the USSR and the Northern 
Department of the Foreign Office would have been aware of the Manezh Gallery scandal and its 
aftermath while monitoring the protean nature of Soviet cultural politics, especially when 
planning a series of major cultural exchanges with the Soviets. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
Pravda article attributed to Ulanova was translated and discussed in the Foreign Office at this 
time; this is clearly indicated in the Foreign Office file currently preserved in the British National 
Archives.78 The explicit attacks on high modernism both in visual art and in music, paired with 
the promotion of Britten’s music as a paragon of healthy Western music, gave a clear message to 
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125 
 
the British government about which forms of British culture were appropriate for presentation in 
the USSR. By this time, Britten had shown an interest in forging relationships and musical 
collaborations with influential members of the Soviet musical elite, and the composer enjoyed 
great international prestige due to the recent successes of the 1962 premiere and the 1963 
recording of his War Requiem. At this time, Britten was the most internationally influential 
British composer, and thus the strongest card in the British cultural deck for such an exchange. 
 The Foreign Office ensured Britten’s participation in the cultural exchanges by 
accommodating the composer’s schedule and health by repeatedly postponing the entire Days of 
British Music Festival. This festival was intended to consist of a delegation of ten important 
British musicians who would perform with Soviet orchestras in the USSR for two weeks. The 
event was to be reciprocated in the following year by a delegation of Soviet musicians who 
would participate in a Soviet music festival in the UK.79 The festival in the USSR was originally 
planned for October 1961, but difficulties regarding Britten’s health jeopardized his 
participation.80 The British ambassador in Moscow advised the Foreign Office to postpone the 
festival to the following year for the sole reason of the composer’s availability. He wrote: 
I would hope that this Festival, which with the participation of Benjamin Britten would 
be a major cultural event and has already been publicized in the Soviet press[,] can be 
carried forward into the next Cultural Agreement (during the course of which the Days of 
Soviet Music in London will in any case be occurring) in order that the chance to 
acquaint the Soviet musical public with contemporary British music and, more important, 
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with our leading modern composer whose name is already well known here, will not be 
lost.81 
 
There was no recorded voice of dissent against the ambassador’s advice among the members of 
the British Council or the Foreign Office. This evidence supports the conclusion that the British 
delegation considered Britten’s participation to be absolutely essential for the festival to take 
place. 
 The Days of British Music Festival was finally presented in Moscow and Leningrad in 
March 1963; it consisted of seven concerts in Moscow, which were repeated in Leningrad. In the 
Foreign Office’s “Report of Implementation of Exchanges” after the conclusion of the festival, 
Britten was designated the leader of the British delegates, all of whom were elite musicians in 
their own right: “Peter Pears (tenor), Norman Del Mar (conductor), George Malcolm 
(harpsichordist), Barry Tuckwell (French horn player) and the Amadeus Quartet.”82 According to 
Colin Mason’s review of the festival’s first concert in The Guardian, the Soviet audiences 
clearly showed a preference toward Britten’s compositions over the other British pieces that 
were presented: 
In the first concert of the series last night, in which the Moscow State Symphony 
Orchestra was conducted by Norman Del Mar, the audience had a chance to hear 
[William Walton’s Symphony No. 1 in B-flat Minor (1935)]. If any work had to be 
duplicated this was a good choice, for it speaks in a language and spirit that ought to be 
easily intelligible to an audience accustomed to the symphonies of Shostakovich. The 
orchestra certainly played it with sympathy and ardor, though its rhythm did not always 
come easily to them, and the grandiose coda, at the end of an inordinately long program, 
began to flag—which is perhaps why the reception, although friendly, was not wildly 
enthusiastic.83 
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Mason also noted that the Soviet reception of Britten’s Sea Interludes was more enthusiastic than 
that of Michael Tippett’s “Ritual Dances” from The Midsummer Marriage (1953).84  
The anonymous Times reviewer who wrote the article “Moscow Ovation for Benjamin 
Britten” also suggests a Soviet preference for Britten. 
Mr. Britten first took a bow from a box of honor after the Soviet State Symphony 
Orchestra had played four interludes from his opera Peter Grimes. But this was not 
enough for the crowd in the gold, cream and white main hall of the Moscow 
Conservatoire, where pictures of great classical composers line the walls. They continued 
to clap until the composer came on stage to take another bow.85 
 
The piece also raises the possibility of the critic’s own bias in favor of the composer, by focusing 
much of its attention on him. In the final paragraph, the reviewer rather dismissively mentions 
that the concert also included performances of Tippett’s “Ritual Dances” and Walton’s First 
Symphony.86 Two other articles of interest include The Guardian’s reviews of Britten’s joint 
recital with Pears and Rostropovich, which focused on the audience’s ecstatic reception of the 
concert (particularly from the younger members of the audience),87 and Mason’s review of the 
Amadeus Quartet’s performance of Britten’s String Quartet No. 2 in C major, Op. 36 (1945) as 
well as works by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Joseph Haydn. On the whole, Mason found the 
reception for the Amadeus Quartet’s concert to be genuinely positive.88 Soon after his departure 
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from the USSR, Britten sent letters of gratitude to the Ministry of Culture—which oversaw all 
artistic affairs in the country—and Goskontsert—for the hospitality and the opportunity to 
perform for Soviet audiences.89 
 
Music for the People: Britten’s Interview with Pravda (1963) 
In addition to Britten’s acceptable musical idiom, his beliefs regarding the role of music 
in society resonated with Soviet ideology. Throughout his career, and particularly in the early 
1960s, Britten stressed that music should be written with the exact purpose of the performance 
and the strengths of the performers in mind, that the composer should be a part and a servant of 
society, and that music should be written for the general public.90 Moreover, the composer 
argued against the act of composition as abstract exercise, the concept that music was above the 
public, and the idea that contemporary music was intended only for a small specialist audience. 
He believed that the above concepts were elitist and isolated composers from society.91 Arguing 
against the avant-garde and the Ivory Tower, he advocated for the performance of high quality 
music for a general, yet discerning, audience in order to stimulate them and to cultivate their 
interest, the public’s participation in classical music through participatory amateur performance 
and music appreciation, and music education and performance opportunities for children.92 The 
voice of Britten in these accounts demonstrates what Paul Kildea illustrated in his biography of 
the composer: that is, Britten as an established composer. This persona was painstakingly 
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cultivated ever since the composer’s early international successes—the most notable being his 
opera Peter Grimes—and it was manifested through his acceptance of prestigious honors such as 
the Freemanship of Lowestoft and a seat in the House of Lords, his newly-acquired taste for 
upper-class living, and his social contact with Queen Elizabeth II and the royal family. This also 
resulted in him distancing himself musically from the British avant-garde and experimentalism, 
and culturally from bohemian and counter-culture lifestyles. His decades-long relationship with 
Peter Pears was treated as discreetly as possible given the conventions of the time and was 
considered to be an open secret, in part because homosexuality was illegal in the UK until 
1967.93  
In an interview with Pravda during the Days of British Music Festival, Britten again 
voiced his position on the role of the composer in society, the need for practical music that could 
educate and be understood and appreciated by the general public, and his opposition to excessive 
experimentation and the concept of “arts for arts’ sake.” Britten also expressed his admiration for 
Soviet audiences, performers, and the Russian musical tradition. In referring to the positive 
critical and popular reception of the festival, he voiced his relief that Soviet audiences both 
understood and accepted British music in general, and his own music in particular.94 According 
to Pyke, the Soviet cultural establishment welcomed Britten’s statements regarding music’s 
function in society as a public service. Khrennikov, the Secretary of the Composers’ Union, was 
reportedly pleased that such statements came from an esteemed foreign composer and would 
therefore have a great influence on the younger generation of Soviet composers.95 
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Pyke argues that Britten did not merely voice his admiration for the Russian musical 
tradition because he was being interviewed by a Soviet newspaper, but because he was genuinely 
enthusiastic about musical culture in the USSR at the time.96 Indeed it is possible that Britten had 
not considered the nature of Pravda as the ideological mouthpiece of the Soviet Communist 
Party. It also seems that he thought this interview was nothing beyond the ordinary. It was not 
until he read Martin Cooper’s reaction to his interview in the Daily Telegraph that he realized the 
possibility that there could be another interpretation of his statements.97 Cooper wrote: 
“Art for the people”—not “for people”—is a slogan that appears in Russian concert halls 
in any case; but during the British musicians’ visit it took on a heightened significance as 
a result of Mr. Khrushchev’s violent attack not only on contemporary Western art (that 
was to be expected, perhaps) but on any art that cannot be interpreted for the Communist 
cause.98 [emphasis mine] 
 
Cooper had placed the interview in the context of Khrushchev’s attacks on ideologically suspect 
Soviet and Western art, which followed the aforementioned Manezh Gallery scandal. To Cooper, 
the Soviet state had been repressing Soviet musicians for not conforming to the party line, and he 
felt that it was the responsibility of Western artists to reveal such injustices and to reject the 
Soviet insistence that artists must be propagandists of communist ideology.99 In his article, 
Cooper did not accuse Britten of serving Soviet propagandistic interests or ignoring the plight of 
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Soviet artists, but it appears that he considered the composer to have been naïve and he implied 
that Britten was willfully ignorant of the current state of Soviet cultural politics.100 
Throughout his career, Britten avoided making public political statements regarding the 
USSR’s treatment of its citizenry and artists. While it is unclear whether Britten was aware of 
Khrushchev’s 1962 attacks on modernists, he was directly involved in the failed attempts to 
procure the participation of Vishnevskaya in the Coventry premiere of the War Requiem in the 
same year. By inviting her to sing, the composer intended to honor the sacrifices of the USSR 
alongside those of Germany and the UK during the Second World War, and to strive for their 
peaceful reconciliation in the present. As a result of the Soviet Minister of Culture Ekaterina 
Furtseva’s firm refusal to allow Vishnevskaya to perform in this context for political reasons,101 
Britten became conscious of the restrictions placed on Soviet artists.102 On the face of it, it 
appears that Britten was taking the same stance toward the USSR as Western left-leaning 
intellectuals had done in the 1930s: voicing support for the USSR as a harbinger of development 
and progressiveness, and falling publicly silent when faced with instances of Soviet repression 
and aggression.103 
Britten did decide to voice a public response, but it is unclear if he was responding to 
Pravda’s spin, Cooper’s interpretation, or both. While the exact catalyst for the response is not 
evident, it is clear that the composer felt that both the Soviet newspaper and the British critic had 
misrepresented him and his beliefs, and that it was necessary to set the record straight. In private 
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correspondence with William Plomer,104 Britten voiced his irritation with both Pravda and his 
critics in the UK:  
I was sickened by Pravda getting me all wrong, [and] of course people who don’t know 
me at all have rushed eagerly for the wrong end of the stick! I have to walk very gingerly 
around this difficult problem, but did what I hoped was a sympathetic tactful talk, which 
of course the blighters got deliberately wrong. However, that isn’t unique to the USSR is 
it?105 
 
Britten began drafting a formal response to be published in The Observer, but never finished it. 
Paul Kildea reconstructed the response from several of the composer’s own preliminary drafts. 
As a result, there are some major drawbacks with this source: Britten did not complete the 
article, he did not make this statement public, and it was intended for a very different readership 
than the Pravda interview. It was supposed to be a response to Cooper for the British readership, 
not Pravda and the Soviet audience. Thus, there is a slight possibility that it could have been a 
calculated attempt to persuade British readers that he could not have been a propagandist, while 
not disclosing his true thoughts on the matter. However, I would argue that this misses the point. 
This matter depends wholly on one’s definition of the word “propaganda:” to be a vehicle for 
ideology such as Marxism, or to more generally persuade the listener to consider a political 
matter. Britten denied involvement in the former, but he clearly subscribed to the latter in his 
anti-fascist song cycle Our Hunting Fathers and his pacifist large-scale works Owen Wingrave, 
Op. 85 (1970) and the War Requiem. In any case, the draft proves to be consistent with Britten’s 
other statements regarding the role of the artist in society that he made throughout his career.  
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In Kildea’s reconstruction of the draft, Britten accuses Pravda of misreporting him, and 
declares that the implication that he believed that a composer should be a propagandist as 
nonsense to anyone who knows him.106 Britten intended to use it as a platform to avoid further 
misunderstanding by explaining his position on the artist in society at length. The following 
extract clarifies his views on musical elitism, and sets forth his concept of music as a form of 
communication and as a language of associations, which directly relates to an overarching theme 
of this chapter: 
One impression I apparently gave was that I thought that art should be made for 
everyone, [and] that I feared that there was a tendency today for the serious composer to 
shut himself up in his Ivory Tower [and] to experiment—‘sealing himself off totally from 
the real world.’ While most people would admit the presence [and] danger of this 
‘tendency,’ I should like to make it quite clear that I believe that the opposite aim is quite 
impossible. Taking it literally, art cannot be for everyone, even supposing there were no 
tone-deaf or [color]-blind people in the world. All arts, aural, visual or tactile, depend on 
having a language for communication, [and] I think everyone really agrees (pace the 
Non-Art theorists) that art is a communication. Otherwise artists would not bother to 
make art, they would only think about it. Now language depends on associations—the 
meaning of words, the shape of objects, the pattern of a minor chord—[and] unless you 
are familiar with that language the art must be largely lost on you.107 [original emphasis] 
 
In this piece, Britten seeks to address Cooper’s wrong-headed interpretation, which he feared 
could imply that he believed in music as a universal language for a unilateral humanity. Cooper 
likely believed this false implication could be adapted to communist ideology’s idea of music as 
propaganda for the people in their struggle for the Communist utopia, which could then brand the 
Ivory Tower elites, as well as the Soviet modernists, as dissident obstacles in this struggle. 
Britten avoids such a connotation by denying the existence of universal music, and instead 
argues for a conception of different genres of music in relation to particular cultures, suggesting 
that music can be shared between several groups, but is not inherently meaningful to all. The 
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example he raises is language: every culture has language, but that does not necessarily mean 
that cultures understand each other’s language. Next, Britten considers both language and the 
arts, including music, to consist of various associations; one needs to understand the association 
in order to fully grasp its meaning. Interestingly, Britten’s connection between association, 
language, and music is very similar to the Soviet-Russian concepts of intonazia and musical 
imagery, which make up a musical system that communicates denotative meaning through 
associations. Obviously, it is very unlikely that Britten was influenced by Soviet-Russian 
aesthetic theory, but it is interesting to notice the similarity of Britten’s mode of thought 
regarding music and language to the prevalent aesthetic theory used in the USSR. If we reference 
Schmelz’s division of postwar twentieth century music into an absolute music camp of Western 
modernism and a mimetic, more representational one of Soviet official music,108 Britten’s 
preference for operatic and text-based composition (song cycles and pieces with evocative titles) 
seems to connect more comfortably with the latter.  
It is also enlightening to view Britten’s situation through Yurchak’s theoretical 
framework. As a result of noting the above similarities between Britten’s and the Soviet 
establishment’s views concerning music and society, it is possible to interpret the Pravda article 
as a performative act: Britten as a sympathetic intellectual espousing political and social views 
that resonated with Soviet ideology. These themes would include “the composer as servant of 
society” and “music needs to be accessible to the people.” In his letter to Plomer, Britten 
privately objected to the idea that Pravda had allegedly twisted his words to accommodate 
Communist ideology, yet he did not publicly withdraw his statements or renounce the Soviet 
 
108 See Page 41. 
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newspaper.109 One can assume that such a brazen course of action would have jeopardized his 
contacts with Soviet musicians and performance opportunities. While Britten rejected the 
constative meaning of the interview, he unknowingly reaped the benefits of the performative act 
of conducting himself as a sympathetic intellectual in a Pravda article. I would further argue that 
the interview took on a new meaning as a public gesture of compliance with the Soviet media 
that demonstrated Britten’s suitability for cultural exchanges. In a way, by performing such a 
ritualistic act, Britten was setting himself up to be accepted into a collective participatory 
experience not unlike Yurchak’s svoi. 
 
The EOG’s Tour of the Soviet Union (1964) 
Throughout the negotiations leading to the Days of British Music Festival, the 
performances for the festival itself, and Pravda’s coverage of the composer and his beliefs, it 
was apparent that both the British and Soviet governments held Britten to be culturally, and 
perhaps politically, very important. This attention was not an isolated phenomenon. By this time, 
the Soviet government had already allowed Richter, Rostropovich, and Vishnevskaya to be 
frequent guest performers at Britten’s Aldeburgh Festival, which received subsidies from the 
British Arts Council.110 Britten himself conducted the very successful premiere of his Symphony 
for Cello and Orchestra, Op. 68 (completed in 1963) with the dedicatee Rostropovich as the 
soloist in Moscow in 1964; and the British Council considered giving recordings of Britten’s 
War Requiem, performances by the English Opera Group (EOG), and the composer’s works 
 
109 Britten would incorporate some of his general ideas regarding music and society, without the 
accusations that Pravda misrepresented him, into his acceptance speech for receiving the first Aspen Award in 1964. 
Benjamin Britten, On Receiving the First Aspen Award: A Speech by Benjamin Britten (London: Faber, 1964). 




dedicated to Rostropovich as gifts to the Soviet delegation in the negotiations for the upcoming 
Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement.111 Moreover, the composer was considering participating in 
an EOG tour of the USSR starting sometime in the early 1960s.  
The British Council, Foreign Office, and the UK Embassy in Moscow all professed their 
support for an EOG tour of the USSR. In the recorded minutes of a July 6, 1962 meeting of the 
British Council, a member representing the arts and sciences division declared that an EOG tour 
would be the best choice for a major manifestation of a cultural exchange with the Soviets.112 It 
is also possible to demonstrate the relative priority of the tour in comparison to other potential 
exchanges, through an analysis of the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British 
Embassy in Moscow.113 Due to limitations in its budget, the Foreign Office had to place priority 
on some exchanges while postponing or canceling others. In an October 25 letter to the Cultural 
Attaché of the British Embassy in Moscow (Alan Brooke Turner), Richard Speaight of the 
Foreign Office reported that the “[British] Council hopes to get the English Opera Group for 
[the] 1963-4 [cultural agreement], but it will probably be necessary to postpone the Elizabethan 
Singers and the Amadeus Quartet until the following year for financial reasons.”114 In his 
response, Turner expressed his disappointment that it was possible that neither the choir nor the 
quartet would be able to travel to the USSR, yet he did not voice the possibility that either could 
take the place of the EOG.115 
 
111 R.A.H. Duke to British Council, 3 March 1964, BW 64/57 UK-USSR Cultural Agreement (hereafter 
cited as BW 64/57), GB-Lna. The EOG was founded in 1947 and was run largely by Britten, Pears, and their close 
circle. Kildea explains that by the late 1950s, Britten and Pears had begun to distance themselves from the 
administration of the company, and it came under the auspices of the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden in 1961. 
Kildea, Selling Britten, 74-75. 
112 British Council, “Note of meeting at the British Council on the Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement 1963-
65, Article IX: Exchanges in the Field of the Arts,” 27 July 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
113 I was not able to find parallel documentation of these negotiations during my research in Moscow. 
114 Speaight to Turner, 25 October 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
115 Turner to Speaight, 8 November 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
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That the EOG tour was a high priority was also made clear by the accommodations that 
were made for the opera company’s changes of schedule at the expense of other exchanges. Back 
in June 1962, soon after receiving the aforementioned Ambassador’s memorandum on Anglo-
Soviet exchanges, Speaight reported that the British Council was considering an exchange of art 
exhibitions during the 1964-1965 season (the second year of the 1963-1965 Anglo-Soviet 
Cultural Agreement).116 In November, when the EOG decided to postpone the tour until the 
1964-5 season, Speaight reported to Turner that the change would displace other planned 
exchanges. In its eventual proposal to the Soviet delegation, the Foreign Office made “no 
mention of an exchange of art exhibitions in the second year.” Speaight explained that “unless 
there is an unexpected increase in their budget, the Council could not finance two major 
manifestations in the same year, such as an Art Exhibition and the EOG. When we had earlier 
contemplated the former, we had expected the EOG to go out in 1963-64.”117 
Arguably the “universal appeal” of the EOG and the prestige of Britten made the 
proposed Soviet tour a much higher priority than an exchange of art exhibitions, which were 
ideologically problematic for both governments. In addition to the Soviet government’s negative 
position on abstract visual art, the Arts Council in particular took a dismissive stance on Soviet 
socialist realist art.118 Speaight was interested in encouraging Soviet artists to distance 
themselves from socialist realism,119 but it is not clear whether the British government would 
have preferred, or if it was even aware of, the abstract artworks that Khrushchev criticized in the 
Manezh Gallery. Official exhibitions of Soviet abstract art were very unusual in the USSR and 
such works were rarely shown abroad, if at all. It is very possible that for some British officials 
 
116 Speaight to Humphrey Trevelyan, 26 June 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
117 Speaight to Turner, 26-28 November 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna.  
118 Foreign Office, “Comments on Cultural Attache’s Memorandum,” 11 July 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna.  
119 Richard Speaight, “Minutes,” Foreign Office, 29 June 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
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at this time, the only evidence that Soviet abstract work existed came from the Soviet 
pronouncements against it. As a result, it is difficult to infer the level of knowledge of Soviet 
contemporary art among British officials in their discussions on the subject. In the field of 
contemporary classical music, the British and the Soviets had more stylistic similarities than in 
the field of contemporary visual art, where such an aesthetic middle ground was less apparent.120 
Meanwhile, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union Humphrey Trevelyan mentioned in 
a dispatch to the Foreign Office that the Soviet proposal for the 1963-65 agreement indicated a 
lack of interest in visual art, which stood in contrast to its desire to increase the tours of theatrical 
and dance companies, orchestras, and soloists.121 The proposal’s vague language enabled the 
Soviet delegation to be flexible in the upcoming negotiations and to avoid specific 
commitments.122 Without common ground in the field of contemporary visual art, it appears that 
both governments were hesitant to risk putting forward potentially unacceptable proposals. 
However, in the sphere of contemporary classical music, the EOG tour provided an opportunity 
for the British to have their premier composer move through the so-called Iron Curtain, and for 
the Soviets to permit ideologically acceptable music from a foreign nation.  
From the British perspective, the negotiations with the Soviet authorities regarding the 
EOG’s Soviet Tour followed a familiar pattern. While the negotiations of the Anglo-Soviet 
Cultural Agreement at the governmental level were relatively easy, the Soviet authorities proved 
to be more uncooperative over specifics during EOG’s own negotiations with the Soviet state 
concert planning institution, Goskontsert.123 The recorded minutes of the December 6, 1963 
 
120 In other years, however, exchanges of visual art exhibitions did take place, but more research needs to 
be done in order to discuss the style of art exchanged and how the exhibitions were received. 
121 Tripp to Speaight, 23 November 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
122 Trevelyan to Speaight, 17 December 1962, BW 64/57, GB-Lna. 
123 The first mention of tour negotiations appears in the EOG’s board minutes in December 1962. See 
English Opera Group Limited (hereafter cited as EOG Ltd.), “Board Meeting Minutes,” 5 December 1962, EOG 
Board 1962-63, GB-ALb.  
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EOG board meeting reveal the results of Assistant General Administrator of the Royal Opera 
House, Covent Garden, John Tooley’s visit to the USSR during the previous month. In Tooley’s 
opinion, the Soviet authorities were unwilling “to pay more than a ludicrously small fee for the 
whole visit.” Moreover, the fee was fixed and did not take into account a share of the ticket sales.  
Also, in order to keep their costs down, the Soviet authorities had insisted on allowing only a 
small group of forty EOG members to tour the USSR.124 
In consideration of the busy staged performance schedule of these tours, the situation of 
being limited to an insufficiently sized group of performers stood to make it very difficult for the 
EOG to prevent its vocalists from having to perform major roles two nights in a row. Moreover, 
such restrictions would have made it very difficult to substitute these musicians if they 
contracted an illness on tour. Britten believed that this restriction regarding the size of the touring 
party could be detrimental to the quality of the performances and would potentially be a great 
embarrassment to the opera group and himself. Britten’s concerns resonated with those in the 
British government involved in Anglo-Soviet relations. In his comments on the future 
development of cultural exchanges in general, Ambassador Roberts argued that it would be 
preferable to cancel a cultural export of questionable quality: 
If a visit, an exhibition, or a concert series makes a poor or disappointing impact on 
Soviet audiences, it would be better to save the money which would be spent on a second 
rate or amateurish presentation here and wait until something certain to achieve a 
powerful effect could be afforded. We have been very fortunate in setting very high 
standards so far and they must be maintained since Soviet audiences are knowledgeable 
and discriminating and quick to sense the second-best and the meretricious.125 
  
Not only would a weak performance prove to be an embarrassment for the opera company, it 
would also be an abashment for the British government and an expensive, useless diplomatic 
 
124 EOG Ltd., Board of Directors Minutes, 6 December 1963, EOG Board 1962-63, GB-ALb. 
125 Roberts to Foreign Office, 8 August 1962, CR 13820-41, in FO 924/1425, GB-Lna. 
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gesture. Despite these setbacks, Tooley was not discouraged by the uncooperative Soviet 
authorities, and he expressed the optimistic desire that there “was a reasonable hope that the 
Soviet authorities might be persuaded to accept a larger company which would make the playing 
of the proposed repertory possible.”126 
In response to the Soviet authorities’ offer of a “ludicrously small fee” that could not 
even cover the expense of the tour, the British government was prepared to support the tour 
financially. Tooley reported that the “Foreign Office and British Council had indicated the 
amount of subsidy they would be willing to put into this project, and it was felt that even if the 
Russians’ fee was not increased the visit could be undertaken by what was being offered by the 
British authorities.”127 Another reason why the EOG could still plan to tour in the USSR was the 
exceptional financial success of its parent organization, the Royal Opera House, Covent 
Garden.128 Due to a significant increase in ticket sales in both ballet and opera and a generous 
government stipend from the Arts Council, the Royal Opera House’s 1961-1962 net surplus was 
nearly twice as much as that of the previous season.129 The Times reported that: “Lord Drogheda, 
chairman of the company’s directors, expressed pleasure that there had been a profit of £61,287 
instead of the forecast loss of £71,000.”130 The Royal Ballet enjoyed great international esteem 
from its recent visit to the USSR, and the opera house had appointed the famous conductor 
Georg Solti as its musical director. Drogheda was also enthusiastic about cultural exchange with 
the Soviets. As The Times noted: “He hoped that Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges would benefit 
from the forthcoming visit of the Bolshoi Ballet to Covent Garden, and the prospective tour of 
 
126 EOG Ltd., Board of Directors Minutes, 6 December 1963, EOG Board 1962-63, GB-ALb. 
127 Ibid. 
128 The EOG was placed under the management of the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden in 1961. Kildea, 
Selling Britten, 186-87. 
129 The Arts Council and its priorities for the disbursement of funding were discussed on Page 64. 
130 “Royal Opera House Makes a Profit,” Times, 4 January 1963, 4. 
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Russia by the English Opera Group.”131 Thus we see that the EOG could expect to have the 
Royal Opera House’s financial support for its tour.132 
It is possible that Britten believed that his status placed him in a uniquely favorable 
position regarding negotiations with Soviet organizations such as the Soviet Ministry of Culture 
and Goskontsert. On March 9, 1964, Britten flew to Moscow to conduct the world premiere of 
his Cello Symphony with Rostropovich. After the performance, the composer met with Minister 
of Culture Furtseva and offered Rostropovich exclusive performance rights to the Cello 
Symphony until the end of 1965 in exchange for permission to record the piece with 
Rostropovich for the British recording company Decca.133 Britten then negotiated with the Soviet 
authorities on behalf of the EOG. In his report to the EOG’s board a couple of months later, 
Tooley reported that Britten had persuaded the Soviets to increase the number of the touring 
party to fifty.134 However, they refused to increase the payment that they were offering. 
Moreover, their terms included the then standard practice of mandating that a fraction of the 
compensation would be paid to the performers of the touring company in nonconvertible rubles, 
which could not leave the USSR. In his report to the EOG’s board, “Mr. Tooley reported that the 
financial arrangements for the tour were very poor; the Group would receive £1,500 in sterling 
plus free hotel, internal travel, food and pocket money; the Russians would pay one-way freight 
 
131 Ibid., 4. 
132 The EOG’s position had shifted considerably after it was transferred to the administration of the Royal 
Opera House. As discussed in Chapter 1, when the EOG was an independent company in the 1940s and 1950s, it 
struggled to make ends meet and received very little support from the Arts Council (which concentrated most of its 
resources on the Royal Opera House). However, once the EOG was transferred to the Royal Opera House, tours 
such as those to the USSR could enjoy the support derived from the Arts Council’s subsidy of the Royal Opera 
House. 
133 Carpenter, 425.  
134 EOG Ltd., Board of Directors Minutes, 4 May 1964, EOG Board 1964-65, GB-ALb. The EOG’s 
expense reports after the tour corroborate this number. Keith Grant to Leonard Grant, English Opera Group: Autumn 
Tour, 1964, 22 October 1964, EOG Provincial and Russian Tour Artists, GB-ALb. 
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and travel.”135 According to the EOG’s banking records, the company was awarded 20,541 
rubles to be divided among the touring party in addition to £1,500 in sterling that was awarded to 
the EOG (and, by extension, the Royal Opera House). The rubles were useless outside of the 
USSR, so any rubles that the EOG did not spend during the tour would remain in the State Bank 
of the Soviet Union.136 Britten’s success in negotiating an increase of the touring party greatly 
improved the chances of a successful tour because it put potentially less strain on the vocalists 
and it allowed for substitutions in the case of illness. While the issue regarding compensation for 
the tour was frustrating to Tooley and the leadership of the EOG, it would not jeopardize the 
tour, because of the Royal Opera’s budget surplus.  
Britten would take one further action in the EOG’s negotiations with the USSR, this time 
with the assistance of Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya. While the EOG’s contract with 
Goskontsert indicated that the touring party would include fifty individuals, it did not provide 
any assurances that the EOG would have access to the theaters’ production staff during the 
rehearsals.137 In July 1964, Britten consulted with Peter Pears, the two Soviet musicians, and 
Tooley regarding the drafting of a letter to be sent to Furtseva over the terms of the tour’s 
contract. This letter was primarily a request for a guarantee that the Soviet performance venues 
would provide stage space and crews for the EOG’s rehearsals. In my opinion, the tone of the 
letter is informal yet respectful; it appears to be more of a personal letter than a formal request to 
an important government authority:  
You have probably heard that we are having trouble over the contract between the 
English Opera Group and Gosconcert [sic] with reference to the proposed tour in 
September/October next. Please forgive my disturbing you personally with our problems, 
 
135 Ibid. 
136 Royal Opera House/Covent Garden to State Bank of USSR, Moscow, 10 September 1964, EOG 
Autumn Tour 1964-66, GB-Alb. 
137 Golovin to Tooley, undated letter, EOG Autumn Tour 1964-66, GB-ALb. 
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but I am really very much afraid that this tour may not take place at all unless you 
intervene.138 
 
Britten goes on to warn Furtseva that these stage rehearsals were “necessary and completely 
reasonable,” and that the EOG would be forced to cancel the tour if these conditions were not 
met. The final sentences of the letter resemble a plea more than an ultimatum; they stress that the 
EOG desired to perform in the USSR, but that the tour simply was not possible under the current 
circumstances:  
Please help us if you can. This tour is important to us, and we want very much to come to 
the USSR. It would be tragic if such an important project [was] allowed to collapse.139   
 
By referring to the EOG tour as an important project, Britten was arguably calling attention to it 
as the major manifestation of the current Anglo-Soviet cultural agreement, and perhaps 
suggesting that its “collapse” would be both tragic and problematic for international relations at a 
time when both governments were wanting to reduce tensions. Britten’s request was successful: 
Golovin of Goskontsert confirmed that the Leningrad theater and its staff would be available for 
rehearsals in the two-day period before the first concert, and that all three of the theaters and 
their staff would be at the EOG’s disposal for the entire tour.140 As a result, the EOG was able to 
rehearse each of the three operas onstage before the productions in Leningrad.141 
 
Soviet Reception of the EOG’s Tour 
The Times critic who had been present at the first performance of Britten’s opera Albert 
Herring, Op. 39 (composed 1947) in Leningrad in 1964 remarked that the theater was filled to 
 
138 Britten to Furtseva, 21 July 1964, EOG Autumn Tour 1964-66, GB-Alb. 
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140 Golovin to Tooley, undated letter, EOG Autumn Tour 1964-66, GB-ALb. 
141 “Russian Tour: Cast Lists,” EOG Autumn Tour 1964-66, GB-ALb. 
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capacity and that the audience’s reception of the opera was “enthusiastic.”142 In an undated 
postcard sent to his friend Sophia Stein, Pears wrote that the Soviet people were “terribly 
hospitable and kind and the audiences so warm and enthusiastic.”143 Later, in Riga, Pears noted 
that the EOG had been given a wonderful reception, and he again complimented the Soviet 
populace by referring to them as a “sweet and friendly people.”144  
Another interesting account appears from a much unexpected source: C.A. Hackett, a 
professor of French from the University of Southampton. In a Times review of the EOG’s 
performance of Albert Herring at the same university in November (immediately after the Soviet 
tour, the EOG toured the English provinces), the reviewer wondered “just how much [the] 
Russian audiences made of Albert Herring.”145 After reading the review, Hackett wrote a letter to 
The Times, and stated that he himself had witnessed the Soviet premiere of the opera: 
For the opening quarter of an hour, I was uneasy; but the gusts of laughter from the 
audience reassured me that their understanding of our language was equal to this 
peculiarly English type of humor.146 When I asked my young Russian neighbor at the 
interval if he liked it, he was amazed at the question. “But of course, I like it! We know 
Britten’s work well here. It is very popular.”147 
 
 
142 “Leningrad Cheers Britten Opera,” Times, 23 September 1964, 11. 
143 Pears to Stein, undated postcard, Britten to Erwin Stein, GB-ALb. 
144 Pears to Stein, undated postcard, Britten to Erwin Stein, GB-ALb. 
145 “Serious Side of Comic Opera,” Times, 3 November 1964, 14. Albert Herring is a chamber opera on the 
subject of the grocery clerk Albert Herring’s growth to become a self-sufficient adult. The plot begins with the 
town’s leadership failing to find a virtuous girl to serve as the “May Queen.” The leaders instead select Albert to be 
the “May King,” but he then escapes and discovers his independence. 
146 Chowrimootoo explains that the humor of Albert Herring is primarily referential. It consists of the 
naming of old English places (such as Iken and Snape) around the fictional town of Loxford where the opera takes 
place, and of the depiction of English stock characters: the dogmatic and moralistic matron Lady Billows, the prim 
teacher Miss Wordsworth, the pious Vicar, the pompous Mayor, and the rustic Superintendent of the Police. These 
characters drew inspiration from Victorian-era novels and the musical theater of W.S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan. 
Christopher Chowrimootoo, Middlebrow Modernism: Britten’s Operas and the Great Divide (Oakland: University 
of California Press, 2018), 68-71. It is possible that Albert Herring fulfilled Russian Anglophiles’ expectations of 
English-ness (discussed earlier as an imagined England derived from English literature), and that they reacted 
favorably to what they perceived as English people behaving in a quintessentially English manner in comic 
situations. Also, these audience members had a knowledge of the English language, which suggests that they were a 
well-educated and privileged part of the Soviet public.  
147 C. A. Hackett, “Albert Herring in Russia,” Times, 6 November 1964, 13. 
145 
 
Hackett then recalled that this popularity was obvious when “the cast was given a standing 
ovation and smothered in bouquets.” In a speech immediately after the concert, the composer 
responded to this positivity by speaking of “Leningrad’s cultured audience.” In his letter, Hackett 
was convinced that this statement was “no empty flattery.”148 Moreover, the response to Britten’s 
work in Moscow was arguably no different than the enthusiastic reactions in both Leningrad and 
Riga. In the aptly titled Times article “Moscow Welcome for Britten Opera,” the composer 
recalled that “the company had received [there], as elsewhere in the USSR, a ‘marvelous 
reception’ from Soviet audiences.”149  
On October 6, 1964, The Guardian translated and published the complete Leningradskaia 
pravda review of the EOG’s Leningrad performances of Britten’s The Rape of Lucretia, Op. 37 
(composed in 1946), Albert Herring, and The Turn of the Screw, Op. 54 (composed in 1954). 
Leonid Entelis, “a well-known music critic and member of the Union of Soviet Composers,” 
authored the original review; the article proves to be an enlightening account of an official Soviet 
opinion of a Western composer.150 While the review was primarily positive in tone, there were 
clearly aspects of Britten’s music that were less ideologically acceptable than others, and these 
trouble spots were either criticized or ignored completely. In the article, Entelis immediately 
observed the striking contrast between the three operas, and states that these different 
compositions were indicative of “Britten’s creative interests, the scale of his mastery, and the 
general direction of his gift.” In his comments on Albert Herring, Entelis complimented Britten’s 
efforts in writing a comic opera, and stated that “musical wit” has become an increasingly rare 
gift, particularly after the deaths of Gioacchino Rossini and Bedřich Smetana.151 
 
148 Ibid., 13. 
149 “Moscow Welcome for Britten Opera,” Times, 10 October 1964, 12. 
150 “A Soviet Eulogy of Benjamin Britten: Review of English production,” Guardian, 6 October 1964, 16. 
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The critic’s account of The Turn of the Screw is much more critical. At the outset, Entelis 
acknowledged the “power and charm” of the composer’s talent, which he claimed was just as 
present in The Turn of the Screw as it was in Albert Herring. However, he reported his confusion 
and disappointment that Britten’s formidable talents were squandered on such a “strange and 
archaic” subject, which featured the “pathological idea” of the children, Flora and Miles, 
communicating with the netherworld. On the surface, the critic viewed the opera (based on 
Henry James’s 1898 novel) as a mere ghost story. Yet, if Entelis considered the possible subtext 
of the libretto to be the homoerotic relationship between Quint (as an older male) and Miles (a 
boy) as what made the opera’s subject “pathological,” he did not explicitly state so in 
Leningradskaia Pravda. Peter Grimes includes a similar dynamic between the lead character and 
his apprentice, which could have suggested abuse, pederasty, and the defiling of innocence. In 
my opinion, Entelis’s disappointment “that Britten gave his talent to the embodying of such a 
trifling subject” and his later stated confusion about Britten’s impassioned defense of the clearly 
guilty protagonist of Peter Grimes implies that the critic refused to acknowledge publicly, or was 
simply unaware (or in denial) of, alternative interpretations of either of these works.152 It is 
possible that Entelis noticed some of these subtexts, but did not include them in his review, due 
to the conventional practice in Soviet criticism, which typically avoided the discussion of 
sexuality.153 
In the final section of the review, Entelis lauded the performance of The Rape of 
Lucretia.154 However, unlike the preceding review of The Turn of the Screw—which openly 
 
152 Ibid., 16. 
153 See Page 215. 
154 The Rape of Lucretia is a chamber opera on the subject of Tarquinius’s rape of Lucretia and her 
subsequent suicide. These events are observed by the male and female choruses, who contemplate the meaning of 
these events, but are ultimately unable to intervene. 
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criticized its problematic aspect—the critic did not mention the more ideologically controversial 
elements of the work itself. The most obvious examples were undoubtedly the religious beliefs 
of the male and female choruses, who narrate the work and impose on it a Christian 
interpretation. Instead, the critic complimented the elegance of the stage design, direction, and 
costumes. More importantly, Entelis focused on Britten’s humanist sympathy for Grimes, the 
“disillusioned man who no longer believes that there is good on the earth,” and calls attention to 
the similarities between Britten’s sympathetic musical treatment of Grimes and of Lucretia. In 
addition, the critic admired the composer’s scathing treatment of Tarquinius: a prince who 
stripped himself of his regalia and reveled in his own “brutal nature.” Possibly, the image of a 
corrupt, decadent royal was more ideologically acceptable and redeemed Lucretia from its more 
religious framing device.155 
Newspaper clippings of two other reviews of the EOG’s Soviet tour, A. Dmitriev’s 
Vechernyi Leningrad review and Shneerson’s Sovetskaia kul’tura article, were saved in the 
EOG’s papers at the Britten-Pears Foundation Archive, which strongly implies that Britten and 
the other directors of the ensemble were aware of their content.156 The former review is of the 
EOG’s first performance in Leningrad. In his review, Dmitriev recalled Britten’s successes in 
Leningrad in the previous year: the Leningrad Philharmonic’s unstaged Soviet premiere of Peter 
Grimes,157 and the Leningrad premieres of the Cello Symphony and the War Requiem. The critic 
referred to Britten as one of the great composers of his time, and recognizes the composer’s work 
to be bold, courageous, and striking. Importantly, Dmitriev complimented Britten for being able 
 
155 Ibid., 16. 
156 It is unclear, however, who selected and preserved the clippings. 
157 The Kirov Theater, under the direction of Djemal Dalgat, gave the fully-staged Soviet premiere of Peter 
Grimes in 1965. See Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “’Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” trans. Nick Winter, Melos 19/20 
(5 August 1997): 64-71. 
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to communicate effectively with the audience and to express elegant musical gestures while at 
the same time utilizing complex contemporary techniques.158  
In the latter article, Shneerson also lauded Britten for his compositional ability and for 
being a positive representation of foreign creativity. Furthermore, this critic considered the 
composer to have been a creator of purposeful contemporary music, rich in content, and which 
utilized a number of different forms and genres. Moreover, in a passage similar to the 
authoritative discourse discussed earlier, Shneerson praised the EOG itself as a major operatic 
innovation and argued that chamber opera was small and portable enough to survive in the harsh 
economic climate of capitalist countries that lacked the generous government support of socialist 
nations. Shneerson explained that in capitalist countries, only a few major ensembles in 
important centers are supported, and that classical music elsewhere had to adapt to survive.159 
Shneerson’s argument was based on the assumption that capitalist countries such as the UK did 
not support music in the Western classical tradition as much as the USSR. While it is true that 
the Soviet government dedicated a higher proportion of its resources to the support of classical 
music—as well as other forms of cultural production that it considered to be high art—than its 
capitalist counterparts, Shneerson arguably overstates his case by overestimating the funding gap 
between the two systems.  
Here I propose that the critic was asserting a standard ideological position based on the 
assumption that the cultural environment in London in the 1960s was like the situation the city 
was in during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century: dependent on the whims of the 
audience in a free market without much government patronage. To give Shneerson the benefit of 
 
158 A. Dmitriev, “Virtuoznoe masterstvo: pervui spektakl’ angliiskogo teatra” [“Virtuosic Mastery: First 
Concert of the English Theater”], Vechernyi Leningrad [Evening Leningrad], 23 September 1964, 1. 
159 Grigorii Shneerson, “Molodaia angliiskaia opera” [“Young English Opera”] Sovetskaia kul’tura [Soviet 
Culture] no. 124, 17 October 1964, 4. 
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the doubt, it is unlikely that he could have been aware of the actual state of government subsidy 
for the performing arts in the UK. At this point in the company’s history, the EOG’s economic 
wellbeing was primarily not derived from its small size, flexibility, or success with audiences, 
but from its support from the Arts Council. By the 1964 tour, however, the EOG was 
administered by Covent Garden, which was the Arts Council’s first priority.160  
It should be noted that not all of the reactions to the Leningrad performances were 
uniformly positive. G.D. Tikhontovsky, a representative of the Leningrad branch of Goskontsert, 
reported to his director in Moscow, Georgy Agadzhanov, that while the performances were a 
great critical success, they appeared to have been unsuccessful overall with the local public.161  
According to the opinions of all of the Leningrad musicians and musicologists, the 
artistic quality [of the English Chamber Opera Troupe] was good, but the [financial] 
results were negative, despite the great preparatory work undertaken [translation mine].162 
 
While Titkhantovsky’s point regarding the performances’ success among musicians, 
musicologists, and critics is consistent with the reviews discussed above, it seems that the overall 
attendance at the concerts was low enough to result in a loss for the venture, despite the great 
pains taken to advertise the concerts and the strong pre-performance coverage in the newspapers. 
In this 1965 report, Titkhantovsky discussed forty-two performances and tours by foreign artists 
and ensembles from countries including the US, the UK, France, the German Democratic 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and by others in artistic fields including theater, 
popular music, folk music, and classical music. He reported that only eight of the groups 
 
160 See Page 64. 
161 Tikhantovsky to Agadzhanov, 8 February 1965, f. 355, op. 2-2, d. 271 Perepiska s Goskontsertom SSSR 
po voprosu organizatsii gastrol’nykh poesdok za rubezhom i poezdok zarubezhnykh artistov v nashu stranu 
[Correspondence with USSR Goskontsert Regarding the Organization of International Tours and Travel of Foreign 
Artists to our Country], Central State Archives of Literature and Art, St. Petersburg (hereafter cited as TsGALI-
SPb). 
162 По отзывам всех ленинградских музыкантов и музыковедов художественное качество 
[Английской камерной оперной труппы] хорошее, но [финансовый] результат отрицательный, несмотря на 
большую подготовительную работу. Ibid. 
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(including the EOG) had negative financial results.163 Possibly, the language barrier resulting 
from the performance of opera in English discouraged much of the general audience from 
attending.  
It should be noted that the EOG performers were compensated for the tour by British 
institutions such as the Royal Opera House and the British Council, as well as the Soviet 
government. Soviet ticket sales, on the other hand, were collected and kept by the Soviet theaters 
and Goskontsert. Britten himself appears to have considered the EOG tour to be a great success. 
From his perspective, the audiences were enthusiastic164 and the Soviet critical reception was 
very positive. Britten would not have been aware of the Goskontsert’s lack of success regarding 
Soviet audience attendance during the tour. In a letter to the company following the tour, Britten 
and the other directors of the EOG expressed their satisfaction with it:   
Now that the performances are over and the excitement is past, we would like to thank 
you for your participation in the autumn tour. It was hard work for us all, but we hope 
that you got enjoyment out of it. This tour, particularly the Russian part, was a very 




In the 1950s and 60s, the difference between the arguably incompatible political and 
cultural structures of the UK and the USSR necessitated the discovery of some form of cultural 
common ground, in order to facilitate the development of cultural exchange between these two 
countries. While some of the musical trends supported by Soviet and British musical 
 
163 Ibid. 
164 The multiple curtain calls following the performances were noted in the time books for the tour. In 
Leningrad, curtain calls numbered from seven to sixteen a performance; six to nine in Riga; and eight to twelve in 
Moscow. EOG Russian Tour Time Book, GB-ALb. 




communities were mutually unpalatable—particularly music that explicitly promoted communist 
ideology on the former’s side and high modernism on the latter’s—the classical mainstream on 
both sides concentrated on the performance of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century canonic 
works of the Western classical tradition and of contemporaneous music in a post-tonal idiom. 
Furthermore, both the British and the USSR had two internationally recognized composers in 
Britten and Shostakovich, whose music exemplified experimentation within tonality. Both 
countries viewed public appreciation of classical music as a barometer for assessing the 
population’s cultural level. These factors made possible international cultural communication in 
the form of the interchange of performers and intellectual property, and they set the stage for 
cultural competition by identifying the conditions for relative success and failure based on the 
public’s consumption of high culture. 
A major difference between the British and Soviet systems surrounded the relationship 
between the arts and government. The British system can be described as selective government 
guidance and patronage: it utilized the BBC in the attempt to guide the British public toward 
greater appreciation of classical music and to become the largest patron of British classical 
musicians, and it provided stipends to performance ensembles through the Arts Council. 
However, it left other aspects of musical production, dissemination, and consumption to the free 
market. While it chose which musical institutions to subsidize, it completely left the explicit 
judgment of aesthetic quality to the musical community and its audiences. 
Meanwhile, the USSR developed an extensive state apparatus which supervised 
musicians’ training and public education as well as the publication, dissemination, and 
broadcasting of music. It sought to directly control as many of these aspects as possible. 
Acceptable music was fundamentally tonal, but official composers allowed for experimentation 
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with modal and, eventually, atonal elements. Socialist realist music connected with textual 
meaning through a system of associations (intonaziia) defined as musical imagery. This aesthetic 
framework provided a methodology for the portrayal of non-musical meaning through musical 
associations and references.  
Britten was not aware that he was already and coincidentally composing music which 
was aesthetically suitable for cultural exchange with the USSR. His evocative post-tonal style 
could fit within the aesthetic framework utilized by socialist realist composers, without following 
the ideological purpose of socialist realism. In other words, Britten’s music existed in a sound 
world similar to that of Soviet composers such as Shostakovich, but he did not support a 
particular political ideology in his work, other than more general issues such as pacifism, 
international reconciliation, and the defense of individuals ostracized by society. Britten’s stage 
works emphasized the protagonist’s own sense of duty, struggle against the collective, and tussle 
with forces not fully understood. In addition, Britten’s stylistic and textual ambiguities in his 
stage works allowed the malleable interpretation of his music in a variety of cultural contexts, 
including within the USSR.166  
Britten was concerned as to whether British music would be understandable and 
acceptable to Soviet audiences before he traveled to the USSR. His worries were dissipated upon 
the first performances of his works in Leningrad and Moscow, which were acclaimed by both 
audiences and critics. In his interview with Pravda, Britten presented himself as a left-leaning 
intellectual with many beliefs concerning education, support for the arts, and the importance of 
 
166 For example, Kirov Theater stage director Margarita Slutskaia interpreted the opera Peter Grimes as a 
cautionary tale on the evils of capitalism and saw the title character’s tragic descent to madness and suicide to be a 
direct result of his obsession to acquire material wealth. Slutskaia to Rockwell Kent, 29 February 1965, f. 337, op. 8, 
d. 67 Perepiska s khudozhnikom R. Kentom oformlenii opery B. Brittena “Piter Graims” [Correspondence with the 
artist R. Kent Regarding the Set Design of B. Britten’s Opera Peter Grimes], TsGALI-SPb. 
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music’s connection with the general public, which resonated with Soviet official cultural policy. 
In the Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges of early 1960s, the British government and Britten 
worked toward a common goal. Both the British and Soviet governments were interested in 
promoting détente through their leading musical figures, and so Britten was an ideal cultural 
diplomat. The Soviet audiences and authorities clearly held him in high esteem, and the 
composer was undoubtedly interested in bringing about performances of his music in the USSR. 
Moreover, Britten was aware that his status afforded him some leverage in negotiating directly 
with Goskontsert and the Soviet Ministry of Culture in order to obtain more favorable touring 





THE QUESTION OF ACCESS:  
THE PROFESSIONAL AGENCY OF BRITISH AND SOVIET MUSICIANS 
 
A Post-Structuralist Reading of the Agency of British and Soviet Musicians 
Before we can discuss the experience of British and Soviet musicians in the musical 
exchanges during the Cold War, it is important to explain how power generally operates in 
societies, by drawing from post-structuralist theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, 
Anthony Giddens, Antonio Gramsci, and Stuart Hall. According to Foucault’s work of the 
1970s, power is not something that can be compared to a solid object that is held by one person 
or group of people; instead it should be considered as something fluid that passes through 
society. It can also be seen as something that acts on people, who can then use it to act 
themselves. As a result, power is convective in the way it moves from a person or institution to 
another. Furthermore, someone with a great deal of power exercises it by compelling a second 
group to act; this second group then uses that power to act upon a third, and so on. To illustrate 
this concept, Foucault evokes the idea of royal power in feudalism: a monarch acts upon his 
vassals but also entrusts them with a portion of his own power; which these vassals then use to 
command their own subordinates. He argues that societies throughout history utilized these 
networks of command and power, even though the names of the players have changed in the past 
few centuries.1 
In Gramsci’s theoretical frameworks on hegemony and on relations between societal 
forces (which were written during his imprisonment as a political prisoner from 1926 to 1937), 
 
1 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 92-99. 
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individuals of social classes carry out, and are representative of, specific functions in society, and 
individuals who share the same function or trade tend to group together.2 In his reading of 
Gramsci’s works, Stuart Hall emphasizes the principle that class (or trade) unity should never be 
assumed, and that conflicting interests exist within every potential group of individuals despite 
their commonalities. Such groups do not form automatically, but instead they are created 
purposefully “as a result of specific economic, political, and ideological practices.”3 In his 
interpretation of Gramsci’s framework, Gavin Smith refers to hegemony as the balance of power 
that shapes society, and that the negotiations and compromises within specific fields of power 
between various groups of people shape the hegemonic project.4 
In Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, certain groups of individuals can attain dominance 
and become the leaders of hegemonic entities that represent their own interests, propagate 
themselves throughout society, and promote a unity of political and economic aims under their 
own stewardship. Importantly, however, such hegemonic entities do not usually stamp out 
subordinate groups. Instead, they tend to strive for an equilibrium between their own interests 
and those of their subordinates, through the constant negotiation and renegotiation of unstable 
compromises.5 Smith explains that cementing hegemony requires stable institutions, the ability 
for the hegemony to propagate itself throughout society, and the actual (or perceived) mastery 
over others.6 According to Hall, hegemonies are complex entities that need to be successful on 
multiple fronts (economic, moral, political, intellectual, etc.) in order to attain their power, and 
 
2 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence, 2005), 180-81. 
3 Stuart Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity,” Journal of Communication 
Inquiry 10, no. 2 (June 1986), 14.  
4 Gavin Smith, “Hegemony,” in A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics, eds. David Nugent and Joan 
Vincent (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2004), 224. 
5 Gramsci, 181-82. 
6 Smith, “Hegemony,” 217. 
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they need the continued support of society at large to maintain their position. Moreover, Hall 
argues that leaders of hegemonic entities—which themselves are specialized in at least one, but 
not all, of the above fronts—tend to seek out common ground with their constituents to utilize 
their expertise and to consolidate the hegemony’s position as leader:7 
The “leading elements” in a historic bloc may be only one faction of the dominant 
economic class—e.g., finance rather than industrial capital; national rather than 
international capital. Associated with it, within the “bloc,” will be strata of the subaltern 
and dominated classes, who have been won over by specific concessions and 
compromises and who form part of the social constellation but in a subordinate role. The 
“winning over” of these sections is the result of the forging of “expansive, universalizing 
alliances” which cement the historic bloc under a particular leadership.8 
 
Hall also explains that leaders of hegemonic entities can either lead through compromise or 
dominate through repression. The latter effectively ensures the rise of the dominating group to 
hegemonic status, but it cannot enlist the voluntary participation of subordinate groups without 
some form of compromise. Both coercion and cooperation are present to some degree in every 
hegemonic entity in various combinations.9 
 It is important not to consider the people living in a society to be passive parties that 
merely receive or react to the dictates of more powerful entities in that society. In Anthony 
Giddens’s sociological theory of agency, human beings living in a societal system are individuals 
who possess knowledge to cultivate agency in that system and, as a result, can act on their own 
accord. In other words, individuals know the rules of how to act in a particular system, and thus 
they know how to leverage the system to help themselves .10 Individuals are free to act on their 
own initiative, and may also seek to combat the hegemony; however, such an individual is still a 
part of society, and, as a result, subject to the needs, wants, expectations, and conventions of the 
 
7 Hall, 14-15. 
8 Ibid., 15. 
9 Ibid., 16-17. 
10 Steven Loyal, The Sociology of Anthony Giddens (London: Pluto, 2003), 30-31. 
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collective. It is important to remember that the exercise of agency can be carried out for either 
individual or collective goals, and that it can be used to both subvert or uphold the larger societal 
system or hegemony.11 Giddens also describes the structure of society as a property of the 
relations between groups of people; even if someone intends to act independently of, or to 
subvert, the societal structure (such as the hegemony and its network of subordinate groups), 
they merely act in support of other structures or create new ones in its place.12  
Foucault commented on the changing role of intellectuals in industrialized society from 
esteemed holders of general knowledge and political educators entrusted to improve the station 
of the common people (examples of these privileged groups in Russia included the nineteenth-
century liberal Russian intelligentsia and the Marxist intellectuals that instigated the socialist 
revolutions in the early twentieth century) to highly specialized professionals in the sciences. In 
the latter category, political involvement decreased as the significance of their scientific findings 
increased. In the case of nuclear physicists and computer scientists, their value to society (and 
the state) resulted chiefly from what they were able to produce. Even though their focus on their 
work appeared to be total, they were still a part of society and they still wielded power in it.13  
Throughout his academic career from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, Bourdieu 
theorized that multiple forms of capital existed in society, and that members of subordinate 
groups who had specialized skills were able to trade in their form of capital (which he identified 
as symbolic or cultural capital) to gain another form of it (such as economic) in exchange.14 In 
 
11 See Chapter 3 of ibid. 
12 Ibid., 71-75. 
13 Foucault, 125-31. 




his reading of Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, Bruce M. Knauft provides the following 
example: 
The artist who trades cultural status to members of the managerial class in the form of art 
lessons obtains some of their economic capital. Conversely, bourgeois clientele pays the 
artist money in hopes of gaining cultural refinement and hence cultural capital. On a 
larger scale, philanthropists buy cultural prestige by magnanimously giving away 
financial assets for public causes or in support of the arts.15 
 
Knauft goes on to explain that this relationship between the managerial class and the artist is 
anchored in the concepts of inequality in both financial assets and cultural prestige.16 Therefore, 
“the philanthropist” and “the artist” are locked in an interdependent and symbiotic relationship, 
and their roles result from having a wealth of their own form of capital but a shortage of the 
other. Foucault’s statements on specialized intellectuals and Bourdieu’s concept of cultural 
capital work nicely within Gramsci’s framework of hegemony: the hegemony needs to be 
validated by cultural prestige, which it can obtain only from the voluntary participation of 
subordinate artists with specialized training. As a result, musical capital becomes the currency, 
which shape the power relations between the hegemony and musicians. The value of musical 
capital depends entirely on criteria set by hegemonic entities, it can differ between such entities, 
and it can be judged alongside other forms of capital (such as political capital). As a result, 
hegemonic entities can favor some musicians over others, and this can affect the agency of those 
musicians. In any case, the extent of one’s agency can only approach, but never reach, full 
autonomy, because every actor must negotiate with some hegemonic system. 
In this chapter, my use of post-structuralist theory is intended to be an interpretive tool to 
analyze the evidence that I collected from British and Soviet records, personal papers, and 
memoirs, as well as biographical accounts of British and Soviet musicians and the secondary 
 
15 Ibid., 114. 
16 Ibid., 114. 
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musicological literature. In utilizing these theories, I seek to answer the following questions: 
Why did the state value classical music and musicians? How did musicians leverage this value to 
acquire the agency needed to pursue their goals? What did the musicians hope to accomplish 
from the use of their agency, or to what did they seek to gain access? Gramsci’s conceptual 
framework for the relations of power between the hegemony and its subordinates can be applied 
to the relationship between socialist governments and organizations of music professionals. 
Foucault’s theories on the fluidity of power can help us understand how the state acted upon 
musicians, and how this power was transferred to these musicians, who then utilized it for their 
own purposes. Bourdieu’s concept of alternative forms of capital indicates how musicians 
exchanged their cultural capital for something that they valued. Giddens’s discussion of agency 
explains that subordinate subjects with agency often commit to actions that, instead of subverting 
societal structures, actually uphold them. This last point is crucial for my study, because it 
prevents the discussion from devolving into a reductionist view of the hegemonic state versus the 
subaltern musician, which ignores the evidence that these two groups often cooperated with each 
other and periodically shared the same goals. In other words, both groups usually sought out 
“win-win” scenarios, in which both received something that they valued (i.e. for the state, 
cultural prestige, and for the musicians, access to the other country’s audiences, contemporaries, 
and intellectual property).  
Post-structuralist frameworks have been used by ethnomusicologists to theorize the 
position of music and musicians in socialist societies in the following two case studies. In her 
article on the post-1944 professionalization of pre-1944 Bulgarian musical culture and the 
position of Bulgarian folk musicians in relation to the state, Donna A. Buchanan posits that the 
musicians constantly negotiated between their personal interpretations of their own identities as 
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musicians and the state’s interpretation of what Bulgarian music should be. At times, the 
musicians questioned the artistic merit and authenticity of the music that the hegemony 
sometimes prescribed to suit its purposes.17 Buchanan then references Bourdieu’s, Foucault’s, 
and Václav Havel’s assertions that hegemonic entities are maintained by the propagation of their 
own “dominant interpretations of social reality as cultural truth,” that intellectuals are integral to 
the production of this truth, that truth and power are fundamentally linked, and that the academy 
is one place where these two forces intersect. From this point, Buchanan posits that in the sphere 
of Bulgarian music, the state-run conservatories, institutes, and the Bulgarian Composers’ Union 
were the locations where truth and power in Bulgarian music intersected and the national folk 
ensembles played out this relationship.18 Considering that the Bulgarian musical establishment 
was in several ways modelled on the Soviet system, it is possible to notice similarities between 
them. 
 In his research on the Chinese state’s efforts to promote a national and cultural identity 
(and to remove Western influences) after the socialist revolution, Frederick Lau indicates that the 
state needed the participation of Chinese musicians of traditional music in order to develop the 
repertoire and performance technique of the dizi (a Chinese transverse flute) into a cultural 
symbol of the Chinese nation. As a result of the state’s patronage, the prestige of the instrument 
and the social position of the musicians who performed and composed for it increased 
dramatically in Chinese society.19 Dizi musicians received a regular salary from the state and 
were given the opportunity to compose, perform, and record at home and abroad. These new 
 
17 Donna A. Buchanan, “Metaphors of Power, Metaphors of Truth: The Politics of Music Professionalism 
in Bulgarian Folk Orchestras,” Ethnomusicology 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 383. 
18 Ibid., 393. 
19 Frederick Lau, “Forever Red: The Invention of Solo Dizi Music in Post-1949 China,” British Journal of 
Ethnomusicology 5 (1996): 113-16. 
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benefits would not have been possible before the revolution. Lau argues that these musicians saw 
the Chinese socialist state as their benefactor (not their oppressor), and that they made a 
conscious decision to contribute their music to the political discourse of the government, and 
thus became functionaries of the Chinese state. Lau then frames the voluntary participation of the 
musicians as an example of how the hegemony and the subaltern function in Gramsci’s 
framework. In this case, domination did not result from coercion or force, but it did arise from 
the state’s successful efforts to persuade the subaltern “to internalize and consent to the dominant 
way of thinking as natural.” Moreover, Lau borrows from Bourdieu’s framework in arguing that 
ideology did not merely radiate from the state; it was instead a dialectic between the state and the 
musicians, and that the latter had an active role in shaping that ideology in practice.20  
 
The Professional Agency of Musicians in the Soviet Union 
When considering the Soviet Union, it is essential not to view the Soviet state as a 
monolithic entity that completely dominated the Soviet populace with an omnipresent ideology. 
Stemming from this rather reductionist view of the USSR is the perception of Soviet citizens as 
being members of one of the following three two-dimensional categories: 1) the repressed, silent 
sufferers; 2) the callous (or brainwashed) enablers of the regime; and 3) the heroic dissidents 
who found ways to silently undermine the state and either survive in the underground resistance, 
escaped the dystopia, or were eventually crushed by the regime. While the above archetypes can 
be interesting Orwellian fictional models—the first being the faceless masses, the second the 
villains who betray their countrymen, and the third the heroes (and allies of the West)—they are 
not historically realistic or useful for this study.  
 
20 Ibid., 127. 
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The best-known example of the use of this narrative in Soviet music history is the 
purported memoirs of Shostakovich, transcribed and edited by the Leningrad critic, musicologist, 
and, later, émigré, Solomon Volkov.21 After studying the arguments both for and against 
Testimony’s authenticity, I take the position that Volkov’s account of Shostakovich is 
problematic, that Volkov speaks as the composer for part or all of the volume, that corroborating 
evidence is needed to justify the academic use of any of its material, and that it is very difficult to 
ascertain how much of Shostakovich’s voice is actually present.22 Regardless of the question of 
Testimony’s authenticity, Volkov’s and his supporters’ primary contribution to Soviet music 
history was the proposition that Shostakovich was a secret dissident who stealthily incorporated 
anti-Soviet imagery in his music as a covert message to fellow dissidents, which was 
undetectable to the musical establishment and the state. This view also places Shostakovich in 
opposition to the Composers’ Union—which was led by personages (such as Khrennikov), 
whom Volkov depicted as two-dimensional cronies of the regime—and does not acknowledge 
that Shostakovich became an important leader of the musical establishment. Moreover, Volkov 
and his supporters claim that this proposition is the one true interpretation of Shostakovich’s life 
and works. For example, Ian McDonald’s The New Shostakovich is essentially a series of literary 
interpretations of Shostakovich’s oeuvre that reduce his creative intent to the protest of the 
Stalinist regime along the conceptual lines of Testimony.23 
 
21 See Solomon Volkov, Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich as related to and edited by 
Solomon Volkov, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (New York: Harper, 1979). 
22 In her 1980 review of Testimony, Laurel Fay was instrumental in raising doubts about its authenticity. 
See Laurel Fay, “Shostakovich Versus Volkov: Whose Testimony?” Russian Review 39, no. 4 (October 1980): 484-
93. Two multi-author volumes cover the major arguments for and against the authenticity of Testimony. For the pro-
Testimony perspective, see Allan B. Ho and Dmitry Feofanov, eds., Shostakovich Reconsidered (London: Toccata, 
1998). For the anti-Testimony perspective, see Malcolm Hamrick Brown, ed., A Shostakovich Casebook 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Both volumes contain previously published articles, and new 
chapters specifically written for the collections. 
23 See Ian MacDonald, The New Shostakovich (Boston: Northeastern, 1990). 
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In my research, I found that Soviet life was far more muddled, as the surviving 
documentary evidence suggests that most Soviet citizens were in the grey area of common 
experience that included various aspects of compliance, loyalty, and resistance. Instead of 
viewing the Soviet experience through the lens of the three archetypes of silent suffers, heroic 
dissidents, and callous enablers, I found it far more useful to consider how power permeated all 
levels of Soviet society, and how Soviet citizens could obtain some of this power for their own 
uses. In other words, I put emphasis on the active and subjective experience of Soviet musicians. 
While the Soviet state was one of the most oppressive and controlling entities in history, Soviet 
citizens found ways to live within this system and negotiate with it, in order carve out some 
agency for themselves. 
The Soviet Composers’ Union—the official professional union of composers, 
musicologists, and critics—was a prime example of the intersection of truth and power described 
by Buchanan. As an organization of professionals of the same field (the composition, critique, 
and study of classical music), it falls into the category of occupational cohesion discussed by 
Gramsci. It was also created by the Soviet government, which matches Hall’s assertion that such 
organizations do not form spontaneously of their own accord. In 1932, the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party disbanded all professional societies formed by their own members 
(i.e. composers, musicians, critics, and musicologists), and created new creative unions in all 
artistic fields. Over the next seven years, various municipal and regional composers’ unions were 
consolidated into one centralized entity known as the Union of Soviet Composers.24 This 
centralization paralleled other aspects of the state-run economy, which monopolized various 
areas of industry, commerce, and creative endeavor and placed them under the government’s 
 
24 Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 18-26. 
164 
 
direct supervision and oversight. As a result of the consolidation of both the state monopoly and 
of the professional organization of composers, the relationship between the state and the 
Composers’ Union fits easily within the Gramscian framework of the relations between the 
hegemonic and subordinate entities: the hegemony mandated the reproduction and dissemination 
of its ideological reality in the form of socialist realism, it lacked expertise in classical music 
(which is a form of symbolic capital described by Bourdieu), and it set up a compromise to gain 
the expertise of music professionals by offering them limited agency, self-management, an 
improved standard of living, and rewarding professional activities such as foreign tours.  
 Elite musicians in the USSR were a privileged segment of the population. They were 
highly educated, enjoyed categorically higher living standards than the vast majority of their 
fellow citizens, and were highly valued for their craft in their country and abroad.25 However, 
what limitations were placed on these musicians, and how much control did they have over the 
trajectory of their careers and their activities as artists? In his monograph on the Composers’ 
Union during the Stalinist era, Creative Union, Tomoff posits that while the Soviet composers 
and musicologists of the Union did not have complete autonomy over their activities, they still 
had a degree of agency to self-govern and to interpret the dictates of the state in their everyday 
practice within the limits imposed on them by the Soviet government.26 
It is important to realize that Soviet musicians with elite status were not merely passive, 
or solely reactive to the hegemony’s exercise of power upon them. We can reference Giddens’s 
position that the agency wielded by individuals and subordinate groups enables them to form 
their own cultural systems. If we apply these concepts to the position of the Composers’ Union 
 
25 Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 
1945-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 14. 
26 Tomoff, Creative Union, 2-4. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, we notice that an entity that was subordinate to the Ministry of 
Culture and the political leadership of the country became a hegemonic entity in relation to 
groups subordinate to itself, such as unofficial composers. Khrennikov, as First Secretary of the 
Composers’ Union, had a great deal of power in the shaping of Soviet music, as well as the 
distribution of funds collected from musical royalties and publishing to remunerate and subsidize 
Soviet composers. Furthermore, Shostakovich (who had suffered under repressions in the late 
1930s and 1940s) also rose to hegemonic status in both artistic and political fields in comparison 
to his younger contemporaries in the early 1960s. As a result, it is important to remember that 
power is fluid, that positions of hegemony and subordination are relative and are always shifting, 
and that a particular person could be in several of these positions simultaneously and at any time. 
Also, feelings of hegemony and subordination can always be internalized. It is very possible that 
musicians who had their formative years during the Stalinist era (such as Shostakovich), 
internalized their subordinance to such an extent that they continued habitually an attitude of 
silent compliance to the government, while younger generations (who did not witness the purges 
of the 1930s) were more likely to test the limits of their agency. 
Elite Soviet performers and conductors were able to exchange their expertise as cultural 
capital in order to become involved in international tours, some of which intersected with Anglo-
Soviet cultural relations. Soviet musicians also had a considerable degree of agency in what they 
did during their participation in international tours within the limits set by the Soviet 
government, namely the state concert agency, Goskontsert, and its parent organization, the 
Ministry of Culture.27 Goskontsert represented the Soviet performers, which meant that it 
 
27 After its institution in 1957, Goskontsert carried out the orders of the Ministry of Culture, and it 
gradually became more independent. Harlow Robinson, The Last Impresario: The Life, Times, and Legacy of Sol 
Hurok (New York: Viking, 1994), 369. 
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arranged performances within the USSR and it negotiated directly with foreign concert agents 
and venues on behalf of all Soviet performers. Elite performers were prized by the Soviet 
government, because they were a living testament to Soviet cultural excellence. They were a 
means by which the Soviet Union could compete with Western powers, particularly the United 
States, more successfully than in the economic sphere. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that 
the Soviet Ministry of Culture understood that this strategy carried the risk of exposing their 
creative intelligentsia to Western ideological influence, which could lead to insubordination and 
even defection.  
In exchange for their artists’ promotion of soft power, the Soviet government provided 
them with a higher-than-average standard of living and access to international travel, but there 
was limited tolerance toward any of these musicians’ periodic ideological nonconformity and 
insubordination. A key area of the state’s relationship with the artistic intelligentsia during 
Stalinism was the annual ritual of the Stalin Prize. Marina Frolova-Walker explains that the 
significant cash disbursements resulting from the awards outstripped the lifetime savings of 
many ordinary Soviet citizens and provided artists with incentives to create works that were 
acceptable to the state. Shostakovich’s cantata in honor of Stalin’s reforestation project, Song of 
the Forests, was written while the composer was recovering from Zhdanov’s denouncements and 
was in a difficult financial position after losing his post at the Moscow Conservatory.28 While the 
cantata was of great ideological value to the state, it only earned 144 rubles in royalties in its first 
year and 10,000 rubles from its publication. Shostakovich was awarded the Stalin Prize for this 
piece, which aided him financially in the form of 100,000 rubles and served as part of his 
ideological recovery. Frolova-Walker also points out that the award’s prestige boosted the 
 
28 See Page 181. 
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statures of the recipients. Benefits could take the form of professional advancement—opera 
singers and theatrical actors who were Stalin Prize winners were given more prestigious roles—
or they manifested in more practical privileges, such as access to train tickets during the travel 
season or tickets to sold-out theatrical productions. Frolova-Walker posits that the denial of 
Stalin Prizes to otherwise esteemed authors and poets, such as Boris Pasternak, took on the 
subtext of government censure.29  
The decision-making process for the Prize provides a convincing example of the agency 
of the artistic intelligentsia and its limitations described by Tomoff. Frolova-Walker explains that 
the selection committees consisted of prominent artists and directors in various fields of the arts: 
theatrical directors, composers, authors, etc. In the first Stalin Prize selection committee, music 
was represented by the composers Yuri Shaporin and Nikolai Myaskovsky, as well as the 
popular songwriter Isaak Dunayevsky. This was also a place of vibrant debates on the merits and 
shortcomings of artistic works. There were disagreements based on aesthetics and ideology, as 
well as arguments between those who sought more autonomy from ideological involvement and 
those who were more hagiographic in their attitudes toward Stalin. While the committee was free 
to discuss and debate various works, they were only the lowest part of the decision-making 
process. Their decisions were subject to the approval of the governmental institutions above it: 
the Committee for Artistic Affairs (or the Ministry of Culture that replaced it), Agitprop, the 
Politburo, and Stalin, himself. This oversight demonstrates the limitations on the artistic 
intelligentsia’s agency described by Tomoff. Frolova-Walker also mentions that towards the end 
of the Stalinist period, the Prize weakened in stature. It was given out with such frequency that 
 
29 Marina Frolova-Walker, Stalin’s Music Prize: Soviet Culture and Politics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2016), 12-15. 
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its effect became diluted and the act of receiving such a prize became a subject of ridicule. The 
Prize was very much of its era, and it was discontinued shortly after Stalin’s death.30 
By leveraging their value (or what Bourdieu identified as cultural capital), elite musicians 
were able to cultivate some agency, which they in turn utilized to gain a degree of control over 
their activities, the disbursement of state support (such as their involvement in the Stalin Prize 
decision-making process discussed above), and access to desired material objects and 
professional advantages. By “access,” I mean the ability to obtain not only valued goods and 
services, but also foreign music and the means to perform it, as well as the ability to forge 
collaborations with foreign composers and performers. People on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
used their agency to obtain this access. To what they sought access depended on their creative 
and/or financial ambitions and the extent of their agency (i.e. how much they could gain through 
their positions without overextending the limitations of those positions). Meanwhile, the lives of 
ensemble and lesser-known soloist musicians were rife with financial difficulties, for they had no 
means to leverage their importance to navigate the Soviet system. In this chapter, I will discuss 
how some Soviet performers, conductors, and directors rose to the status of elite musicians and 
how they used their position to gain access to British music by advocating for its performance 
and, in some instances, for British composers to write new music for them.  
 While the Soviet government invested heavily in the arts and in arts education—which 
provided many graduates in the arts with a greater probability of employment in relation to the 
graduates of other countries—its oversight of all of the concert planning, major arts education 
institutions, and performance ensembles meant that the government maintained strict control of 
the cultural establishment. Elizabeth Wilson, who studied as a graduate student in Mstislav 
 
30 Ibid., 12-29. 
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Rostropovich’s cello studio at the Moscow Conservatory from 1964 to 1969 and continued 
taking lessons with the cellist for the next two years,31 recalled that her fellow students were 
assigned posts as teachers, performers, or professors. These positions could be located anywhere 
in the USSR, and the students had absolutely no control in the matter. In addition, the USSR 
mandated that its citizens carry internal passports; travel within the country was subject to 
restrictions; and each citizen was expected to reside and work in a particular assigned area. 
Wilson explains that practically all of these students wished to remain in Moscow or receive a 
position in Leningrad, but such appointments were intended for only the highest achievers 
among them.32 While it is possible that personal connections played a role in giving some 
students an advantage in the selection process, as it did elsewhere in Soviet higher education,33 it 
is evident from the anxiety of Wilson’s colleagues that it was very difficult to control where a 
particular graduate would spend the rest of his or her career. 
 Those fortunate and talented enough to become the conductors of major ensembles, 
soloists, or highly placed composers were used by the Soviet government in order to demonstrate 
Soviet excellence in education and high culture. Soviet ideology mandated that socialist societies 
were in the vanguard of human development, and that the USSR was the leader of the world 
socialist movement. As a result, the Soviet government invested heavily in demonstrating 
excellence in the arts, as well as other forms of competition such as chess, the Olympics, and 
space exploration. In this context, elite Soviet musicians were not only assigned to participate in 
international competitions, they were expected to dominate. 
 
31 Elizabeth Wilson, Rostropovich: The Musical Life of the Great Cellist, Teacher, and Legend (Chicago: 
Dee, 2008), 351-52. 
32 Ibid., 295-96. 
33 Benjamin Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and 
Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 58-60. 
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The Ministry of Culture intended the international tours of Soviet elite musicians to 
explicitly demonstrate that art could transcend politics, while implicitly promoting the political 
image of the USSR as a peaceful and culturally enlightened great power. Furthermore, 
international tours were intended to demonstrate Soviet cultural excellence, not only through the 
display of technical virtuosity, but also through the strategic selection of repertoire. In Virtuosi 
Abroad, Tomoff argues that this strategy manifested in three stages: 1) the performance of 
canonical works in the classical tradition to demonstrate proficiency; 2) the performance of 
Russian classics (such as works by Tchaikovsky) to portray Soviet artists as the rightful heirs of 
the Russian musical tradition; and 3) the performance of new Soviet works to imply that the 
USSR was the current leader in the composition of contemporary music.34 Soviet unofficial 
music was avoided. Goskontsert and the Ministry of Culture were very selective in what 
represented the USSR abroad. Western contemporary music was usually excluded because 
unacceptable music (such as pieces with serial or aleatoric elements) was obviously avoided, 
while more acceptable recent music (such as compositions with tonal or post-tonal elements) 
diverted attention away from Soviet compositional accomplishments.  
The pretense that important international competitions, particularly those in the USSR, 
remained impartial, was crucial in order to argue that they were meaningful indicators of artistic 
excellence. The first Tchaikovsky Competition in 1958, which was the first international 
competition on Soviet soil, almost fell into controversy when the American pianist Van Cliburn 
became the audience favorite. Cliburn’s success was apparently so clear that not awarding him 
first prize would have brought the integrity of the competition into question. The judges, with 
reportedly the blessing of Khrushchev himself, awarded Cliburn top honors. Tomoff argues that 
 
34 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 124-26. 
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the USSR, buoyed by its recent victories in other international competitions, felt confident 
enough in its success to play the role of the gracious loser on that occasion.35 However, Minister 
of Culture Nikolai Mikhailov believed that such a gesture could only be used sparingly. He 
subsequently pressed for greater oversight in the touring of elite musicians, in order to increase 
the amount of time high-ranking conservatory professors stayed at home to teach the next 
generation of Soviet virtuosi. The fear was that if Soviet artists were defeated on a routine basis, 
it could not be convincingly argued that they—and the Soviet system that they represented—
were the best in the world.36 Mikhailov’s successor, Ekaterina Furtseva, pressured the jurors of 
the 1970 Tchaikovsky Competition—the pianist Emil Gilels, the violinist David Oistrakh, and 
Rostropovich—to ensure that Soviet musicians won first prize, because of the centenary of 
Lenin’s birth. Rostropovich reportedly suggested that they postpone the competition for a year so 
that they could host a fair contest.37 It appears that Rostropovich’s strategy was effective at 
dispelling Furtseva’s ultimatum, but only because he was an internationally prominent musician 
needed by the Ministry of Culture to promote Soviet cultural hegemony through performance 
and the training of new virtuosi, or in other words: a goose laying golden eggs.38 
 
Elite Soviet Musicians in International Cold War Cultural Exchange 
To illustrate the concepts mentioned above regarding the position of elite Soviet 
musicians in the early Cold War and the opening of cultural relations with the West, the 
following section includes the recollections and biographical accounts of four performers—
 
35 Ibid., 1-2. 
36 Ibid., 98-108. 
37 Wilson, Rostropovich, 168-70. 
38 It is possible that Gilels and Oistrakh, being members of the older generation that came of age during 
Stalinism, did not raise similar objections due to their internalization of Soviet hierarchies (and the dire 
consequences that could result from their subversion), while the younger Rostropovich was more confident in his 
position as an elite musician. 
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Oistrakh, Rostropovich, Vishnevskaya, and Richter—in order to illustrate how they became 
premier musicians of the USSR and how they navigated the challenges of international cultural 
exchange. Instrumentalists generally rose to prominence by winning important Soviet and, 
eventually, international competitions. Elite vocalists were usually soloists of major opera 
companies; the soprano Vishnevskaya, for example, rose up the ranks to become the prima 
donna of the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow. As discussed earlier, the USSR sought to demonstrate 
soft power to the West, and these musicians were among its strongest cultural resources. 
  By the time cultural relations between the USSR and West opened further in the mid- to 
late 1950s, David Oistrakh was already an established violinist and at the height of his renown at 
home. He had risen to international prominence in the interwar period, by winning the 1935 
Henryk Wieniawski Competition in Warsaw and the 1937 Eugène Ysaӱe (later Queen Elizabeth) 
Competition in Brussels. Oistrakh’s international competition career was interrupted by the 
restrictions on travel resulting from the Second World War; nonetheless, he continued to 
consolidate his position as an elite musician by earning the Honored Figure of the Arts of the 
Russian Soviet Republic in 1942, a Stalin Prize in 1943, and the Order of Lenin in 1946. After 
the war, the isolationist politics of late Stalinism resulted in only a partial reopening of travel 
opportunities. At this time, Oistrakh was one of only a handful of musicians able to perform in 
Western Europe, but it was not unusual for travel plans to break down for little apparent reason.39  
With Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange beginning to thaw after Stalin’s death, Oistrakh was 
able to perform in London in 1954.40 Around this time, a delegation of Soviet musicians and the 
Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations Abroad (VOKS) arrived in the UK. Included in 
this party was the violinist Igor Oistrakh, David Oistrakh’s son. The British concert agents Lilian 
 
39 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 116-17. 
40 Ibid., 117.  
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and Victor Hochhauser seized the opportunity to contract Igor to perform a very successful 
concert at Royal Albert Hall. The Hochhausers then used this success to convince the delegation 
to allow them to contract the older Oistrakh for the following year.41 These performances set the 
foundation for the Hochhausers’ business relationship with the USSR and they soon became the 
primary conduits for the travel of musicians between two countries.42 
It should be understood that the younger generation of Soviet performers such as Richter, 
Rostropovich, and Vishnevskaya were at the beginning of their illustrious careers. While the 
older Oistrakh was accustomed to being a virtuoso in the Stalinist regime and was distrustful of 
both the Soviet government and the West, the younger generation matured under different 
circumstances and had a greater awareness of their worth to the Soviet Union, their international 
celebrity, and what opportunities their position as virtuosi afforded them as cultural 
ambassadors.43 Musicians from the older generation such as Oistrakh and Shostakovich 
remembered the 1930s, and, as a result, their interactions with the government afterwards took 
on a quiet complacency and caution.44 Vishnevskaya reported in her memoirs that she had a 
conversation with Oistrakh in 1969, when she and her husband gave Solzhenitsyn shelter. In her 
recollection, she recorded the following statement from the violinist: 
I won’t play the hypocrite with you: I never would have taken him in. To tell the truth, 
I’m afraid. My wife and I lived through ’37, when night after night every person in 
Moscow feared his arrest. In our building, only our apartment and the one facing it on the 
same floor survived the arrests. All of the other tenants had been taken off God knows 
where. Every night I expected the worst, and I set aside some warm underwear and a bit 
of food for the inevitable moment. You can’t imagine what we went through, listening for 
 
41 This interview was published when the Mariinsky (f.k.a. Kirov) Ballet arrived at the Royal Opera House, 
Covent Garden in 2014 to perform. This tour was negotiated by Lilian and Victor Hochhauser. Mick Brown, “Victor 
and Lilian Hochhauser: Exclusive Interview,” Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2014, accessed 15 July 2017, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/dance/10988191/Victor-and-Lilian-Hochhauser-exclusive-
interview.html. 
42 The position and agency of the Hochhausers as concert agents involved in Anglo-Soviet musical 
exchange will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
43 Email correspondence between Elizabeth Wilson and the author, 5 December 2017. 
44 Email correspondence between Elizabeth Wilson and the author, 5 December 2017. 
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the fatal knock on the door or the sound of a car pulling up. One night, a Black Maria 
stopped out in front. Who were they coming for? Us or the neighbors? The downstairs 
door slammed, and the elevator began its ascent. Finally, it stopped on our floor. We 
listened to the footsteps and went numb. Whose door would they come to? An eternity 
passed. Then we heard them ring at the apartment across from us. Since that moment, I 
have known [that] I’m no fighter.45 
 
Having lived through an era when the regime imprisoned and executed its citizens for little cause 
throughout the 1930s, many of Oistrakh’s generation were conditioned to fear the state and tried 
not to directly confront it. However, Oistrakh’s and Shostakovich’s younger compatriots, 
particularly Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya, directly complained to the Ministry of Culture in 
response to perceived injustices and actively leveraged their worth to gain greater agency over 
their careers.  
Rostropovich’s rise to prominence is documented extensively by Elizabeth Wilson and 
Russian critic Tamara Grun-Grzhimailo in their monographs on the musician.46 He was born into 
a family of Russian musicians in Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan. His father and mother taught cello 
and piano, respectively, at the conservatory there, and Mstislav and his sister, Veronika,47 began 
their musical studies in their early childhood. The family moved to Moscow in the early 1930s, 
where Rostropovich’s father, Leopold, taught Mstislav cello at the Gnesin Institute and then at 
the Sverdlovsk District Music School. In the late 1930s, Rostropovich studied composition in the 
Moscow Conservatory’s high school program, and he became a student at the Moscow 
Conservatory in both cello and composition in the early 1940s.48 This brief account of 
Rostropovich’s background demonstrates that he was perfectly poised to become an elite Soviet 
performer: he was raised in a family of professional musicians and had access to some of the 
 
45 Galina Vishnevskaya, Galina: A Russian Story, trans. Guy Daniels (San Diego: Harcourt, 1984), 215-16. 
46 Wilson, Rostropovich; and Tamara Grum-Grzhimailo, Rostropovich i ego sovremenniki [Rostropovich 
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finest musical academies in the USSR. Thus, his rise was due to the combination of his 
exceptional musical ability and the privileges he enjoyed as a result of his birth.  
In the 1945 All-Union Competition for pianists, violinists, and cellists, the eighteen-year-
old Rostropovich dominated the cellist category to the extent that Shostakovich—who served as 
a judge—persuaded the panel to award third, instead of second, prize to the runner-up, because 
he felt that Rostropovich was on a totally higher level. (Interestingly, Richter also participated in 
this competition and split first prize with Viktor Merzhanov in the pianist category.) This early 
victory placed the cellist as a soloist with the Moscow Philharmonia, and he was soon 
performing as a soloist throughout the USSR and socialist Eastern Europe.49 Rostropovich was 
perfectly poised to become a major figure in Anglo-Soviet cultural activities once relations with 
the West thawed enough to make cultural exchange with the West possible. He was among the 
first Soviet musicians to travel to Finland and Norway in 1949 and 1951, respectively, as part of 
two Soviet musical delegations. Both delegations included David Oistrakh, and the 1951 visit 
also included Gilels and Ulanova.50 Rostropovich rose to prominence by becoming a member of 
the Composers’ Union in 1950 (he had studied composition as well as cello at the Moscow 
Conservatory), winning the Stalin Prize in 1951,51 and giving roughly two hundred concerts a 
year in the 1960s.52 
While having access to international performance opportunities was obviously beneficial, 
the most evident drawback for Soviet musicians was a lack of control over their travel. In her 
memoirs, Vishnevskaya recalled both positive and negative aspects of her position as an elite 
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Soviet musician.53 She had emerged from a life of poverty during the 1930s and during the war, 
but she successfully passed an audition to become a soloist at the Bolshoi Theater in 1952, and 
she became one of the leading performers at the central theater in the USSR. While the material 
benefits of such a position were second only to those of powerful members of the Soviet 
Communist Party, the soprano believed that she was being used as a tool for one purpose or 
another. For instance, she and others like her were utilized simply to entertain and mingle with 
high-ranking Party officials.54 The compensation of Soviet artists was also fixed according to a 
fee schedule based on the standing of the performer, and compensation was meted out 
performance by performance. Neither the success or failure of the performance, the size of the 
venue, nor the money earned via ticket sales had any bearing on the performance fee. On 
international tours, Goskontsert would allow the performers to receive the equivalent amount of 
the fixed fee in foreign currency and would keep the remainder.55  
While the fee for a soloist was still considerable in comparison with what lower-ranked 
musicians could expect, Vishnevskaya recalled that the overall financial wellbeing of her 
husband Rostropovich depended not on his career as a performer (due to the relatively low 
compensation for each performance), but on his salaried position as a professor at the Moscow 
Conservatory, which was dependent on the health of his relationship with the Ministry of 
Culture.56 (Rostropovich began teaching at the Moscow Conservatory in 1948, which was soon 
after the beginning of his international performing career and before he joined the Composers’ 
Union.57) As far as the state was concerned, the virtuoso professor had two responsibilities: to 
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garner prestige and foreign currency through performance, and to train the next generation of 
award-winning virtuosi.58  
Furthermore, Vishnevskaya’s international performances and tours were subject to the 
political climate. In 1962, Soviet Minister of Culture Ekaterina Furtseva declined to give 
Vishnevskaya permission to participate as a soloist in the world premiere of Britten’s War 
Requiem because it was to be performed at Coventry Cathedral, which had been rebuilt with 
West German money. (West German and Soviet relations had soured in this period, leading to 
the construction of the Berlin Wall.) Vishnevskaya was instead ordered to perform for a 
television broadcast in the USSR.59 Furtseva essentially decided the soprano’s performance 
schedule and the latter had absolutely no say in the matter.60 In a 2009 interview with the 
musicologist Cameron Pyke, Alan Brooke Turner explained that Furtseva and the Soviet political 
establishment could not accept the symbolism of having a soloist from West Germany (a 
member of NATO since 1955) and one from the USSR present a work denouncing war together. 
Brook stated that “the rejection of war was an ideal shared by the Soviet Union—but on Soviet 
terms.”61  
It is important to note, however, that the rewards afforded to the elite musicians were not 
available to their less prominent compatriots. The soloist rate could be over twenty times the fee 
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given to ensemble musicians. In the international tours of large Soviet ensembles, every 
performer received the same daily allowance. The soloist rate applied only when elite musicians 
traveled or performed alone as soloists, and not as members of ensembles such as the Moscow 
State Orchestra or the Bolshoi Ballet. Even though all of the vocalists, instrumentalists, and even 
the conductor received the same low flat rate, the elite musicians had at their disposal foreign 
currency saved from solo tours and they were also free to propose to Goskontsert additional 
performances as soloists while on tour and to receive and keep the soloist rate of remuneration. 
For example, in 1969, Rostropovich conducted Tchaikovsky’s Eugene Onegin and Prokofiev’s 
War and Peace in France, Austria, and Japan and received only the daily allowance for ensemble 
members, but he requested Goskontsert to allow him to agree to additional performances as a 
cellist and earned the soloist performance rate.62  
Elizabeth Wilson recalls Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s dacha in the statement 
below, which illustrates the level of privilege enjoyed by elite Soviet musicians:  
Shortly after Shostakovich bought his dacha in Zhukovka in 1960, he suggested to 
Rostropovich that he should look for a property in the same settlement and helped him in 
his search. For Rostropovich, the house in one of Moscow’s most exclusive areas of 
dacha-land – Zhukovka was originally built for the privileged class of Academician-
Scientists – meant more than just a lovely family home in the quiet of surrounding 
forests. It became an ongoing project: the house was renovated and extended, fences and 
hedges went up, a tractor was required, a Spanish bar and modern gadgets installed, a 
garage erected and two large Newfoundland dogs to guard it. Finally, a new wing was 
constructed, housing a large concert hall. During his trips abroad, Rostropovich spent his 
spare time acquiring the materials needed for these improvements.63 
 
High-ranking Soviet artists also directly enjoyed the hospitality of Western concert agents. The 
American concert agent Sol Hurok often bought dresses and jewelry for leading Soviet female 
performers on tour in the US to accompany him to expensive dinners at restaurants and banquets. 
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He also allowed elite performers to sign restaurant bills in his own name but instructed them not 
to inform the Ministry of Culture, in order to avoid reductions in their paychecks.64  
While there was some sort of a tradeoff for these elite musicians due to the 
aforementioned material comforts, the situation was not the same for the performers of a lower 
position or for the support crew. On tour, Vishnevskaya recalls in her memoirs that the musicians 
essentially camped in their hotel accommodations and brought their own food from the USSR, in 
order to save as much of their wages as possible to take home, or to purchase cheap foreign 
products to sell for a profit back home.65 She remembers that in Paris, the chorus of the Bolshoi 
Opera suffered from malnutrition and the opera house set up a cafeteria in its basement. 
Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya were not staying with the chorus due to their aforementioned 
connections, but they did see the space on one occasion and thought that it resembled a mess hall 
for the homeless. It should be noted that the Paris Opera tour was completely sold out and a great 
financial success for Goskontsert.66 Vishnevskaya noticed that Hurok, on the other hand, fed the 
Bolshoi Ballet at his own expense for a very pragmatic reason: to reportedly prevent performers 
from fainting on stage. When the Ministry of Culture learned of this practice, it cut the Soviet 
performers’ daily allowance in half. It should be noted that even under these difficult terms, 
international travel for less prominent performers still reaped enough material rewards in the 
form of foreign currency and the sale of foreign goods to improve their living standards in the 
USSR significantly.67  
Despite the above restrictions, Soviet elite musicians were able to secure a degree of 
material well-being, and to gain access to foreign travel and intellectual property. International 
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travel was controlled by the state, but musicians who attracted Western audiences were seen as 
assets in procuring foreign currency. In return, these performers enjoyed material comforts that 
were well beyond the reach of the average Soviet citizen. However, such rewards were entirely 
conditional and resulted from the musicians’ usefulness to the state. In the USSR, acquiring a 
large apartment, a new car, and high-quality consumer goods depended primarily on having 
access to these items and not on having enough cash to buy them. Access to such comforts was 
generally achieved via personal networks, connections with well-placed individuals—such as 
Western concert agents and high-ranking Soviet Party members in the case of musicians—and 
the opportunity to earn foreign currency that was highly valued in the USSR. In other words, 
Soviet consumers existed in a shortage economy where supply was always limited, and demand 
was constantly high. Only those who had connections had the opportunity to obtain highly 
valued goods and services. Vishnevskaya explains that: 
The title of People’s Artist of the USSR brings many privileges with it: a good apartment 
rent-free, for example, or permission to make trips abroad, or vacations in government 
sanatoriums. And if you become sick, you can get the best medical care free, a private 
room in the Kremlin hospital, the most scarce and expensive medication, and delicious 
food offered on a menu. Everything there is as it is in the best clinics abroad. These 
advantages are rare—in Russia you cannot buy them for any amount of money. They are 
granted to you only if the government itself, by awarding you its prizes and titles, singles 
you out from the endless gray Soviet masses.68 
 
Foreign goods were even more valuable and rare, because they could not be obtained in the 
country and one needed access to foreign currency and the ability to travel internationally to 
procure them. These goods were sometimes smuggled in by such travelers, but these actions 
carried the risk of being discovered at the border.  Elite musicians were able to exploit their tours 
and their position as cultural intelligentsia in Soviet society. The extent of this agency was 
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directly related to the amount of foreign money and prestige they garnered as international 
celebrities. 
It should be noted, however, that even those at the pinnacle of the Soviet musical 
establishment still suffered financial difficulties when they fell out of favor with the Ministry of 
Culture. Composers typically relied on conservatory positions to garner a year-round salary. 
When Shostakovich lost his professorial position at the Moscow Conservatory after Zhdanov’s 
denouncement of him in 1948, he and his family fell into economic hardship despite his 
international fame. Also, the composer’s fall from grace resulted in the reduction of 
performances of his music, which, in turn, reduced the money he received from royalties. 
Vishnevskaya reported in her memoir that from 1948 to 1960, Shostakovich had difficulty 
earning enough rubles to support his family. His hardship was particularly acute during the last 
years of Stalin’s life, and she believed that he was driven to compose works such as the film 
scores for Young Guards (1948) and The Fall of Berlin (1950), the oratorio Song of the Forests,  
Ten Choral Poems by Revolutionary Poets, Op. 88 (1951), and the cantata The Sun Shines on the 
Motherland, Op. 90 (1952) to appease the government and ease his financial situation. His 
privileged position as one of the few Soviet composers whose music was consistently performed 
abroad resulted in a situation where Mezhknig, the Soviet institution charged with the export of 
intellectual property, still profited from the sale of Shostakovich’s music to foreign publishers. 
While Shostakovich received only a small share of these earnings from Mezhknig, he did so in 
coveted foreign currency.69 By the 1960s, Shostakovich had risen again to become one of the 
prominent figures of the Soviet musical community, had joined the Soviet Communist Party, and 
had publicly taken the party line in his pronouncements against serial music. Considering his 
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earlier difficulties, it is possible that he took these positions to gain long-lasting financial 
stability for himself and his family. When considering his actions regarding his statements on 
serialist music, which were discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to remember them 
in context of the difficult issues that he had faced a few years prior.  
The Soviet government maintained a high degree of control over international travel and 
performance, and it functioned as the gatekeeper. Every concert and tour involving Soviet artists 
outside of the USSR needed Goskontsert approval, and performances that required travel to the 
capitalist West were placed under particularly stringent scrutiny, due to the ever-present risk of 
defection.70 Bolshoi Theater ballerina Maya Plisetskaya was not allowed to travel to the West 
until she was married. Then, the Soviet state kept her husband, the composer Rodion Shchedrin, 
in Moscow as collateral when she toured internationally. This arrangement meant that defection 
would have resulted in the end of her marriage.71 Still, Soviet musicians did have some degree of 
agency over their activities abroad. They could use their position to propose specific 
performances using their connections with foreign concert agents, writing up their own 
contractual terms, and then submitting these terms to Goskontsert for consideration. Wilson 
recalled that the nature of the relationship between musicians and the Soviet authorities was 
directly proportional to the prestige of particular artists and their connections to foreign concert 
agents. While all musicians attempted to curry favor with Goskontsert by providing them with 
gifts in order to improve their standing, lesser known Soviet performing artists lacked 
connections with foreign concert agents and were, as a result, more dependent on Goskontsert to 
receive more international touring opportunities.72  
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Historian Anne E. Gorsuch explains that the Soviet state travel agency Intourist placed a 
plethora of restrictions on the travel of ordinary tourists in and out of the USSR, which included 
character reports, letters of reference, and monitoring while abroad.73 In order to test the 
ideological loyalty of musicians, Goskontsert kept detailed records on those who were being 
considered for international tours. Such procedures were very similar to those that monitored the 
behavior of Soviet international tourists. Both performers and tourists were accompanied by 
translators and guides, who would keep their delegations under observation. Usually these 
groups had a trusted Soviet citizen acting as delegation leader, and, in some cases, KGB minders 
(British concert agent Lilian Hochhauser referred to them as “sputniks,” which literally translates 
to “travel companions”) to monitor the Soviet performers. If any international travelers 
(musicians, crews, or tourists) were suspected of suspicious activity (such as purchasing Western 
goods to sell in the USSR) or insubordination, they were typically barred from traveling abroad 
in the future.74 Regarding KGB monitoring, elite musicians had the means to evade such 
restrictions. Even though famous musicians were less dependent on Goskontsert for performance 
opportunities, they still needed to provide “gifts” to the high-ranking members of the Ministry of 
Culture to reduce government involvement in their travels. For example, Vishnevskaya routinely 
sent bribes in American currency to Minister of Culture Furtseva, who had acquired a taste for 
Western furs and jewelry, to prevent such interference and to have greater agency in contract 
negotiations over her own performances.75  
Goskontsert also considered Finland—which was a Western capitalist country bordering 
Soviet Russia, and which declared neutrality in the Cold War and had a policy of repatriating 
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Soviet émigrés—to be an ideal testing ground for musicians with international performance 
aspirations.76 If the musicians stayed on their best behavior and did not attempt to emigrate, they 
might be considered for tours in other capitalist countries in the future. Oistrakh and 
Rostropovich were among the first Soviet musicians to perform in Finland after the Second 
World War (in 1949) as part of a delegation to improve Soviet-Finnish cultural relations. The 
performers were monitored by an employee of the Committee on Artistic Affairs and were 
required to write reports on their activities. Meri Herrala argued that Oistrakh’s compliant 
behavior on tour opened up opportunities for him to perform in Italy in 1951, France in 1953, the 
UK in 1954, and the US in 1955.77 
The Soviet pianist Sviatoslav Richter, who had won first prize in the piano division of the 
same All-Union Solo Competition that launched Rostropovich’s international career, was faced 
with other difficulties. As an elite musician with unquestioned virtuosity and musicianship, he 
was a valuable asset to the USSR. However, the Soviet authorities considered Richter to be a 
flight risk due to his family history and German ethnicity. Richter’s family lived in Odessa 
during the war, and his father, a German, was shot dead by the Soviet People’s Commissary of 
Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1941. The NKVD was a security agency of the USSR and was 
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responsible for the country’s secret police and gulag system. At this time, much of the German 
population of Odessa was interrogated, relocated, or executed for suspected espionage. 
Moreover, Richter’s mother remarried another German, and resided in West Germany. As a 
result, it was assumed that he would defect if he was provided with the opportunity to travel to 
the West. When cultural relations began to open in the mid- to late 1950s, these fears led to the 
Soviet refusal to allow Richter to begin touring in the West alongside his contemporaries. 
(Musicians such as Gilels, Igor and David Oistrakh, and Rostropovich did not have suspect 
family histories, and were thus allowed to perform there.) The refusal had begun to demoralize 
Richter. He canceled concerts, and he accepted fewer tours in the USSR and in the Eastern Bloc, 
because he could not explain to foreign journalists why he was not allowed to tour in the West. 
Other elite Soviet musicians advocated for Richter’s travel rights, and, in 1960, eventually 
convinced Minster of Culture Furtseva (who had succeeded Mikhailov earlier that year) to give 
him the appropriate clearance. Richter would first be tested by a trip to Finland with the Moscow 
Philharmonic; he would then tour with this orchestra in the US. After that successful tour, the 
Ministry of Culture, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and the KGB decided that 
its doubts regarding Richter’s loyalty were unfounded, and that he would be allowed to tour 
internationally in capitalist countries.78 
Soviet elite musicians were aware of their worth and did not need to ingratiate themselves 
with Goskontsert. They were well-known internationally, and were sought after by foreign 
concert agents, ensembles, and festival directors. Goskontsert was very receptive to sending 
Soviet musicians to venues with high audience demand, because such performances ensured a 
high return on the government’s investment on their education and financial support.79 In an 
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interview, British concert agent Victor Hochhauser recalled that Goskontsert received the Soviet 
musicians’ tour wages, passed only ten percent of them to the musicians, and kept the remaining 
ninety percent of the payments in highly-valued foreign currency.80 Regarding the compensation 
of Soviet performers, Hochhauser’s account conflicts slightly with Vishnevskaya’s. The former 
states that performers received a percentage of the negotiated fee sent to Goskontsert, while the 
latter recalled that performers received a flat fee unrelated to the amount paid to Goskontsert.81 
Harlow Robinson corroborates Vishnevskaya’s account. He indicates that Soviet musicians only 
received the foreign equivalent of the fixed soloist fee that they would have earned in the 
USSR.82  
In any case, Goskontsert ensured that it received most of the foreign currency resulting 
from the international performances of Soviet musicians. In his interview with Brown, Victor 
Hochhauser expressed his frustration with Goskontsert, saying that they were merely low-level 
administrators who thought only about money.83 Simon Morrison explains that while the Soviet 
state declared that it sent Soviet artists abroad for entirely political and nationalist reasons, the 
primary motivation was actually financial.84 Morrison posits that Western ensembles, such as the 
Sadler’s Wells Ballet, set an example for the profitability of international tours: 
Stalin had left the Soviet budget in a catastrophic shape, the industrial and military 
complex so dilapidated as to allow US spy planes to fly unimpeded over Soviet terrain. 
USSR cultural exchange and international friendship organizations made the crucial point 
that other ballets in other places, like the Sadler’s Wells Ballet in England, had made up 
for lean times with lucrative tours; the Bolshoi Ballet could compete with these 
companies across the globe. It became a product to be sold—like the silver deposits of 
Transbaikalia or pearls fished from the rivers of the Kola Peninsula.85 
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Morrison goes on to say that the opportunity to alleviate financial pressures through an increase 
in tours triumphed over the KGB’s concerns that this would result in more defections.86 
The fixation with tour profitability led to the Soviet preference to negotiate with 
professional concert agents rather than the friendship societies, which were ideologically 
compatible, but commercially incompetent.87 This became a mutually beneficial arrangement 
that gave concert agents such as Sol Hurok and Victor and Lilian Hochhauser access to Soviet 
musicians, because they consistently provided the Soviet musicians’ state concert agency with 
large, reputable venues full of ticket-buying Westerners. This practice became the source of 
concert agents’ capital, which in turn gave them agency in their negotiations with Goskontsert. 
The high demand of Western audiences for Soviet performers also allowed for greater agency in 
the musicians’ selection of contracts, if what they proposed was going to be profitable. 
Furthermore, some of the most valued musicians were allowed so-called “eccentricities” in their 
contract choices and negotiation strategies. Richter, for example, avoided bureaucracy as much 
as possible, and it was very likely that his wife, Nina Dorliak, did most of the negotiating with 
Goskontsert. Wilson recalls that Richter used his clout as an elite performer to avoid performing 
in the US as much as possible, even though Goskontsert considered such performances to be 
very lucrative. While he could not completely avoid performing in that country, he was able to 
reduce his touring activities there considerably.88  
Rostropovich, on the other hand, was much more comfortable negotiating with 
Goskontsert and the Ministry of Culture, and he bristled at what he believed to be overbearing 
bureaucratic oversight and micromanagement. For example, during his first American tour in 
 
86 Ibid., 340. 
87 Ibid., 340. 
88 Wilson, email correspondence with the author, 5 December 2017. 
188 
 
1956, the cellist was ordered to inform the Ministry of Culture which pieces he would be 
performing so that the Ministry of Culture could relay these selections to Sol Hurok, the 
American concert agent organizing the tour. When the Ministry of Culture official contacted him 
over the phone, Rostropovich provided a list of spurious pieces, such as Johann Sebastian Bach’s 
Seventh Cello Suite, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Fourth Cello Sonata, and Alexander 
Scriabin’s Cello Sonata. The Ministry officials did not realize that none of these compositions 
existed until they had already relayed them to Hurok. This prank embarrassed the Ministry, 
which resulted in Rostropovich gaining greater agency over his performance repertoire abroad.89 
It should be clear, though, that a less prominent performer would have had his or her 
international performance opportunities revoked.  
Wilson posits that Rostropovich also knew how to leverage his worth.90 In one case in 
1969, Rostropovich was performing in New York, when he received a call from Vishnevskaya 
informing him that the Bolshoi Theater had refused to grant her permission to embark on her 
upcoming American tour. Vishnevskaya had not been attending the Bolshoi Theater’s weekly 
Communist Party briefings. She knew that she was not the only performer to avoid the meetings, 
and that her absence had not caused any issues earlier. Permission to go on tour required a 
Bolshoi Theater form signed by the Party secretary, the chairman of the local Party committee, 
and the managing director of the Bolshoi Theater. Nonetheless, she was aware that only Furtseva 
had the authority to cancel such a high-profile tour and Vishnevskaya surmised that the Minister 
of Culture had decided to make an example of her. The tour, which was already being advertised 
in the US, was going to be canceled. According to Vishnevskaya, in the case of such 
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cancellations, the Western concert agent that arranged the tour would be informed that the soloist 
had fallen ill or had a pre-existing commitment.91 
In response, Rostropovich called the Soviet Embassy in Washington and threatened to 
cancel all his concerts, to conduct an interview with The New York Times to report that his wife 
was refused permission to travel for political reasons, and to return immediately to Moscow. 
Anatoli Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, foresaw that Rostropovich’s actions would result in 
an unwanted scandal and promptly contacted the Soviet authorities. While it is unclear from 
Vishnevskaya’s recollection whom he telephoned, his call had an immediate effect. According to 
Vishnevskaya, Furtseva called her, informing her that Dobrynin was causing an uproar about the 
tour and that this was the first she had heard about the cancellation. Vishnevskaya was then 
called to Furtseva’s office, where the Minister of Culture lectured the Bolshoi’s directors and 
Party leadership in her presence, chastised them for humiliating the soprano, and asked her to 
embark on the tour. However, by this point, Vishnevskaya decided that she was no longer 
interested in touring in the US, that Rostropovich could return to Moscow, and that they did not 
need to make any more American dollars for the state at that time. After Vishnevskaya declined, 
she was sent to the Central Committee office, where she was told that they had received a 
complaint that she was not attending political meetings; she was asked to go on tour because it 
was in the national interest. The representative also warned her that she should not set a bad 
example for the next generation of performers by declining—which would result in the loss of 
her travel opportunities—and that both she and Rostropovich could be replaced with other Soviet 
performers. She later acquiesced, her tour began as planned, and Rostropovich’s tour was not 
interrupted.92 This account demonstrates Rostropovich’s ability to bargain with his clout as a 
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world-renowned cellist and conductor. At the same time, this episode indicates that the state still 
had a high degree of control. Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya could persuade the Ministry of 
Culture that allowing her to tour was in its best interests, but they could never force or compel 
the state to comply. Moreover, this sequence of events can be considered to have been an omen 
for Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya, as they would soon find the limits of what their prestige and 
agency could afford them. 
David Oistrakh was much more passive in his negotiations with Goskontsert. As noted 
earlier, Wilson suggests that this behavior was possibly a result of the violinist being part of the 
generation that came of age during Stalinism.93 Wilson’s suggestion is corroborated by 
Vishnevskaya’s memoirs. In her recollection of her and Rostropovich’s decision to shelter 
Solzhenitsyn in 1969, she noted that Oistrakh admitted that he was too afraid to take such a stand 
against the government. He still recalled the purges of the late 1930s, and the fear that he could 
have been arrested and sent to the camps like so many of his neighbors still haunted him.94  
Musicians could hope to persuade the governmental bodies, but they could not force them 
to cooperate with their requests. As a result, famous Soviet and foreign musicians’ power to 
influence state authorities was very limited in politically charged situations. In the 
aforementioned case of the ministry’s refusal to allow Vishnevskaya to perform in the War 
Requiem’s premiere, Minister of Culture Furtseva took a hardened political position.95 Britten 
had intended for three countries—which he thought suffered the most during the war—to be 
represented in the premiere: the UK (with Peter Pears), Germany (Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau), and 
the USSR (Vishnevskaya). However, this was also the period of the Berlin Wall’s construction, 
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during which relations between the two Germanies were very poor. Furtseva refused permission 
purely on political grounds, and it was impossible for anyone, including both Vishnevskaya and 
Britten, to convince her otherwise.96  
In many cases, there were no such major political issues, so Goskontsert did not usually 
seek to prevent elite Soviet musicians performing abroad. Once the War Requiem performance 
shifted from the specific context of the Coventry Cathedral reconstruction, Vishnevskaya was 
allowed to record the work under the Decca label in 1963 with Britten, Pears, and Fischer-
Dieskau. Kildea posits that the idea that Vishnevskaya was allowed to participate was a part of 
the “unsteady détente” between Britten and Furtseva.97 An example of how future requests 
worked can be seen in what happened roughly a year after the War Requiem premiere. A 
communication was sent by the director of the Holland Festival asking for Vishnevskaya to 
perform the piece at the festival. Goskontsert promptly granted permission, expressed no 
concerns from the Ministry of Culture or Furtseva about the performance, and requested that the 
Bolshoi Theater release Vishnevskaya for the tour.98 This exchange is remarkable for only one 
reason: that it was completely routine. Without the specific political concerns regarding West 
Germany, Goskontsert tended not to object to performance requests regarding the War Requiem. 
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The Agency of British Composers in Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchange 
It should be noted that Gramscian conceptions of power relations and hegemony are not 
exclusively applicable to socialist societies. In the British context, the postwar government 
patronage of the Arts Council can also be considered in this light: the government utilizing the 
expertise of leading British musicians—particularly, in the sphere of large-scale opera—in order 
to demonstrate that British cultural sophistication in London was on par with what could be 
found in the capitals of the European continent, while dedicating fewer or no resources to 
projects that sat outside of these priorities.99 As an internationally prominent opera composer, 
Britten was able to enjoy a significant demand for his musical capital under the British system. 
To use Bourdieu’s framework, the Arts Council exchanged their financial capital, for Britten’s 
artistic one. In addition to financial support, Britten also gained access to prestigious theaters, 
such as Covent Garden, which was the venue of large-scale operas such as Billy Budd, Op. 50 
(1951, revised 1960) and Gloriana. Arts Council sponsorship in exchange for Britten’s musical 
capital also resulted in its support of his other endeavors, such as the EOG and the Aldeburgh 
Festival.  
Britten’s success with British state patronage is dramatically contrasted by Alan Bush’s 
difficulties. Joanna Bullivant explains that as a British communist, Bush was outspoken in his 
support of the Soviets and developed his musical style in accordance with his own interpretation 
of socialist realism.100 However, his uncompromising political stance limited his musical capital, 
and thus his agency in having his works performed in the UK. Bush’s difficulties in getting his 
operas performed began with a competition held by the Arts Council, in which the winning 
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works were supposed to be performed by Covent Garden. Bush’s opera, Wat Tyler, was 
specifically composed for the occasion and was one of the four winners. However, a 
performance never occurred, and instead Wat Tyler was given a BBC radio premiere in 1956 by 
semi-professional performers who were largely organized by the composer. This came after the 
work had been broadcast,101 and professionally staged twice, in East Germany, where opera 
directors held him in much higher regard.102 Bush, who had studied in Berlin before the Second 
World War and was heavily influenced by Hans Eisler, obtained patronage from the Leipzig 
Opera in the German Democratic Republic.103 This company gave the belated fully-staged 
premiere of Wat Tyler in 1953, as well as the first performances of his second and third operas: 
Men of Blackmoor (premiered in 1956) and The Sugar Reapers (premiered under the alternative 
title Guyana Johnny in 1966). Meanwhile, the Berlin Staatsoper commissioned Bush to write his 
fourth opera, Joe Hill (or The Man Who Never Died; premiered in 1970).  
The particularities of Bush’s political and musical positions that hindered his 
performance prospects in the UK became assets in gaining the support of East German opera 
theaters. In his operas, Bush sought to promote class consciousness, turn a critical eye towards 
the oppression of the working class throughout history, portray the sacrifices of socialist realist 
heroes, and provide glimpses of a more equal and fair society in the future.104 Wat Tyler depicts 
the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt and the martyrdom of the title character at the hands of the corrupt 
king’s men, The Men of Blackmoor is set during the early labor union movement in northern 
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England during the nineteenth century, The Sugar Reapers portrays the struggle for Guyanese 
independence in the face of British colonialism in 1953, and Joe Hill covers the 1915 trial and 
execution of the title character, who was a union leader in Utah. It is very possible that the 
subject matter of these operas (three of which include the struggle against British feudalism, 
capitalism, and colonialism) and their use of socialist realist protagonists led to incompatibility 
with British opera theaters, and compatibility with East German ones.  
In the mid- to late 1960s, Bush hoped that his success in East Germany and the gradual 
thawing of Cold War relations would result in the reevaluation of his operas by Covent Garden 
and Sadler’s Wells.105 In 1966, he sent the scores for Wat Tyler and The Men of Blackmoor to 
Georg Solti at Covent Garden,106 but they were summarily rejected.107 Bush interpreted his 
difficulties to be either fundamentally politically motivated,108 or the result of opera theaters 
prioritizing the established international canon over British contemporary music.109 The only 
exceptions were the performance of serial and modernist works of the Western avant-garde 
(which he considered to be a passing fad) and what Bush termed as “Britten worship.”110 
 As mentioned earlier, some British contemporary music was performed in the USSR; 
however, many of these instances were made possible by being part of a specific event that 
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emphasized Anglo-Soviet cultural relations. These occasions included the visit of high-profile 
British composers and musicians to the USSR, and festivals organized to explicitly celebrate the 
music of each other’s countries. Aforementioned examples of these instances include the visits of 
Bliss’s delegation to the USSR in 1955, The Days of British Music Festival in 1963—which 
included Soviet performances of the music of Britten, Tippett, and Walton—and the English 
Opera Group Tour in 1964. These events were organized by British and Soviet governmental 
bodies as gestures in cultural diplomacy. They were also isolated events. The performance of 
British music ceased after the occasions’ conclusions and the British celebrities’ departures. 
However, there were several instances in which performances of British music were proposed by 
Soviet ensemble directors and musicians themselves. Furthermore, these performances were 
largely intended to be carried out regularly—in a theater’s general repertoire over the course of a 
few years—and not as isolated performances for special occasions, and without the direct 
involvement of British composers or the governments of either country.  
Generally, it was very difficult for foreign contemporary music to gain a foothold in the 
repertoires of Soviet ensembles and soloists even if Soviet composers, critics, and musicologists 
deemed these works to be “progressive.” The integration of foreign contemporary music required 
the sustained support of local performers to cultivate demand, familiarize the audience through 
repeat performances, and to shepherd the performances past any obstacles that arose. It should be 
noted that these difficulties were not solely the concern of Soviet musicians interested in 
performing British music in the USSR, but they were also relevant for the performance of Soviet 
music in the UK. In Chapter 1, the efforts of the British conductor Henry Wood to introduce 
London audiences to Russian and Soviet music at the Proms from 1895 to 1944 illustrated this 
principle. In this case, the advocacy of Wood was indispensable to the British audience’s 
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acceptance of Russian and Soviet music. In Western economies, once the demand for something 
becomes strong enough, companies (such as music publishers and record labels) and musicians 
are financially incentivized to satisfy that demand. 
  While the economic force of popular demand for both consumer goods and classical 
music was present in the USSR, it did not necessarily follow that Soviet firms would be able, or 
even attempt, to supply the appropriate amounts of them, because the primary source of income 
for large state firms was the Soviet government, not sales to the populace. Also, the 
idiosyncrasies in the Soviet import of intellectual property due to the Soviet refusal to participate 
in the international copyright conventions (which will be discussed in the following chapter) 
resulted in the Soviet reliance on means other than the buying or renting of intellectual property 
from foreign publishers via licit channels. In order to account for these issues (the lack of 
incentive for Soviet firms to acquire foreign intellectual property, and the Soviet refusal to 
observe international intellectual property law), Soviet citizens needed utilize their agency to 
find other means to obtain it. Some Soviet ensemble directors and conductors were able to use 
their position in Soviet society, their influence on the Soviet political establishment, and their 
opportunities for international travel to gain access to foreign contemporary music.  
 The performance of British contemporary music in the USSR also involved the agency of 
British composers. In Chapter 2, I discussed how Britten’s compositional style, his beliefs 
regarding the roles of the arts in society, the connections he had forged with elite Soviet 
musicians, the strong rapport that he cultivated with both British and Soviet state entities, and his 
fame in the international opera scene made him an ideal cultural diplomat. These attributes can 
also be considered within the post-structuralist framework discussed above. Each one of the 
above successes contributed to his musical capital, which could encourage new Soviet advocates 
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of Britten’s music to emerge and improve their chances in shepherding his works to the stage 
through the many administrative obstacles placed in their way. Alan Bush’s attempts to have his 
operas performed in the USSR can also be examined, in order to demonstrate his relative lack of 
agency in Anglo-Soviet musical exchanges. While Bush was musically and politically aligned 
with the USSR, his music did not carry the same clout as Britten’s in Soviet circles. Also, his 
political views conflicted with the British government, and so he received practically no state 
support and he was not invited to take part in official cultural exchanges. While he lacked 
Britten’s rapport with both the British government and the Soviet Ministry of Culture, Bush did, 
however, have connections with influential Soviet musicians, and their advocacy provided him 
with the capital needed to facilitate two Soviet productions of his operas. 
Discussed below are the efforts of three prominent Soviet directors and conductors who 
utilized their agency in order to advocate for the performance of Britten’s works in the USSR: 
conductor of the Bolshoi Theater Gennady Rozhdestvensky, conductor of the Kirov Theater 
Djemal Dalgat, and general director of the Bolshoi Theater Mikhail Chulaki. Also discussed is 
the advocacy of Kaarel Ird, director of the Vanemuine Theater in Tartu in Soviet Estonia, who 
facilitated the Soviet performance of Bush’s operas. Finally, this section discusses the efforts of 
Rostropovich to use his agency to gain access to Britten, in order to facilitate the creation of new 
compositions for the solo cello. 
 
Gennady Rozhdestvensky and the Introduction of Britten’s Music to the Soviet Union 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, some Soviet composers and musicians were able to 
gain access to Western twentieth-century works that had not previously been available during 
Stalinism. Schmelz indicates that the loosening of restrictions on international travel and on the 
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interchange of scores and records after Stalin’s death was responsible for this new access. 
International tours and competitions gave Soviet performers the opportunity to purchase such 
works, and Western composers also sent their own pieces, as well as those of other musicians, to 
their Soviet contemporaries. Schmelz asserts that Western governments, particularly the US, 
encouraged such transfers to demonstrate Western intellectual openness and aesthetic 
modernism, but the Soviet musicians were often more interested in the music itself than the 
ideological or political subtexts of such transfers.111 
Rozhdestvensky—who was invited by the Soviet Ministry of Culture to participate in the 
Varshavsky Music Festival in Czechoslovakia in January and February 1955—found pieces of 
contemporary Western music, including Britten’s, at the archives of the Czech Philharmonic.112 
He wrote: 
In the archive, I had the opportunity to study a large quantity of compositions, which 
were not available in our Russian libraries. There, I first saw Britten’s scores: the 
Passacaglia from the opera Peter Grimes…, Sinfonia da Requiem, [and] Variations of a 
Theme by Purcell.113 I subsequently conducted these works many times, especially the 
brilliant Variations [translation mine].114 
 
Rozhdestvensky considered the “Passacaglia” from Peter Grimes to be wittily composed, 
particularly in Britten’s use of metrical complexity in his placement of an eleven-beat-long 
ground bass in a standard 4/4 meter, which meant that the bass passage’s beginning always 
appeared on different beats of the measure. See Example 1.115 
 
111 Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical: Unofficial Music during the Thaw (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 44-50. 
112 Gennadii Rozhdestvenskii, Mozaika [Mosaic] (Moscow: Moskovskaia gosudarstvennaia konservatoriia 
imeni P.I. Chaikovskogo [P.I. Tchaikovsky Moscow State Conservatory], 2010), 188-89. 
113 Otherwise known as A Young Person’s Guide to the Orchestra. 
114 В архиве я имел возможность изучить большое количество сочинений, не имевшихся тогда в 
наших российских библотеках. Там я впервые увидел партитуры Бриттена – пассакалию из оперы «Питер 
Граймс»…, «Симфонию-реквием» [и] «Вариации на тему Перселла». Впоследствии я много дирижировал 
этими сочинениями, в особенности блистательными «Вариациями». Ibid., 188-89. 
115 Ibid., 189. 
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Example 1: Opening of “Passacaglia” from Peter Grimes (Piano Reduction)116 
 
 
116 The eleven-beat units are marked with brackets. Peter Grimes, Vocal Score by Benjamin Britten © 1945 
By Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers LTD. All Rights Reserved. For The Sole Use Of Thornton Miller, 
University of Illinois. Used With Permission. 
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It appears that Rozhdestvensky found moments such as these particularly fascinating to perform, 
and it is possible that this interest in Britten’s compositional style fueled the conductor’s support 
for the British composer’s music.  
Upon his return to the USSR, Rozhdestvensky became one of the first advocates for the 
performance of Britten’s music there, and the pieces that he studied at the archives in Prague 
were among the first works that he introduced to Soviet audiences. It should be noted that the 
1955 Moscow concert discussed in the previous chapter, which included Britten’s Four Sea 
Interludes from “Peter Grimes” and works by Akutagawa, Gershwin, and Nielsen, was 
conducted by Rozhdestvensky’s father, Nikolai Anosov.117 In an interview with Cameron Pyke, 
Rozhdestvensky recalled that this concert was the first instance that he heard Britten’s music.118 
 The following episode illustrates how some subject matter still taboo in the USSR during 
the post-Stalinist thaw, and how it required small adjustments in order to prevent a scandal. 
Rozhdestvensky explained: 
Regarding the Sinfonia da Requiem, I cannot resist recalling the curious case of its first 
performance in the Soviet Union. In 1961, I conducted it in a Moscow radio studio. 
When, the music editor prepared the performance for broadcasting, he was apparently 
frightened by the title Sinfonia da Requiem, and so he changed it to Symphony in D 
Minor [emphasis and translation mine].119 
 
 
117 Gennady Rozhdestvensky took the masculine version of his mother’s last name, Rozhdestvenskaya. His 
patronymic (i.e. middle name, which in the Russian naming convention is derived from the father’s first name) is 
still based on his father’s first name, Nikolay. As a result, his full name was Gennady Nikolayevich 
Rozhdestvensky. I.M. Yampol’sky, “Rozhdestvensky, Gennady (Nikolayevich),” Grove Music Online, last modified 
28 February 2002, accessed 19 June 2019,  
https://doi-org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.24025. 
118 Pyke, 146-47. See Appendix 10 of Pyke for the complete interview. 
119 Что касается «Симфонии-реквиема», то я не могу не рассказать здесь о курьезном случае, 
связанном с первым исполнением этого сочинения в СССР. Я дирижировал «Симфонию-реквием» в Москве 
в радиостудии в 1961 году. Руководство музыкальной редакции, подготовляя к печати радиопрограмму, 




It is possible that the editor for this broadcast changed the name of the piece to the more neutral 
classical music nomenclature in order to avoid any potential censure stemming from the religious 
connotation of the term “requiem.”120  
The official Soviet position on the requiem in general can be gleaned from the 1941 and 
1975 editions of the Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia [Great Soviet Encyclopedia] and the 
1978 edition of Muzykal’naia entsiklopediia [Musical Encyclopedia]. Their three definitions of 
the requiem from both the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras are remarkably consistent in character. 
They all refer to the requiem as primarily a Western classical music genre that emerged from the 
Roman Catholic requiem mass tradition. The focus of each of these encyclopedias on the 
requiem as classical music implies that the genre was primarily an expression of high artistic 
culture and was no longer considered one of religious expression.121 In the broader arts, requiems 
also appeared as a literary and poetic genre on the subject of death and mourning.122 It should be 
noted that the term requiem was considered to be primarily a foreign concept, and was very 
different from Soviet funeral practice, which was a secular ritual that drew from Russian 
Orthodox tradition.123 It appears that in the USSR, it was considered to be an imported Western 
 
120 The history of religion in the USSR was characterized by a constantly changing relationship between the 
state and religious organizations and was punctuated by government interventions. Soon after Stalin’s death, the 
Soviet government lessened its involvement in religious affairs. However, in 1954, the Central Committee launched 
an anti-religious campaign. After the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the government shifted its attention to other 
matters and many Soviet citizens interpreted de-Stalinization in general as a transition to a more tolerant 
governmental stance on religion. From 1958 to Khrushchev’s removal from power in 1964, the government resumed 
its anti-religion initiative. See Chapter 2 of Victoria Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet 
Atheism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). Rozhdestvensky’s broadcast of Sinfonia da Requiem 
occurred during the 1958-1964 campaign.  
121 O.Iu. Shmidt, ed., Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 48 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 
1941), 552; B.V. Levik, “Rekviem,” in Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 21, ed. A.M. Prokhorov (Moscow: 
Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1975), 608-09; and B.V. Levik, “Rekviem,” in Muzykal’naia entsiklopediia, vol. 4, ed. 
Iu.V. Keldysh (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1978), 593-94. 
122 The Indiana University Digital Library Program compiled a bibliographic index of Soviet periodicals 
from 1955 to 1975. It is a valuable reference resource for Soviet literary and musicological publications in this 
period. Indiana University Digital Library Program, Letopis’ zhurnal’nykh statei [Soviet Periodical Index], last 
modified 11 September 2007, accessed 16 April 2019, https://libraries.indiana.edu/resources/spi. 
123 While the Soviet funerals of soldiers and political martyrs could contextualize their deaths as sacrifices 
for the socialist revolution, Christopher A.P. Binns notes that the Soviet rejection of religion presented a number of 
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concept. Fairclough explains that even during Stalinism, Western sacred music, such as Mozart’s 
Requiem, K. 626 (1791), was seen as a cultural artifact and not as a religious statement. 
Therefore, this genre was not affected by Soviet attacks on organized religion.124 
Regarding the name change for the Sinfonia da Requiem broadcast, it appears that there 
was not sufficient cause to alter it: the piece was in the vein of an esteemed Western classical 
music genre that included the contributions of Mozart, Giuseppe Verdi, and Brahms; the genre 
was a concertized version of the mass; the Catholic mass itself was very different from Russian 
Orthodox traditions;125 and while the Sinfonia and its movements are named after parts of the 
mass, it is a purely instrumental symphonic work and thus did not include voices or text. 
However, it is important to note that the change of the Sinfonia da Requiem’s title to Symphony 
in D minor was not act of official censorship. Instead, it appears to have been an instance of self-
 
difficulties in the creation of atheistic rituals for unheroic deaths. For ordinary citizens, a Soviet funeral might have 
included the following events drawn from Russian tradition: a brief ceremony at the home of the deceased, a 
procession to the place of burial, and/or a burial ceremony held by an official (rather than a priest). Unlike Russian 
Orthodox memorial ceremonies (panikhida), no Biblical texts, hymns, or psalms were chanted, recited, or sung 
during the event. Christopher A.P. Binns, “The Changing Face of Power: Revolution and Accommodation in the 
Development of the Soviet Ceremonial System: Part II,” Man 15, no. 1 (March 1980): 179-81. 
124 Pauline Fairclough, “‘Don’t Sing It on a Feast Day’: The Reception and Performance of Western Sacred 
Music in Soviet Russia, 1917-1953,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 70-71. 
In her dissertation, Svetlana Studennikova traces the development of the requiem from its roots in the Catholic mass 
to a secularized and concertized genre of classical music on the subject of death, the latter of which was imported 
into Russia in the eighteenth century. The composition of requiems in Russia followed Western classical music 
traditions set by Mozart and, later, nineteenth-century romantic composers. After the revolution, requiems were also 
composed in memory of important Soviet government leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and Sergei Kirov, and in 
honor of fallen Soviet soldiers and the victims of fascism. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Soviet composers such as 
Edison Denisov and Alfred Schnittke continued to compose requiems in the concert music model derived from the 
Catholic mass. See Svetlana Vladimirovna Studennikova, “Zhanr rekviema v otechestvennoi muzyke: Istoriia, 
traditsii, sovremennost’ [The Requiem Genre in Russian National Music: History, Tradition, Contemporaneity]” 
(D.F.A. [iskusstvovedeniia] diss., L.B. Sobinov State Conservatory, Saratov, 2010). For further study on the Soviet 
composition of requiems and pieces in the memory of political and musical figures, see Tat’iana Stanislavovna 
Andrushak, “Memorial’nost’ v otechestvennoi muzyke poslednei treti XX veka (k issledovaniiu fenomena) 
[“Memorialization in Russian National Music in the Last Third of the Twentieth Century: A Study of the 
Phenomenon”] (D.F.A. [iskusstvovedeniia] diss., L.B. Sobinov State Conservatory, Saratov, 2008). 
125 Fairclough indicates that ideological concerns could be raised if Soviet choirs performed works that 
stylistically strayed too close to Russian Orthodox chant or sacred vocal pieces. Fairclough, “‘Don’t Sing It on a 
Feast Day,’” 67-69. She explains that the unspoken embargo on Russian sacred music would begin to weaken in the 
mid-1960s. Ibid., 105. My point here is that works derived from the requiem mass were very different (particularly 
in the use of instruments and movements derived from the Catholic mass) from Russian Orthodox traditions. 
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censorship on the part of the radio director, in order to reduce the risk inherent in broadcasting a 
work that had any religious connotations. It is possible that the fact that the piece was written by 
a living Western composer resulted in the director’s heightened sense of caution.126 
Rozhdestvensky also conducted the Soviet premieres of Britten’s Spring Symphony, Op. 
44 (1949) in 1963 at the Great Hall of the Moscow Conservatory;127 the Serenade for Tenor, 
Horn, and Strings in 1959, also, at the Great Hall;128 and the opera A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
at the Bolshoi Theater in 1965,129 the last of which will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. In addition to performing these works in the USSR, Rozhdestvensky presented the 
Variations during the Leningrad Symphony Orchestra’s British tour in September 1960—which 
was arranged by the British Council’s Soviet Relations Committee—alongside the British 
premiere of Shostakovich’s First Cello Concerto.130 It is understandable that Rozhdestvensky 
chose to present the Variations alongside the cello composition. As a guest of the UK, the 
conductor chose to perform a recent British work with a new Soviet work, and it was no 
coincidence that both works were written by the most prominent composers of their respective 
countries. While this apparently well-meaning gesture angered Britten’s publisher—Ernst Roth 
of Boosey & Hawkes—because the conductor obtained and performed the work without paying 
 
126 As mentioned earlier in previous chapters, Stephen V. Bittner explains that there was a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the reinterpretation of Stalinist ideological positions during the tenure of Nikita Khrushchev as 
the Soviet head of state. See Chapter 2 of Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience 
and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
127 Programma, 6 May 1963, Gennady Rozhdestvensky to Benjamin Britten (hereafter cited as GR to BB), 
Britten-Pears Foundation Archives (hereafter cited as GB-ALb). 
128 Cameron Pyke, Benjamin Britten and Russia (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2016), 149. 
129 Rozhdestvensky to Britten, 26 October 1965, GR to BB, GB-ALb. 
130 UK Soviet Relations Committee, “Draft Agenda for Inter-Governmental Talks on Anglo-Soviet Cultural 
Relations, Annex A: Program for Cultural, Educational, Scientific and Technical Exchanges between the United 




for it,131 the performance succeeded in providing the opportunity for Britten, Rostropovich, and 
Shostakovich to meet in person and to listen to each other’s music. This event catalyzed 
Britten’s, Rostropovich’s, and, eventually, Kirov Theater conductor Djemal Dalgat’s active 
participation in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange.  
Soviet advocacy on behalf of Britten’s major stage works has been well documented in 
the secondary literature on the composer.132 The day after the September 1960 concert, Britten 
met with both Rozhdestvensky and Rostropovich at the latter’s hotel room. While there is not a 
written record of their conversation, there are two points that they very likely discussed: the 
composition of new solo works for the cello, and the possibility that Britten’s opera Peter 
Grimes would be performed at the Bolshoi Theater.133 This latter suggestion is corroborated by 
Rostropovich’s October 1960 letter to the composer, in which he encouraged Britten to conduct 
the Soviet premiere of the opera.134  
In response to the growing Soviet demand for Britten’s stage works, Boosey & Hawkes 
agreed to loan the opera Peter Grimes to the Bolshoi Theater. At this time, the general director of 
the Bolshoi was Vasily Pakhomov; however, after the directorship transferred to Mikhail 
Chulaki in 1963, the Bolshoi Theater lost interest in staging the opera.135 Meanwhile, 
 
131 Thornton Miller, “Striking a Compromise: Britten, British Publishers, Soviet Theaters, and the 
Premieres of Peter Grimes and The Prince of the Pagodas,” in Benjamin Britten Studies: Essays on An Inexplicit 
Art, eds. Justin Vickers and Vicki Pierce Stroeher (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2017), 388-89. 
132 Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” trans. Nick Winter, Melos 19/20 (5 
August 1997): 64-71; Miller, 377-401; and Pyke, 118 and 223-29. 
133 Ibid., 383-84. 
134 Rostropovich to Britten, trans. anon., 12 October 1960, in Letters from a Life, vol. 5 1958-1965, eds. 
Reed and Cooke, 279. 
135 See f. 648, op. 8, d. 93 Perepiska s Gosudarstvennym komitetom Soveta Ministrov SSSR po kul’turnym 
sviaziam s zarubezhnymi stranami o postanovke opery B. Brittena “Piter Graims” [Correspondence with the USSR 
State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Regarding the Production of B. Britten’s Opera Peter 
Grimes] (hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 8, d. 93), RGALI; and f. 648, op. 11, d. 13 Perepiska s Soiuzom sovetskikh 
obshchestv druzhby i kul’turnoi sviazi s zarubezhnymi stranami, inostrannymi organizatsiiami i otdel’nymi 
grazhdanami o gastroliakh artistov teatra v Kanade, Rumynii, Iaponii, uchastii v konkurse artistov baleta v Rio de 
Zhaneiro, postanovke opery v B. Brittena “Piter Graims” i dr. [Correspondence with the Council of Soviet 
Friendship Societies and Societies for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Foreign Organizations, and Civil 
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Rostropovich’s attention had shifted entirely to encouraging Britten to compose new cello works 
for himself to perform. Later, in Leningrad, Kirov Theater chief conductor Djemal Dalgat 
contacted Britten to ask if it was possible for the Kirov to stage Peter Grimes, being apparently 
unaware that the Bolshoi Theater had the score and did not intend to perform it.136 It is very 
likely that arrangements were made to transfer the score to the Kirov; meanwhile, Chulaki opted 
to instead present another of Britten’s operas: A Midsummer Night’s Dream.137 
In my research, I have not yet been able to determine why Pakhomov was interested in 
Peter Grimes and why Chulaki sought to stage A Midsummer Night’s Dream. In addition, it is 
unclear why exactly both directors advocated for the performance of Britten’s stage works other 
than the fact that this was the opportunity to perform contemporary works by a prestigious and 
“progressive” Western composer. It should be noted, however, that Pakhomov’s and Chulaki’s 
support for the Soviet performance of Britten’s pieces was limited to these two operas. 
 
Djemal Dalgat and the Soviet Premieres of Britten’s Stage Works 
Dalgat’s advocacy was invaluable for the promotion of Britten’s stage works in 
Leningrad. He studied conducting under Ilya Musin at the Leningrad Conservatory and 
composition with Nikolai Myaskovsky at the Moscow Conservatory. From the early 1950s, he 
 
Departments Regarding Artists’ Tours in Canada, Romania, and Japan; Participation in the Ballet Competition in 
Rio de Janeiro, the Production of B. Britten’s Opera Peter Grimes, and Others] (hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 11, d. 
13), RGALI. 
136 Miller, 395-96. Dalgat attained this position earlier in 1963. Rabota v proshlom [Past Work], 12 March 
1968, f. 337, op. 13, d. 34 Dalgat, Dzhemal-Eddin Enverovich (hereafter cited as f. 337, op. 13, d. 34), Central State 
Archives of Literature and Art, St. Petersburg (hereafter cited as TsGALI-SPb). 
137 See f. 648, op. 11, d. 117 Perepiska s sovetskimi obshchestvami druzhby, inostrannymi organizatsiiami i 
otdel’nymi grazhdanami o priglashenii A.D. Maslennikova na rol’ iurodivogo v opere M.P. Musorgskogo “Boris 
Godunov” pod upravleniem dirizhera U. Karoiana (Zal’tsburgckii festival’), repertuare gastrolei artistov baleta v 
Avstrii, Iugoslavii, postanovke opery B. Brittena “Son v letniuiu noch’” v GABTe i dr. [Correspondence with Soviet 
Friendship Societies, Foreign Organizations and Civil Departments Regarding the Invitation of A.D. Maslennikov to 
the Role of the Holy Fool in M.P. Mussorgsky’s Opera Boris Godunov Conducted by H. Karajan at the Salzburg 
Festival, Repertoire of the Ballet Artists’ Tour of Austria and Yugoslavia, Production of B. Britten’s Opera A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, and others] (hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 11, d. 117), RGALI. 
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trained at the Kirov Theater under the direction of the conductor Boris Khaykin, and soon began 
teaching conducting at the Leningrad Conservatory. He started regularly conducting at the Kirov 
Theater in 1963, and served as the theater’s chief conductor from April 1965 to February 
1967.138 By 1963, Dalgat had already conducted several of Britten’s smaller-scale orchestral 
works with the Leningrad Philharmonic such as the Soirées musicales, Op. 9 (1936), Matinées 
musicales, Op. 24 (1941), and the Prelude and Fugue, Op. 29 (1943), and had plans to perform 
Les Illuminations, Op. 18 (1939) and the Serenade for Tenor, Horn, and Strings in the near 
future.139 As a Kirov conductor, he was centrally involved in the Soviet performances of Peter 
Grimes, the War Requiem, and The Prince of the Pagodas, Op. 57 (published in 1956 and 
premiered in 1957). He also translated the librettos for all of these works into Russian.  
The Kirov Theater’s production of Peter Grimes in 1965 was the first major stage work 
by a living Western composer to become part of a major Soviet theater’s season. The Kirov 
Theater had presented Franz Schreker’s Die Ferne Klang (1912) and Alban Berg’s Wozzeck, Op. 
7 (completed in 1922 and premiered in 1924) in 1925 and 1927, respectively. Nonetheless, these 
were special performances in the presence of the composers, and the works did not enter the 
repertoires of the theater.140 Peter Grimes, however, was being considered as part of the Kirov 
Theater’s repertoire plan for 1965-1967, which meant that it being placed on equal footing with 
the rest of the season’s offerings: Russian and Western classics such as Modest Mussorgsky’s 
Boris Godunov (1874), Mozart’s Don Giovanni, K. 527 (1787) and Magic Flute, K. 620 (1791), 
 
138 Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 64. 
139 Dalgat had also attempted to perform the “Scottish Ballad,” Op. 26 (1941) in Leningrad, but he could 
not gain access to the parts in the USSR. Dalgat to Britten, 27 June 1963, Djemal Dalgat to Benjamin Britten 
(hereafter cited as DD to BB), GB-ALb. 
140 Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 65-66. I do not know at this time whether Die 
Ferne Klang and Wozzeck were included in the Kirov Theater’s repertoire after Peter Grimes. I am certain, however, 
that they did not enter the Kirov’s performance plans before Britten’s opera, and that their performances during the 
1920s were isolated events. 
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Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov’s Sadko (1898), Sergei Taneyev’s Oresteia (1895), Richard Wagner’s 
Tannhäuser (1845), and Soviet contemporary opera such as Dzerzhinsky’s Quiet Flows the 
Don.141 In addition, the performances would not be in the presence of the composer, which 
meant that it was not part of a high-profile international event. As a result of these unusual 
circumstances, Peter Grimes was placed under a very high degree of both aesthetic and 
ideological scrutiny, which necessitated an influential Soviet advocate to shepherd the 
production to its opening night.  
In order to convince the directors of the Kirov Theater that including Peter Grimes in the 
upcoming season’s offerings would be a worthwhile endeavor, Dalgat conducted an ensemble of 
performers drawn from the Leningrad Symphony in two un-staged performances of the opera in 
March 1964.142 These performances were deemed to be very successful by M. Bialik, who was a 
critic of the Composers’ Union mouthpiece, the journal Sovetskaia muzyka.143 In light of 
Tomoff’s thesis in his book Creative Union—that the Communist Party depended on creative 
unions such as the Composers’ Union to assess cultural value and ideological suitability in their 
respective fields—it can be ascertained that this review deemed Peter Grimes to be suitable for 
inclusion in the Kirov Theater’s official repertoire.144 Moreover, Dalgat’s long-term efforts 
reflected an interest in the performance of Britten’s other operas in the USSR. In an April 1964 
 
141 Kirov Theater, Perspektivnyi repertuarnyi plan na 1965-1967 godu [Prospective Repertoire Plan for 
1965-1967], f. 337, op. 1, d. 1100 Repertuarnye plany teatra na 1965-1967 gg. [Theater Repertoire Plans for 1965-
1967], TsGALI. The source lists Shostakovich as the composer of Quiet Flows the Don; this appears to be an error. 
142 Ibid., 65-66. 
143 M. Bialik, “Pis’mo iz Leningrada” [“Letter from Leningrad”], Sovetskaia muzyka [Soviet Music], no. 9 
(September 1964): 81-82. 
144 The distinction between the Communist Party and creative unions was somewhat muddled by the fact 
that some union members (particularly high-ranking members) were also members of the Party. This meant that 
some reviewers and critics could have been speaking as mouthpieces of the Party, but that others were not. This 
ambiguity can cloud whether an article appearing in a major Soviet publication was actually promoting the party 
line. In this case, I would maintain that a positive account of the Peter Grimes performances in Sovetskaya muzyka 
helped Dalgat’s efforts in raising support for a fully staged production of the opera. 
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letter to his publisher, Britten noted that these un-staged performances had caught the attention 
of two other Soviet institutions—the Maly Opera Theater in Leningrad and the Riga Opera—to 
include the work in their own opera seasons.145 
It is at this point that preparations began for the Kirov Theater’s production of Peter 
Grimes; however, difficulties arose during the period up to the first performance. Kovnatskaya 
was a student at the Leningrad Conservatory at the time and had personally heard of these 
problems: 
Backstage there was gossip to this effect and in as much as the producers and many of the 
singers from the theatre worked in the conservatoire, there [was] also, as I remember, 
much whispering [that] went on as to the difficulties of the work.146 
 
Kovnatskaya’s research in the St. Petersburg Central State Archive of Historical and Political 
Documents revealed the discussions about Peter Grimes in the Kirov Theater’s company 
meetings. A major issue that arose there, which was mentioned in Kovnatskaya’s recollection, 
related to the technical difficulty of the opera. Some of the principal singers were not able to 
perform their parts, due to either a lack of ability or effort. Dalgat’s frustrations with these 
musicians was evident in his recorded statements in the meetings.147  
Up to that point, Soviet opera theaters typically performed only eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Western canonic works (by composers such as Bizet, Mozart, Verdi, and 
Wagner), Russian nineteenth-century classics (by composers such as Glinka, Mussorgsky, 
Rimsky-Korsakov, and Tchaikovsky), and Soviet contemporary ballet and opera, which was 
primarily tonal and/or composed in the conceptual framework of socialist realism (such as the 
 
145 Britten’s interest in encouraging Soviet performances of his operas in the USSR without assurances that 
Soviet opera houses would provide compensation for those works exacerbated an already strained relationship 
between the composer and Ernst Roth, the managing director of his publisher Boosey & Hawkes. Britten to Roth, 10 
April 1964, Benjamin Britten to Boosey & Hawkes 1964, GB-ALb; and Miller, 397-99. 
146 Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 67. 
147 Ibid., 68-69. 
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works of Reinhold Glière, Khrennikov, and Yuri Shaporin).148 As a result, the harmonic content 
of Soviet opera performance was for all practical purposes rooted firmly in functional tonality, 
which could have made Britten’s use of bitonal, modal, and, sometimes, atonal elements difficult 
to execute. The repertoire of the Kirov Theater in the 1960s, and other Soviet theaters in general, 
could be interpreted as somewhat conservative by the standards of Western mainstream classical 
music, and regressive by the standards of Western modernism. 
Kovnatskaya also explains that the theater’s hierarchy—which would normally have 
placed Dalgat in a position of authority—was complicated by the fact that a few of the 
performers subordinate to him were members of the Communist Party. Moreover, Dalgat was 
not a Party member and was not awarded any marks of distinction by the Party. As a result, in 
Party meetings and other such events, Dalgat was in a vulnerable position. This dynamic also 
meant that the support of Party members was very valuable for Dalgat, but if they voiced 
ideological concerns, the production could have been put under investigation.149 Luckily for the 
conductor, Distinguished Artist of the Soviet Union and Communist Party member Nikolai 
Khuniadi defended both Dalgat’s leadership and the opera, and also agreed with the conductor’s 
criticisms of the vocalists, who were not putting forth the effort to learn their parts. Kovnatskaya 
notices that there was a peculiar power dynamic at play in Khuniadi’s statements. He was a 
performer in the company and thus a subordinate of the conductor Dalgat; however, his societal 
position as a distinguished artist and a member in the Party complicated this dynamic.150 She 
writes: 
 
148 Repertory lists and schedules for the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow are preserved in RGALI, and for the 
Kirov Theater in Leningrad in TsGALI-SPb. After Stravinsky’s visit to the USSR in 1962, compositions from his 
early and neoclassical periods were deemed acceptable for performance and recording there. Schmelz indicates that 
total acceptance of Stravinsky’s music would only come sometime after his death in 1971. Schmelz, Such Freedom, 
If Only Musical, 59-61. 
149 Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 67-68. 
150 Ibid., 68. 
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The subordination according to rank… was fundamentally changed when it came to party 
meetings where, in line with the Party’s own hierarchy, a singer or chorus member could 
have the “advantage of power” over a producer or conductor.151 
 
In his statements at the Party meeting, Khuniadi referred to Dalgat as a “young” conductor and 
as a “junior” comrade, even though they were the same age. Kovnatskaya argues that the context 
of the meeting made this language possible.152 In other words, Dalgat’s lower position in the 
political sphere, complicated the power dynamic in the theater. In an environment with different 
forms of power, Khuniadi’s political affiliation trumped Dalgat’s authority in the theater’s 
hierarchy and his musical capital. Luckily for Dalgat and the production of Peter Grimes, 
Khuniadi was an ally and not a foe. 
Peter Grimes was not Dalgat’s only production of Britten’s music. Dalgat was involved 
in the Soviet republication and performance of Britten’s War Requiem in Leningrad.153 Also, the 
English Opera Group Tour in 1964—which included performances of The Rape of Lucretia, 
Albert Herring, and The Turn of the Screw in Leningrad, Moscow, and Riga, and was discussed 
in Chapter 2—provided the model for Dalgat’s initiative to create his own chamber opera group 
as an ensemble of the Kirov Theater.154 In 1968, Dalgat wrote a proposal to the artistic director 
of the theater, P.I. Rachinsky, to create a chamber opera company to perform Baroque and 
smaller-scale contemporary works, and sent a repertoire list that included Albert Herring.155 It 
appears that this request was ultimately unsuccessful, because there is no further mention of this 
 
151 Ibid., 68. 
152 Ibid., 68. 
153 Organ gosudarstvennoi bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the USSR], Notnaia Letopis’ 
[Musical Catalog], vol. 3 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Kniga [Book Publishing], 1968), 76; and Organ gosudarstvennoi 
bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the USSR], Notnaia Letopis’ [Musical Catalog], vol. 1 (Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo Kniga [Book Publishing], 1972), 136. 
154 Kovnatskaya, “‘Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” 71. 
155 Dalgat to Rachinskii, 9 July 1968, f. 337, op. 7, d. 54 Dokladnaia zapiska dirizhera D.E. Dalgata 
directoru teatra o razvitii zhanra kamernoi opery i sozdanii ansamblia kamernoi opery [Memorandum by Conductor 
D.E. Dalgat to the Director of the Theater about the Development of Chamber Opera as a Genre and about the 
Creation of a Chamber Opera Ensemble], TsGALI-SPb. 
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ensemble in the Kirov Theater’s records or in Dalgat’s personal file.156 Moreover, the 
correspondence between Britten and Dalgat indicates that Britten had been attempting to transfer 
the score for Albert Herring to Dalgat for some time, but these efforts were thwarted by delays 
on the part of Boosey & Hawkes in preparing the score.157 Dalgat eventually received the score 
for Albert Herring, and he was able conduct the work in an unstaged performance with the 
Leningrad Philharmonic in 1973 in honor of Britten’s sixtieth birthday.158  
Dalgat had intended for the ballet The Prince of the Pagodas to be sent by Boosey & 
Hawkes to the Soviets in a similar manner as Peter Grimes in the early 1960s. However, Dalgat 
was not aware that the loan agreement for the performance of the opera (which will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter) was intended to be a one-time-only compromise, in order to 
facilitate a more conventional commercial relationship between Soviet theaters and the British 
publisher.159 In addition, Dalgat had not realized that the British publishing firm, particularly its 
managing director Ernst Roth, considered both the Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters to be in violation 
of their agreement as early as 1964. Dalgat’s interest in staging The Prince of the Pagodas 
reopened the question of how to transfer British copyrighted music to the USSR for 
performance. However, there was a second issue regarding the ballet: it is very likely that Britten 
saw Dalgat’s proposal to produce The Prince of the Pagodas on the Soviet stage as an 
opportunity to revise one of his less successful works.  
As Paul Kildea recalls in his biography of the composer, the composition of the ballet 
was fraught with difficulties before the 1957 Covent Garden premiere, which garnered only 
 
156 See f. 337, op. 13, d. 34, TsGALI-SPb. 
157 Britten to Dalgat, 2 June 1969, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
158 Dalgat to Britten, 6 August 1973, DD to BB, GB-ALb. In my research on Dalgat, I found many 
instances of his admiration for Britten’s music and of various kinds of advocacy that included the performance, 
publication, and translation of Britten’s pieces in the USSR. In the future, I will attempt to determine why Dalgat 
was interested in Britten’s music. 
159 Miller, 398. 
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mixed reviews and limited success with the ticket-buying public. Kildea observes that Britten 
was not knowledgeable in ballet and dance, and, as a result, he was dependent on the expertise of 
his choreographer John Cranko. However, Britten was unable to meet with Cranko when 
questions arose during the composition process, and Kildea believes that the work’s final product 
suffered as a result.160 As discussed in my essay on the subject, Dalgat offered a much closer 
collaborative relationship between himself, the composer, and the Kirov Theater’s choreographer 
Vinogradov. Dalgat served as liaison and translator between Britten and Vinogradov, and sent 
detailed lists of suggestions and questions to the composer.161 While Britten was unable to visit 
Leningrad to participate in the theater’s preparations or to attend the Soviet premiere in 1972, 
Dalgat informed Britten that the critical response was very positive and that he believed that the 
performances were very successful.162  
 
Mikhail Chulaki’s Defense of A Midsummer Night’s Dream on the Bolshoi Stage 
As mentioned earlier, the shift in the Bolshoi Theater directorship from Pakhomov to 
Chulaki resulted in the theater producing A Midsummer Night’s Dream instead of Peter 
Grimes.163 The Soviet premiere occurred on October 28, 1965—which was five years after the 
world premiere—and was conducted by Gennady Rozhdestvensky. Dalgat translated the libretto, 
which facilitated the Russian performance of the opera and demonstrated another example of his 
 
160 Kildea, Benjamin Britten, 417-19. 
161 Miller, 400-01. 
162 Dalgat to Britten, 2 February 1973, DD to BB, GB-ALb. 
163 Mikhail Chulaki was a composer of primarily ballet music and the artistic director of the Bolshoi 
Theater from 1955 to 1956 and from 1963 to 1970. He briefly served as the artistic director of the Leningrad 
Philharmonic in the late 1930s. Chulaki was also a member of the Secretariat of the Composers’ Union from the late 
1940s. E. Grosheva, “Ot sostavitelia” [“From the Compiler”] in M.I. Chulaki, Zhivye v pamiati moei: Vstrechi, 
vospominaniia, iumoreski [Living in my Memories: Meetings, Memories, and Humor], comp. E. Grosheva 
(Moscow: Sovetskii kompozitor [Soviet Composer], 1990), 3-4. 
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advocacy of Britten’s music in addition to the Kirov Theater’s production of Peter Grimes.164 
Like the Kirov production of Peter Grimes, A Midsummer Night’s Dream faced stringent criteria 
regarding its aesthetic acceptability for performance in the USSR, especially because the 
production was to take place in the country’s flagship theater. In other words, if the Ministry of 
Culture or the Composers’ Union branded the opera to be decadent or formalist, the entire 
production could have been canceled. It is not clear why the Bolshoi Theater decided not to 
present Peter Grimes, but it is possible that the change of directors was in part responsible. 
Chulaki was enthusiastically interested in the A Midsummer Night’s Dream production, and he 
used it as an opportunity to invite Nicola Benois (formerly Nikolai Benua)—who emigrated from 
the USSR in the early 1920s and became the principal set designer at La Scala in Milan—to 
design the sets for the production.165 
Evidence suggests that the greatest practical challenge to the Bolshoi Theater’s 
production of A Midsummer’s Night Dream occurred during the dress rehearsal. Before the 
rehearsal, one of Furtseva’s deputies had told her that the opera’s music was pederasticheskaia 
[pederastic].166 The metaphorical connotation of this term would have been understood as 
suggesting that Western modernist music was less masculine and more effeminate than Soviet 
realist music. In other words, by referring to homosexuality and, more specifically, pederasty, as 
a departure from heteronormativity, the deputy was perhaps hinting that Western modernism was 
decadent, regressive, and an unfortunate deviance from true art. The term does not typically 
appear in formal authoritative discourse or in music criticism of the time, but Khrushchev used it 
 
164 V.I. Zarubin, Bol’shoi teatr: Pervye postanovki oper na russkoi stsene, 1825-1993 [The Bolshoi 
Theater: First Productions of Operas on the Russian Stage, 1825-1993] (Moscow: Lak, 1994), 207-08. 
165 Chulaki to Furtseva, 3 July 1965, f. 648, op. 11, d. 117, RGALI. It is possible that Chulaki’s interest in 
an English opera based on Shakespeare’s play stemmed from the English imaginary discussed earlier on Page 100. 
166 M.I. Chulaki, Ia byl direktorom Bol’shogo teatra… [I Was the Director of the Bolshoi Theater…] 
(Moscow: Muzyka [Music], 1994), 114. 
214 
 
in his spontaneous response to the Soviet artists of abstract art at the Manezh Gallery incident a 
few years earlier in 1962.167 Sculptor Ernst Neizvestny and painters Leonid Rabichev and Inna 
Shmelyova were among the artists chastised by Khrushchev and top Party officials. In 2012, 
Rabichev recalled that Khrushchev said that he and the other artists would be exiled from the 
USSR.168 Historian Robert V. Daniels reported that Khrushchev’s reaction to the Soviet abstract 
art on display included the following: “Judging by these experiments, I am entitled to think that 
you are pederasts, and for that you can get ten years.”169 
Considering the Party authorities’ use of the term “pederastic” to undermine and ridicule 
modernist art and music, it is also possible, but ultimately unlikely, that it was a comment on 
Britten’s actual sexuality. Britten was a homosexual in a closeted de facto life partnership with 
Peter Pears from 1939 to his death in 1976.170 From the 1920s to the early 1950s, homosexuality 
was neither socially acceptable nor legal in the UK, the police crackdown on “gross indecency” 
was particularly harsh, and Freudian therapists sought to “cure” homosexuals of their affliction. 
McKibbin asserts that due to the risk of blackmail, loss of employment, violence, and arrest, 
homosexuals needed to conceal their sexuality and they tended to favor short and anonymous 
sexual encounters in order to protect themselves. Not everyone’s experience was the same, 
however; class was an important factor. Typically, those of higher classes had more resources 
and connections, which they could use to conceal aspects of their lives from the public. Also, 
McKibbin posits that homosexuality was more expected and accepted in the artistic fields, such 
 
167 See Page 122. 
168 Alexander Zemlianichenko, “Manezh Re-Examines Khruschev [sic] Outrage of 1962,” Moscow Times, 
20 December 2012, accessed 15 March 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2012/12/20/manezh-re-examines-
khruschev-outrage-of-1962-a20360. 
169 Robert V. Daniels, The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 293. 
170 Humphrey Carpenter, Benjamin Britten: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 130. 
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as the theater.171 Philip Brett explains that the legal limitations imposed on the open expression 
of homosexuality in the UK until 1967 indicates why Britten did not make his sexuality publicly 
known, and that it resulted in his reluctance to disclose the true nature of his relationship with 
Pears even in the years following the repeal of this legislation.172  
It may be that Furtseva and the Ministry of Culture were aware of Britten’s sexuality, but 
if they were, they habitually ignored or did not call attention to what they considered to be 
private. In Turner’s 2009 interview with Pyke, he recalled that the Music Committee of the 
British Council, which oversaw Britten’s visits to the USSR for the 1963 Days of British Music 
Festival and the 1964 EOG tour, paid no attention to the composer’s sexuality. The major issues 
discussed when briefing the delegates were about the black market and Soviet law. Turner 
admitted that the early 1960s was a time when British people did not normally talk about 
sexuality, and Britten’s homosexuality did not seem to be an issue.173 
For a contemporary reader knowledgeable of Britten’s life, the charge “pederastic” 
actually connects to another aspect of the composer’s sexuality: his physical attraction to 
adolescent boys. However, such a reading is difficult to sustain historically. While those close to 
Britten during his life might have been aware of Britten’s pedophilic desires, such knowledge did 
not enter the public sphere until the publication of Humphrey Carpenter’s 1992 biography of the 
composer, which was well after his death in 1976.174 Also, at this time in 1965, Britten’s 
reputation as a composer was at its zenith in the USSR, which resulted in the considerable 
demand for his musical capital at the time. If the composer had been branded publicly as a sexual 
 
171 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
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deviant, the Soviet authorities would not have allowed so many of his works to be performed, 
published, and recorded in the USSR. Furthermore, Furtseva herself said that it was not a 
coincidence that Britten was afforded such a privileged position in Soviet music culture: it was 
because his musical style contained no “extremist experiments,” was a logical development of 
the British national tradition, and closely resembled Shostakovich’s musical idiom.175 Therefore, 
it is more likely that the term “pederastic” was used more metaphorically in relation to the 
musical style of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and not intended as a literal judgement on 
Britten’s sexuality or as a condemnation of his music in general. In any case, it is very unlikely 
that the content of the opera could have been construed as pederastic, especially when considered 
in relation to other operas that were performed in the USSR, which had more explicitly 
homoerotic subtexts, such as the relationships between Peter and his apprentice in Peter Grimes 
and between the ghost Quint and the boy Miles in The Turn of the Screw.  
According to Chulaki’s recollections, the use of this term by one of her deputies drove 
Furtseva to investigate the matter personally. A few minutes before the dress rehearsal, she 
called the Bolshoi director to ask about the opera. Chulaki, who was aware of Furtseva’s 
somewhat conservative aesthetic tastes, began his defense by discussing the characteristic set and 
costume designs and saved the question of the music until later in the conversation. As soon as 
he mentioned the music, however, Furtseva interjected by asking whether it was “pederastic.” 
Chulaki recalled that he was at a loss on how to respond, and Furtseva informed the director that 
she would be observing the rehearsal personally with her deputies.176 
I realized then that a fight was imminent, and I was determined to win it! We all sat in the 
central box, I positioned Furtseva near the side of the box, and myself next to her. During 
the opera rehearsal, I explained to her what was happening on the stage. I used the 
 
175 Elizabeth Wilson, “Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part I,” Musical Opinion 136, no. 
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176 Chulaki, 114-15.  
217 
 
following method: When the music became complicated, formalist, or (to use her term) 
“pederastic,” I tried to distract her by discussing the content of the opera, and the beauty 
of the sets and costumes of the production. Then, when the music became especially 
melodic, I interrupted my own explanations to exclaim, “Listen to this! Such a motive! 
Such a musical effect!” I continued this performance for the whole rehearsal, I kept 
Furtseva in the corner of the box, and by doing so: I did not allow her to discuss the 
music with her deputies [translation mine].177 
 
The dichotomy between the terms “pederastic” and “melodic” in the above quote appears to 
confirm that Furtseva and her deputy were utilizing the metaphoric use of the term: pederastic as 
modernist and formalist. Ultimately, it appears that Chulaki’s diversionary tactics were 
successful, because Furtseva’s line of questioning changed course to discuss the opera’s 
international reputation. Chulaki simply indicated that the work was being performed in major 
opera houses around the world, and he assured her that the opera was successful in these 
productions. At this point, Britten’s capital as an international celebrity tipped the balance. 
Furtseva turned to her deputies and quietly, yet firmly, stated the following, “It is the position of 
the Ministry that, since this composition was being staged in all of the major opera centers in the 
world, we will support the Bolshoi Theater production” [translation mine].178 
While it is possible that the success of the EOG tour in 1964 and the Kirov Theater’s 
staged production earlier that year contributed to clearing the way for A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream at the Bolshoi, such a suggestion is uncorroborated by documentary evidence. In any 
case, this production was not the first contemporary Western opera to be staged in one of the two 
Soviet cultural capitals, and so it is possible that its production benefited from being judged by 
 
177 Я понял, что предстоит бой и что я должен его выиграть! Мы все уселись в центральную ложу. Я 
притиснул Фурцеву к барьеру и стал объяснить, что происходить на сцене. Причем использовал такой 
прием: там, где музыка была сложная, формалистическая, по ее понятиям (или это есть «педерастическая»?), 
я старался ее отвлечь, рассказывал содержание, обращал внимание на красоты постановки; в тех же местах, 
где музыка особенно мелодична, я прерывал сам себя и говорил: «Вот послушайте, какой мотив, какой 
звуковой эффект!» Так я и продержал ее все время в углу ложи, не давая общаться со своими клевретами. 
Ibid., 115.  
178 Так вот, позиция министерства: это ставится во всех крупных оперных мира, и мы поддерживаем 
постановку Большого театра. Ibid., 115. 
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criteria that were less stringent than those imposed on the Kirov production of Peter Grimes. A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream was very successful in Moscow and it was performed forty-seven 
times there, in the most prestigious Soviet theater, during the next eight years.179  
 
Kaarel Ird’s Advocacy of Alan Bush’s The Sugar Reapers 
Politically and culturally, Alan Bush deferred to the USSR in all matters, even if this 
brought him into conflict with the UK and its interests. In other words, he dedicated himself 
completely to the USSR and its ideological mission. However, Bush—even with his outspoken 
ideological loyalty to the USSR, his criticism of British capitalism and imperialism, his 
participation in the activities of the Soviet cultural establishment such as the Second Congress of 
the Composers’ Union, and his efforts to follow Soviet dictates and promote proletarian music in 
both his home country and abroad—still found it nearly impossible to present his operas on a 
Soviet stage. Bush’s case is included in this chapter to help us answer the following question: 
why did a British communist composer lack the capital needed to get his operas performed in the 
USSR, and how did this state of affairs illustrate the agency of Soviet directors and performers? 
By 1960, Bush had already sent at least two requests to have his operas performed in the 
USSR, the latter of which was sent directly to Minister of Culture Furtseva. Neither of these 
letters received a response or even a confirmation of receipt.180 Throughout the 1960s, he also 
sent inquiries to his friend, the Soviet musicologist Grigory Shneerson, to lobby for  
performances.181 It is possible that the following revelation was a contributing factor in the 
 
179 Zarubin, 209. 
180 Bush to Shneerson, 3 September 1960, f. 375, no. 244, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). 
181 See f. 375, no. 452-603, RNMM; and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl. Bush’s correspondence with Shneerson is 
also discussed in Louise Wiggins, “‘Story of a Friendship’: Alan Bush, Grigorii Shneerson and Cultural Diplomacy 
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Ministry’s silence. In 1965, Kaarel Ird, director of the Vanemuine Opera Theater in Tartu, 
informed Bush that he had been accused of formalism, which had essentially blacklisted 
performances of his operas in the USSR.182 As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the Soviet cultural 
establishment gave dictates through the language of authoritative discourse, which 
communicated what was ideologically sound music.183 To be declared formalist was in many 
ways similar to being accused of heresy in the Catholic Church. Bush immediately contacted 
Shneerson, who assured him that he did not consider him a formalist.184 In addition, Ird assured 
Bush that Shostakovich himself had defended Bush and his music against these charges.185 It is 
unknown to what extent the charge of formalism had affected the receptiveness of Soviet opera 
theaters to perform Bush’s operas. Neither Bush, Ird, nor Shneerson indicated the exact source of 
this accusation in their correspondence.186 Shneerson himself denied that any such accusations of 
formalism had been made against Bush’s music in the USSR.187 I have not found a document 
charging Bush’s music with formalism in my archival research in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
yet it might be that such an attack spread via word of mouth and did not appear in the form of 
written authoritative discourse. Considering the lack of documentation, it is also possible that 
Bush was never accused of formalism. 
Bush’s efforts were not completely in vain: Ird indicated that he himself was interested in 
the composer’s works, and he requested that Bush send over the materials to allow the 
 
cultural establishment, as well as his activities in British Composers’ Guild and in communist-backed associations 
for cultural relations with the USSR.  
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Vanemuine Opera to give the Soviet premiere of one of his operas.188 While Bush happily 
complied with Ird’s request, he was still disappointed to find that the two most prestigious opera 
theaters in the USSR, the Bolshoi in Moscow and the Kirov in Leningrad, showed absolutely no 
interest in his works. Shneerson explained the situation to Bush in the following letter: 
[Regarding] the lack of interest towards your operas from the Bolshoi and other Soviet 
opera houses—that is true. But you should keep in mind that these institutions have the 
same indifference to the operas of many other excellent composers—even Richard 
Strauss and Richard Wagner. Britten is the only [exception], but he has here a very strong 
and active defender—Rostropovich.189 
 
The reason why the Bolshoi and the Kirov did not stage Bush’s operas actually had more to do 
with the lack of support from Soviet musicians: people who could have both advocated for his 
operatic music and have been able to use their agency to facilitate productions of it. While 
Britten’s international reputation, connections with Soviet elite musicians, and the successful 
performances in the USSR resulted in his significant musical capital, which encouraged Soviet 
advocacy for his music, Bush’s reputation and accomplishments did not have nearly as much 
impact there. In the cases of the Kirov’s staging of Peter Grimes and the Bolshoi’s staging of A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, Britten had the support of Rostropovich, Chulaki, Dalgat, and 
Rozhdestvensky. Bush, meanwhile, had few supporters in similar positions.  
Nevertheless, Bush’s influence in the Soviet theater world began not with his political 
credentials or the socialist subject matter of his operas, but through the advocacy of Ird, a Soviet 
director interested in Bush’s music who was also in a position to stage it. Ird’s advocacy bore 
fruit in 1969, when The Sugar Reapers received its Soviet premiere at the Vanemuine Theater.190 
 
188 Bush to Shneerson, 3 January 1966, f. 375, no. 273, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). 
189 Shneerson to Bush, 10 February 1966, MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl. 
190 Bush to Shneerson, 17 September 1969, f. 375, no. 297, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl); and Bush 
to Shneerson, 17 November 1969, f. 375, no. 298, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). In the future, I plan 
investigate how Ird learned of Bush’s music, what he liked about it, and how his interest of it developed.  
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Bush had limited operatic success in the UK and the USSR after this performance. It is possible 
that the Tartu production of The Sugar Reapers facilitated its Odessa staging in 1973,191 but 
Bush’s attempts to interest the Bolshoi afterwards in his works were not successful.192 The first 
and only fully-staged British performance of a Bush opera was the Keynote Opera’s production 
of Wat Tyler at the Sadler’s Wells Theater in 1974;193 in addition, the BBC broadcasted Joe Hill 
twice between 1978 and 1981.194 For the remainder of Bush’s life, he would not compose 
another opera. 
Even after his consistent lobbying, participation in the Soviet cultural establishment, and 
his status as a communist activist, Bush’s operas were not staged in the principal cultural capitals 
of the USSR: Leningrad and Moscow. Bush’s musical capital, and his agency, were too limited 
to reach the operatic stages of these cities. Meanwhile, both of the most prestigious Soviet 
venues—the Bolshoi and the Kirov Theaters—were presenting two of Britten’s operas in their 
season offerings (and had hosted the EOG Tour, which included performances of Britten’s three 
chamber operas, in 1964). Britten was left-leaning, but not a communist. Also, he was receptive 
to the Soviet performance of his operas, yet he only responded to preexisting Soviet demand and 
to the inquiries from potential Soviet advocates. In other words, he did not actually utilize his 
agency because he did not actively seek out Soviet performances. His Soviet advocates, 
however, did mobilize theirs, and Britten’s significant musical capital aided their efforts. 
 
191 Shneerson to Bush, 7 November 1973, MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl. 
192 Bush to Shneerson, 5 November 1976, MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl. 
193 Bush to Shneerson, 25 May 1974, f. 375, no. 321, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). Keynote was 
not affiliated with the Sadler’s Wells Opera Company. 
194 Bush to Shneerson, 17 December 1978, MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl; and Bush to Shneerson, 26 June 1981, 
MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl. 
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It is possible that the aesthetic tastes of the operatic directors of these capitals were more 
suited to Britten’s works,195 that they perceived Britten as a more important cultural figure, or 
that they pragmatically believed that Britten would draw large ticket-buying audiences. Bush 
recalled that one of the directors of the Bolshoi Theater attended the dress rehearsal of the 1966 
world premiere of The Sugar Reapers in Leipzig,196 and that he subsequently performed excerpts 
from Wat Tyler and Men of Blackmoor on the piano for the directors of the Latvian State Opera 
Theater in Riga (which had also hosted the EOG tour, and later requested to perform more of 
Britten’s operas).197 Even so, these theaters did not acquire an interest in Bush’s operas. Perhaps 
these works were declined for aesthetic reasons. Bush also recalled to Shneerson that his friend, 
the Russian-Latvian critic Pyotr Pechersky criticized Bush’s orchestration after attending the 
Tartu production of The Sugar Reapers. According to Bush, Pechersky wrote that “a more 
individualized approach to the dramatic composition from the point of view of timbre would 
undoubtedly enrich the work.”198 In any case, Soviet theaters favored the more apolitical Britten 
over the ideologically aligned Bush. Importantly, the necessary influence of a Soviet advocate 
exercising his or her agency was demonstrated in Bush’s case, when his operatic fortunes 
improved, not as a result of his lobbying, but as a direct result of the agency of well-placed 
Soviet opera directors.  
 
195 Hugo Cole indicates that Bush’s operas freely used popular song or local music, and that the chorus 
(which symbolized the people) played a vital role in the drama. Cole finds in Bush’s stage works a much greater 
connection to Mussorgsky than to Verdi or Wagner. The word setting is usually syllabic, and the text is set closely 
to spoken English. Hugo Cole, “Bush, Alan (opera),” Grove Music Online, last modified 6 January 1999, accessed 
22 March 2019, https://doi-org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.O009303. It is 
possible that Bush’s efforts for realism and clarity were a result of his conscious integration of Zhdanov’s 1948 
criticisms of formalism and his dictates on what socialist realism should accomplish. Bullivant, “‘A World of 
Marxist Orthodoxy,’” 7-21. 
196 Bush to Shneerson, 22 December 1966, f. 375, no. 280, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). 
197 Bush to Shneerson, 18 December 1967, f. 375, no. 287, RNMM (and MS Mus 440, GB-Lbl). 
198 Bush to Shneerson, 4 May 1971, f. 375, no. 309, RNMM. 
223 
 
Meanwhile, in the mid-1960s alone, five of Britten’s operas had been performed in the 
two Soviet cultural capitals: The Rape of Lucretia, Albert Herring, and The Turn of the Screw by 
a visiting company in both cities, and Peter Grimes and A Midsummer Night’s Dream by the 
Kirov in Leningrad and the Bolshoi in Moscow, respectively. It is also possible that the political 
content of Bush’s operas actually lowered his chances of garnering interest among the more 
prestigious Soviet opera houses, and that Britten’s works (which were based in British poetry 
and literature) were seen as a continuation of British traditional high arts and not merely political 
pieces. As a result, Britten may have been seen by the Soviets as having a greater degree of 
musical capital than Bush. Bush’s attempts to raise support from the Composers’ Union and the 
Ministry of Culture failed, but he did gain support along similar lines as Britten through the 
advocacy of the opera directors in Tartu and Odessa who were interested in his music. Despite 
all of his seeming advantages, Bush’s particular case shared one important characteristic with his 
contemporary’s experience regarding the promotion of his own music in the USSR: the necessity 
for at least one Soviet advocate with a personal stake in facilitating its performance. It appears 
that Bush’s limited success was a result of a deficiency in the value of the musical capital he 
wielded in the USSR, particularly in contrast to Britten. 
 
Rostropovich’s Efforts to Encourage Britten to Compose New Music for the Cello 
 As we have seen, Soviet musicians exercised their agency in order to gain access to 
British music and to facilitate the performance, publication, and dissemination of these works in 
the USSR. While these actions were certainly great achievements—made all of the more 
remarkable because their successes were derived largely from the efforts of dedicated individuals 
rather than government mandated initiatives—they involved primarily the performance of 
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previously composed music. Rostropovich, on the other hand, went a step further by using his 
agency to ask a Western composer to write an entirely new body of music. Up to that point, 
Britten had not composed any solo music for the cello. Then, from 1960 to 1971, he composed 
the most works in the standard performing repertoire for the solo cello since J.S. Bach: two solo 
cadenzas for Joseph Haydn’s Cello Concerto No. 1 in C Major, Hob.VIIb:1 (1765; Britten’s 
cadenzas were written in 1964), the Sonata for Cello and Piano, Op. 65 (1961), the Cello 
Symphony, and three suites for unaccompanied cello.199  
 Elizabeth Wilson has argued that Rostropovich recognized early in his performance 
career that, as a solo instrument, the cello had a lower position than the piano and violin, because 
it lacked both brilliant compositions and charismatic virtuosi. In an interview with the critic 
Tamara Grum-Grzhimailo, Rostropovich, perhaps half-jokingly, expressed his frustration with 
previous generations of cellists, and took them to task for not inspiring whom he thought of as 
the canonic composers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to write more works for their 
instrument: “I despise those cellists who lived in Mozart’s time and did not ‘squeeze’ one piece 
for cello from him. Not even one! And also, those who did not prompt Beethoven or Brahms to 
create at least one cello concerto [translation mine].”200 Rostropovich sought to address these 
issues by expanding the repertoire and the expressive capabilities of the solo cello. He first 
emulated the virtuosic style of Pablo Casals, befriended a great number of composers, and used 
his charismatic personality and technical mastery of his instrument to encourage them to write 
new pieces for him.201 At the final round of the aforementioned 1945 All-Union Solo 
 
199 Peter Evans, The Music of Benjamin Britten (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 551-
59. 
200 Я презираю тех виолончелистов, которые жили во времена Моцарта и не «выжали» из него ни 
одного произведения для виолончели. Ни одного! И тех, кто не побудил Бетховена или Брамса создать хотя 
бы по одному концерту для виолончели. Ibid., 46. 
201 Wilson, Rostropovich, 43-44. 
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Competition, Rostropovich performed Myaskovsky’s Cello Concerto, while his competitors 
performed works from the nineteenth-century standard solo repertoire.202 After his victory, 
Rostropovich premiered Myaskovsky’s Cello Sonata No. 2 in A minor, Op. 81 (1948).203 He also 
gained the notice of Soviet composers by advocating for their maligned works. He rescued 
Glière’s Cello Concerto, Op. 87 (1946) from obscurity (it had failed to find a place in the 
repertoire after its disastrous premiere); and by doing so, Glière subsequently dedicated the piece 
to Rostropovich.204  
It was through this method that Rostropovich developed a particularly close collaborative 
friendship with Prokofiev.205 The composer’s career after his return to the USSR was full of both 
triumphs and defeats, which resulted from his contentious relationship with the artistic 
establishment, namely the Composers’ Union and the Ministry of Culture. Prokofiev was 
awarded six Stalin Prizes, and was thus the most decorated composer during the Stalinist Era. 
However, he was also the composer most affected by Zhdanov’s attacks in 1948, and his stature 
in the USSR never truly recovered until a few years after his death. In his final years, Prokofiev’s 
prospects showed considerable improvement in light of his declining health and as a result of his 
attempts to reform his musical style.206 
At the time of his collaboration with Rostropovich, Prokofiev was in the paradoxical 
position of being the most internationally recognized Soviet composer, while chafing under the 
aesthetic constraints of late Stalinism. It is possible that the composer’s receptiveness to 
Rostropovich’s admiration and dedication was aided by his own difficulties with the creative 
 
202 Ibid., 38. 
203 Grum-Grzhimailo, 45. 
204 Wilson, Rostropovich, 64-65. 
205 Grum-Grzhimailo, 25-28. 
206 See Chapter 3 of Frolova-Walker. 
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oversight and criticism of the Composers’ Union since the advent of Zhdanovshchina. In the 
aftermath of the 1948 decree, the number of performances of Prokofiev’s older music and the 
demand for his new music fell sharply.207 With remuneration only from the occasional 
composition of patriotic and film music, he fell into dire financial straits. Once Rostropovich 
learned of these difficulties, the cellist convinced Khrennikov to divert some of the Composers’ 
Union’s funds to aid Prokofiev. In a series of interviews with Rostropovich, Grum-Grzhimailo 
ascertained that the two became inseparable.208  
In the final years of his life, Rostropovich and Richter gave the premiere of Prokofiev’s 
Cello Sonata, Op. 119 (completed in 1949 and published in 1951), and Rostropovich and Richter 
(on piano) performed Prokofiev’s Cello Concerto No. 1 in E minor, Op. 58 (1938) with the 
composer in the audience in 1950. After this, Prokofiev revisited and revised the work so 
extensively that he deemed it to be his second work in the genre: the Cello Concerto No. 2 in E 
minor (1952). Rostropovich and Richter (conducting the Moscow Youth Orchestra) premiered 
the Second Cello Concerto in 1952. After this premiere, Prokofiev again called on Rostropovich 
to help him revise the work and renamed it the Sinfonia Concertante in E minor, Op. 125 
(completed in 1953).209 The composer did not live long enough to see the work at its premiere.210 
Prokofiev’s reputation in the USSR did not improve until Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin 
at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Until this denouncement, Rostropovich found that it 
was easier to perform the work abroad than in Moscow. Noticing the opening of cultural 
 
207 See Chapters 7 and 8 of Simon Morrison, The People’s Artist: Prokofiev’s Soviet Years (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
208 Grum-Grzhimailo, 25-28. 
209 For clarification, the Second Cello Concerto was not published, and thus it does not have an opus 
number. It would, however, become the basis for the Sinfonia Concertante, which was published. 
210 Wilson, Rostropovich, 66-78. 
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relations after Stalin’s death and using his influence on the Soviet cultural establishment, he gave 
the world premiere while on tour in Copenhagen in 1954.211 
Sometime after Prokofiev’s death, Rostropovich found a new collaborator in 
Shostakovich, who wrote two cello concertos for him in 1959 and 1966, respectively. The cellist 
was famous for learning and memorizing new virtuosic works very quickly: he had learned 
Shostakovich’s First Cello Concerto in a few days after it was completed in August, giving the 
world premiere in Leningrad under the baton of Evgeny Mravinsky on October 4, and the 
Moscow premiere with Alexander Gauk on October 9.212 This speed meant that the cellist had 
been able to perform a very large number of newly-composed works before he first came into 
contact with Britten. His repertoire included pieces by Soviet composers such as Arno 
Babadzhanian, Boris Tchaikovsky, Evgeny Golubev, Khachaturian, Lev Knipper, Yuri Shaporin, 
Vissarion Shebalin, and Mieczysław Weinberg.213  
 Rostropovich continued this practice of encouraging the expansion of the cello literature 
with Britten. In September 1960, after the London premiere of Shostakovich’s First Cello 
Concerto,214 Rostropovich took the opportunity to introduce himself to the British composer. 
Britten and Shostakovich were seated next to each other at this concert, and the two met with 
Rostropovich afterwards. According to Elizabeth Wilson, Rostropovich immediately requested 
 
211 Ibid., 83-84. 
212 Grum-Grzhimailo, 43-44. 
213 Ibid., 46. 
214 Barry Tuckwell was the principal French horn for the LSO for this concert. In honor of Tuckwell’s 
retirement from solo performance in 1997, Rostropovich sent him a congratulatory letter, in which he admitted that 
the principal horn had the second-most difficult part in the concerto and that he was shaken by the beauty of 
Tuckwell’s sound. “Tributes,” Horn Call 27, no. 3 (May 1997): 94-95. Tuckwell also admired Rostropovich’s 
musicianship. In Winthrop Sargeant’s article on the horn player, he described the following recollection when 
Tuckwell played for the LSO. During Rostropovich’s performance of Robert Schumann’s Cello Concerto in A 
minor, Op. 129 (1850), which begins with a very long note sustained by the solo cello, Tuckwell was astounded at 
how Rostropovich was able to make a held note musically interesting, and he tried to analyze how Rostropovich did 
it in the hope that he could as well. Winthrop Sargeant, “Profiles: Something I Could Do,” New Yorker 53, no. 4 (14 
March 1977): 50. 
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that Britten consider writing a piece for him to perform, and they agreed to meet on the following 
day to discuss the details. The Sonata for Cello and Piano was a direct result of Rostropovich’s 
proposal, and it was premiered by Rostropovich and Britten at the Aldeburgh Festival in 1961.215 
Rostropovich then gave its Soviet premiere at the Small Hall of the Moscow Conservatory that 
winter.216  
Britten’s other cello works followed this example of being premiered either in Moscow 
or at the Aldeburgh Festival, with a performance in the other location following soon after. The 
composer conducted the world premiere of the Cello Symphony, for example, in the Great Hall 
of the Moscow Conservatory in 1964.217 The symphony was later performed at Snape Maltings 
during the following summer.218 Britten’s unaccompanied cello suites were composed after 
Rostropovich requested that the composer write six suites for him and they signed an informal 
agreement on a restaurant napkin. However, Britten would complete only three suites. It is 
possible that Rostropovich’s difficulties with the Soviet government in the early 1970s—which 
will be discussed in greater detail below—and the sudden decline of Britten’s health prevented 
the composer from fulfilling the full terms of their agreement. Elizabeth Wilson explains that 
Britten’s suites were intended to be an homage to Bach’s Six Cello Suites, BWV 1007-1012 
(composed from 1717 to 1723) in his use of multiple independent superimposed melodic lines, 
fugal counterpoint, as well as in the way they make connections to the stylized dance suite genre 
of the Baroque Era.219 
 
215 Wilson, Rostropovich, 178-82. 
216 Ibid., 184. 
217 Wilson, Rostropovich, 184. 
218 Kildea, Benjamin Britten, 469. Snape Maltings is the large concert hall of the Aldeburgh Festival. 
219 Wilson, Rostropovich, 264-65. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, Britten professed that music should be composed as 
a form of communication with the public. He also indicated that composers should write with the 
performer in mind. In his acceptance speech for the Aspen Award (see previous chapter), Britten 
stated the following:  
I certainly write music for human beings—directly and deliberately. I consider their 
voices, the range, the power, the subtlety, and the colour potentialities of them. I consider 
the instruments they play—their most expressive and suitable individual sonorities, and 
where I may be said to have invented an instrument (such as the Slung Mugs of Noye’s 
Fludde) I have borne in mind the pleasure the young performers will have in playing it.220  
 
The breadth of work written by Britten for Rostropovich was only surpassed by the number of 
compositions and roles Britten wrote for Pears. Both Kildea and Pyke argue that Britten had not 
encountered a cellist of the same caliber as Rostropovich in the UK, that there were no 
weaknesses in Rostropovich’s playing to bolster or disguise, and that Rostropovich had the 
technical and expressive potential to play anything that Britten wrote for him.221 As discussed 
earlier, Rostropovich had a remarkable ability to prepare and memorize music very quickly, had 
an insatiable desire for newly-composed works for the cello, and had formidable instincts for 
musical interpretation and musicality. Elizabeth Wilson explains that as a string player himself, 
Britten had an intuitive knowledge on how to write difficult, yet still idiomatic, passages for the 
instrument. Also, Rostropovich’s technical ability allowed Britten to push the boundaries of 
technical possibility for the cello.222 According to Pyke, the cellist was convinced that some 
passages in Britten’s works were impossible to play on the cello, until he attempted these 
sections and found that they were, in fact, possible. Also, Britten deferred to Rostropovich to 
modify the fingerings and bowings and to suggest alternate passages before publication, in order 
 
220 Benjamin Britten, On Receiving the First Aspen Award: A Speech by Benjamin Britten (London: Faber, 
1964), 10-11. 
221 Kildea, Benjamin Britten, 448-49; and Pyke, 214-15. 
222 Wilson, Rostropovich, 179-81. 
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to make these pieces easier to perform or more effective in performance.223 However, at this time 
I am unable to ascertain the extent of Rostropovich’s editorial suggestions.224  
 
Britten’s and Rostropovich’s Collaboration on the First and Second Cello Suites 
Below I will discuss two areas, in which Britten and Rostropovich experimented in 
developing performance technique for the solo cello in the First and Second Cello Suites: the use 
of the cello to simulate multiple instruments (of similar or different timbre), and the exploration 
of right arm (i.e. bow hand) virtuosity. The “Canto Primo” [“First Song”] movement of Britten’s 
First Cello Suite consists of two melodic lines which can move independently of each other (as 
opposed to moving simply in parallel). The upper voice is higher in register, while the second 
voice is primarily made up of tied pitches. It is also possible to argue that a third voice (the 
pitches sounded on the two lower strings) is present throughout the movement. The illusion of 
multiple instruments is present in the first nine measures of the “Canto Primo,” which are given 
below in Example 2: 
 
 
223 Pyke, 214-16. 
224 To investigate the extent of Britten’s and Rostropovich’s contributions to the final version of the cello 
works, I would need to gain access to the preliminary sketches and the archival records of both Boosey & Hawkes 
and Faber Music. 
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Example 2: Opening of “Canto Primo” from Britten’s First Cello Suite225 
 
Thus, the impression is of multiple instruments, but the primary means of differentiation in the 
above example is register, not timbre. As a result, one may imagine the performance of a consort 
of instruments from the same family. Also, there is a certain amount of ambiguity in 
differentiating between distinct voices, as contrasts in register and rhythm become more and less 
pronounced as the piece progresses. This ambiguity results in a fluidity as the distinction 
between the voices go in and out of focus.  
 A much more pronounced allusion to multiple instruments occurs throughout the first 
section of the “Marcia” [“March”] movement. This also connects with Britten’s tendency to 
write mimetic music, which was one reason why his works were popular in the USSR.226 In 
Example 3, the first measure calls for the cellist to play the harmonic series in the upper register 
 
225 The printed time signature of this movement is “(4/2).” The parentheses indicate flexibility in the 
number of beats per measure. For the sake of clarity, I have written the actual time signatures in the example. Suite 
for Cello, Op. 72 by Benjamin Britten, edited by Mstislav Rostropovich © 1966 by Faber Music Ltd. All Rights 
Reserved. For The Sole Use Of Thornton Miller, University of Illinois. Used With Permission.  
226 See Pages 41 and 134. 
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of the first string. Then in the next measure, the cellist bounces the wood of the bow (col legno 
technique) against the third and fourth strings:227 
 
Example 3: Opening of “Marcia” from Britten’s First Cello Suite228 
 
In the above excerpt, the cellist evokes the bugle in the first measure and the military (possibly 
snare) drum in the second. The cello mimics the valve-less bugle by performing in its high treble 
register, with the “pure” (i.e. without vibrato) timbre characteristic of the use of natural 
harmonics,229 and the performance of only the pitches of the harmonic series. By striking the 
wood of the bow against the third and fourth strings, the cello simulates a drum tattoo.  
 A second example of the use of contrasting timbre appears later in the First Suite during 
the “Bordone” [“Drone”] movement. Here Britten calls for the cellist to maintain a drone on the 
 
227 The strings of the cello from highest to lowest pitch are “A,” “D,” “G,” and “C.” I refer to these strings 
in the text as the “first,” “second,” “third,” and “fourth strings,” respectively. In the musical examples, I designate 
them as the Roman numerals “I,” “II,” “III,” and “IV,” respectively. 
228 The printed time signature is (12/8); I have included the actual times signatures in this example for the 
sake of clarity. Britten, Suite for Cello. 
229 On instruments of the violin family, natural harmonics are played by lightly touching the string with the 
fingers of the left hand while the string is bowed with the right. At certain points on the string (especially on the 
half-way, the third-way, and the quarter-way points) the pitches of the harmonic series are played. In this example, 
the left hand lightly touches the string at the half-way point and moves to the higher third and fourth points. The 
harmonics sound when the finger reaches these points. The sonic effect is the sounding of the pitches of the 
harmonic series in succession, and not a slide or a glissando. 
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open second string with the bow,230 while alternating between pesante pizzicato on the fourth 
string (which is performed solely with the left hand by pressing the string with the index finger 
while plucking the string with the little finger) and seamlessly adding animato passagework on 
the first string while still playing the drone. The diversity of styles has the potential in presenting 
the illusion that the audience is listening to three different instruments. See Example 4: 
 
Example 4: The First Section of “Bordone” from Britten’s First Cello Suite231 
  
 
230 The term “open” means that the string is played only with the bow and without contact from the left 
hand. 
231 The printed time signature is (9/8); I have included the actual time signatures in this example for the 
sake of clarity. I have also placed the three lines (animato, drone, and pesante pizzicato) into separate staves. In the 










Both the second-string drone and the first-string animato passage are performed with the bow 
simultaneously. In the example above, it is possible to perceive the pesante and the animato 
passages as being in two different tempi, while the dynamics between the arco (bowed) voices 
(animato and drone) and pizzicato (pesante) are independent of each other. For example, in the 
fifth measure, the drone voice is pianissimo, while the pesante voice is fortissimo.  
Armenian cellist Vagram Saradjian, who studied with Rostropovich at the Moscow 
Conservatory, recalled that Rostropovich emphasized technical virtuosity of the right hand (the 
bowing hand) as well as the left hand (which is usually responsible for stopping the string to 
change its pitch). Saradjian insisted that most cellists are experts of left-hand technique, yet they 
habitually neglect the right.232 In the “Bordone,” the cellist must maintain a drone on the second 
string, while also sharing the string with the first to play the animato passages. Then in measure 
eight, the animato material crosses over from the first to the third string, while the second-string 
drone continues without pause. Meanwhile, the pesante transfers to the first string. The difficulty 
of this section in performance arises from the need to depict a seamless transition of the animato 
passagework from the first to the third strings (so that it sounds like the passagework is 
descending beneath the drone) without interrupting the drone on the second string. If the sound 
 
232 Saradjian was my cello professor during my studies in the performance master’s program at the 
University of Houston. Wilson indicates that he was Rostropovich’s student at the Moscow Conservatory from 1966 
to 1974. Wilson, Rostropovich, 353. 
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breaks during the transition, then the listener is given the impression that a new voice is 
beginning, which is not the intended effect.  
A third point of interest occurs when the three distinct lines are reduced to one (mm. 12 
to 15). At this point the animato passagework occupies the same register as the drone, and 
gradually merges with the drone’s pitch while maintaining its rhythm. This effect is 
accomplished by playing the pitch D (in the same octave) on the second, third, and fourth strings. 
Also, it is possible that this passage is a reference to the switching back and forth between the 
pitch D played on both the second and third strings in the opening of the “Prelude” movement of 
Bach’s Sixth Cello Suite. See Example 5: 
 
Example 5: The Opening of the “Prelude” from Bach’s Sixth Cello Suite233 
                   III   II  III III   II  III III   II   I   III   II  I (or II) 
  
 
This technique is known as bariolage bowing, and it allows the musician to present timbral 
difference while keeping the pitch static. Bariolage bowing is much more common in the 
violin’s repertoire than in the cello’s.  
All three of Britten’s cello suites include a fugue movement. The technical difficulty of 
this genre is a direct result of the limited capacity of instruments of the violin family to perform 
(or appear to perform) several independent lines simultaneously. Wilson indicates that Britten’s 
 
233 Sr. Joh. Seb. Bach, Suite VI, in Six Suites à Violoncello Solo, BWV 1007-1012), ed. Werner Ickling 
(Siegburg: Ickling, 1997), 50. Accessed 6 May 2020. https://imslp.org/wiki/Special:ReverseLookup/121688 
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fugues were an homage to Bach’s accomplishments in the genre.234 The most explicit example of 
a fugue in Bach’s cello works occurs in the first movement of the Fifth Suite.235 See Example 6:  
 
 
Example 6:  
The Opening of the Fugal Section of the “Prelude” from Bach’s Fifth Cello Suite236 
 
     SUBJECT------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
          -----------------------------------------|ANSWER----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         ……………………………………………………| 
 
                 SUBJECT--------------------------------------------- 
 
         ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
 
        ANSWER…………………………………………………………………………………………….... 
 
        ……………………………………….|  
 
 
Instead of performing multiple lines simultaneously, the fugue is evoked through the statement 
of the subjects and answers in different registers of the instrument, while other voices are either 
implied by switching to other registers or directly presented through the playing of two or three 
 
234 Wilson, Rostropovich, 264. 
235 The movement is divided into a toccata (a free and improvisatory development of the key) and a fugue 
section (which starts on measure 27). 
236 Johann Sebastian Bach, Suitte 5me, in Cello Suites, BWV 1007-1012,  ed. Shin-Itchiro Yokoyama 




strings simultaneously. The latter (known as double- or triple-stopping, respectively) can only be 
used in certain combinations due to the physical limitations of the cellist’s hand. As the fugue 
progresses, the rhythm and contour change in order to accommodate the illusion of multiple 
voices. 
 Britten continues this practice in the “Fuga” movement of his Second Suite. Like Bach, 
the subjects in particular, and the voices in general, of Britten’s fugue are demarcated according 
to register. Again, all of the voices cannot accumulate throughout the exposition (i.e. voices are 
added until all are sounding at the same time) as in fugues for keyboard instruments and 
ensembles. An important distinction, however, emerges from the fact that while Bach wrote each 
subject individually with brief hints of other voices included within the passage, Britten presents 
a complete countersubject alongside the subject. Also, unlike the earlier example taken from the 
“Canto Primo” (Example 1), Britten does not only use register to differentiate between separate 
voices. Instead, each statement of the subject and the countersubject is confined to one string for 
the entirety of that statement. For example, the first subject is performed on the third string, the 
second subject on the second string, the first countersubject on the third string, etc. As a result, it 
is possible to interpret the four-stringed cello as a consort of four instruments that take turns 
performing the iterations of the subject and the countersubject. As Wilson notes, the composer’s 
subject is sparsely written with moments of silence between the pitches, in order to facilitate its 
combination with the countersubject during the rests of the subject.237 In order to keep the 
statements of the subject clearly distinguishable to the listener, Britten only pairs the subject with 
the countersubject or another iteration of the subject. Unlike conventional three- and four-voice 
fugues (which add voices to the texture with each entrance of the subject or answer as the 
 
237 Wilson, Rostropovich, 264. 
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exposition progresses), no more than two voices appear simultaneously in this fugal 
exposition.238 
In Example 7 below, the solid-line bracket demarcates the statements of the subject, and 
the dotted-line indicates the statements of the countersubject. The dashed line appears with the 
tail of the subject, which transitions to the next statement of the subject, and the arrow indicates 
when this transition material is elaborated: 
 
Example 7: The Exposition of “Fuga” from Britten’s Second Cello Suite239 
  
 
238 Britten’s decision to set a fixed limit of two simultaneous voices is also a result of the cello’s inherent 
technical limitations as a predominately single-line instrument. 
239 Second Suite for Cello, Op. 80 by Benjamin Britten, edited by Mstislav Rostropovich © 1969 by Faber 
Music Ltd. All Rights Reserved. For The Sole Use Of Thornton Miller, University of Illinois. Used With 
Permission. For the sake of clarity, an ossia line is given in the example to avoid excessive ledger lines, and rests are 





Considering the difficulties inherent in determining the structure of twentieth-century fugal 
expositions, a form that tends to stray from conventional examples based on the duality of 
subjects in the tonic key and answers in the dominant, I suggest that it is possible to interpret this 
movement either as a three- or a four-voice fugue. In the former interpretation, the three subjects 
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appear in different registers and the second and third are accompanied by the same 
countersubject. In this case, the fourth subject would be a middle entry (i.e. a full statement of 
the subject after the exposition). In the latter, the fourth statement of the subject is included in the 
exposition even though the line that accompanies it is a recurrence of the second iteration of the 
subject displaced by one beat. By appearing on the second beat of the fourth statement of the 
subject, this recurrence appears in the same manner as the statements of the countersubject that 
preceded it. It is possible to consider that the ambiguity of the fourth subject could be a way to 
transition from the clearly demarcated exposition to the free development of the subjects that 
follow. 
The technical difficulty of the above example arises from the need to keep the separate 
lines distinct and intelligible. In order to accomplish this task, the cellist is required to keep the 
rhythm accurate and the use of rubato limited to the phrasing of the fugal subject. Also, the 
performer must ensure that the voice presenting the subject is in the sonic foreground and is 
appropriately phrased, while the other voices support it in the background. If the cellist fails to 
keep the different lines distinct, then the illusion of the fugue’s counterpoint is lost and is 
reduced to the presentation of only one line. In summation, the switching back and forth between 
multiple registers in order to present the illusion of multiple voices is indicative of Britten’s and 
Rostropovich’s exploration of the technical virtuosity of the right arm.  
The Third Suite is arguably a distillation of Britten’s and Rostropovich’s efforts to 
explore the expressive potential of the bow, while reducing the utilization of the extended 
techniques discussed in the previous examples from the First and Second Suites. In contrast to 
the other suites, the Third is based on four Russian themes, including the “Kontakion for the 
242 
 
Departed” from the Russian Orthodox tradition.240 In his review of the world premiere of 
Britten’s Third Suite, Observer critic Stephen Walsh noted the following: 
It hardly needs saying that Britten has again composed marvelously for Rostropovich. 
There are fewer special effects than in his other cello works (though as usual he doesn’t 
fail to find a memorable opening idea, in the pedal pizzicato on the open [fourth] string: 
indeed, the resonance of the unstopped [third and fourth] strings is a feature throughout). 
Their emphasis is rather on the full sweep of the bow, which in Rostropovich’s hands 
certainly takes on a quite new expressive meaning. One’s attention is held by the 
magnificent breadth of the playing even when not by the sheer variety of the music. But 
other cellists may find the task harder.241 
 
On the whole, Wilson considers that all three suites “exploited the instrumental brilliance of the 
dedicatee to the full.”242 It is clear that Britten’s works for the solo cello were the product of the 
very close collaboration between the composer and Rostropovich, which was practically a 
laboratory for the development of technical and expressive possibilities for the instrument. 
The cello works were not the only pieces by Britten for Soviet artists. The soprano solo 
part of the War Requiem was composed specifically with Vishnevskaya’s voice in mind.243 She 
indicates that at the time of her first appearance at the Aldeburgh Festival in 1961, Britten had 
already begun writing the War Requiem. Also, during Vishnevskaya’s time at Aldeburgh, he 
decided to write a solo part for her. She also remembers that several months later, when Britten 
sent the part to her, Rostropovich remarked that it was as if Britten had painted her musical 
 
240 Nicholas Clark of the Britten-Pears Foundation notes that the Russian themes were quoted from 
Britten’s copy of Tchaikovsky’s collected works that he purchased in part in the UK, and that he bought and was 
given some of the volumes during his visits to the USSR. Email correspondence between Clark and the author, 17 
September 2015. The circumstances surrounding how Britten acquired these volumes will be discussed in greater 
detail on Page 300.  
241 Stephen Walsh, “Britten’s Latest,” Observer, 29 December 1974, 16. 
242 Wilson, Rostropovich, 264. 
243 During Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s first performances at the Aldeburgh Festival, the soprano 
performed Mussorgsky’s Songs and Dances of Death (composed in 1875 and 1877) and Heitor Villa-Lobos’s 
Bachianas Brasilerias no. 5 (composed in 1938 and 1945). Wilson, Rostropovich, 183-84. Vishnevskaya recalled in 
her memoirs that she performed songs of Prokofiev, Tchaikovsky, Richard Strauss, as well as arias from Vincenzo 
Bellini’s Norma (composed in 1831), Giacomo Puccini’s Manon Lescaut (premiered in 1893), Verdi’s La Forza del 
Destino (1862), Shostakovich’s Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District, and Mussorgsky’s Songs and Dances of 
Death. Vishnevskaya, 364-65. 
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portrait. Britten also composed the short song cycle The Poet’s Echo to poetry by Alexander 
Pushkin for Vishnevskaya as soprano and Rostropovich as pianist while he and Pears were 
visiting a Composers’ Union retreat in Armenia as guests of the two Soviet musicians.244 He also 
considered composing an opera on Leo Tolstoy’s novel Anna Karenina to be premiered at the 
Bolshoi Theater, which would have included Vishnevskaya as the title character, Pears as her 
husband, and would have been conducted by Rostropovich. These plans did not come to fruition. 
Colin Graham drafted a libretto—which was discussed by Britten and Pears—but the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 made it impossible for Britten to accept a commission from 
the Bolshoi Theater. The composer then considered that it might be possible to write a smaller-
scale work for the Aldeburgh Festival, but lost interest after the project was accidentally leaked 
to the press.245 In the late 1960s, Rostropovich also asked Arthur Bliss to write a concerto for 
cello and orchestra. Bliss began sketching the work in 1969, and Rostropovich gave the world 
premiere at the Aldeburgh Festival in the following year.246 
 
The Limits of Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s Agency 
Russian pianist and pedagogue Vera Gornostaeva observed, in an interview with Grum-
Grzhimailo, that Rostropovich tended to adopt musical father figures and to become closely 
involved in their lives. She argues that in addition to Prokofiev and Shostakovich, Rostropovich 
became deeply invested in the affairs of the Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn.247 
 
244 Cameron Pyke, Benjamin Britten and Russia (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2016), 188-93. In the 
future, I will investigate why Rostropovich considered the soprano solo part of the War Requiem to be 
Vishnevskaya’s musical portrait. In other words, I will attempt to determine which musical characteristics Britten 
included in the part were a direct result of Vishnevskaya’s performance style. 
245 Carpenter, 444-45. 
246 Arthur Bliss, “Concerto for Cello and Orchestra,” in Bliss on Music: Selected Writings of Arthur Bliss, 
1920-1975, ed. Gregory Roscow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 272. 
247 Grum-Grzhimailo, 39-40. 
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Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya—who had voiced political doubts about the USSR in private 
after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia—were the first high-profile members of the cultural 
intelligentsia to face Soviet repression as a direct result of coming to Solzhenitsyn’s aid. 
Solzhenitsyn was removed from the Writers’ Union in 1969 after the samizdat [underground] 
distribution The Gulag Archipelago in 1967,248 and the publication of his banned semi-
autobiographical novel Cancer Ward in the West in 1968. Due to the centralization of cultural 
employment in the USSR, Solzhenitsyn was unable to find publishing opportunities or paid work 
as a writer after his expulsion, and he became ill and destitute.  
In 1969, Rostropovich learned of the author’s condition and gave him shelter at his estate 
and later at his summer home. Furtseva ordered the musicians to remove the disgraced writer 
from their property, but they refused unless the state provided Solzhenitsyn with appropriate 
housing. Furtseva declined to help the writer and warned that if Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya 
continued to aid him they would face serious consequences. After Solzhenitsyn was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970—which the USSR dismissed as a blatant political gesture to 
undermine it—the government’s repression of Solzhenitsyn intensified, which in turn prompted 
Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya to send an open letter to the Soviet journals Izvestiia [News], 
Literaturnaia gazeta [Literary Gazette], Pravda [Truth], and Sovetskaia kul’tura [Soviet 
Culture].249 In this letter, they criticized the government’s hypocrisy in lauding the Nobel Prize 
committee’s selection of Mikhail Sholokhov (the author of the socialist realist novel The Quiet 
Don) in 1965 as the just recognition of an important literary figure, while accusing the same 
committee of playing dirty political games by honoring the disgraced writers Boris Pasternak and 
 
248 In The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn argued that the Soviet prison camp system was instituted by 
Vladimir Lenin (and not only Stalin) and developed alongside (and was an integral part of) the USSR. 




Solzhenitsyn in 1958 and 1970, respectively. They also took the Soviet establishment to task for 
its draconian treatment of Soviet composers in 1948, and the continued censorship of Soviet 
composers. Both Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya believed that they could leverage their musical 
capital, that the Ministry of Culture would remember that they were still valuable assets to the 
Soviet cultural establishment, and that their international fame provided them with some 
protection from Soviet retribution.250 However, it appeared that they had overstepped their limits, 
and their access to international travel came under the scrutiny of Goskontsert and its parent 
organization, the Ministry of Culture. Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s international and, 
eventually, domestic performance opportunities were curtailed as a result of their support for 
Solzhenitsyn.251 
Meanwhile, Britten and the British Ambassador Duncan Wilson utilized their agency to 
voice their support for Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya to the Soviet government. They used 
Britten’s participation in the Days of British Music Festival in the USSR in 1971 as leverage, 
declaring that the composer would only participate in the festival if he could perform alongside 
the “two Slavas:” his friends Sviatoslav Richter and Mstislav Rostropovich.252 The former was 
still on good terms with the Soviet government, and the latter was not. While the plan proved to 
be a success, both Britten and Duncan Wilson noticed that Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya were 
subject to petty embarrassments throughout the course of the festival. As a result of his 
 
250 Ibid., 318-19. According to Vishnevskaya’s memoirs, Rostropovich wrote the letter, she revised it, and 
he agreed to her suggestions and rewrote it. Vishnevskaya’s perspective on the letter is preserved in her memoirs: 
Vishnevskaya, 394-96. Vishnevskaya also included a copy of the letter’s English translation as an appendix in her 
memoirs. Vishnevskaya, 488-91. 
251 Wilson, Rostropovich, 320-25 and 329-35. 
252 The Days of British Music Festival in 1971, which was stipulated in the Anglo-Soviet cultural 
agreement for 1971-1973 and was organized by the British Council, Victor and Lilian Hochhauser, Goskontsert, and 
the Ministry of Culture, was comprised largely of four performances of the LSO in Leningrad, followed by the 
repetition of these concerts in Moscow. The concert of the “two Slavas” was the last of the four. Elizabeth Wilson, 
“Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part II,” Musical Opinion 136, no. 1495 (July-August 2013): 18. 
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dissatisfaction with the Soviet treatment of his friends and his own declining health in the early 
in the early 1970s, Britten did not take another trip to the USSR.253  
Britten and Pears saw the Bolshoi Theater’s production of A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
in 1971 during the Days of British Music Festival. However, they only stayed for the first act and 
left the theater during the intermission, while avoiding the notice of the Soviet performers who 
wanted to meet them in the lobby. Afterwards, according to Wilson, Britten exclaimed that he 
would have to write a “Bolshoi-proof” opera. Up to this point, Britten rarely criticized Soviet 
performances of his music. Pyke explains that the Bolshoi production had deviated from 
Britten’s original conception of the work in several ways. To compensate for the large 
performance space of the Bolshoi Theater, Rozhdestvensky increased the size of the pit 
orchestra, the role of Oberon was performed by a female vocalist and not a male countertenor 
(because none were available in the USSR), and the female chorus’s vibrato was particularly 
wide. Pyke suggests that Britten could have had trouble recognizing the piece at some points of 
the production because of these deviations, which could have resulted in his early departure.254 It 
is also possible that the Soviet treatment of Rostropovich led to Britten’s growing ambivalence 
and, possibly, distaste toward the grand gestures of Soviet cultural exchange—such as the 
festival of British music—and that he saw the Bolshoi performance of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream in the context of those events.255 It is also possible that the Britten’s dislike for the 
 
253 Ibid., 25. Britten and Pears participated in the festival as official guests of the British Embassy. William 
Walton and his wife, Susana, also attended as guests of the London Symphony Orchestra, which performed 
Walton’s First Symphony. (See Page 126 and Footnote 83 in Chapter 2.) There, the Waltons chafed at Soviet 
supervision, which restricted their movement and ability to socialize on tour. They also saw firsthand the endemic 
food shortages that limited the diversity (oranges were considered to be highly desired and rare) and affected the 
quality of the food (making it difficult for Susana Walton to identify which dishes were fish, meat, or vegetable). In 
addition, the Waltons were outraged by the Soviet treatment of Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya during the festival. 
Susana Walton, William Walton: Behind the Façade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 205-09. 
254 Pyke, 225-26. 
255 Wilson, “Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part II,” 21-25. 
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Bolshoi Theater’s production stemmed from the composer simply considering it a poor 
performance of his music. Besides, it is impossible to ascertain whether Britten disliked the 
entire Bolshoi production, which spanned several years, or only the particular performance that 
he attended that night.  
In any case, Britten habitually placed a very high premium on performance quality and 
professionalism, especially when these performances included his own music. Also, Britten’s 
negative reaction to the Bolshoi performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream was not the first in 
which he was critical of a performance of his music in the USSR. Earlier, during his 1965 visit to 
the Composers’ Union Retreat in Soviet Armenia with Rostropovich, Pears, and Vishnevskaya, 
the group attended a music festival of Britten’s music in Yerevan. Pears recalled in his travel 
diary that Yuri Aranovich, the conductor of the Armenian State Symphony Orchestra, did not 
adequately prepare Britten’s Cello Symphony in rehearsal (he concentrated instead on the Sea 
Interludes from Peter Grimes and A Young Person’s Guide to the Orchestra) for a festival in his 
honor and the composer forbade its performance at the concert.256 It should be noted, however, 
that Britten’s apparent ambivalence toward the 1971 Days of British Music Festival and the 
Bolshoi production of A Midsummer Night’s Dream did not affect his overall attitude toward 
Soviet performers interested in his music.  
It is possible that Britten’s own rapport with the Soviet Ministry of Culture—which he 
had painstakingly cultivated over the previous ten years—was souring as a result of his 
outspoken support for Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya. While Britten was in Moscow in 1971, 
he presented the score of his Third Cello Suite to Rostropovich after Britten had performed it on 
 
256 Peter Pears, The Travel Diaries of Peter Pears, 1936-1978, ed. Philip Reed (Woodbridge, Suffolk: 
Boydell, 1995), 129-30. 
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the piano for him, Shostakovich, and a small group of Soviet friends.257 Britten planned for 
Rostropovich to give the premiere at the Aldeburgh Festival later that year just as he gave the 
premieres of the First and Second Suites. However, the Soviet Ministry of Culture sought to 
punish Rostropovich, and possibly Britten as well, by refusing to allow Rostropovich to travel to 
Aldeburgh over the next three years.258 This series of events significantly reduced the value of 
Britten’s, Rostropovich’s, and Vishnevskaya’s musical capital, and, as a result, weakened their 
agency in their dealings with the Soviet Ministry of Culture. 
Even after Solzhenitsyn was forced to emigrate from the USSR following the 
international publication of The Gulag Archipelago, the performance opportunities for 
Rostropovich continued to deteriorate. In addition, the performance prospects of Vishnevskaya 
were also affected. The couple decided to apply for two-year exit visas for themselves and their 
two daughters in 1974.259 Once they had left the country, Rostropovich was finally free to give 
the premiere of Britten’s Third Cello Suite. The couple entered the Western concert circuit and 
planned to return to the USSR after a few years while renewing their temporary visas in order to 
maintain their Soviet citizenship. However, in 1978, they learned from a news broadcast that 
their citizenship had been revoked. They would not be able return to Russia until the final 
months of the USSR.260 
 
257 Ibid., 21-22. 
258 See Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
259 One of Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s last musical activities in the USSR was their participation in 
a recording of Giacomo Puccini’s Tosca (1900) by Bolshoi Theater performers. (Rostropovich served as the 
conductor, while Vishnevskaya performed the role of Floria Tosca.) At this time, Solzhenitsyn had already been 
forced to emigrate, and Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s performance prospects were severely curtailed. After 
obtaining Furtseva’s blessing, Vishnevskaya was to sing the title role, and Rostropovich was to conduct. Between 
recording sessions, however, members of the cast denounced the couple on political grounds and the production was 
canceled. In response, Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya wrote to Leonid Brezhnev himself to ask for exit visas to live 
abroad for two years. The request was immediately granted. Wilson reports that Rostropovich had expected 
someone to have implored him to stay, and he interpreted this apparent ambivalence as a lack of respect for his 
service and achievements. Wilson. Rostropovich, 332-38. 





In this chapter, I have discussed how Soviet musicians exchanged their musical capital to 
acquire agency in order to gain access to foreign music, perform it in the USSR, and (in the case 
of Rostropovich) encourage the production of new works. As elite members of the cultural 
intelligentsia, these musicians already enjoyed a relatively high standard of living in the USSR, 
which was comparable to that enjoyed by Party members and nuclear physicists.261 Furthermore, 
I have explored how the musical capital of British composers could either bolster or hinder these 
efforts. In Britten’s case, his capital had reached such a point that he did not even need to use his 
agency to advocate for the Soviet performance of his works. In Bush’s case, however, active use 
of his own agency to exchange his musical and political capital for Soviet performances of his 
works was unsuccessful until a Soviet director utilized his own agency to stage The Sugar 
Reapers in Tartu. 
Musical capital, which could result from the prestige of a musician’s compositions or 
performances, was the currency of cultural exchange. This capital empowered the agency of 
Soviet musicians and directors, and they used their agency predominately to gain access to 
opportunities to purchase or otherwise obtain valued goods and services in the USSR, or to have 
the ability to travel internationally to purchase foreign items (such as intellectual property). 
Several historians of the USSR, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, have 
argued that having access to goods and services was far more important to the Soviet citizen than 
possessing actual currency. In other words, Soviet consumers competed with each other for a 
limited amount of goods. In Western capitalist economies, by comparison, supply outstripped 
 
261 For example, the British tenor Peter Pears observed during a 1966 Christmas holiday visit to the USSR 
that Shostakovich, himself a Party member, was friends and neighbors with one such Soviet nuclear physicist. In his 
account, Pears only refers to the physicist as “Professor D.” Pears, 148-50. Elizabeth Wilson indicates that 
“Professor D.” was Andrei Dmitrivich Sakharov. Wilson, Rostropovich, 182. 
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demand. Therefore, they were supply-driven, and companies competed to sell their commodities 
to a limited number of consumers. The Soviet economy, on the other hand, was plagued by 
shortages in the supply of Soviet-made consumer goods, which were distributed by a centralized 
supplier, and of foreign consumer goods, the acquisition of which required having access to 
international travel or foreign people. Thus, access to high-quality housing, automobiles, foreign 
goods, and musical instruments was generally an indication of privilege in Soviet society. 
Simply having the currency did not mean that one could obtain such commodities before they 
were sold out or even that one had the opportunity to purchase or otherwise obtain them. As a 
result, one’s position in society and one’s personal networks were vastly more important than the 
number of rubles in one’s bank account.  
Access to international travel and foreign intellectual property, such as published scores, 
was an even more highly prized commodity, and it was within the reach of most elite Soviet 
musicians. I suggest that some musicians went a step further by gaining access to foreign 
contemporary composers. These connections to influential foreign musicians could open 
additional opportunities abroad. Richter, Rostropovich, and Vishnevskaya cultivated close 
friendships with Britten and Pears, and were frequent guests at the Aldeburgh Festival. More 
importantly, though, Rostropovich utilized his access to the British composer to get Britten to 
write music for him to play. It should be noted that this example of access embodied a mutually 
beneficial opportunity: Britten gained access to the USSR’s premier cellist, who was also 
dedicated to encouraging the composition of new music for the cello. In addition, access was not 
only important for Soviet musicians, conductors, and theater directors. Both Britten and Bush 
benefitted from their connections with Soviet music professionals. It was through the advocacy 
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of their Soviet counterparts that the performance of their stage works in the USSR was made 




ROYALTIES, LOANS, AND BARTER: ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL BARRIERS DURING THE EARLY 1960s 
 
Economic and Legal Obstacles to Anglo-Soviet Exchange 
This chapter investigates the transfer of British intellectual property to the Soviet Union 
and its use from the opening of Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange in the late 1950s to the Soviet 
entry into the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) in 1973. The increase in the interchange 
of performers that resulted from exchange agreements led to a sudden rise in the transportation 
of intellectual property across the so-called Iron Curtain, which further led to the efforts of 
government representatives, publishers, and music professionals to resolve or circumvent the 
differences between British and Soviet economic and legal policies. While ideological 
considerations played a significant role in determining the appropriateness of particular styles of 
music and performers for these exchanges, they were not responsible for the overall difficulty in 
the transfer of intellectual property. Rather there were economic and legal obstacles inherent in 
the interchange of music that was aesthetically and ideologically acceptable to the Soviet cultural 
establishment. In the course of this chapter, I explain how some British and Soviet musicians and 
publishers were able to use their professional agency to circumvent these barriers in order to 
facilitate the transfer, publication, and dissemination of intellectual property. 
As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the primary economic obstacle to cultural 
exchange was the inconvertibility of Soviet currency, which discouraged foreign artists and 
publishers from collaborating with the USSR as a result of the Soviet inability to provide 
adequate compensation in local (i.e. not Soviet) currency. The primary legal obstacle was the 
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Soviet refusal to join the Berne Convention or the UCC, which meant that Soviet citizens and 
institutions were not legally obligated to observe the intellectual property rights of other 
countries, and vice-versa. This noncompliance with international copyright law also discouraged 
foreign publishers and artists from sharing their intellectual property with the USSR, since Soviet 
parties were under no legal obligation to follow foreign restrictions on that property’s use and 
were not required to compensate the holders of that work’s copyright.  
In order to avoid misconceptions about the British and Soviet publishing industries and 
policies of copyright legislation, a brief overview of their historical development up to the early 
1970s is necessary. It is vital to understand that there were also a great number of similarities and 
differences in how the British and Soviet systems developed and in what they intended to 
accomplish. This legal history forms the framework upon which actual instances of cultural 
exchange will be situated in order to understand them. It is impossible to discuss them in a 
contextual vacuum.  
 
A Short History of British, Russian, and Soviet Copyright Law 
British copyright protection began with the Statute of Anne in 1710. In this period, 
English law valued public access above the rights of the author and awarded copyright protection 
for a certain time span after a work’s publication, after which it would fall into the public 
domain. The French (or Continental) system was fundamentally different and was based on the 
principle that copyright was the author’s human right; protection existed for the entire life of the 
author and for an additional allotment of time for the author’s heirs. The Berne Convention, the 
first multilateral copyright convention, was formed in 1886. It required its members to ensure the 
protection of a work’s copyright for the entirety of the author’s life, and the 1908 revision 
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stipulated protection for an additional fifty years after the author’s death. Clearly, the Berne 
Convention falls within the Continental tradition of copyright. The United Kingdom changed 
course and became one of the original signatories of the Berne Convention in 1886. When the 
UK acceded to the Convention, it adopted aspects of the Continental tradition into its domestic 
observance of copyright. The primary change was an alteration in the term of protection from 
one based on a span of time after publication to one spanning the entire life of the author and a 
period of time after the author’s death. Since their entry into the Convention, the British were, 
and continue to be, major proponents of this agreement.1 
Multilateral copyright conventions such as the Berne required all participating countries 
to observe a minimum of common protections for the use of the intellectual property of the other 
countries. Typically, the holders of copyright were publishing (and, later, recording) firms that 
received royalties for the use of their copyrighted material, and a portion of these fees were 
awarded to the original creators of that material (which included authors and composers). The 
1908 revision of the Berne Convention also included protections for performance rights for 
performances and mechanical rights for recordings.2 Cyril Ehrlich explains that in order to 
incorporate these changes into British law and to maintain the UK’s place in the Berne 
Convention, the British government passed the Copyright Act of 1911.3 The Mechanical 
Copyright Licenses Company formed in 1910 in anticipation of the 1911 Act to license the 
mechanical rights for musical works.4 The Performing Right Society was founded in 1914. It was 
 
1 Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), 159-60.  
2 Articles 11 and 12, respectively, of the Revised Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works of November 13, 1908. 
3 Cyril Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance: A History of the Performing Right Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 12-13. 




comprised primarily of publishers and composers and it collected royalties from performers and 
concert venues.5  
Tsarist Russia partially complied with international norms, but its involvement was 
limited to a few relatively short-lived bilateral agreements. Its last major piece of copyright 
legislation was the Russian Copyright Act of 1911, which specified a period of protection for the 
entirety of the author’s life with the addition of fifty years for the benefit of his or her heirs. This 
term was set to match the terms of the member states of the Berne Convention. However, Russia 
did not participate in the multilateral convention. Instead, it participated in bilateral agreements 
with France and Belgium that were left to expire. In the 1910s, Russia renewed its agreements 
with these two countries, and drafted new agreements with Denmark and Germany.6 Agreements 
with limited durations and definite expirations tended to be favored by states that intended to 
limit their involvement in such agreements.   
Russia changed its stance considerably toward international copyright due to shifts in its 
national and foreign policy that occurred after the October Revolution in 1917. At this time, the 
new Soviet government still had bilateral copyright agreements with Belgium, Denmark, and 
Germany, which originated from the Tsarist Era. However, these agreements were not enforced 
and were allowed to expire by the new regime. Essentially, the Soviet government denied that it 
was the legal successor of Tsarist Russia and refused to recognize the former government’s 
 
5 The first organization to charge performers for royalties is the French Society of Authors, Composers, and 
Publishers of Music (SACEM), which was founded in 1851. Societies for the protection of performance rights 
emerged in other Berne Convention participants in Europe throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and 
in the early twentieth century. Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance, 1-2. 
6 Russia entered bilateral copyright agreements that had terms similar to the Berne Convention (only twenty 
years after the author’s death instead of fifty, and translation did not require authors’ consent) with France in 1861 
and Belgium in 1862. The agreements expired after twenty-five years, and they were not renewed. Later, Russia 
concluded three-year agreements that closely followed the terms of the Berne Convention with France in 1912, and 
Belgium and Denmark in 1915. Russia also concluded a five-year agreement with Germany in 1913, which was 
suspended during the First World War. It was reinstated, but not observed, after the war due to the regime change in 
Russia. Michael A. Newcity, Copyright Law in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1978), 11-15. 
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agreements with, and debts owed to, foreign countries.7 For roughly the first fifty years of its 
existence, the USSR avoided involvement in both multilateral and bilateral international 
copyright agreements. The early Soviet state of the late 1910s and the early 1920s became even 
more isolationist by deviating from international norms of protection (such as nationalizing the 
copyright of deceased Russian composers and eliminating the postmortem transfer of royalties to 
composers’ heirs). Also, foreign works were not afforded any protections, and could be 
translated without the consent of, or remuneration to, the original author.8 In the mid-1920s, 
Soviet copyright law resumed observing some of the Continental norms that it had earlier 
discarded. Soviet copyright protection now lasted for the entire life of the author, and for a 
fifteen-year postmortem period (which was far shorter than the minimum period to join the 
Berne Convention). In principle, Soviet copyright law remained unchanged until the early 1960s, 
when it was slightly modified. In the late 1960s, it would gradually resume its involvement in 
international copyright by drafting bilateral copyright agreements with socialist countries under 
its influence.9 
In 1932, Soviet composers had begun receiving a percentage of ticket sales in royalties 
for the public performance of their music. After a Supreme Court ruling in the following year, 
composers also received royalties for recordings of their works.10 Muzfond was created soon 
after the formation of the All-Union Composers’ Union in 1939; it was placed under the control 
 
7 See Curtis Keeble, Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000). 
8 In 1917, the Soviet government had the right to nationalize the music of pre-revolution Russian 
composers; and, two years later, it had the right to nationalize any intellectual property, limit royalties awarded to 
copyright holders, prevent heirs from receiving the royalties of deceased copyright holders. Newcity, 17-22. 
9 By 1979, the USSR had bilateral copyright agreements with Hungary from 1968 to 1971 and from 1978 
onwards, with Bulgaria from 1971, with the German Democratic Republic from 1974, and with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia from 1975. Mark Boguslavsky, The U.S.S.R. and International Copyright Protection, trans. Yuri 
Shirkov (Moscow: Progress, 1979), 222-24. 
10 N.L. Zil’bershtein, Avtorskoe pravo na muzykal’nye proizvedeniia [Copyright Law for Musical Works] 
(Moscow: Sovetskii kompozitor [Soviet Composer], 1960), 44. 
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of the professional union and not the governmental Committee on Artistic Affairs. Muzfond 
gathered royalties from public performances, kept a percentage of the proceeds for copyrighted 
composers, and kept all of the royalties from the performance of the works of non-copyrighted 
composers (such as composers outside of the Composers’ Union). It then used its funds to 
support Union members in their professional and private lives.11 The fact that Muzfond was 
placed under the guidance of the Union and not the government was very significant, since it 
meant that professional musicians—and not governmental bureaucrats—were in charge of the 
financial wellbeing of other musicians. Moreover, Muzfond’s practice of also gathering the 
royalties of non-copyrighted composers ensured that a composer could not make a living writing 
music if he or she was not affiliated with the Composers’ Union. Later in 1954, the All-Union 
Administration for the Protection of Authors’ Rights (VUOAP) was created under the auspices 
of the Writers’ Union to collect royalties for the creative unions (and thus for Muzfond), to 
advocate for Soviet authors and composers in copyright disputes, and to advise the government 
in matters regarding intellectual property.12  
 
 
11 Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 46-55. 
12 Serge L. Levitsky, Introduction to Soviet Copyright Law, vol. 8 of Law in Eastern Europe (A.W. 
Sythoff, Leiden, 1964), 229-30. 
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Figure 1: Bureaucratic Hierarchy of the Creative Unions, Muzfond, and the VUOAP 
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In 1964, Soviet Russia incorporated copyright law into its civil code, yet no significant changes 
were made to the aspects of the law regarding the copyright protection of music.14 
Meanwhile, the United States continued to follow the earlier English principle of 
copyright: American copyright law protected works for only twenty-five years after publication. 
The UCC guidelines—which were primarily devised to ensure American participation in 1955—
were largely within the Anglo-American tradition, and they were intended to constitute a more 
accessible convention than the Berne. At the time, the US was not a member of the Berne 
Convention; it had instead drafted a wide network of bilateral agreements with other countries 
around the world. The UCC’s conditions were identical to American copyright law: a twenty-
five-year period of protection after publication, a registration requirement, and a provision for 
 
13 See Footnote 20 in Chapter 4. 
14 See Whitmore Gray and Raymond Stults, trans., “Copyright,” in Civil Code of the Russian Soviet 




authors to be given the ability to transfer their rights to another entity for the purposes of 
publication. As a result of these similarities, the US did not have to make any changes to its own 
legislation to be able to accede to the convention. The USSR, on the other hand, had to make 
substantial alterations in its civil code to be eligible to join the UCC in 1973. The major 
modifications involved increasing the postmortem term of protection from fifteen to twenty-five 
years, requiring that publishers fulfill the formalities of registration during publication, and 
enabling the transfer of rights from authors to publishers.15 As a result of its entry into the UCC, 
the historical progression of Soviet copyright law can be framed as an initial distancing from 
international participation, followed by a reluctant and slow return, which culminated in the 
entry into a multilateral convention. The above developments in British and Russian/Soviet 
copyright law are outlined below in Figure 2. 
 
 
15 V.A. Dozortsev, “Avtorskoe pravo” [“Copyright Law”], in Kommentarii k grazhdanskomu kodeksu 
[Commentary on the Civil Code], eds. C.H. Bratys’ and O.N. Sadikov (Moskva: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1982), 




Figure 2: Timeline of British and Russian/Soviet Developments in Copyright Observance 
 
Great Britain/UK Russia/USSR 
1710: Queen Anne Statute  
 1828-1887: Copyright develops over a series 
of acts, music gained protection in 1840 
 1861 and 1862: Bilateral Agreements with 
France and Belgium 
1886: Original signatory of Berne Convention  
1908: Revision of Berne Convention  
1911: Licensing of Mechanical Rights 1911: Copyright Act 
1914: Performing Right Society 1910s: Bilateral Agreements between Tsarist 
Russia and France, Belgium, Denmark, and 
Germany 
 1917-1925: Soviet government had the right 
to nationalize private copyright, and removed 
postmortem terms of protection 
 1925-1928: Private copyright and postmortem 
terms of protection restored in a series of 
legislative acts.  
 1932: Composers awarded royalties 
 1939: All-Union Composers’ Union and 
Muzfond 
 1954: VUOAP 
1957: Joins UCC  
 1964: Copyright integrated into civil code 
 1968: Begins to observe international 
copyright through bilateral agreements with 
select socialist allies 
 1973: Joins UCC, creation of VAAP16 
 
 
Anglo-Soviet Trade of Intellectual Property before 1973 
Before the USSR acceded to the UCC, the exchange of intellectual property between the 
USSR and the UK fell into two major categories: exchanges that did not have the consent of the 
 
16 See Footnote 20 in Chapter 4. 
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foreign holders of the work’s copyright, and those that did. Due to the territoriality of copyright 
law, both were completely legal under British and Soviet law: Soviet citizens were not obligated 
to follow British law in the USSR, and British citizens were not required to follow Soviet law in 
the UK. Without an international agreement, the other nation’s laws—including those regarding 
copyright—were legally irrelevant. Therefore, Soviet publishers could legally reproduce British 
intellectual property without the consent of, and without compensating or even notifying, the 
original creators of that property or the holders of that property’s copyright. Moreover, British 
citizens could use Soviet intellectual property without consent for the same reason: the 
territoriality of copyright law. The definition of these consent-less exchanges depended entirely 
on the definer’s perspective. This practice seemed like piracy to many of the original creators 
and copyright holders of the intellectual property; however, it was perceived as the free use of 
unprotected works—otherwise known as the public domain—to users and publishers of that 
property in the other country.  
The use of copyrighted material without consent did not form the entirety of the 
international transfer of intellectual property. British and Soviet institutions were able to forge 
mutually beneficial agreements to trade with, and buy and sell this material to, each other. For 
example, the demand for Soviet music was high enough to create a standard procedure for the 
British republication of recent and new Soviet music. The British publisher Boosey & Hawkes 
and the Soviet trade agency Mezhknig maintained a standing agreement starting in 1946 for the 
transfer of Soviet scores to be sent from the latter to the former, and for them to be republished 
under the imprint of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press, which was a subsidiary of Boosey & 
Hawkes. The Anglo-Soviet Music Press paid lump sums to Mezhknig in British currency for the 
physical copies of Soviet scores and for the exclusive right to publish and disseminate those 
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Soviet compositions in the UK. This procedure also allowed for the exploitation of a loophole in 
the Berne Convention known as the “Berne Backdoor.” If previously unpublished Soviet 
compositions were published simultaneously in the USSR and the UK, the works would enjoy 
both multilateral Berne Convention protection and Soviet domestic copyright protection. Other 
Western publishers such as the American publishing firm Leeds, in affiliation with the Am-Rus 
Music Corporation, and the West German firm Peters Edition had similar arrangements with the 
USSR regarding the Western publication of Soviet music.17  
This system allowed the Soviets to receive highly valued foreign currency through the 
sale of their published music to the UK and other foreign countries, while the publishers in these 
foreign countries were free to republish Soviet publications and disseminate them within their 
own countries for a profit. This mutually beneficial procedure was able to exist despite the Soviet 
refusal to participate in international intellectual property law and provided the standard means 
for the licit transfer of Soviet intellectual property abroad. However, such a system was not 
feasible for the transfer of intellectual property from the UK to the USSR, because British 
publishers could not convert Soviet currency into pounds. The Soviet government could have 
arranged for their publishers to be paid from its stockpiles of foreign currency, but it was 
apparent that it was either unwilling or unable to allow the expenditure of such currency for 
cultural intellectual property. Moreover, the Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange agreements—which 
were put in place to circumvent the economic difficulties in order to promote the cultural 
interchange—focused exclusively on the exchange of performers and ensembles. The 
 
17 Helen Wallace, Boosey & Hawkes: The Publishing Story (London: Boosey, 2007), 89-90; D.W. 
Krummel, “Leeds,” in Music Printing and Publishing, eds. D.W. Krummel and Stanley Sadie (New York: Norton, 
1990), 318; and Hans-Martin Plesske and Frances Barulich, “Peters (i),” in Music Printing and Publishing, eds. 
Krummel and Sadie, 363. 
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agreements did not stipulate procedures in relation to the exchange of intellectual property; 
therefore, they were unable to correct this imbalance. 
Before the USSR acceded to the UCC, the international exchange of intellectual property 
from Western Europe and the US to the USSR was outside the normal sphere of commercial 
practice. In the absence of an official means of transfer of intellectual property to the USSR, 
Soviet performers, and sometimes publishers, obtained, sold, and disseminated foreign scores 
without the permission of the original holders of those scores’ copyright. Meanwhile, British 
publishers were aware that their Soviet counterparts often gained unauthorized access to their 
intellectual property for republication, dissemination, and performance in the USSR.18 For 
example, the instance discussed in the previous chapter, when Rozhdestvensky acquired copies 
of Britten’s scores in Czechoslovakia and brought them into the USSR for performance, he had 
neither consent of the composer nor of his publisher Boosey & Hawkes.  
The major obstacle for Soviet citizens (including ensemble directors, performers, and 
publishers) interested in foreign copyrighted material was usually the acquisition of the full 
score. While reduced scores could be used for study purposes (or the performance of a piece 
using reduced forces such as in a piano or vocal score), holding the full score would have 
allowed the Soviet recipients to copy out any required performance parts by hand.19 Also, it 
 
18 A similar situation regarding the unauthorized use of foreign intellectual property existed in the People’s 
Republic of China. After the communist takeover in 1949, the new government ceased acknowledging foreign 
copyright protection. Natasha Roit, “Soviet and Chinese Copyright: Ideology Gives Way to Economic Necessity,” 
Loyola Entertainment Law Journal 6 (1986): 63-69. The illicit Chinese use of foreign intellectual property 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s led to the US using its considerable influence (particularly in the fields of trade and 
technology) to pressure China to comply with international standards and accede to the Berne Convention and the 
UCC in 1992. Stephanie L. Sgambati, “China’s Accession to the Berne Convention: Bandaging the Wounds of 
Intellectual Property Piracy in China,” Ford Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum 3, no. 1 
(Autumn 1992): 149-65. 
19 During my research, I only had access to Russian state archives and not to the institutional libraries of the 
ensembles and theaters (which are closed to the public). The former held primarily the paper records that ensembles 
and theaters sent to the archives, while the latter still holds many of the scores and parts used by major Soviet 
ensembles. I was therefore unable to confirm if the performance parts for foreign copyrighted pieces were copied 
out by hand or printed. 
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would have been far simpler to transport the score without its parts, or to transmit it by creating a 
version on microfilm. As a result, the acquisition of full scores were of primary concern to Soviet 
citizens, and so they did not normally request to rent performance parts or discuss the question of 
performance rights.  
Even though it could be a source of irritation, the unauthorized use of British musical 
intellectual property in the USSR did not usually have a direct financial impact on British 
publishers. As a result of the impasse in British and Soviet copyright law, British publishers 
could neither control the Soviet performance of their protected works nor request fees for their 
illicit use. When Soviet musicians performed British copyrighted works in the USSR, they did 
not acknowledge the copyright, mechanical, and performance rights of those works. It appears 
that British publishers were aware of the futility of convincing the USSR to recognize their 
intellectual property rights, and, as a result, they did not encourage the Soviet performance of 
their protected works. It was only when Soviet musicians performed or sent recordings of British 
music abroad that they started to impact the revenue stream of British publishers and record 
companies. Because at this point, the illicit Soviet performances and recordings entered into 
open competition with the publishers’ licit ones, and drew audiences and consumers away from 
the latter. The entry of illicit competition reduced licit ticket and recording sales, and, as a result, 
affected the mechanical and performance fees paid to the publisher. As mentioned above, the 
Soviet mechanism for observing mechanical and performance rights was designed to only 
provide renumeration to Soviet composers for the performance and recording of their works in 
the USSR.20 Nonetheless, considering that they never received such fees, it made no difference 
to British revenue streams, unless Soviet productions entered the international market. 
 
20 After the Soviet entry into the UCC, the country was required to observe the copyright, mechanical 
rights, and performance rights of all other UCC members in the national currency of those members. The use of 
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Attempts to Convince the Soviet Union to Acknowledge International Copyright 
British publishers, musicians, and diplomats unhappy with the status quo sought to 
convince the USSR either to change its policies regarding international intellectual property, or 
to find a loophole that would satisfy all of the concerned parties in the short term. Regarding the 
former option, the efforts of British diplomats to persuade the USSR to accede to the Berne 
Convention all ended in failure.21 Starting in 1946, the British government sent several requests 
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to convince the Soviet government to 
reconsider its position on international copyright. These attempts were not successful, and the 
British government discontinued these efforts in 1949.22  
The greatest change that the USSR would have to make in order to comply with 
international copyright norms was to eliminate the practice of translating foreign works without 
consent. In Soviet legal discourse, this practice was referred to as the freedom of translation. It 
stipulated that language should not be a barrier in the free dissemination of knowledge around 
the world, and that requiring the original author’s consent and remuneration would make such 
efforts economically unfeasible. The Soviet argument also involved the increased importance of 
free translation in a multinational, multilingual state such as the USSR. Boguslavsky argued that 
before it joined the UCC, the Soviets had needed the freedom of translation to provide low cost 
 
foreign protected intellectual property was then placed under the purview of the newly-created non-governmental 
Vsesoiuz Agentsvo po Avtorskim Pravam [All-Union Agency of Authors’ Rights] (VAAP), which replaced entities 
such as the VUOAP and became the sole Soviet institution that handled all domestic and international Soviet 
intellectual property matters (including the remuneration of Soviet and foreign composers and publishers for the use 
of their intellectual property). Boguslavsky, 142-44. 
21 Regarding whether international copyright should be discussed during an upcoming trade delegation to 
the USSR, William Wallace of the Board of Trade stated that: “It is true that the subject has been taken up in the 
past without success, and I doubt the likelihood of any significant change in the Russian attitude. But that need not 
stop us trying.” Wallace, 6 March 1959, BT 209/1161 Foreign Office: Suggestion that the Soviet Government May 
Seek to Adhere to the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions (hereafter cited as BT 209/1161), National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter cited as GB-Lna). 
22 British Council, Brief for Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva, October 1955: Copyright and 
Royalties in the Soviet Union and the United States of America, BW 2/573 Soviet Relations Committee (hereafter 
cited as BW 2/573), GB-Lna. 
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translations of the world’s intellectual property for their less culturally and technologically 
developed ethnic groups and member states. In other words, this policy was in place in order to 
promote the public good. This line of reasoning maintained that it was only after these groups 
increased their cultural and technological literacy that the Soviet government felt comfortable 
discarding the freedom of translation.23 This policy can be seen as the argument of a cultural 
importer: a state that is dependent on foreign intellectual property and is thus unable, reluctant, 
or unwilling to acknowledge international copyright protection to avoid the financial burden of a 
significant trade deficit. 
Throughout the history of international copyright law, various nations have considered 
themselves at various times to be either cultural importers or exporters. The former is faced with 
higher domestic demand for foreign intellectual property than foreign demand for their own 
property. The latter, meanwhile, enjoy a high foreign demand for their own intellectual property, 
and thus profit from its export. Over time, a state can transition from an importer to an exporter if 
the foreign demand for their own intellectual property becomes stronger than its domestic 
demand for foreign property. Generally, cultural exporters support the international adherence to 
copyright protection, because it will ensure that foreign publishers provide remuneration for the 
use of their material. Meanwhile, cultural importers often avoid such measures because they 
would expose their dependence on foreign intellectual property. Usually, a state in transition 
from cultural importer to exporter increases its participation in international copyright protection 
in order to reap the foreign profits of its intellectual property, and to protect its property from 
unauthorized use abroad. 
 
23 Boguslavsky, 146-48. 
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One discussion that was very representative of British diplomats’ attempts to sway the 
Soviet stance on international copyright occurred in 1959 during the intergovernmental 
negotiations for the first Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange Agreement. Ralph Murray of the 
Foreign Office argued to Georgy Zhukov, head of the Soviet delegation and chairman of VOKS, 
that the Soviet position obstructed the free flow of information between the UK and the USSR 
and had a negative effect on Anglo-Soviet relations in general.24 The exchange was reported as 
follows: 
Mr. Zhukov, the leader of the Russian Delegation, stated that it was their “position on 
principle not to join the Copyright Conventions.” They did not feel that books were “a 
commodity subject to the normal principles of commercial life” and saw no objection to 
publishers being able to publish freely, without the consent of the authors, translations of 
any works they wished. Mr. Zhukov gave a list of UK publishers who had published 
translations of Russian works without consent—including, he mentioned somewhat 
plaintively, Not by Bread Alone.25 He said, however, that generally they had no objection 
to UK publishers acting in this way, but at the same time they considered that Soviet 
publishers should also have every right to translate whatever they wished.26 
 
Zhukov’s immediate dismissal of Murray’s ideas indicates the Soviet lack of interest in such a 
policy change, especially one initiated by a representative of another country. This event also 
touches on incompatible interpretations of the freedom of information: Murray’s conception of 
the free flow of information was that it required international copyright protection, while 
Zhukov’s position, which was conceptually based in the freedom of translation, was in 
opposition to the perceived restrictiveness resulting from the observance of international 
copyright. 
 
24 B.J.D. Styles of the Board of Trade witnessed and reported on the exchange between Murray and Zhukov 
at the negotiations. Styles, 26 November 1959, BT 209/1161, GB-Lna 
25 Soviet author Vladimir Dudintsev’s novel Not by Bread Alone, which was published by the journal Novyi 
Mir in 1956, was an attack on corrupt and parasitic state bureaucrats. While it was a work of fiction, the historian 
Denis Kozlov argues that it was ultimately a critique of real administrative and economic problems in the USSR and 
a symbol of the post-Stalinist thaw. See Denis Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the 
Stalinist Past (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 88-89. 
26 Styles, 26 November 1959, BT 209/1161, GB-Lna. 
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Natasha Roit notes that the Soviets were aware that abandoning the freedom of 
translation and acceding to a multilateral copyright convention would inevitably result in a costly 
imbalance in the trade of intellectual property between the USSR and the countries of Western 
Europe and the US. While cultural importers on the verge of becoming exporters usually 
increased their involvement in international copyright to protect their exports, Roit argues that 
the USSR never achieved this status. Nonetheless, it would eventually join the UCC in 1973 
under these unfavorable circumstances. She also explains that the Soviets pragmatically acceded 
as part of an exchange quid pro quo in order to obtain American tax concessions to encourage 
the export of Soviet patents and to gain the respectability required to access American trade 
secrets in technology and industry. Therefore, the USSR complied with international copyright 
under unfavorable terms in the field of the arts in order to benefit from better trade in the fields 
of commerce and technology.27 
The failure of governmental entities to find a workable solution to the international 
copyright and currency issues before 1973 resulted in a difficult situation for those interested in 
the transfer of intellectual property from the UK to the USSR. Moreover, the incapacity of Soviet 
publishers and cultural institutions to engage in international trade or to export British currency 
to the UK without permission from the Soviet government rendered the sale of intellectual 
property to Soviet entities a difficult, if not impossible, prospect. Thus, British musicians and 
publishers were forced to find other avenues to transfer British intellectual property to the USSR 
that did not result in the Soviet entities acquiring it for nothing in return. 
Due to the difficulties inherent in the difference between British and Soviet copyright 
policies, much of Britten’s music could simply not be made available in the USSR via legal 
 
27 Roit, 57-59. 
269 
 
means. British publishers were resistant to transferring their intellectual property to a nation that 
did not compensate them for that property or offer copyright protection for those works. Without 
a viable procedure to purchase or rent British intellectual property, some Soviet citizens 
interested in British intellectual property could not acquire this property for their own personal or 
professional use.  
 
Circumventing the International Copyright Impasse 
  Efforts to account for the differences in British and Soviet copyright law manifested in 
four major categories: loan agreements, Soviet republication of British music, non-currency-
based compensation, and reciprocal exchanges. In the following sections, the transfer of British 
intellectual property to the USSR and the Soviet use of this property will be discussed in relation 
to these categories. It should be noted that several of these transfers involved an overlap of two 
or more of the categories, and were often the results of the initiatives of music professionals. 
Since 1960, Britten had sought to facilitate access to his music for Soviet performers, students, 
and, possibly, publishers. Soviet performers and scholars such as conductor of the Kirov Theater 
Djemal Dalgat and Soviet Lithuanian musicologist Adeodatas Tauragis sought to gain access to 
this music for performance and study, respectively. Soviet publishers such as Muzyka (the state 
music publisher) and Sovetskii kompozitor (the publishing office of the Soviet Composers’ 
Union) were interested in republishing Britten’s music for dissemination in the USSR, while 
Britten’s own publishers—particularly Ernst Roth of Boosey & Hawkes—sought to establish a 
financially based system of exchange with Soviet performers. Moreover, alternative forms of 
compensation and non-legally binding agreements were devised by both British and Soviet 
parties in order to carry out some of the intellectual property transfers by circumventing the 
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issues regarding compensation in non-Soviet currency and the Soviet refusal to adhere to 
international copyright conventions. Importantly, every one of these transfers of intellectual 
property to the USSR lay outside of the scope of the cultural exchange agreements devised 
between the British and Soviet governments; they were instead derived from the individual 
interests of composers, musicologists, performers, and publishers. 
 
Loan Agreement: Adeodatas Tauragis 
 A loan agreement came into force when a Soviet individual or institution contacted a 
British publisher and requested a selection of copyrighted music to be sent to the USSR for a 
limited time for individual study or performance at a Soviet venue. These agreements usually 
included only the full score, and, in cases of projected performances, performance parts were 
copied out from the score after it arrived in the USSR by the receiving party. Loan agreements 
always stipulated that the Soviet recipients were discouraged from republishing these 
compositions or performing them outside of the USSR. These actions violated British copyright, 
but (as we have seen) British copyright law was not observed in the USSR due to territoriality. 
As a result, these agreements were legally non-binding, were expected to be carried out on good 
faith, and were not subject to litigation if the agreements’ terms were violated.  
Adeodatas Tauragis (f.k.a. Peželis) was a Soviet Lithuanian musicologist who was among 
the first Soviet researchers of Britten’s music.28 From 1959 to 1962, Tauragis was a doctoral 
student at the Moscow Conservatory, where he completed his dissertation on Britten’s music. He 
later produced the first Soviet monograph on the British composer in 1964 and produced several 
 
28 He changed his last name from Peželis to Tauragis in 1964. The latter name will be used in this 
dissertation to refer to the musicologist before and after his name change, except in citations that reference his 
correspondence before 1964. 
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articles on Britten’s compositions throughout his career. Lithuanian musicologists Edvardas 
Šumila and Rūta Stanevičiūtė posit that the correspondence between Britten and Tauragis can be 
divided into two periods: firstly, the period between 1960 and 1962, when Tauragis was 
communicating with Britten and John Andrewes of Boosey & Hawkes to gather Britten’s full 
published scores for his dissertation research; and secondly, the period from 1964 to 1972, 
during which time Britten visited the USSR and Tauragis carried out his book research on the 
composer.29 While he considered Britten to be a very talented and interesting composer, Tauragis 
confessed to a friend in a 1962 letter that Britten was not a musical innovator on the same level 
as the other “letter B” composers: Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms. Tauragis also felt that while 
the influence of Mahler, Puccini, Prokofiev, and Stravinsky was evident in his music, Britten still 
possessed an easily recognizable individual style.30  
In 1959, Tauragis graduated from the Vilnius State Conservatory and began his doctoral 
studies in Moscow. That year, the Komische Oper [Comic Opera] of Berlin performed Britten’s 
opera Albert Herring in Moscow. Tauragis attended and wrote a review of the concert for the 
Lithuanian journal Literatūra ir menas [Literature and Art], for which he served as a critic and 
editor. It is very possible that this performance catalyzed Tauragis’s interest in, and led him to 
base his doctoral research on, Britten’s music. On May 9, 1960, Tauragis sent a letter of 
introduction to Britten in order to inform the composer that he was researching his music. He 
explained that the Moscow Conservatory’s library had been able to obtain some recent books and 
articles on the composer, as well as the British editions of some of his compositions; these pieces 
 
29 Edvardas Šumila and Rūta Stanevičiūtė, “Adeodatas Tauragis—Benjaminas Brittenas: laiškai ir 
turinėjimai” [“Adeodatas Tauragis and Benjamin Britten: Letters and Exploration”], Ars et Praxis [Art and Practice] 
11 (2014): 197-200. 
30 The letter is addressed to Janice, but there is no more information in Tauragis’s personal archives on 
Janice’s full name or anything about her, other than that she was a student of the violin. Peželis to Janice, 28 August 
1962, in ibid., 210.  
272 
 
included the Simple Symphony, the Seven Sonnets of Michelangelo, Op. 22 (1940), and the 
Diversions for Piano Left Hand and Orchestra, Op. 21 (1940, revised 1954). Tauragis also had 
access to the operas Peter Grimes and The Turn of the Screw, but he would have only seen the 
vocal scores of these pieces.31 Nonetheless, Tauragis lacked the means and connections to travel 
to the West and, thus, could not access or purchase the composer’s other scores. In a gesture that 
will be discussed in one of the later sections of this chapter, Tauragis offered an exchange quid 
pro quo: he would send copies of Prokofiev’s and Shostakovich’s compositions in exchange for 
Britten’s scores.32  
It appears that Tauragis’s request was sent first to Boosey & Hawkes, and on May 24, the 
publisher forwarded Tauragis’s request for a “loan of material” to Britten.33 The composer 
informed his publisher on the following day that he was interested in facilitating the loan, since it 
would be a positive gesture before his visit to the USSR in the following year;34 however, he 
would support the transfer only with the approval of his publisher. Here I have quoted Britten’s 
response in full: 
Thank you for forwarding the letter from the Lithuanian student in Moscow. I am 
answering it myself, saying I have passed on the request to Boosey & Hawkes. I enclose 
the list of the works which, he says are unobtainable and unviewable in Russia. Could 
you discuss the whole thing with Dr. Roth? I personally feel that if some way could be 
found of having these works available in the U.S.S.R., in spite of the difficulties which I 
know exist there, it would be a very good thing, especially as Peter [Pears] and I plan to 
go there next year. Could not some compromise in the copyright difficulties be found, for 
instance by having the scores at the British Embassy or the British Council? Anyhow, I 
pass the matter over to you to do what you can about it.35 
 
31 Considering that both the Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters sent a request for the full score of Peter Grimes a 
few years later (which will be discussed later in this chapter), it can be argued that the full score was unavailable in 
the USSR. It is very likely that the full score of The Turn of the Screw was also unavailable. 
32 Peželis to Britten, 9 May 1960, in ibid., 201-02. 
33 John Andrewes to Britten, 24 May 1960, Boosey & Hawkes to Benjamin Britten 1960 (hereafter cited as 
B&H to BB, followed by the year), Britten-Pears Foundation Archives (hereafter cited as GB-ALb). 
34 It appears that this visit did not materialize. Britten’s first visit to the USSR was in 1963 to participate in 
the Days of British Music Festival in Leningrad and Moscow. 
35 Britten to Andrewes, 25 May 1960, Benjamin Britten to Boosey & Hawkes 1960 (hereafter cited as BB 




John Andrewes of Boosey & Hawkes was receptive to the idea of a loan, on the condition that 
the use of the material was restricted to personal study and not publication, recording, or public 
performance.  
Since Tauragis was using only the scores for analysis, there was no reason to provide 
performance parts or to require him not to move these materials out of the country. However, if 
Tauragis had performed or recorded Britten’s music out of the USSR, then these performances 
and recordings could have entered into direct competition with those Boosey & Hawkes 
authorized. As a result of such unauthorized competition, the publisher would have lost revenue 
in performance and mechanical fees. Meanwhile, in Britten’s response to Tauragis, he expressed 
his support for the student’s research, informed him that Boosey & Hawkes would make the 
necessary arrangements, and assured him that his publisher would do anything needed to 
facilitate the transmission of copyrighted material from the UK to the USSR: 
I was most interested and grateful for your charming letter. It was, of course, very 
moving for me that you are taking so much trouble over my works, and you can be sure 
that [my publishers and I] will do everything we can to help you in your research. I have 
communicated with Boosey & Hawkes on your behalf, and although there are great 
difficulties I realize, I am sure they will do everything they can to let you see what scores 
of mine you wish to see.36 
 
It should be noted that in his correspondence with either Tauragis or Boosey & Hawkes, Britten 
seems to have been primarily concerned with facilitating Soviet access to his music and does not 
seem to have been very concerned with the unauthorized use of his works in the USSR. He did 
not seem to be worried that Tauragis could theoretically have violated his copyright by 
performing or recording his works. It is possible that Britten was aware that even if his works 
were pirated in the USSR, it would have little effect on his own livelihood, if such illicit 
 
36 Britten to Peželis, 25 May 1960, in Šumila and Stanevičiūtė, 202-03. 
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performances, copies, and recordings remained within the USSR and did not compete with his 
own licit productions and recordings on the international market. 
The position of Boosey & Hawkes, however, was focused on preventing any 
unauthorized use of its intellectual property. Andrewes was fully aware that such use would be 
illegal under British, but not Soviet, law. As a result, if Tauragis published the loaned materials 
with a Soviet publisher, Boosey & Hawkes could not hold him legally accountable for copyright 
infringement. Andrewes wrote:  
You may perhaps not be aware that the USSR does not respect the copyright laws of this 
country, which are designed for the protection of composers’ interests, and to save their 
works from exploitation by unauthorized persons. In particular, certain works of Mr. 
Britten have been published and performed in your country without the composer 
receiving any remuneration in the way of royalties or performing fees, which is the 
means by which composers earn their living in Western countries as much as in the 
USSR. 
 
We trust that you will take care not to let this happen to any of these works which we are 
lending to you for your personal use, and which we ask you to return to us in a few 
[months’] time when you have completed your study.37 
 
In order to compensate for the firm’s legal vulnerability in loaning intellectual property to a 
Soviet citizen, which undermined the material’s legal protections, Andrewes placed a moral 
obligation on Tauragis, and evoked the intent of British copyright to protect the livelihoods of 
composers.  
 Tauragis informed Andrewes that while some of Britten’s works had been performed in 
the USSR—namely, The Four Sea Interludes from “Peter Grimes,” the Simple Symphony, and 
A Young Person’s Guide to the Orchestra, Op. 34 (1946)—none of these works had been 
published there.38 The official Soviet publication records corroborates this statement: as of 1960, 
 
37 Andrewes to Peželis, 3 June 1960, B&H to BB 1960, GB-ALb. 
38 Peželis to Andrewes, 29 June 1960, in Šumila and Stanevičiūtė, 205.  
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none of Britten’s compositions had been published in the USSR.39 Nonetheless, foreign 
copyrighted music could still circulate within the country, and Soviet performers and ensembles 
could perform, possess, copy, make parts from, and disseminate these scores in an unofficial 
capacity. Unlike officially published scores, however, such illicit scores were not readily 
available to the Soviet populace.  
It is possible that Boosey & Hawkes had concerns about the potential losses in revenue 
accrued from the loaning of its intellectual property to a Soviet student, and placed limits on the 
number of opera scores that it sent to Tauragis. On June 30, Tauragis reported to Britten that 
Boosey & Hawkes refused to send the operas The Rape of Lucretia and Billy Budd.40 A possible 
reason for this refusal was that the publisher would stand to lose significantly more from the 
illicit performance and recording of major stage works than those of other musical genres. 
Nonetheless, the publisher demonstrated interest in Tauragis’s proposal that the Soviet state 
institution Mezhknig, which carried out the international trade of intellectual property, could 
purchase scores for the Moscow Conservatory’s library in British currency. Tauragis also sent a 
new list of pieces, which included the two previously requested operas.41 Andrewes was 
receptive to this new request, informed Tauragis which pieces were available, and provided him 
 
39 Organ gosudarstvennoi bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the USSR], Letopis’ muzykal’noi 
literatury [Catalog of Musical Literature] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vsesoiuznoi knizhnoi palaty [All-Union Book 
Chamber Publishing], 1953-66); and Organ gosudarstvennoi bibliografii SSSR [State Bibliographic Body of the 
USSR], Notnaia letopis’ [Musical Catalog] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Kniga [Book Publishing], 1967-79). Official 
Soviet publication records are chronicled in these printed annual catalogues, which are divided into roughly four to 
twelve volumes per year. Specific citations are given henceforth as Letopis’, volume number, year, and page 
number. It should be noted that the catalog’s publication year does not always match the publication year of the 
music in question, because the catalog was a retroactive record of the Soviet publications released several months 
before. The Four Sea Interludes from Peter Grimes, Simple Symphony, and A Young Person’s Guide to the 
Orchestra were eventually published in the USSR a few years later in 1966, 1966, and 1967, respectively. See 
Letopis’, vol. 2 (1966), 59; Letopis’, vol. 4 (1966), 40; and Letopis’, vol. 1 (1968), 48; respectively. 
40 Peželis to Britten, 30 June 1960, in Šumila and Stanevičiūtė, 206. 
41 Peželis to Andrewes, 29 October 1960, in ibid., 207. 
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with a list of prices.42 It appears that Tauragis was successful in his efforts to gain access to 
Britten’s published opera scores. 
 
Loan Agreement: Peter Grimes and the Bolshoi Theater 
The transfer of the Peter Grimes score was introduced in the previous chapter to illustrate 
Dalgat’s professional agency in facilitating the inclusion of this piece in the Kirov Theater’s 
repertory. We will now revisit this transfer from the perspective of Britten and his publishers 
Boosey & Hawkes, particularly that of the managing director of the firm Ernst Roth, in order to 
discuss the circumvention of the copyright impasse between the UK and the USSR. In 1960, 
Britten attempted to encourage change in the Soviet position on international copyright. Instead 
of trying to directly persuade Soviet bureaucrats that they should strive for such changes in 
policy, Britten lobbied his own government to bring the matter of Soviet non-compliance to the 
British government’s attention and to increase their efforts in pressing the USSR to change its 
position. He became interested in Soviet copyright policy after Tauragis’s aforementioned 
request and Rostropovich’s invitation for Britten to conduct Peter Grimes at the Bolshoi Theater. 
From his experience with the loan agreement with Tauragis, Britten understood that the current 
differences in British and Soviet copyright policies did not bode well for the regular transfer of 
British intellectual property. In March 1961, Britten drafted a letter to Hamilton Kerr of the 
Board of Trade to persuade the British government to intensify its efforts to convince the Soviets 
to change its stance toward international copyright.43  
 
42 Andrewes to Peželis, 8 November 1960, in ibid., 208. 
43 Thornton Miller, “Striking a Compromise: Britten, British Publishers, Soviet Theaters, and the Premieres 
of Peter Grimes and The Prince of the Pagodas,” in Benjamin Britten Studies: Essays on An Inexplicit Art, eds. 
Justin Vickers and Vicki Pierce Stroeher (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2017), 377-401. 
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In this letter, Britten argued that recent efforts to press for cooperation in the Soviet 
dissemination of British music would not have any lasting effect if Soviet artists did not 
regularly perform British music in the USSR. Britten suggested that the Soviets could be 
convinced to join a bilateral copyright agreement with the UK, as opposed to joining a 
multilateral convention such as the Berne Convention or the UCC, which would necessitate a 
drastic and unlikely change in Soviet policy. Britten also voiced Andrewes’s earlier concerns 
regarding the threat of Soviet piracy of British music—including competition between 
composers’ own licit and Soviet illicit recordings distributed abroad—to the livelihoods of 
British composers, in order to spur Kerr to action.44 Interestingly, this argument parallels that of 
the proponents of the British Music Copyright Act of 1906, who had argued for the 
criminalization of music piracy in order to protect the financial wellbeing of composers, 
publishers, and vendors.45  
The composer’s argument that the USSR was receptive to change was supported by the 
belief that the current Soviet policy was a holdover from Tsarist isolationism. Also, Britten noted 
that Russia had participated in bilateral agreements before, and raised the question: Why should 
the USSR abstain from such agreements in the present?46 Britten argued that: 
As you know, the greatest obstacle to the sending of music for sale or hire to the USSR 
has always been the disinclination of that government to accord copyright protection to 
any other than their own composers. This is not a political matter, but stems from the last 
century. This fact might even be used to suggest that they now reverse a situation that 
could be described as an example of old Tsarist isolationism!47 
 
 
44 Britten to Hamilton Kerr, 7 March 1961, in BT 209/1215 Board of Trade File, Letter about Difficulties in 
Sending Music for Sale or Hire to the Soviet Union (Disinclination of the Soviet Government to Accord Copyright 
Protection to Foreign Composers) (hereafter cited as BT 209/1215), GB-Lna. The letter is published in full in Miller, 
385-86. 
45 Isabella Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Portland, Oregon: 
Hart, 2010), 260-64. 




Britten’s request was ultimately a failure: most of his arguments had already been posed to 
Soviet diplomats with little to no effect; he was unaware that the current imbalance in the 
demand for intellectual property heavily favored the UK; and he overestimated the potential that 
Russia’s historic engagement in bilateral copyright agreements had to become a precedent for 
future agreements. If anything, the USSR was even more isolationist in the observance of 
international copyright than Tsarist Russia. Noncompliance with international intellectual 
property norms was in the USSR’s best interests at the time. The official response to Britten’s 
request merely articulated that the British government would continue its efforts to convince the 
Soviets to change its policy.48 Britten’s letter was intended to be a call to action, but it appeared 
over a decade after the British government had already abandoned its ill-fated attempts to 
persuade the USSR. While it demonstrates Britten’s position on Soviet copyright and the Soviet 
dissemination of British music, it did not have any noticeable effect on British or Soviet policy. 
 Later, after Britten’s unsuccessful March 1961 attempt to lobby Kerr for the 
normalization of Anglo-Soviet copyright relations in order to permit the transfer of the full score 
of Peter Grimes to the Bolshoi Theater for performance, Roth sought to negotiate the transfer of 
the opera in exchange for payment in pounds. Roth also insisted that the Bolshoi Theater respect 
British performance rights by requiring it to pay Boosey & Hawkes one hundred pounds per 
performance plus ten percent of the ticket sales.49 Instead of providing payment, Vasily 
Pakhomov, the director of the Bolshoi Theater from 1961 to 1963, suggested barter as an 
 
48 Reginald Maulding to Kerr, 16 March 1961, BT 209/1215, GB-Lna; and Maulding to Kerr, 16 March 
1961, B&H to BB 1961, GB-ALb. 
49 D.C. Thomas, Mr. Victor Hochhauser, 29 August 1961, CR 13820/77 Minutes Giving an Account of 
Exchanges negotiated by Mr. Victor Hochhauser while in Moscow (hereafter cited as CR 13820/77), in FO 
924/1397 Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement and other exchanges, 1961 (hereafter cited as FO 924/1397), GB-Lna. 
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alternative: to send Boosey & Hawkes the full score for any Russian or Soviet opera in exchange 
for Peter Grimes.50  
The concert agent Victor Hochhauser also involved himself by participating in parallel 
negotiations regarding Peter Grimes with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, and learned of this 
proposition during his own deliberations regarding future cultural exchanges in Moscow that 
summer. Hochhauser, who had significant experience in negotiating with the USSR, realized that 
Roth’s demands were impossible for the Bolshoi Theater because they were based on payment in 
foreign currency for the score and the additional forfeiture of foreign currency derived from the 
conversion of Soviet ticket sales. The observance of foreign performance rights was already 
outside of Soviet practice, and the payment of these fees in valuable foreign currency would have 
been doubly unacceptable for the theater. Hochhauser, however, approved of Pakhomov’s plan 
and considered it to be a viable compromise for the following reasons: it was based on the 
practice of reciprocity (one opera in exchange for another), it did not involve the payment of 
currency, and it did not involve the observance of foreign mechanical or performance rights. 
Boosey & Hawkes would gain a Soviet opera, which they could produce in the UK, without 
compensating Mezhknig through the Anglo-Soviet Music Press.51 Roth, however, saw 
Hochhauser as meddlesome, prevented the concert agent from negotiating for a Soviet 
performance of the opera, and continued his attempts to arrange for a currency-based exchange 
with the Bolshoi.52  
 
50 Pakhomov to S.K. Romanovskii, 17 April 1961, f. 648, op. 8, d. 93 Perepiska s Gosudarstvennym 
komitetom Soveta Ministrov SSSR po kul’turnym sviaziam s zarubezhnymi stranami o postanovke opery B. 
Brittena “Piter Graims” [Correspondence with the USSR State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries Regarding the Production of B. Britten’s Opera Peter Grimes] (hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 8, d. 93), 
Russian State Archives of Literature and Art (hereafter cited as RGALI). 
51 Thomas, Mr. Victor Hochhauser, 29 August 1961, CR 13820/77, in FO 924/1397, GB-Lna. 
52 Rufina Ampenoff to Britten, 17 August 1961, B&H to BB 1961, GB-ALb. 
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Predictably, the Soviet theater declined to purchase or rent the score, and Roth proposed a 
temporary loan in October under the following conditions: the opera could only be performed by 
the Bolshoi Theater, the full score would be returned in good condition in six months, the opera 
would not be recorded for the purposes of sale, the score itself would not be copied or 
reproduced, and performances could only be broadcast in the USSR.53 These conditions outlined 
the publishing firm’s major concerns regarding the dissemination of a piece of its intellectual 
property that was being supplied to a theater that was not legally obligated to respect its 
copyright, and the time limit of the agreement emphasized the temporariness of the arrangement. 
Pakhomov considered these terms, particularly the six-month time frame, to be impossibly 
strict,54 and Roth adjusted his conditions to the following: the opera could still be performed and 
broadcast only in the USSR; the opera could be recorded, but the recordings could not be 
exported; the opera score and any copied-out parts could be duplicated, but not sold or given to 
the public outside of the USSR; and the original opera materials would be returned to Boosey & 
Hawkes in two years instead of six months.55 Pakhomov agreed with all of these conditions in an 
October 11 letter to Roth.56 The condition that only the full score (excluding the performance 
parts) be sent was present in both of Roth’s offers to the Bolshoi. This stipulation was acceptable 
to the Soviet theater because it was the minimum required to perform the work and it was 
 
53 V. Kochemasov to Pakhomov, 15 October 1961, f. 648, op. 8, d. 93, RGALI. Roth’s original 1961 terms 
were not found in Bolshoi Theater’s records held at RGALI, but they are referenced in this letter sent from the State 
Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries to Pakhomov of the Bolshoi Theater. 
54 Pakhomov to Kochemasov, November 1961, f. 648, op. 8, d. 93, RGALI. 
55 Rot [sic] to Pakhomov, 21 June 1962, f. 648, op. 11, d. 13 Perepiska s Soiuzom sovetskikh obshchestv 
druzhby i kul’turnoi sviazi s zarubezhnymi stranami, inostrannymi organizatsiiami i otdel’nymi grazhdanami o 
gastroliakh artistov teatra v Kanade, Rumynii, Iaponii, uchastii v konkurse artistov baleta v Rio de Zhaneiro, 
postanovke opery B. Brittena “Piter Graims” i dr. [Correspondence with the Council of Soviet Friendship Societies 
and Societies for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Foreign Organizations, and Civil Departments 
Regarding Artists’ Tours in Canada, Romania, and Japan; Participation in the Ballet Competition in Rio de Janeiro, 
the Production of B. Britten’s Opera Peter Grimes, and Others] (hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 11, d. 13), RGALI. 
56 Pakhomov to Rotf [sic], 11 October 1962, f. 648, op. 11, d. 13, RGALI. 
281 
 
consistent with Mezhknig’s practice of selling Soviet scores to Western publishers. The British 
publishers found the lending of only the score acceptable because it limited financial risk: should 
the Bolshoi Theater fail to return the opera, the publisher would lose only the score, and not the 
score in addition to the parts. This second set of conditions did not explicitly state that the 
Bolshoi Theater was the one ensemble authorized to perform the work; it stipulated only that the 
opera could be performed solely in the USSR.  
Since Boosey & Hawkes already did not have the legal right nor the physical ability to 
disseminate its copyrighted works in the USSR, the company could not be adversely affected if a 
Soviet theater performed and distributed recordings of the firm’s copyrighted works within the 
USSR. However, this arrangement would negatively affect Boosey & Hawkes if the Bolshoi 
violated its agreement and disseminated Peter Grimes outside of the USSR, because that would 
have placed the Soviet theater in direct competition with productions and recordings that Boosey 
& Hawkes had authorized abroad. Hypothetically, Roth could not place a moral obligation on a 
Soviet institution such as a theater in the same way that Andrewes had appealed to Tauragis. 
Roth may instead have appealed to the Bolshoi Theater’s assumed interest in a transition to a 
more normalized business arrangement that included compensation in usage fees and 
performance royalties in exchange for British intellectual property. In his earlier negotiation with 
the Bolshoi Theater, Roth had rejected the theater’s offer to exchange the score of Peter Grimes 
for that of a contemporary Soviet opera, and his proposed terms had included royalties of one 
hundred pounds sterling plus ten percent of the ticket sales of the Bolshoi production of Britten’s 
opera.57 While Roth’s terms were rejected by the Soviet theater—which necessitated Roth’s 
proposal to change from a rental to a loan agreement—they do demonstrate his ambitions to 
 
57 Thomas, Mr. Victor Hochhauser, 29 August 1961, CR 13820/77, in FO 924/1397, GB-Lna. 
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pursue a more conventional business relationship. According to Roth’s line of reasoning, the 
Soviets’ abidance by such an arrangement would be maintained by their desire for further 
exchanges, and he sought to sway the Soviet theater with economic incentives. The temporary 
character of the loan reinforced the impression that the transfer was not a gift and only a 
transition to a more normal business relationship.  
Even though the score was sent to the Bolshoi Theater, the opera company did not stage 
it and the score was not returned to Boosey & Hawkes. It is possible that the physical score was 
transferred to the Kirov Theater in Leningrad, where the work was performed under the direction 
of Djemal Dalgat in 1964.58 These performances—which were discussed in the previous 
chapter—were very successful, sparked Soviet interest in Britten’s operas, and led to further 
requests for loans for his works.59 Moreover, Britten fully supported the continued practice of 
sending operatic scores in the same manner as Peter Grimes. In an April 1964 letter to Roth, he 
wrote: 
I do not know how much you have heard about my operatic “life” in [the] USSR, but I 
thought, in case, I would warn you that there is considerable competition to perform 
certain operas of mine there, and certain confusion as well! For one reason or another the 
Bolshoi wish to drop Peter Grimes and undertake A Midsummer Night’s Dream instead. 
In light of the success of the concert-version of Peter Grimes recently in Leningrad, I 
gather that there is competition to do this work on the stage between the [Maly] Opera 
(Leningrad), the Kirov Theatre, and the Opera in Riga. The conductor, Dalgat, who did 
Grimes in Leningrad, now, I gather, wishes to do [A Midsummer Night’s Dream] in the 
same way, and is, I hear, already translating it into Russian.60 What are we to do about it? 
There are of course now printed scores of these works around in Russia, and so even if 
we ignore them the performances are likely to take place. So would it not be better to 
regularize them as you so kindly did with Grimes at the Bolshoi? 61 
 
 
 58 To learn more of the Kirov Theater’s preparation and performances of Peter Grimes and of the Soviet 
popular and critical reception of these performances, see Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “’Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov 
Theatre,” trans. Nick Winter, Melos 19/20 (5 August 1997): 64-71. 
59 Miller, 397-98. 
60 It is possible that this translation was used in the Bolshoi Theater production. See Page 212. 
61 Britten to Roth, 10 April 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb.  
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Ostensibly, he considered the Peter Grimes loan to be a success and an important ingredient for 
the Soviet reception of his music, and he wished to encourage further performance of his works 
there. 
However, for Roth, the loan was a complete commercial failure, and the prospect that 
such loans were being proposed as the new standard simply added insult to injury. In his 
response, Roth stated that: 
Russia presents a big problem and it is somewhat strange that much smaller and poorer 
countries such as Yugoslavia and Poland get permission for transfers of foreign currency 
for performances while Russia does not. Peter Grimes was regularized to the extent that 
Mr. Pachomov, director of the Bolshoi Theatre, confirmed that all performances, 
broadcasts or recordings made from the material supplied by us are to be confined 
exclusively to Russia. However, this is an arrangement which we can make in one 
exceptional case and it cannot become a rule that we have to supply expensive materials 
free of charge which will not be returned to us. In other words, the guarantee against 
misuse cannot be the only basis on which things can develop to any large degree.62 
 
After Roth’s original intent for a currency-based exchange disintegrated, he was willing to settle 
for a temporary loan that had the potential to encourage such exchanges in the future. However, 
when it became clear that Soviet theaters planned on obtaining the scores free of charge, he lost 
interest in working with them. Also, the fact that the theater failed to return the score, essentially 
turned the loan into an expensive gift, which then set the precedent for future de facto presents. 
Roth’s plan backfired. He ostensibly had underestimated the Soviet preference for non-currency 
exchange, which was the primary process that had driven the Anglo-Soviet cultural agreements 
up to that point.  
 
 
62 Roth to Britten, 22 April 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. 
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Loan Agreement: The Gift of A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
Sometimes, transfers of British copyrighted musical scores to the USSR were far simpler 
than the Peter Grimes example and did not involve the participation of the publisher. While the 
transfer of A Midsummer Night’s Dream to the USSR was not exactly a loan agreement (which 
would have involved the expectation that the score would be returned to the UK), it was so 
closely connected to the Peter Grimes episode that I believe it warrants discussion here. As noted 
above, Roth saw the Peter Grimes loan to have been a complete failure, while Britten was 
interested in cultivating Soviet demand for his stage works and indicated that the Bolshoi Theater 
had decided to drop Peter Grimes and wanted to produce A Midsummer Night’s Dream instead. 
The composer suggested that they send the score in the same manner as Peter Grimes,63 and 
Roth promptly rejected this prospect.64 
It should be noted that from 1950 to the early 1960s, Britten’s relationship with Boosey 
& Hawkes was becoming increasingly strained. Nicholas Clark explains that the loss of his close 
allies, advisers, and supporters in the firm—Ralph Hawkes died in 1950, Erwin Stein died and 
Anthony Gishford resigned in 1958, and Donald Mitchell was asked to resign in 1963—was a 
major reason why Britten chose not to renew his contract in the final months of 1963. Clark 
argues that the close personal relationships that Britten forged with these individuals was 
essential for creating a supportive environment for composition. Importantly, Britten considered 
Roth to be emotionally distant and especially focused on business matters and practicalities. 
Later, in the spring months of 1964, Britten co-founded the new publishing company Faber 
 
63 Britten to Roth, 10 April 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. 
64 Roth to Britten, 22 April 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. 
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Music with Mitchell.65 In light of the above narrative, it is possible to ascertain how the whole 
Peter Grimes case was a contributing factor to Britten’s dissatisfaction with Roth and his 
eventual departure from Boosey & Hawkes. 
It is also possible that the deterioration and collapse of Britten’s relationship with Boosey 
& Hawkes led him to circumvent his old publishing firm to provide Soviet musicians with access 
to his works. In the exchange between Britten and Roth discussed above, Britten mentioned that 
Soviet theaters were interested in staging A Midsummer Night’s Dream, but Roth forbade the 
prospect that the opera should be simply given away like Peter Grimes. While on tour with the 
EOG, a few months after leaving Boosey & Hawkes and co-founding Faber Music, Britten took 
the complete score of A Midsummer Night’s Dream with him to the USSR. Keith Grant of the 
EOG reported in a 2009 interview with Pyke, that while Britten was in conversation with a few 
Soviet opera directors in Riga, they explained that they wanted to stage the opera; however, they 
did not have access to enough foreign currency to purchase the score. They explained that it 
might take years to gather the funds needed for the transaction. Apparently, Britten simply gave 
the score to the directors without any conditions for its use.66 While Grant did not mention the 
identity of the directors in his interview with Pyke,67 it is possible that this score was sent to the 
Bolshoi Theater for its performances in the following year. Grant also said he did not know what 
Boosey & Hawkes’s position was on the matter, or if they were aware that Britten gave away the 
score.68 It is possible that Britten was exhausted with the long negotiations that were a major part 
 
65 Nicholas Clark, “From Boosey & Hawkes to Faber Music: Britten Seeks a ‘Composer’s Place,’” in 
Benjamin Britten Studies: Essays on An Inexplicit Art, eds. Vicki P. Stroeher and Justin Vickers (Woodbridge, 
Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 407-23. 
66 Appendix 3: Interview with Keith Grant, London, 25 September 2009, in Cameron Pyke, Benjamin 
Britten and Russia (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2016), 290.  
67 Ibid., 290. 
68 Ibid., 290. A Midsummer Night’s Dream was published in 1960 by Boosey & Hawkes. Britten’s transfer 
from Boosey & Hawkes to Faber Music in 1964 meant that only the pieces he composed after the move would be 
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of the Peter Grimes transfer, considered Boosey & Hawkes to be frustratingly obstructive, and 
simply sought a quick solution to the issue. 
 
Loan Agreement: The Prince of the Pagodas and the Kirov Theater 
The transfer of the score for The Prince of the Pagodas in 1970 was relatively simpler 
than the Peter Grimes transaction and was far more beneficial to Boosey & Hawkes than both 
the Peter Grimes and A Midsummer Night’s Dream cases. By the time Dalgat sent Britten a 
request for the score and permission to perform The Prince of the Pagodas at the Kirov Theater, 
Roth had already retired.69 The former managing director was succeeded by David Adams, who 
devised a compromise through which Boosey & Hawkes would receive payment for the ballet 
score, and the Soviet theater would not need to provide payment in hard currency. As discussed 
earlier in this dissertation, Mezhknig had been selling full musical scores to the Anglo-Soviet 
Music Press—a subsidiary of Boosey & Hawkes—for British currency since 1945.70 Instead of 
requiring a Soviet institution to provide payment for The Prince of the Pagodas, Adams avoided 
the issue by deducting the amount from the British currency owed by the Anglo-Soviet Music 
Press to Mezhknig.71 Dalgat became the primary contact for this exchange, and Boosey & 
Hawkes sent the full ballet score and the piano reduction to the Kirov Theater in January 1970.72 
Regarding the issue of performance parts, the Kirov was interested only in the full score and not 
 
under Faber Music’s copyright; this move had no effect on Boosey & Hawkes copyright on works published before 
1964.  
69 Roth retired in 1964. Miller, 398-400. 
70 See Page 261. 
71 Miller, 399. 
72 Adams to Dalgat, Untitled Receipt, 28 January 1970, Djemal Dalgat to Benjamin Britten, GB-ALb. 
Adams’s letter to Dalgat was kept in Dalgat’s apartment, was damaged in the fire that took the conductor’s life in 
1991, and was photocopied and sent to the Britten-Pears Foundation Archives to be stored in the same folder as 
Dalgat’s correspondence to Britten. 
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the parts.73 The result of this transfer was a reduced price in British currency for the score and 
the evasion of the currency conversion issue (the Anglo-Soviet Music Press paying a reduced 
amount to Mezhknig, was much easier for all parties than the Soviet theater paying the British 
publisher in British currency). However, the Soviet theater’s refusal to buy the parts reduced 
Boosey & Hawkes’s profits from the transfer. 
 
The Soviet Republication of Britten’s Musical Scores 
As mentioned earlier, foreign editions of intellectual property such as musical scores 
were often purchased abroad and then brought back to the USSR, where they were used by 
performers, studied by students, and kept by libraries. Several of Britten’s pieces were purchased 
in the West and then used in the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s. The British cellist and 
musicologist Elizabeth Wilson recalled that most Soviet musicians and students had little to no 
access to foreign editions. She loaned out her copies of the Britten cello suites to the other 
conservatory students and gave the Borodin Quartet the sheet music for Frank Bridge’s String 
Quartet No. 3, H. 175 (1926). Rostropovich himself routinely lent out music to his students for 
them to photocopy or copy by hand. In some cases, a score was handed down from performer to 
performer. For example, Yehudi Menuhin gave the score of Edward Elgar’s Violin Concerto No. 
1 in B minor, Op. 61 (1910) to David Oistrakh, who then gave it to the Soviet-Latvian violinist 
Gidon Kremer.74 In several cases in the 1960s, the unofficial dissemination and performance of 
editions of British music in the USSR did not constitute copyright infringement under British 
law. For example, Tauragis’s personal study of the British editions of Britten’s scores for his 
dissertation research was not infringement, and so Boosey & Hawkes was receptive to loaning 
 
73 Britten Hire Book l-r, Boosey & Hawkes Collection, Royal College of Music, Special Collections.  
74 Email correspondence between Elizabeth Wilson and the author, 5 December 2017. 
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and selling their scores to Tauragis. Nonetheless, the recording, broadcasting, and for-profit 
performance of these scores did infringe on their copyright. As discussed earlier, such uses were 
not illegal in the USSR due to territoriality; and, as a result, British publishers were generally 
uninterested in sending their intellectual property to the Soviets. 
The legal impasse between the USSR and the countries involved in the international 
intellectual property conventions was complicated by the Russian republication tradition. As a 
result of the lack of involvement in international copyright law, a practical system of 
republishing foreign literature developed. Importantly, such a practice was often not considered 
to be the theft of an author’s property, but instead the opening of a new readership or audience 
for a piece of work. In the musical field, this practice was not formally carried out by the Soviet 
government, but was driven by musicians and, possibly, critics and musicologists interested in 
foreign culture who had connections with Soviet publishers. While several music publishers 
were able to operate in the USSR under the supervision of the government, the Soviet state 
music publisher, Muzyka,75 was in the strongest position to publish foreign contemporary 
composers, and it specialized in the publication and dissemination of Russian and foreign music 
of the classical and contemporary eras. As the official state music publisher, it had its own 
censors, who were employed by the firm.76 Instead of submitting proposed publications to the 
external censors, Muzyka needed only to pass works by their more amenable in-house censors. 
This slight nuance afforded Muzyka the opportunity to be more flexible in selecting works for 
 
75 The abbreviated name of the Soviet state music publisher changed from Muzgis to Muzyka in 1964. For 
the purposes of this chapter, this publisher will only be referred to as Muzyka. 
76 T.C. Iaskazhuk, “Izdanie i rasprostranenie muzykal’noi literatury v sovetskii period (1960-1980-e godu)” 




publication. As a result, it might have been more able to publish the works of living Western 
composers than other Soviet publishers.77 
Moreover, Soviet republication was sometimes encouraged by the very creators of 
foreign copyrighted compositions, much to the chagrin of the legal holders of that copyright: the 
creators’ publishers. This practice had been common since Arthur Bliss’s 1956 visit to the 
USSR.78 While in Moscow, Bliss had exchanged books, records, and, most importantly, scores 
with Kabalevsky, Khachaturian, David Oistrakh, and Shostakovich as a gesture of international 
friendship and professional respect.79 Russian musicologist Lyudmila Kovnatskaya recalled in an 
interview with the author that Britten habitually brought some of his scores with him to the 
USSR as gifts to the Soviet performers of his compositions and to the Soviet institutions that he 
respected, such as the Leningrad Conservatory.80 These scores were very possibly loaned to 
Muzyka, republished, and disseminated throughout the USSR as purchasable scores. None of 
these gifts, or their subsequent republications, were authorized by Britten’s publishers: Boosey & 
Hawkes and, starting in 1964, Faber Music. For example, Sovetskii kompozitor (the publisher of 
the Soviet Composers’ Union) republished the Cello Sonata in 1962, and Muzyka republished 
the scores of The Young Person’s Guide to the Orchestra and the Four Sea Interludes from Peter 
Grimes in 1966. According to Pyke, each of these works was published without authorization 
from Boosey & Hawkes. Moreover, he noticed that the layout of the Muzyka editions were 
almost identical to the original Boosey & Hawkes editions, which suggested that the Soviet 
publisher copied them.81  
 
77 Conversation between Lyudmila Kovnatskaya and the author, 6 November 2017. 
78 See Page 85. 
79 In his article about the trip, Moore did not mention which pieces were exchanged. Gerald Moore, “We 
Were Proud of Sir Arthur in Russia,” Music and Musicians 4, no. 11 (July 1956): 12. 
80 List of Britten’s Music Sent to Russia, undated, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
81 Pyke, 167-70. 
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The official Soviet publication records chronicle all of the compositions that were 
republished in the USSR after their original publication in the UK. It is possible to measure 
Soviet interest in British composers by investigating the frequency of Soviet republications; see 
Chart 1.  
 
 
At first glance, there is a categorical difference between the quantity of republished works by 
Britten and those by other British contemporary composers whose music was performed in the 
USSR or who visited as cultural diplomats. These composers include Arthur Bliss, Alan Bush, 
William Walton, and Ralph Vaughan Williams. Chart 1 illustrates this difference by showing the 
number of Soviet republications issued each year, with a breakdown by composer, between 1953 
and 1978.82 In other words, this chart illustrates Britten’s domination over other British 
 
82 The years 1953 and 1978 were chosen because the former included the death of Stalin, and the latter was 
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Chart 1: Number of Soviet Editions of British Compositions 
per Annum, 1953-1978
Walton Bliss Williams Bush Britten
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composers in the Soviet republication of his music—which started a few years after he entered 
Soviet musical life through his London meeting with Rostropovich and Shostakovich in 1960—
and indicates the high value that Britten’s musical capital had in the USSR. Despite Tippett’s 
left-leaning political stance, friendship with Alan Bush, and the performances of his Midsummer 
Marriage in Moscow and Leningrad at the Days of British Music Festival in 1963, there is no 
record of Soviet republication of any of his compositions between 1953 and 1978. Vaughan 
Williams is included in the table as a control: he was the most prominent British composer 
before his death in 1958, and serves as the representative of the previous generation of British 
composers for the purposes of comparison with those who were actively involved in cultural 
exchanges with the USSR.83 
 Starting in the mid-1960s, the interest of Soviet publishers in Britten’s music far 
surpassed their demand for works by other British composers in both quantity and consistency. 
The four works of Vaughan Williams that were republished in the USSR were some of 
composer’s folksong arrangements that were included in large collections of English folk songs 
and pedagogical pieces.84 The publishers Muzyka and Sovetskii kompozitor published Bliss’s 
Two Interludes for Piano, F. 151 (1925)85 and his Sonata for Viola and Piano, F. 91 (1933), as 
well as Walton’s Viola Concerto (1929). In addition, the solo parts of Bliss’s Sonata and 
Walton’s Concerto were edited for publication in 1974 by the Soviet soloists Igor Boguslavsky 
and Yevgeny Strakhov, respectively.86 It is very possible that the republication of these works 
fell in the aforementioned tradition of composers gifting the scores to the performers who gave 
the Soviet premieres of those pieces and then got them published in the USSR. Bush appears to 
 
83 See Letopis’, all volumes from 1959 to 1979. 
84 Letopis’, vol. 4 (1959), 23; Letopis’, vol. 1 (1960), 21-22; and Letopis’, vol. 2 (1961), 22. 
85 Letopis’, vol. 1 (1974), 125. 
86 Letopis’, vol. 3 (1975), 81; and Letopis’, vol. 3 (1974), 99; respectively. 
292 
 
have been the only British composer to have composed a piece to be published exclusively in the 
USSR. This was an ideological pro-Soviet piece in honor of the cosmonauts: “For the First Time 
in Millions of Years…,” which was published by Sovetskii kompozitor in 1961.87 It was 
republished by Muzyka in 1963 in the collection Kosmos, which included contributions from 
other foreign composers.88 “For the First Time in Millions of Years” does not appear to have 
been published in the UK. 
Muzyka and Sovetskii kompozitor republished a wide range of Britten’s pieces. Some of 
these compositions were drawn from the same genres as the aforementioned British composers: 
songs, pedagogical pieces, folksong arrangements, and solo pieces. One of the solo compositions 
was Soviet violinist Mark Lubotsky’s 1973 performance edition of the Violin Concerto, Op. 15 
(1940).89 The majority of Britten’s solo pieces that were republished, however, were written 
specifically for one Soviet performer—Rostropovich—who also served as the editor for both the 
British and Soviet editions. These compositions included Britten’s Cello Sonata, his cadenzas for 
Haydn’s First Cello Concerto, and his First Cello Suite.90 Unlike the Soviet republications of 
works by other British composers, those of Britten’s compositions included large orchestral 
pieces such as the Simple Symphony, The Young Person’s Guide to the Orchestra, and the War 
Requiem.91 It is possible that the republication of Britten’s larger works meant that there was 
enough demand among Soviet scholars to study this music or enough ensembles in the USSR 
interested in performing the pieces.92 Also, the fact that the Soviet republication of Britten’s 
 
87 Letopis’, vol. 1 (1962), 17. 
88 Letopis’, vol. 4 (1963), 25. 
89 Letopis’, vol. 2 (1974), 116. 
90 Letopis’, vol. 1 (1963), 81; Letopis’, vol. 3 (1967), 73; Letopis’, vol. 4 (1970), 74; respectively. 
91 Letopis’, vol. 1 (1968), 48; Letopis’, vol. 4 (1966), 40; Letopis’, vol. 3 (1968), 76; and Letopis’, vol. 1 
(1972), 136; respectively (the final two entries of this list cite two different Soviet editions of Britten’s War 
Requiem). 
92 The music catalogs do not specify whether the full or reduced scores were published in Soviet editions.  
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music continued to dominate those of other British composers after his last appearance during 
the second Days of British Music Festival (1971), the emigration of his closest Soviet friends 
Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya (1974), and his death (1976) suggests that the Soviet musical 
establishment still considered him to be an important composer after he ceased to participate 
directly in Soviet musical life. Between 1953 and 1978, Muzyka and Sovetskii kompozitor 
published two Soviet editions of Bliss’s and Walton’s music, three of Vaughan Williams’s, five 
of Bush’s, and fifty-one of Britten’s.93 Interestingly, roughly four-fifths of the Soviet editions of 
Britten’s works are arrangements, excerpts, and movements of his well-known orchestral pieces, 
operas, and song cycles, which suggests the Soviet demand was for pedagogic pieces and 
amateur works for domestic consumption. All of the republications of the other British 
composers’ works also catered to this market, except for the Soviet editions of Bliss’s Viola 
Sonata, Op. 52, F. 91 (1934) and Walton’s Viola Concerto (1929) and his comic opera The Bear 
(1967).94 
It is possible that Britten’s physical presence in the USSR played a role in his success. 
Tippett never visited the USSR and the only Soviet performances of his music I found were 
connected with the 1963 Days of British Music Festival. Walton’s First Symphony was 
performed at both Days of British Music Festivals (in 1963 and 1971), but he attended only the 
later one.95 His successes in the USSR started after that point. However, it is possible that there 
were other factors at play. While Bush began visiting the USSR in the 1930s and Bliss in the 
1950s, their number of Soviet publications was still very low in comparison to Britten’s.96 
 
93 See Letopis’, all volumes from 1953 to 1979. 
94 Letopis’, vol. 3 (1975), 81; Letopis’, vol. 3 (1974), 99; and Letopis’, vol. 5 (1979), 42; respectively. 
95 See Page 126 and Footnote 83 in Chapter 2. 
96 See Louise Wiggins, “‘Story of a Friendship’: Alan Bush, Grigorii Shneerson and Cultural Diplomacy 
before and during the Cold War,” Russian Journal of Communication 8, no. 3 (2016): 256-72. 
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Another factor was the frequency of Soviet performances of Britten’s works (far more than 
Bliss’s and Bush’s), which arose from the interest of Soviet conductors, directors, and 
performers. It is likely that the high Soviet demand for Britten’s music led to greater 
opportunities for Soviet republication, and that this demand was reinforced by the composer’s 
own tendencies to cultivate close collaborations with Soviet musicians and to facilitate the Soviet 
transfer of his scores. Bush also facilitated the transfer of his music to the USSR, but it seems 
that the relatively low demand for his music among Soviet performers led to the low number of 
Soviet republications. 
 Some of the pieces that Boosey & Hawkes had sent to Tauragis to aid the student in his 
research were later published by the official Soviet publishers Muzyka and Sovetskii 
kompozitor. It appears that the reissuing of these pieces began in 1966, a few years after 
Tauragis’s request. It is possible that Tauragis, who had expressed frustration on the lack of 
access to foreign contemporary music in the USSR, facilitated their Soviet publication. It also 
seems that Britten, either inadvertently or intentionally, cleared the way for Soviet republication 
by giving published scores to Soviet artists and institutions.97 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether 
Britten was aware of the extent of the Soviet republication of his work. In any case, a possible 
cause for Roth’s dissatisfaction with Britten’s relationship with the USSR could have been 
Britten’s continued practice of giving away copyrighted material to the citizens and institutions 
of a country that routinely refused to provide appropriate compensation or respect the terms of 
use for that material. It appears that at various occasions, Britten was ignorant, ambivalent, or 
 
97 Britten to Roth, 10 April 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. List of Britten’s Music Sent to Russia, 
undated, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. The Britten-Pears Library preserves a copy of a list of compositions—
likely compiled by one of Britten’s secretaries—that was sent directly to Soviet ensembles and institutions including 
the Leningrad Conservatory, the Leningrad Philharmonic, the Leningrad Philharmonic String Quartet, the Kirov 
Theater, and the Maly Theater. There was a Maly Theater in both Moscow and Leningrad, and the list does not 
specify in which city the theater was located. It is likely that the theater in question was the theater in Leningrad, 
which had requested Britten’s operas in 1964. 
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even supportive of the Soviet practice of republishing his music. Considering that Britten strived 
to make more of his music available to the USSR, encouraged the performances of his music 
there, and switched to Faber Music in part because of the latter’s more sympathetic stance 
toward the Soviet use of Britten’s music, it seems likely that Britten considered the facilitation of 
Soviet performances and republication to be a higher priority than Roth’s professed goal of 
forming a more commercial relationship with Soviet publishers and theaters. 
 
Ex-Gratia Compensation in Inconvertible Currency 
Remuneration of authors and composers in the USSR worked in a fundamentally 
different way from capitalist countries. Capitalist publishers usually provided royalties to the 
author based on sales or an amount decided before publication based on projected sales. Since 
profit was the goal for capitalist publishers, they would continue to disseminate a work or 
produce additional editions of it as long as its sales generated an appropriate profit. 
Compensation for composers would also include fees for performing and mechanical rights, 
which were a percentage of the sale of tickets and recordings, respectively. Meanwhile, Soviet 
publishers, which were completely subsidized by the state, compensated authors and composers 
a fixed amount upon publication and produced a fixed number of books or scores for 
dissemination. As discussed earlier, Soviet composers were also compensated for performances 
and recordings of their works.98 
In the USSR, the amount of remuneration for works was decided by government decree 
in a fee schedule divided by genre, instrumentation, and time span of the composition. This 
categorization was intended to favor work that was considered to be more labor intensive, so that 
 
98 Zil’bershtein, 44. 
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prestigious and complex genres (such as opera, ballet, operetta, oratorio, symphony, and ballet) 
received high fees, and shorter, less prestigious, and less complex genres (dances, songs, 
romances, ballads, and salon music) lower ones. While such priorities were designed to 
compensate composers for their creative labor (more labor-intensive compositions required more 
time to produce), it is clear that perceptions of “high” versus “low” culture also shaped the fee 
schedule. Within each category, there were four levels of compensation, which depended on the 
aesthetic and ideological value of the work as well as the professional reputation of the creator of 
that work. In practice, the Composers’ Union decided which level of compensation to award a 
composer. The consumer demand for the work had no effect on this decision.99 See Tables 2 and  
3 below: 
 
99 Prilozhenie No. 2 k Instruktsii primeneniiu Postanovleniia Soveta Ministrov RSFSR ot 20 aprelia 1957 g. 
No. 325 [Appendix 2: On the Instruction for the Application of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic Resolution of April 20th, 1957, No. 325] in ibid., 159-61. Government-mandated 
compensation schedules, which could stay in place for years, were possible in the USSR because the currency and 
the prices of goods and services were held stable by government decree. 
100 Ibid., 159-61. 
Table 2: Five Musical Genres with the Highest Rates of Remuneration and the 








Opera 30,000 45,000 60,000 80,000 
Ballet 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 
Symphony 15,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 
Operetta 12,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 
Oratorio 12,000 18,000 24,000 30,000 
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Table 3: Five Musical Genres with the Lowest Rates of Remuneration and the 




From the Soviet state’s perspective, Soviet copyright law was generally intended to 
encourage and support composers’ creativity in producing works to aid society’s development 
toward communist utopia. Ideologically speaking, Soviet society—which was represented by the 
Communist Party—judged these works for their effectiveness in this task and compensated the 
composers accordingly. The state then authorized socialist organizations, such as publishers and 
theaters, to disseminate and publicly perform the music.102 Works of inadequate or suspect 
ideological content still enjoyed copyright protection, but publishers and theaters would usually 
limit or forego their public use.103 
 
101 Ibid., 159-61. 
102 Ibid., 5-7. 
103 Soviet jurists debated whether works deemed ideologically useless to society should be excluded from 
copyright protection. This debate was particularly present in the late 1950s, when the Soviet government was 
preparing to revise its 1928 Copyright Law. The debate was settled by the argument that, under contemporaneous 
conditions, socialist organizations could already refuse to disseminate unsuitable works to the public. As a result, 







Small Choral Work w/ Inst. 
Accompaniment 
500 1,000 2,000 2,500 
Dances and Small Songs for 
Estrada Orchestra, Folk 
Orchestra, or [Conventional] 
Orchestra 
500 1,000 1,500 2,500 
Romances, Ballads 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 
Songs 400 700 1,000 1,500 
Small Chamber Work (Prelude, 
Nocturne) 
300 700 1,200 1,500 
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 Even in the absence of a legal obligation, some Soviet literary publishers still felt 
obligated to compensate foreign creators financially. Such ex-gratia payments were not 
uncommon. In the UK in 1945, British writer Harold Nicholson received five hundred pounds 
for the 1943 Soviet re-publication of his book Diplomacy. Nicholson did not send any request for 
compensation and the payment was given without explanation. Also, in 1945, John Boynton 
Priestly, on behalf of the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR and the Author’s Society, 
visited Moscow to lobby for the Soviet remuneration of British authors for the use of their 
works. His efforts were unsuccessful, but he was given royalties for his own work upon leaving 
the USSR. British publishers also made ex-gratia payments to Russian authors.104  
Nonetheless, such a non-legal obligation to compensate authors for their intellectual 
property did not ensure that payment would be rendered in convertible currency. The Soviet 
state’s monopolization of the foreign trade of intellectual property and its restrictions on the 
conversion and transfer of convertible currency out of the USSR resulted in the inability of the 
majority of Soviet publishers to provide fair monetary compensation to foreign creators.105 As a 
result, even in cases when Soviet publishers felt obligated to compensate foreigners, they would 
have been able to do so only in inconvertible currency (rubles)—which was useless outside of 
the USSR—or through the non-currency-based exchange of intellectual property.  
In cases where a Soviet publisher compensated a foreign creator in inconvertible rubles 
for its use, the creators’ own publishers were usually frustrated by the unauthorized use of their 
intellectual property or, at best, indifferent to what ultimately amounted to a commercially 
useless gesture. For example, in 1964, a Soviet publisher gave Britten four hundred rubles in 
 
104 British Council, Brief for Foreign Ministers at Geneva, October 1955, BW 2/573, GB-Lna. There is no 
record of Soviet music publishers attempting to compensate foreign composers or publishers in this source. 
105 John B. Quigley, The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly: Institutions and Laws (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1974), 75-78. 
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royalties during one of the composer’s visits to the USSR in exchange for their publication of a 
collection of some of Britten’s vocal music. The composer informed Roth of the payment in a 
letter and asked for Roth’s guidance in the matter. 
By the way, they recently published a “selected vocal music of [Benjamin Britten].” 
there, and I was handed over 400 [rubles] for royalties when I was there. I had, of course, 
to leave them there, in a bank account; what arrangement shall we make over this? Some 
of it of course is for [Boosey & Hawkes] – do you ever need cash there?106 
  
Roth, however, declined to have any part in payments rendered in Soviet currency:  
Do not bother about the 400 [rubles] you received; they may be useful to you when you 
go to Russia again. [Rubles] in a Russian bank are [of] no use to us.107  
 
There was a personal financial benefit to the composer receiving royalties in rubles: they 
were accrued interest in a bank and were available during his visits to the USSR. As a result, 
Britten had some purchasing power in the USSR independent of his British income, and he took 
full advantage of this arrangement by buying a large quantity of Russian sheet music there to be 
sent back to his personal library in Aldeburgh. While Britten did not record which publisher 
provided him with the four hundred rubles, it was most likely Muzyka. As mentioned earlier, the 
firm was in the strongest position to publish foreign music, and it was publishing Britten’s 
works, including an entire collection of Britten’s vocal music in Izbrannoe dlia golosa s 
fortepiano [Favorites for Voice and Piano] in 1963, which was one year before Britten was 
offered the four hundred rubles.108 
In 1964, when Muzyka compensated Britten for the Soviet publication of his songs, the 
1957 fee schedule set by the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation was still in effect. In 
 
106 Britten to Roth, 10 April 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. This letter is discussed in part, but not 
printed in full, in Philip Reed and Mervyn Cooke, eds., Letters from a Life: The Selected Letters of Benjamin 
Britten, 1913-1976, vol. 5 1958-1965 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2010), 571. 
107 Roth to Britten, 22 April 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. This letter is discussed, but not printed in 
full, in Reed and Cooke, eds., Letters from a Life, 571-72. 
108 Letopis’, vol. 4 (1963), 19. 
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this schedule, reproduced above in Tables 2 and 3, four hundred rubles is listed as the lowest of 
the four levels of remuneration for a song collection. It seems likely that the Soviet publisher 
adhered to this schedule in deciding the amount of compensation it would award Britten. The 
low level is not surprising, since Britten was not a Soviet composer, and thus not a member of 
the Soviet Composers’ Union. Nonetheless, the fact that he received any compensation at all as a 
foreign composer is very noteworthy. 
 
Ex-Gratia Compensation in Intellectual Property 
As discussed earlier, Britten and Pears traveled to the USSR on several occasions to 
purchase Soviet musical scores to be sent back to his home in Aldeburgh for private study. After 
Pears’s death in 1986, their library of personal papers and their music collection were 
transformed into the holdings of the Britten-Pears Foundation Archives. Of particular interest is a 
Soviet multi-volume complete edition of Tchaikovsky’s compositions.109 Pyke has observed that 
several of these volumes were inscribed with the British publishing firm Musica Rara’s imprint 
or an English price marking. He deduces that Britten probably purchased many of these volumes 
in London between 1955 and his first visit to the USSR in 1963.110 In addition, Elizabeth Wilson 
reports that Britten and Pears continued to seek out and purchase some of the volumes during 
their travels to the USSR.111 Nicholas Clark informed me that the other volumes of this unique 
edition were given to Britten by a Soviet publisher in lieu of monetary compensation for their 
publication of his music. Clark learned of this exchange in conversation with Britten’s longtime 
 
109 P. Chaikovskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [Complete Set of Works], vol. 1, ed. V.V. Asaf’eva 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Muzykal’noe Izdatel’stvo [State Music Publishing], 1953). 
110 See Appendix 17: Britten’s Volumes of Tchaikovsky’s Complete Works, in Pyke, 328-31.  
111 Elizabeth Wilson, “Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part II,” Musical Opinion 136, no. 
1495 (July-August 2013): 22. 
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assistant Rosamund Strode. He indicated that Britten’s study of this edition shows it had a direct 
impact on his compositional practice, as it still contains the composer’s bookmarks; these 
indicate which of Tchaikovsky’s folksong arrangements were quoted in and became the building 
blocks of Britten’s Third Cello Suite.112  
According to Strode, the Soviet publisher had gifted the set to the composer during two 
of his trips to the USSR in exchange for republishing his music there.113 Thirty-one Soviet 
editions of Britten’s music had been published up to the time of his final visit in 1971. Twenty-
four were published by Muzyka, six by Sovetskii kompozitor, and one by Muzyka Ukraina.114 
Also, the Tchaikovsky edition was published by the Soviet state music publisher: Muzyka.115 
Therefore, the most likely explanation is that Muzyka, which published the majority of the 
Soviet editions of Britten’s music, gifted the volumes that Britten did not possess to the 
composer in lieu of payment. What remains unclear from Strode’s statement is whether the 
Soviet publisher and Britten struck an agreement before the former published the latter’s music, 
or if the music was published earlier without Britten’s or his British publisher’s consent, so that 
the Soviet publisher was compensating the composer after the fact. Moreover, there is no written 
record of this transaction; nor is there a record of the particular work or works of Britten, for 
which the Soviet publisher provided compensation.116 Nonetheless, if Strode’s account of the 
assemblage of the Tchaikovsky Edition is correct, it is a clear example of payment in kind by a 
 
112 Email correspondence between Clark and the author, 16 and 17 September 2015. Pyke discusses 
Britten’s use of the Tchaikovsky edition and the broader influence of Tchaikovsky and the Russian cultural tradition 
on Britten’s compositional style. See Pyke, 41-46. 
113 Email correspondence between Clark and the author, 17 September 2015. 
114 See Letopis’, all volumes from 1953 to 1972. The state music publisher of Soviet Ukraine. In this 
dissertation, the term “Muzyka” without the inclusion of the term “Ukraina” pertains to the central Soviet publisher 
and not the Ukrainian office. 
115 Chaikovskii. 
116 There is no mention of such an exchange in Britten’s correspondence with his own publishers or in 
correspondence with Russian personages and institutions. See correspondence between Britten and Boosey & 
Hawkes and Britten’s Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
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Soviet publisher for the use of a British composer’s intellectual property. In addition, this 
remuneration occurred before Soviet law mandated that the foreign creator’s consent and 
remuneration in convertible currency was required in order to publish a new edition of his or her 
copyrighted works.  
Why is there no record of the negotiations between Britten and Muzyka in the Britten-
Pears Foundation Library? Possibly there was such a record, but it did not survive. However, this 
seems an unlikely scenario, based on my experience in researching Britten’s personal papers. 
The composer saved an unusually high number of both noteworthy and mundane personal and 
professional documents, which are preserved in the Britten-Pears Foundation Archives. If the 
Soviet publisher provided Britten with a written agreement or receipt, I am certain that he would 
have preserved it alongside similar agreements from both British and foreign publishers. It is 
likely that the Soviet publisher disseminated Britten’s music without his knowledge or consent, 
and then attempted to find some way to compensate the composer after the fact. It is also likely 
that the lack of archival records resulted from a spoken arrangement, made during one of the 
composer’s visits to the USSR, to provide the edition in gratitude for the earlier Soviet 
publication of Britten’s music.117 This would also be consistent with Strode’s account that the 
edition was received over the course of two visits. If a significant number of Muzyka’s 
republications resulted from Britten’s gifts to Soviet artists, then the Tchaikovsky scores could 
also be considered to be gifts in honor of both Britten’s friendship with the Soviet musical 
community and as compensation for Britten’s practice of giving his scores to Soviet musicians 
and, by extension, publishers.  
 
117 It is possible that there was a written record of this arrangement in Muzyka’s internal records, but I have 
not yet found it in my archival research. 
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While Muzyka did not need Britten’s permission to publish the composer’s music and 
was not legally obligated under Soviet law to pay him, it was still morally obligated to 
compensate the composer for his creative labor. This case turns out to be very similar to the 
occasion (discussed in the previous section of this chapter), when Muzyka provided Britten with 
four hundred rubles for the Soviet publication of his music. Both cases involved the unauthorized 
publication and dissemination of Britten’s works by a Soviet publisher; neither the composer nor 
Boosey & Hawkes were notified of the Soviet publication; and the Soviet publishers attempted to 
compensate the composer in some form after they had already published and disseminated his 
works in the USSR. The transfers of the rubles and the edition coincided with the composer’s 
Soviet visits, which likely facilitated oral as opposed to written agreements to avoid the 
difficulties inherent in negotiating with either the Soviet state or the British publisher. Due to the 
obstacles in obtaining convertible currency in the USSR, it is very possible that the supposedly 
simple act of purchase a published piece of music in convertible currency was just not an option 
for the Soviet publisher. 
 
Exchange Quid Pro Quo: Rostropovich’s Performance Exclusivity 
Roth’s insistence on currency-based exchange in relation to the Bolshoi Theater’s 1961 
request for the score of Peter Grimes clashed with Soviet practice and the realities inherent in the 
legal and economic differences between British and Soviet policy. It simply was not in the Soviet 
theater’s best interest or ability to compensate the British publisher in convertible currency, 
which would have required the permission of Mezhknig. In addition, the inability of British 
publishers to enforce the terms of loan agreements made such arrangements infeasible. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, reciprocity became the core tenet of the cultural exchange agreements 
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with the USSR.118 The interchange of performers was carried out on a reciprocal basis in order to 
minimize the exchange of convertible currency. The reluctance of the USSR to provide financial 
support in hard currency also resulted in a similar situation regarding the exchange of intellectual 
property. The reciprocal exchange of musical scores was carried out or attempted in some of the 
exchanges discussed above. For instance, 1) Tauragis proposed to send Britten scores of 
Prokofiev’s and Shostakovich’s music in return for the British composer’s compositions;119 2) 
the Bolshoi Theater offered to send Boosey & Hawkes a contemporary Soviet opera score in 
exchange for Peter Grimes;120 and 3) Britten received several volumes of the Tchaikovsky 
complete edition in lieu of payment for the Soviet publication of his music. Each of these cases 
involved the trade—which may or may not have been the result of an agreement between both 
parties—of comparable objects of intellectual property, which in turn resembled the framework 
of the cultural exchange agreement: the reciprocal interchange of comparable performers and 
ensembles. While such exchanges usually pertained to barter, they could also result in legally 
non-binding agreements regarding the observance of performing and mechanical rights. 
 British critic John Warrack’s review of the Cello Symphony’s premiere summarized 
Britten’s position of esteem in Russian musical culture. 
Britten has become a part of the Russian musical scene: he was the only contemporary 
English or American composer whose music I noticed in Soviet editions when in Russia 
recently, his personal reception after the new Cello Symphony was of the cordiality 
reserved for a friend and not an [honored] stranger, and at a Moscow music school I was 
bombarded with questions about his plans and his music. Britten himself was surprised to 
be involved in expert discussions about works he had almost forgotten, and delighted by 
the “present” of a carefully prepared performance of the first half of the War Requiem by 
the students of the Leningrad Conservatory.121 
 
 
118 See Page 92. 
119 Britten to Peželis, 8 August 1960, in Šumila and Stanevičiūtė, 206. 
120 D.C. Thomas, Mr. Victor Hochhauser, 29 August 1961, CR 13820/77, in FO 924/1397, GB-Lna. This 
citation refers to Thomas’s report on his conversation with Hochhauser. 
121 John Warrack, “Britten’s Cello Symphony,” Musical Times 105, no. 1456 (June 1964): 418. 
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In discussing the genesis of the symphony as well as the earlier Cello Sonata, Warrack attributed 
the inspiration for the work to Rostropovich’s virtuosity. The critic remarked that the 
representatives of the Soviet musical establishment in the audience received the symphony 
perhaps “a trifle too politely,” and that the students’ reaction to the piece was ecstatic, as they 
stamped and clapped until the final movement was encored. According to Warrack, a Moscow 
Conservatory professor who was present informed him that no work had been acclaimed by the 
younger generation as much as the Cello Symphony in years. Warrack also reported that 
Rostropovich described the symphony’s reception as one of the most positive in recent memory, 
and said it was deeper in emotion and thoughtfulness than mere “superficial” excitement. 
Moreover, Warrack mentioned the appearance of Britten’s compositions in the form of Soviet 
publications, which were certainly not authorized by the composer’s British publishers.122 
After the performance, the composer made an offer to Furtseva, proposing that 
Rostropovich would retain the exclusive right to perform the Cello Symphony in exchange for 
her permission for Decca to record Rostropovich performing the piece with the English Chamber 
Orchestra in July 1964. According to a letter written well after this conversation, such recordings 
were also to be sent to the Soviet state recording label Melodiya, so that they could be released 
simultaneously in both the UK and in the USSR.123 It should be noted that Furtseva had already 
given permission for an earlier Decca recording of Britten and Rostropovich performing his 
Cello Sonata (in 1961),124 and for one of Vishnevskaya performing as the soprano soloist in the 
 
122 Ibid., 418-19. 
123 Britten to Furtseva, 27 December 1967, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
124 Philip Stuart, “Decca Classical Discography,” Research Center for the History and Analysis of Recorded 
Music, last modified 2009, accessed 29 December 2017, 282, www.charm.rhul.ac.uk/discography/decca.html. 
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War Requiem (in 1963).125 Both recordings were released simultaneously in the UK and the 
USSR.126 
Before his trip, the composer had discussed with Roth the possibility of awarding 
exclusive performance rights for the composition to Rostropovich. In the meantime, Britten had 
learned that the Moscow Philharmonic wished to take the Cello Symphony on a world tour in the 
autumn of 1965 with Rostropovich as the soloist,127 and he felt that this presented an opportunity 
for proposing a deal to both further his own and Soviet interests. Britten would record his work 
with the Soviet dedicatee on a British record label, and the Moscow Philharmonic and 
Rostropovich would retain the exclusive right to perform the work during their forthcoming 
international tour. He wrote: 
I discussed this with Madame Furtseva, who was enthusiastic and grateful. She, as a 
result, has given permission for Rostropovich to record it for Decca, there being as you 
know strict rules now about Russian artists recording with foreign companies. I hope you 
feel that this plan is reasonable.128 
 
Britten’s proposal was approved in Roth’s reply, which assured Britten that all of Boosey & 
Hawkes’s branches had been informed that Rostropovich had been awarded exclusivity until 
December 31, 1965. Interestingly, Roth’s reply also mentions the issue of performance rights, 
which Boosey & Hawkes still legally claimed for all performances of the Cello Symphony by the 
Moscow Philharmonic and Rostropovich outside of Russia.129 The Copyright Department of 
Boosey & Hawkes contacted Britten in June 1964 to confirm that Decca had the composer’s 
permission to record the work with Rostropovich in July,130 Britten promptly consented to the 
 
125 See Page 191. 
126 Britten to Furtseva, 27 December 1967, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
127 Britten to Roth, 20 March 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Roth to Britten, 24 March 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. All states that recognized British copyright 
through bilateral and multilateral (such as the Berne and UCC) agreements were legally obligated to respect Boosey 
& Hawkes’s claim to performance rights. At the time, the USSR did not.  
130 Muriel James to Britten, 11 June 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. 
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recording,131 and the recording label released Rostropovich’s performances of the Cello 
Symphony and Joseph Haydn’s First Cello Concerto, which included Britten’s newly composed 
cadenzas.132 
The exclusivity that Boosey & Hawkes had awarded to Rostropovich according to 
Britten’s wishes was not a legally binding contract between these parties. If either side violated 
their side of the agreement, no lawsuit could be filed against that infringement. It was essentially 
an informal business arrangement based on a nonbinding contract. Boosey & Hawkes still legally 
held the intellectual property rights (including performance rights) to the symphony. It could still 
choose which performers and ensembles could perform or record the work, and it only gave that 
permission to Rostropovich for the span of the agreement. If the work was illicitly performed or 
recorded by another party, it would have been an infringement of Boosey & Hawkes’s 
intellectual property rights and not the rights of Rostropovich or the Moscow Philharmonic. This 
business agreement, much like the earlier loan agreement between Roth and the Bolshoi Theater 
regarding Peter Grimes, was conceived as a mutually beneficial arrangement, in which 
compliance would maintain good relations between the two sides and foster the potential for 
more such agreements in the future.  
 As the failure of Roth’s ill-fated deal with the Bolshoi Theater indicates, such an 
arrangement is only as strong as the persistent commitment of all of the involved parties toward 
its fulfillment. Such deals do not exist in an abstract space where a mere agreement is final; they 
are continuously tested by the actual compliance of the involved parties in real circumstances 
over their timespans. In mid-June 1964, roughly a few weeks before Rostropovich was scheduled 
 
131 John Cullum to James, 12 June 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. Cullum was Britten’s secretary at the 
time. 
132 Stuart, 329. 
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to record the symphony, Boosey & Hawkes forwarded a request from another orchestra that 
wanted to perform the work in the following year with another internationally renowned cellist. 
The New Philharmonia Orchestra [has] just asked us for permission to perform the 
[Cello] Symphony with Jacqueline du Pré at the Royal Festival Hall on [the] 1st [of] 
March 1965. I have informed the Orchestra that Mr. Rostropovich has the exclusivity at 
least until the end of 1965, but they have asked me nevertheless to find out whether it 
would be possible for them to [still] perform the Cello Symphony.133 
 
Britten quickly declined the offer and explained that he could authorize no exceptions to his 
exclusivity agreement with Rostropovich. This meant the New Philharmonia Orchestra would be 
unable to perform the symphony unless they did so with Rostropovich instead of du Pré.134 
While Britten was under no legal obligation to maintain the integrity of the agreement, it can be 
reasoned that the composer considered any such deviation to be a risk to the positive rapport that 
he had painstakingly cultivated with Soviet institutions such as the Ministry of Culture. 
Furthermore, had Britten accepted the New Philharmonia Orchestra’s offer, the chronological 
proximity of the request to the eve of the recording could have jeopardized Rostropovich’s 
participation. While we can only speculate about the underlying rationale behind Britten’s 
decision, the emphatic nature of his refusal is clear from the composer’s handwritten marginalia 
on the request. It reads: “Obviously no!”135 
Britten’s commitment to the exclusivity arrangement was also indicated by his continued 
adherence to it after the Soviets had fulfilled their end of the bargain: that is, after Rostropovich 
recorded the symphony with Decca. Apparently, there was some ambiguity regarding the exact 
date of the expiration of the agreement, and Andrewes contacted Britten for clarification. In a 
 
133 Rufina Ampenoff to Britten, 17 June 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. 
134 Cullum to Ampenoff, 18 June 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb. 
135 Ampenoff to Britten, 17 June 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. For the sake of comparison in tone, 
note that the marginalia on the aforementioned request for Britten to confirm his consent for the Decca recording 
with Rostropovich was a mere “OK.” Muriel James to Britten, 11 June 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb.  
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December 1964 letter, Andrewes explained that the publisher had received numerous requests 
from various ensembles to perform the work, and that they needed to know exactly when the 
piece would be available.136 In Britten’s marginalia on Andrewes’s enquiry and in his response 
to the publisher, the composer indicated that the agreement was intended to cover the length of 
Rostropovich’s tour with the Moscow Philharmonic in the US in the autumn of 1965.137 This 
statement implies that the actual expiration date should have been adjusted to coincide with the 
end of that tour. It appears that the original expiration of the agreement remained unchanged 
from the last day of 1965. In April 1965, Andrewes learned that the tour was projected to end in 
November, and so he kept the expiration date as December 31st to allow a buffer in case of any 
changes in the Soviet orchestra’s plans.138 By ensuring that the Moscow Philharmonic’s 
American tour included Rostropovich’s exclusive performances of the Cello Symphony, Britten 
kept a strong rapport with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, which in part enabled him to continue 
his collaborations with Soviet musicians. Legally speaking, the exclusivity agreement with the 
Ministry of Culture never existed; Boosey & Hawkes had always kept control of the intellectual 
property rights associated with the piece and simply refused permission to anyone else who 
wanted to perform it, which it could continue to do for as long as it required. 
Britten’s initial agreement with Furtseva regarding Rostropovich’s exclusive performance 
rights for the Cello Symphony allowed the composer to make a similar request regarding the 
participation of Soviet artists in British recordings. In 1967, he requested that Rostropovich and 
Vishnevskaya record the works Britten had composed for the couple, for Decca, and that the 
recordings be sent to the USSR so that they could be issued simultaneously by Melodiya.139 
 
136 Andrewes to Britten, 7 December 1964, B&H to BB 1964, GB-ALb. 
137 Ibid.; and Cullum to Andrewes, 28 December 1964, BB to B&H 1964, GB-ALb; respectively. 
138 Andrewes to Britten, 5 April 1965, B&H to BB 1965, GB-ALb. 
139 Britten to Furtseva, 27 December 1967, Russian Correspondence, GB-ALb. 
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These works included Britten’s First and Second Cello Suites and the song cycle The Poet’s 
Echo. Furtseva agreed to Britten’s proposition, and the recordings were released by Decca and 
Melodiya in July 1968.140 
 
Summary 
 Before the USSR acceded to the UCC, the international exchange of intellectual property 
from Western Europe and the US to the USSR was outside the normal sphere of commercial 
practice. British publishers were aware that their Soviet counterparts often gained unauthorized 
access to their intellectual property for republication and dissemination in the USSR, and that the 
Soviet market was practically inaccessible due to the restrictions on the international exchange of 
Soviet currency. By sending delegations and forging loan agreements, British publishers hoped 
to eventually convince the USSR to respect British copyright and to provide appropriate 
remuneration for the Soviet use of British intellectual property. However, it appears that these 
efforts were largely unsuccessful. Deals regarding performance exclusivity and simultaneous 
recording releases were more successful, possibly because they did not involve the exchange of 
currency. 
 While the export of intellectual property to the USSR was a risky and unprofitable 
venture for British publishers, some musicians were interested less in financial incentive, and, 
instead, were more receptive to gaining access to new audiences and performance opportunities 
for their music. In his negotiations with the Bolshoi Theater regarding the transfer of the score 
for Peter Grimes, Roth dismissed offers for a reciprocal exchange of operas and was fixated on 
the prospect for appropriate financial compensation in the present or near future. His lack of 
 
140 Stuart, 401. 
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flexibility resulted in the failure of his loan agreement, as the Soviet theaters changed their plans 
and requested additional scores without compensation. If anything, Roth set a precedent for 
future de facto gifts to Soviet theaters and ensembles, and he obviously found this turn of events 
to be very frustrating. 
 While Roth’s underlying motives for the exchanges appear to have been based primarily 
on the potential for financial profit, Britten advocated for both unprofitable and profitable 
exchanges with the USSR, and did not demonstrate preference for the latter in his 
correspondence and actions. The transfer of his scores to aid Tauragis’s academic research and to 
facilitate the performance of his stage works in the USSR were both commercially unprofitable 
ventures. Furthermore, both loans suggested a degree of risk by sending intellectual property to a 
nation that did not respect British copyright. If the Soviet recipients illicitly reproduced or 
disseminated the compositions, there would have been no legal recourse for Britten or Boosey & 
Hawkes to protect their intellectual property. On the other hand, Britten’s exclusivity agreement 
with Rostropovich and the Soviet Ministry of Culture had a clear financial motive: to ensure the 
cellist’s participation in Decca’s recording of the Cello Symphony. Britten’s close adherence to 
this agreement during his rejection of du Pré’s and the New Philharmonia’s proposal to perform 
the symphony indicated his commitment to the recording deal with Rostropovich. Although his 
attention to the intent of the agreement—that Rostropovich have exclusivity during the Moscow 
Philharmonic’s American tour—influenced his response to Andrewes’s request to clarify the 
expiration of the agreement, arguably this attention was justified by the need to keep a positive 
rapport with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, to ensure the opportunity for both further profitable 
deals and collaborative projects with Soviet musicians.  
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 The rapport that Britten maintained with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, the high esteem 
that Soviet musicians and audiences placed in his works, and the Soviet demand for the 
publication and dissemination of his pieces contributed to the high value that his musical capital 
had in the USSR. In addition, Britten’s position as the most prominent British composer during 
the 1960s, resulted in a situation in that his publishers were pressured to take financial risks in 
dealing with Soviet institutions, in order to placate one of their most valuable assets. The result 
of having a high demand for his musical capital in both the UK and the USSR, gave Britten the 
unusual ability to negotiate with both capitalist publishers and socialist institutions in order to 
facilitate the transfer of his music to Soviet musicians. Also, the Soviet musicians discussed in 
this chapter utilized their agency, and contributed to these efforts by providing the initial demand 
and shepherding this music through innumerable administrative, financial, and legal barriers. 
Throughout this chapter, we have seen that British publishers and the Soviet state behaved as 
hegemonic entities that made concessions to both British and Soviet musicians. In addition, 
Soviet publishers, who were powerful institutions from the perspective of these musicians, were 
subordinate to more powerful state institutions and were subject to their policies regarding the 
international exchange of currency and the impasse in international intellectual property law.  
The music professionals discussed in this chapter were interested in facilitating the 
transfer of British intellectual property to the USSR for various reasons. Soviet performers and 
musicologists sought to gain access to this music for performance and research, while Britten 
sought to collaborate with elite Soviet performers and to access a new audience for his 
compositions. Britten’s publishers, such as Boosey & Hawkes, strove to gain access to Soviet 
audiences, but only in a commercial context. As a result of the economic and legal obstacles to 
so-called normal commercial practice, British and Soviet parties had to devise means to 
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circumvent them through non-currency-based exchanges and agreements. These arrangements 
existed in an extralegal space, and—in the absence of legal recourse—could only survive if they 




“VICTOR HOCHHAUSER PRESENTS”: CONCERT AGENT AS INTERMEDIARY 
 
The situation has the elements of a game of brinkmanship in which the players are the 
Soviet government, [the actors’ trade union] Equity, and (contingently) [Her Majesty’s 
Government], with the British Jews ready to intervene and the miserable [Victor] 
Hochhauser trying, with his heart in his boots, to earn an honest penny. 
 
- British Ambassador to the Soviet Union Terence Garvey reporting his conversation 
with Victor and Lilian Hochhauser to Julian Bullard of the FCO about the upcoming 
Bolshoi Ballet London season, 19 February 1974.1 
 
 
Western concert agents acted as the conduits in cultural exchange with the Soviet Union, 
and they were essential in facilitating communication between the Soviet cultural apparatus and 
Western artistic communities and audiences. Unlike musicians and composers, their capital was 
derived purely from their ability to negotiate performance contracts and their connections with 
both Western and Soviet performers, Western venues, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, and 
Goskontsert. These concert agents were businesspeople in their own right and were not 
supported by or directly affiliated with their countries’ governments. As a result, they primarily 
used their agency to contract elite Soviet performers and ensembles for performances in the 
West, to arrange for the touring of Western musicians and ensembles in the USSR, and to 
support as many exchanges as they were able to carry out. In other words, they were interested in 
facilitating the mutually beneficial interchange of touring musicians between the USSR and their 
home countries. They shouldered the financial risks of those exchanges and had to soak up costs 
 
1 Garvey served as the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1973 to 1976. Garvey to Bullard, 19 
February 1974, FCO 34/274 Exchanges of Performing Arts between UK and Soviet Union: Tour of Bolshoi Ballet 
and Panov Case (FCO 34/274 and 275 are both titled Exchanges of Performing Arts between UK and Soviet Union: 
Tour of Bolshoi Ballet and Panov Case and will be hereafter cited as FCO 34/274 and 275, respectively), National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter cited as GB-Lna). 
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when those exchanges fell through. Goskontsert preferred to work with foreign concert agents 
instead of negotiating with foreign government entities because agents had direct access to 
foreign venues, and they were independent entities who acted out of their own financial interests 
rather than that of the political goals of their own states. In other words, Goskontsert valued 
political ambivalence in their Western business partners. The position of an intermediary was 
also quite precarious, as many different parties (including Goskontsert and Western political 
forces) needed to be placated in order to maintain its position as negotiator.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the activities of the Czech-born, Jewish, and London-based 
concert agent Victor Hochhauser and his wife and business partner Lilian Hochhauser from 1953 
to 1977; during most of this period, their firm was the primary concert planning connection 
between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Moreover, they facilitated the postwar 
introduction of elite Soviet musicians—such as David and Igor Oistrakh, Rostropovich, Richter, 
and Vishnevskaya—to British audiences. (David Oistrakh, who was a member of the older 
generation, had begun touring the West in 1937, but these travels were interrupted by the Second 
World War and late Stalinism, and thus Oistrakh had to be reintroduced to the West in the mid-
1950s.2) The Hochhausers needed to constantly demonstrate their value to the Soviet cultural 
apparatus by providing access to large and prestigious British venues, which maximized the 
amount of foreign currency that could be sent back to the Soviet state.  
They also had to keep silent on politically sensitive issues, such as the Soviet occupation 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet institutional anti-Semitism in the early 1970s, and the 
emigration of elite Soviet artists in general. Moreover, the Hochhausers needed to shield their 
business—which was in part dependent on the travel of artists to and from the USSR—from 
 
2 “Mr. David Oistrakh: Admired Russian Violinist,” Times, 25 October 1974, 18. 
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British political critics and anti-Soviet popular sentiment, which in turn sought to restrict or 
altogether cease those cultural exchanges in response to the above political issues. Several of 
these critics called attention to Victor Hochhauser’s Czech and Jewish background, which led to 
claims that the concert agent was compliant with a regime that repressed both the nation of his 
birth and his people. It is difficult to determine what impact Victor Hochhauser’s Jewish heritage 
had on his relationship and negotiations with the USSR. His American counterpart, Sol Hurok, 
was in a similar position. Hurok was also Jewish, and he emigrated from Soviet Ukraine in his 
twenties. In practice, both agents sought to distance their businesses from political controversy 
and instead frame the presentation of Soviet performers as an apolitical manifestation of artistic 
excellence.3 This chapter will examine the Hochhausers’ efforts to retain their position as the 
primary conduit in the Anglo-Soviet interchange of performers by placating both British and 
Soviet interests during these politically and morally challenging times. 
 
The Role of the Concert Agent in Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange 
As discussed earlier in this dissertation, cultural exchange agreements between the USSR 
and the West were one of the primary mechanisms that facilitated the reciprocal transfer of 
professionals and students in a wide range of fields. They were devised to circumvent the 
economic, legal, and political factors that prevented the organic development of such exchanges. 
The primary state institutions involved in the negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange 
agreements were the British Council, the British Foreign Office (or the Foreign and 
 
3 In his biography of Hurok, Harlow Robinson argued that the concert agent’s difficulties with Goskontsert 
and the Ministry of Culture arose from difficult American-Soviet relations during the Vietnam War, the Soviets’ 
desire to increase their profit shares in negotiations, and the Soviet attempts to break Hurok’s monopoly over the 
contracting of Soviet artists in the US. Robinson does not mention Hurok’s Jewish heritage as a major cause for his 
difficult relationship with the USSR. Chapters 21-23 of Harlow Robinson, The Last Impresario: The Life, Times, 
and Legacy of Sol Hurok (New York: Viking, 1994). 
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Commonwealth Office), and VOKS. While the agreements stipulated which performers and 
ensembles would take part in the exchanges, they were usually vague about the timing of the 
performances and the remuneration of the performers. More exact arrangements would be made 
by intermediaries, such as the concert agents and the directors of ensembles, after the agreement 
was put in place.  
On the Soviet side, the next stage of planning was passed on to the Ministry of Culture 
and, later, to Goskontsert. Meanwhile, concert planning in Western countries was handled on a 
specifically capitalist basis by entrepreneurs and concert firms. It was possible for Goskontsert 
and the Ministry of Culture to contact the British government entity in charge of the arts, the 
British Council, and ask it to communicate with British concert agents, or to circumvent the 
British government and contract the agents directly. Typically, Goskontsert sought the latter, in 
order to minimize the British government’s political intervention. Since there were no state 
counterparts to Goskontsert in the West (the British government could not order its musicians to 
perform, and it did not act as a concert agency), the Ministry of Culture and Goskontsert found 
themselves in the position of circumventing the British government and working routinely with 
independent concert agents.  
Earlier, during the 1930s, Soviet involvement in cultural exchange had usually been 
conducted with Soviet-sponsored “friendship societies” in the West (such as the UK-based 
British-Soviet Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR), which 
were populated by Western nationals who were communists or, at least, left-leaning and 
politically sympathetic to the Soviet cause. These societies were strongest during the 1930s, 
when many Western intellectuals viewed the USSR as a leftist model state and occasionally 
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visited the USSR on chaperoned excursions.4 During an era of growing Western suspicion 
toward the USSR following the Second World War, the friendship societies were generally seen 
as poorly disguised Trojan Horses tasked with undermining Western states. In turn, the USSR 
began to withdraw their support of, and to gradually distance themselves from, these societies.5 
The friendship societies would continue to operate and to arrange for the visits of Soviet 
performers to the West, but their activities were primarily limited to a minority of Western 
citizens who were already politically sympathetic to Marxist-Leninist socialism.6 
The USSR’s involvement in cultural exchange with the West transitioned from working 
with the explicitly political friendship societies toward the presentation of more politically 
implicit gestures, such as the demonstration of excellence in the arts. Performances of elite 
classical music performers and exciting folkdance troupes became part of an effort to entertain 
Western audiences (and thus cultivate pro-Soviet sentiment), and to demonstrate Soviet 
preeminence in culture, education, physical prowess, and technological development. While 
these displays were able to be used to reduce Cold War tensions, they were also intended to have 
been demonstrations of superiority in Cold War competition and some, such as the international 
performances of Soviet artists, were sources of valuable foreign currency.  
By the mid-1950s, Soviet entities generally sought out apolitical, professional, and 
reliable business partners in their concert agents. A few Western concert agents were able to 
form stable business relationships with the USSR, and effectively monopolize the import of 
Soviet musicians to the West and the export of Western musicians to the USSR. Furthermore, 
 
4 See Chapter 3 of Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and 
Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945-
1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 148-57. 
6 See f. 355, op. 2, d. 514 Dokumenty o zarubezhnykh gastroliakh [Documents Regarding Tours Abroad], 
Central State Archives of Literature and Art, St. Petersburg. 
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because the official cultural exchange agreements were devised to encourage international 
exchange, they only mandated the minimum number of exchanges during a limited period 
(usually for one or two years). This allowed concert agents to arrange for further profitable 
exchanges beyond the stipulations of the agreements during their allotted periods. In other 
words, if an agreement stipulated that four exchanges would take place, concert agents were able 
to make the arrangements for those four. In addition, they would be free to arrange additional 
exchanges outside the confines of the agreement but still within the time frame it specified. As a 
result, the performances and the tours mentioned in the agreements represented only a fraction of 
those that occurred during a particular period. The British concert agents Lilian and Victor 
Hochhauser were the primary intermediaries between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, and 
they wielded significant agency in shaping Anglo-Soviet musical exchange.  
Many concert agents and firms in the West focused their energies on the cultivation of 
exclusivity agreements with large numbers of performing musicians. British firms such as Ibbs 
and Tillett, Harold Holt, and Wilfred van Wyk became the sole representatives for dozens, if not, 
hundreds of British musicians and foreign musicians (when the latter performed in the UK).7 The 
Hochhausers also became the sole representatives of artists, but on a much smaller scale in 
comparison with the aforementioned firms. They were more specialized, and focused primarily 
on the import and export of musicians to and from the USSR. In this respect, they were 
unmatched in the UK.8 The importance of this specialized kind of concert agent is rooted in the 
fundamental differences between Western and Soviet concert planning. Soviet concert planning 
and artist representation, both within the USSR and abroad, was centralized and handled entirely 
 
7 Christopher Fifield’s monograph study of the concert firm Ibbs and Tillett includes extensive artists’ lists 
of these firms in its appendices. Christopher Fifield, Ibbs and Tillett: The Rise and Fall of a Musical Empire 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 300-01. 
8 Ibid., 323. 
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by the state agency Goskontsert. Meanwhile, a large number of concert planning entities of 
various sizes formed a large capitalist network throughout the West. In order to avoid direct 
competition with their larger contemporaries, some agents carved their own niches by working in 
specialized genres or with particular groups of performers. Concert agents such as Victor and 
Lilian Hochhauser in the United Kingdom and Sol Hurok in the United States specialized in 
serving as intermediaries between the USSR and their bases of operation in the West. 
The procedure for contracting British and foreign, but not Soviet, artists was 
fundamentally different than that governing the contracting of Soviet artists. For non-Soviet 
cases, an agent represented an artist and charged a fee of ten to twenty percent of the artist’s 
earnings. For Soviet cases, the artist’s services were sold for a fee in foreign currency by 
Goskontsert to a Western agent. Goskontsert then decided how much of this fee would reach the 
artist.9 The Hochhausers usually negotiated terms with Goskontsert, paid them a fee, and then 
represented the artists of the resulting performances directly. The other firms, such as Ibbs and 
Tillett, also participated in the Anglo-Soviet exchanges, but to a far lesser degree.10 
 
The Hochhausers’ Monopoly and the Soviet Union 
Victor Hochhauser, an Orthodox Jew whose family emigrated in 1939 from 
Czechoslovakia in the wake of growing anti-Semitism, settled in London and became a concert 
planner almost by happenstance. Rabbi Dr. Solomon Schonfeld requested that he arrange a 
charity concert for the pianist Solomon Cutner in 1945. The concert sold out and Victor 
Hochhauser soon after contracted the violinists Ida Haendel and Yehudi Menuhin and the Vienna 
Philharmonic with conductors such as Wilhelm Furtwängler and Bruno Walter for performances 
 
9 Ibid., 369. 
10 Fifield, 369. 
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in the UK. In 1949, Victor Hochhauser married Lilian Shields, who became his business partner. 
The Hochhausers shared responsibilities in their new partnership, and they both worked with 
foreign musicians and forged relationships with prestigious venues in the UK.11   
By 1953, the Victor and Lilian Hochhauser partnership was already an established, but 
small, London-based concert planning firm with a strong international reputation, and their 
Sunday evening concerts at Royal Albert Hall regularly featured Menuhin and the conductor 
Thomas Beecham.12 At this point, the Hochhausers were perfectly positioned to take full 
advantage of the USSR’s aforementioned pivotal shift in its relationship with the West. In 
November 1953, a delegation of Soviet musicians and VOKS representatives arrived in the UK. 
Included in this party was Igor Oistrakh, the son of the USSR’s premier violinist David Oistrakh. 
The Hochhausers convinced the delegation to allow the younger Oistrakh to perform at the Royal 
Albert Hall. The performance was a great success, and they were able to invite David Oistrakh to 
the UK in the following year.13 Goskontsert became the Hochhausers’ primary contact in the 
USSR. Once the Anglo-Soviet cultural agreements were put into place in 1959, the Hochhausers 
were poised to be primary intermediaries between the USSR and British audiences and 
musicians. Over the next two decades, the Hochhausers became the major UK concert agents for 
 
11 The Hochhausers’ 2010 interview with Nicholas Wroe of The Guardian was published on the same 
weekend as the arrival of the Bolshoi Ballet and Opera, which was scheduled to perform six ballet programs and 
Tchaikovsky’s opera Eugene Onegin at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. These performances were 
negotiated by Lilian and Victor Hochhauser. Nicholas Wroe, “Victor Hochhauser: My Great Stroke of Luck Came 
When Stalin Died,” Guardian, 17 July 2010, accessed 15 July 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2010/jul/17/victor-hochhauser-impresario. 
12 Mick Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser: Exclusive Interview,” Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2014, 
accessed 15 July 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/dance/10988191/Victor-and-Lilian-Hochhauser-
exclusive-interview.html. 
13 Ibid. The delegation also included Khachaturian. Igor Oistrakh’s concert was on November 22nd. 
“Russian Artists to Visit Britain,” Times, 27 October 1953, 10.  
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elite Soviet performers such as David and Igor Oistrakh, Richter, Rostropovich, and 
Vishnevskaya.14  
 While the international exchange of performing artists appeared to be based primarily on 
the promotion of a positive cultural image of the USSR abroad, the Hochhausers quickly realized 
that political concerns were secondary to commercial matters in practice. The Hochhausers’ 
contacts in Goskontsert were primarily dedicated to carrying out the cultural exchange 
agreements with the UK in terms as financially beneficial to the USSR as possible. In the 
Hochhausers’ 2010 interview with The Guardian, Lilian Hochhauser recalled that: 
It was a wonderful business for them… It was not political in any way—we were really 
dealing with low-level apparatchiks. We knew you had to have patience. It would be 
talking, discussing, trying to understand their minds. What they were really interested in 
was the money.15 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the entire Soviet cultural apparatus sought to maximize the 
import of foreign currency, particularly from Western Europe and the US, and to minimize the 
loss of this currency. Goskontsert preferred working with the Hochhausers, because the agencies 
had a firm understanding of each other and because the Hochhausers had access to the most 
prestigious British venues, which would consistently provide a good return on the Soviet 
investment. As the Hochhausers worked with Goskontsert, they arranged mutually beneficial 
performances in both the UK and the USSR, and the esteem in which they were held by the 
Soviet cultural apparatus increased to the point of their being able to negotiate directly with the 
British and Soviet governments. Eventually, the Hochhausers began traveling to Moscow to meet 
 
14 It should be noted that the Hochhausers’ clients who were also promoted by Goskontsert were not 
exclusively Russian. David Oistrakh was of Jewish descent and was born in Ukraine. Richter was also born in 
Ukraine and was of German and Russian descent. 
15 See Wroe. 
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with the Soviet Minister of Culture to propose the travel of certain British and Soviet ensembles 
and performers.  
In the aforementioned 2010 interview with The Guardian, the Hochhausers remarked that 
the USSR directly benefited from cultural exchange. They reported that the Soviet state kept 
roughly ninety percent of the monies paid to Soviet artists performing in the UK. From a 
Western perspective, this practice appears to be simple exploitation. Nevertheless, to play 
Devil’s Advocate, it might be possible to justify these actions by arguing that from the Soviet 
perspective, Soviet musicians were already earning an appropriate level of remuneration in their 
regular salaries independent of the tour, and the Soviet state had not charged conservatory tuition 
for the education of these performers.16 As discussed in Chapter 3, Soviet soloists were members 
of an elite class, which included citizens useful for Soviet goals such as Olympic athletes, chess 
grandmasters, and nuclear physicists. However, their financial rewards and their privileged 
positions in society were juxtaposed with restrictions over domestic and foreign travel, and a loss 
of control over the trajectories of their careers. 
 
The Bolshoi Ballet’s 1963 London Season 
 The Bolshoi Ballet’s first Western-tour performances occurred in October and November 
1956 at Covent Garden and were organized largely between the General Manager of the Royal 
Opera House, John Tully, the Soviet Embassy in London, and the Soviet Ministry of Culture. 
The Hochhausers do not seem to have yet been involved in these negotiations.17 During the early 
 
16 See ibid. 
17 V. Timofeev, Zapis’ Besedy s administratorom teatra Kovent Garden Dzhonom Tuli ot 14 avgusta 1956 
g. [Record of the conversation with John Tully of the theater administration of Covent Garden, 14 August 1956], in 
f. 648, op. 8, d. 83 Materialy o mezhdunarodnom kul’turnom sotrudnichestve (prikaz, zapis’ besedy, perepiska) 
[Materials on International Cooperation (Orders, Recorded Conversations, and Correspondence)], Russian State 
Archives of Literature and Art (hereafter cited as, RGALI). Simon Morrison discusses the 1956 tour in Bolshoi 
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1960s, however, they consolidated their position as the preeminent intermediaries in the 
negotiation of the travel of British and Soviet musicians between their respective countries. This 
position eventually enabled the Hochhausers to propose the large-scale tours of Soviet ensembles 
on a for-profit basis.  
 In a letter written on May 4, 1962, Victor Hochhauser asked Bolshoi Theater artistic 
director Vasily Pakhomov if it was possible for the Bolshoi Ballet to give a four-week long 
summer season in London during the following year. The concert agent also specifically 
requested that Aram Khachaturian’s ballet Spartak, Op. 82 (composed in 1954, premiered in 
1956) and some other recent Soviet ballets be included in the season.18 Over the next few 
months, the Bolshoi Theater, citing unspecified difficulties, was not able to commit to Victor 
Hochhauser’s proposal,19 and he periodically asked the theater for a more definitive answer.20 He 
then met with Furtseva on January 8, 1963. The Minister of Culture assured the concert agent 
that the tour would take place and referred to it as a “symbol of the willingness to increase 
cultural work with Great Britain.” She also informed Victor Hochhauser that there had been a 
Soviet desire to keep the Bolshoi Ballet in Moscow for several years after its recent tour in the 
 
Confidential: Secrets of the Russian Ballet from the Rule of the Tsars to Today (New York: Liveright, 2016), 339-
42. 
18 Victor Hochhauser to Pachumov [sic], 4 May 1962, f. 648, op. 11, d. 37, Perepiska s Soiuzom sovetskikh 
obshchestv druzhby i kul’turnoi sviazi s zarubezhnymi stranami o gastroliakh artistov teatra v Anglii, Italii, Kanade; 
priobretenii eskizov i risunkov K.A. Korobina k spektaliam “Boris Godunov”, “Zolotoi petushok” i dr. 
[Correspondence with the Council of Soviet Friendship Societies and Societies for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries Regarding the Tour of Bolshoi Theater Artists in England, Italy, and Canada; the Purchasing of Sketches 
and Drawings of K.A. Korobin for the Performances of Boris Godunov, The Golden Cockerel, and Others] 
(hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 11, d. 37), RGALI. 
19 The following letters are in f. 648, op. 11, d. 37, RGALI: Pakhomov to Victor Khochkhozer [sic], 
undated; Pakhomov to V.T. Stepanov, 5 July 1963 (the date typed on the letter is incorrect; the actual date is most 
likely one year earlier: 5 July 1962); Pakhomov to Khochkhozer [sic], 5 July 1962, RGALI. 
20 The following letters are in f. 648, op. 11, d. 37, RGALI: Victor Hochhauser to Pachomov [sic], 23 May 
1963; and Victor Hochhauser to Pachomov [sic], 18 July 1962. 
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US, but that the Ministry of Culture was now pressing ahead with Anglo-Soviet cultural 
exchange, despite the reservations of the Bolshoi Theater’s director.21 
It is possible that Furtseva was referring to the concerns of the theater’s artistic director 
Vasily Pakhomov that the company was over-touring, which became apparent in a January 14, 
1963 report to the Minister of Culture. In his memorandum to that official, Pakhomov reported 
that after the Bolshoi Ballet’s international debut in London in the autumn of 1956, it had 
embarked on tours to France, Belgium, West Germany, China, Egypt, Poland, Hungary, and for 
a second time to the US and Canada. Meanwhile, smaller touring parties were sent to Japan, 
Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Finland, England, Holland, Indonesia, 
Syria, Lebanon, as well as selected countries in Africa and Latin America.22 Although Pakhomov 
attributed such a heavy touring schedule to the great international appetite for his country’s 
socialist art, he was concerned that the company’s repertoire was becoming too reliant on classic 
works such as Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake, Op. 20 (premiered in 1877), Adolphe Adams’s Giselle 
(1841), and Don Quixote (1869) by composer Ludwig Minkus and choreographer Marius Petipa, 
and that the company needed a reprieve from touring during the 1963-1964 season to add new 
productions. Nonetheless, Pakhomov indicated that Bolshoi Ballet should still embark on their 
tour of London before this reprieve. He then proposed that the July 1963 London tour should be 
the last with a large detachment of 90-95 artists, and that after this visit, touring parties should 
only number 20-25 people.23 It should be noted that Pakhomov lost his position as artistic 
 
21 “Russia Wants More Cultural Links,” Times, 9 January 1963, 7. 
22 Pakhomov did not mention which countries in Africa and Latin America. 
23 Pakhomov to Furtseva, 14 January 1963, Dokladnaia zapiska o gastrol’noi deiatel’nosti baleta Bol’shogo 
teatra Soiuza SSR [Memorandum about the Touring Activities of the Bolshoi Theater], f. 648, op. 11, d. 52 
Perepiska s Ministerstvom kul’tury SSSR o repertuare gastrolei baleta v Londone, postanovke K.Ia. Goleizovskim 
baleta S.A. Balasaniana “Leili i Medzhnun”, gastroliakh zarubekhnykh artistov na stsene teatra, rabote nad fil’mom 
“Bolshoi balet” i dr. Chast’ I [Correspondence with the USSR Ministry of Culture Regarding the Repertoire of the 
Ballet Tour in London, K.Ia. Goleizovskim’s Production of S.A. Balasanian’s Ballet Leili and Majnun, Work on the 
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director of the Bolshoi later that year, and it was taken up by Mikhail Chulaki.24 It is unclear 
whether his report had any effect on this turn of events. 
Once the initial difficulties regarding scheduling were resolved, the correspondence 
between Goskontsert and Victor Hochhauser focused on the resolution of more minor issues. As 
of February 1963, contractual negotiations for the July 1963 London tour were well underway. 
According to the related correspondence between Goskontsert and the Bolshoi Theater, the 
negotiations were primarily about working out small details over repertoire, travel, translators, 
publicity, and contractual language.25 By June, Rozhdestvensky was selected to conduct the 
tour,26 and Chulaki finalized the repertoire and performance schedule.27 In addition to the 
classics, Swan Lake and Giselle, the ballet program included the following Soviet ballets and 
suites: Prokofiev’s Zolushka (Cinderella), Shchedrin’s The Humpbacked Horse (written in 
1955),28 and Lieutenant Kijé (the music of which was drawn from Prokofiev’s 1934 film score), 
which had been premiered at the Bolshoi Theater in 1945, 1960, and 1963, respectively.29 Also 
 
Film The Bolshoi Ballet, and Others] (f. 648, op. 11, ds. 52 and 53 hereafter cited as f. 648, op. 11, ds. 52 and 53, 
chast’ I and II, respectively), RGALI. 
24 Chulaki served as artistic director of the Bolshoi Theater from 1954 to 1959 and from 1963 to 1970. Iurii 
Grigorovich, Concert Program, 19 November 1993, in M.I. Chulaki, Ia byl direktorom Bol’shogo teatra… [I Was 
the Director of the Bolshoi Theater…] (Moscow: Muzyka [Music], 1994), 133. 
25 Pakhomov and Lavrovskii to Ponomarev, 4 February 1963, f. 648, op. 11, d. 59 Perepiska s 
Goskontsertom SSSR o sostave uchastnikov i repertuare gastrolei teatra v Anglii, Bolgarii, Vengrii, SShA i dr., 
stazhirovke artistov D. Uzunova i N. Giaurova (Bolgariia), B. Grei (Angliia) i dr. Chast’ I [Correspondence with 
Goskontsert Regarding the Selection of Participants and Repertoire for the Tours in England, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
USA, and others; the Internships of Artists D. Uzunova and N. Giaurova (Bulgaria), B. Grey (England), and Others], 
RGALI. Several examples of the correspondence in f. 648, op. 11, d. 56 focus on repertoire and publicity. See f. 
648, op. 11, d. 56 Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR o sostave uchastnikov i repertuare gastrolei v Gretsii, Finliandii, 
Anglii, poezdke v Shvetsiiu balmeistera A.M. Messerera dlia postanovki baleta P.I. Chaikovskogo “Lebedinoe 
ozero”, stazhirovke baleriny Ansal’di (Braziliia) i dr. [The USSR Ministry of Culture on the Selection of Tour 
Participants and Repertoire in Greece, Finland, and England; the Ballet Master A.M. Messerer’s Trip to Sweden for 
a Production of Tchaikovsky’s Ballet Swan Lake; Internship of Ballerina Ansaldi (Brazil); and Others] (hereafter 
cited as f. 648, op. 11, d. 56), RGALI. 
26 Chulaki to Stepanov, 12 June 1963, f. 648, op. 11, d. 53, chast’ II, RGALI. 
27 Chulaki to Furtseva, 25 June 1963, f. 648, op. 11, d. 53, chast’ II, RGALI. 
28 “Dancing at Its Richest,” Times, 5 July 1963, 15. 
29 Hochhauser to Pakhomov, 27 March 1963, f. 648, op. 11, d. 61 Perepiska s sovetskimi obshchestvami 
druzhby, inostrannymi organizatsiiami i otdel’nymi grazhdanami o gastroliakh artistov teatra v Anglii, Irlandii, 
priglashenii V. Fel’zenshteina (GDR) dlia postanovki v GABTe odnoi iz oper D. Verdi i dr. [Correspondence with 
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included were Prokofiev’s Romeo and Juliet and Aram Khachaturian’s Gayane, which had been 
premiered at the Kirov Theater in 1940 and 1942, respectively.30 Although it does not appear that 
Khachaturian’s Spartak was performed on the 1963 tour, Shchedrin’s The Humpbacked Horse 
could have satisfied Victor Hochhauser’s earlier request for a recent Soviet work.31 
While they were not without difficulties in communication, the negotiations between the 
Hochhausers, Goskontsert, and the Bolshoi Ballet for the 1963 London tour were not plagued by 
difficult political issues. Nevertheless, even relatively calm periods in Soviet cultural history 
were not completely serene. The government’s intervention in the arts after the Manezh Gallery 
incident in 1962 had affected poetry and literature directly, although its impact on musical 
composition was much less severe.32 The performance of music of a non-controversial character 
by establishment Soviet and classic Russian composers did not attract the attention of the 
government. In other words, there was an artistic crisis occurring during the tour’s negotiations, 
but it affected cultural areas far removed from the Bolshoi Ballet. As far as Victor Hochhauser 
was concerned, no large political issues confronted him on either the British or Soviet side, and 
this negotiation was relatively simple and easy.  
 
Soviet Friendship Societies, Foreign Organizations, and Civil Departments Regarding Artists’ Tours in England and 
Ireland, V. Felzenstein’s (GDR) Invitation for performances at the Bolshoi Theater of One of G. Verdi’s Operas, and 
Others], RGALI. 
30 M. Anastas’ev to V.T. Stepanov, 3 May 1963, f. 648, op. 11, d. 56, RGALI. 
31 Italian composer Cesare Pugni composed the ballet The Humpbacked Horse for the Imperial Theater in 
St. Petersburg in 1864, and it has been performed in multiple versions since the original version’s premiere. 
Shchedrin’s 1955 version was intended to be a new independent work (with new music) based on the same Russian 
tale. “Dancing at Its Richest,” Times, 15. Levon Hakobian considers Shchedrin to be one of the more conformist 
composers of the generation following Shostakovich. He was able to experiment with modernist stylistic elements 
while remaining largely within the bounds of establishment acceptability. Hakobian describes The Humpbacked 
Horse to be in the style of the fairy tale operas of Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov and Igor Stravinsky’s Firebird (1910). 
Shchedrin was closely connected with the ballet (he was married to Maya Plisetzkaya, the prima ballerina of the 
Bolshoi Ballet) and wrote five ballets in total. Levon Hakobian, Music of the Soviet Age, 1917-1987 (Stockholm: 
Melos, 1998), 319-22. 
32 See Page 122. 
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The relatively calm political climate during the Bolshoi Ballet’s 1963 tour allowed for the 
distancing of cultural gestures from political concerns. While incidents such as the construction 
of the Berlin Wall in 1962 prevented some musical exchanges from taking place, they did not 
result in a complete severance or reconsideration of cultural relations in general. During the tour, 
there were no protests against Khrushchev’s contemporaneous attacks on the cultural 
intelligentsia, which stemmed from the Manezh Gallery incident, or against recent international 
incidents such as the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (which had occurred 
during the Bolshoi Ballet’s first tour). The anonymous ballet critic (or critics) of The Times, for 
example, voiced his/her admiration for the Bolshoi as one of the “great companies of the world,” 
and his/her disapproval of certain creative decisions and stylistic imperfections in the production. 
However, they did not once mention politics.33 The tour was very successful with the British 
public: the performances were sold out a month in advance, and most of the audience members 
had bought the full allotment of ten tickets.34 This depoliticized environment became fertile 
ground for the further cultivation of cultural relations, because it satisfied the Soviet Ministry of 
Culture’s need to demonstrate the benign cultured-ness of the USSR to the rest of the world, on 
the one hand, and the Soviet appetite for foreign currency from ticket sales, on the other. The 
performances were very beneficial for the Hochhausers: it was a profitable venture that 
consolidated their position for future exchanges with Soviet dancers and musicians. 
 
Political Criticism of the Soviet Union and the Prague Spring 
The Hochhausers’ relationship with the USSR flourished during periods of relative 
political calm. During these periods, the Hochhausers could stress the division between the arts 
 
33 “A Basic Assumption of the Heroic,” Times, 2 July 1963, 13; and “Dancing at its Richest,” Times, 15. 
34 “2,000 Queue for the Bolshoi,” Times, 13 May 1963, 12. 
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and politics, and, as a result, not take a political position. However, during periods of political 
turmoil, public sentiment often conflated so-called cultural expressions with the political actions 
of that country. In these cases, the artistic diplomats—such as touring dancers and musicians—
were sometimes seen as representatives of their home country both artistically and politically. It 
was at this point, when the separation of artistic and political spheres broke down, that the 
depoliticized artistic space of ballet performance also became the site of mass political 
demonstrations and the target of condemnation on political rather than aesthetic grounds in the 
British press. Moreover, the severity of the political situation made it increasingly difficult for 
the Hochhausers to maintain an apolitical stance, which could have stemmed from critics’ own 
personal beliefs or from the political pressure imposed by contemporaries and the general public. 
In addition, the Soviet effort to appear as a strong—yet benign—beacon to the future was 
liable to be undermined by events that could be politically embarrassing. While Soviet 
institutions no longer required Westerners to speak positively of the Soviet political position, it 
was still taboo to criticize it. Any public stand by a Western concert agent or musician on an 
opposing political position could immediately and permanently jeopardize that person’s relations 
with the Soviets. The Hochhausers were undoubtedly aware of the Soviet sensitivity to criticism, 
and, as a result, they trod carefully, so as not to risk damaging an important sector of their 
business’s income. Their caution was very evident in two of the major scandals affecting the 
Soviet image abroad: the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of their own member state Czechoslovakia in 
1968, and the USSR’s general repression of Jewish populations, which included the refusal to 
allow Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel in the early 1970s. 
The Prague Spring (January to August 1968) can be described as a period of 
liberalization in Czechoslovakia that began with the effort to decentralize the country’s economy 
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in order to revitalize it, which in turn led to efforts to democratize the country’s political 
structure. The reforms were not anti-communist; instead they were based on the idea that 
Czechoslovakia had completed the first stage of socialism—the dictatorship of the proletariat35—
and was ready to move on to a more humanistic stage. The loosening of government control, a 
newly acquired freedom of association, and the aforementioned economic and political 
democratization allowed for social movements independent of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party to develop.36 Four-fifths of the Czechoslovak population had supported the reformers, and 
the citizens were divided into three main groups: the monocrats, the reformists, and the 
pluralists. The monocratic and reformist factions were still loyal to the single-party system, and 
accepted that the Communist Party should continue its leadership role. The former wished to 
keep political power in the hands of the Communist Party, while the latter argued to diversify the 
political stage by allowing the creation of non-communist political parties. However, these 
alternatives would be restricted to those of the leftist National Front, which would not enter into 
direct competition with the Communist Party. Meanwhile, the pluralists were in support of a 
multi-party democratic political system, which would result in open elections between left- and 
right-wing factions. Throughout the Prague Spring, the pluralist faction of the Czechoslovak 
population grew steadily to roughly twenty-four percent.37 
 
35 The dictatorship of the proletariat is a Marxist principle that suggests the proletariat should govern in the 
transition period (socialism) between the defeat of bourgeoise (the end of capitalism) and the attainment of utopia 
(communism). In practice, the directorship of the proletariat followed the Leninist position that the Communist Party 
was the true representative of the proletariat and its interests, and that it needed complete control of the state and the 
economy to remove the remaining vestiges of the bourgeoise, prevent counterrevolution and foreign imperialist 
intervention, and to lead the country towards communist utopia. Encyclopedia Britannica, “Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat,” 1 May 2017, accessed 27 January 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/dictatorship-of-the-
proletariat. 
36 Zdeněk Strmiska, “The Prague Spring as a Social Movement,” in Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and 
Crises, 1918-88, eds. Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal (London: Macmillan, 1989), 253-55. 
37 Ibid., 257-62. 
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At this point, the reformist faction was still the majority, but it appeared to be losing 
ground to pluralist sentiment on the eve of a major election. In public polls taken in 1968, thirty-
one percent were in favor of allowing political parties outside of the National Front to exist, and 
twenty-three percent were in favor of allowing the creation of parties without the permission of 
the Communist Party. Moreover, the conviction that the most important condition for the 
creation of a free society was the existence of an unsuppressed opposition was becoming more 
common in the public psyche. The clear majority polled of both Party and non-Party members 
were in support of the unconditional protection of the freedoms of speech and expression.38 
Assuming that the reformist communists desired to keep the Communist Party’s preeminent 
position in Czechoslovak politics, it appears that an increasingly prominent and influential 
portion of the general population desired to tread farther into the realm of political pluralism. 
While the creation of National Front parties or cooperative parties that were approved by the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party would have been acceptable within the reform communists’ best 
interests, the possible emergence of unapproved and oppositional parties would have been 
beyond the Communist Party’s control.  
By the summer of 1968, the West was beginning to take notice, and several observers 
were already drawing parallels between the Prague Spring and the suppressed 1956 reforms in 
Hungary. In July, while the USSR and its allies were conducting military exercises near the 
Czechoslovak border, a group of concerned British citizens—including historians, physicists, 
writers, and the composers Lennox Berkeley and Benjamin Britten—signed Lord Russell’s open 
letter to The Times to call attention to the Czechoslovak situation. They described the Prague 
Spring as a quiet effort to reform within the framework of socialism and Czechoslovakia’s own 
 
38 Ibid., 262-64. 
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democratic tradition, and they worried that the USSR and its communist allies would interfere 
with, or even directly intervene in, these reforms. They also argued that these reforms were 
Czechoslovakia’s right as a sovereign entity.39  
Czechoslovakia’s Warsaw Pact allies Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, 
Poland, and the USSR determined that a pluralist Czechoslovak political model could potentially 
influence and destabilize their own political systems and thus weaken world socialism. The 
Soviet Politburo itself was becoming increasingly worried that the Czechoslovak reforms were 
having a destabilizing effect on the USSR: the younger generation was becoming attracted to 
Czechoslovak liberalization, and the state-run media of the Soviet member states Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine were presenting the reforms in a positive 
light.40 As a result, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the USSR 
intervened by invading the country in August 1968.41 Czechoslovakia was then occupied by its 
Warsaw Pact allies who sought to remove the reformists from the government, quell public 
unrest, consolidate the control of conservatives loyal to the Soviet party line, and return the 
country’s political and economic structure to the status quo ante.42 
The invasion sent shockwaves through the West, but while many in the artistic 
community immediately denounced the attack, the musicians and the concert agents who 
maintained connections with the USSR had to tread carefully in the public sphere. Britten, Pears, 
and their friends, Donald and Kathleen Mitchell, were attending the Edinburgh Festival when 
they heard the news of the invasion. In her travel diary, Kathleen Mitchell indicated that Britten, 
 
39 Lord Russell and others, “Letters to the Editor, Czechoslovakia on the Brink: The Threat of 
Intervention,” Times, 24 July 1968, 9. 
40 Mark Kramer, “The Kremlin, the Prague Spring, and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Promises of 1968: 
Crisis, Illusion, and Utopia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 333. 
41 Romania was the only Warsaw Pact ally to refuse to take part in the invasion. 
42 William Tompson, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev (London: Pearson, 2003), 38. 
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Pears, and the Mitchells privately expressed the hope that the reformists, which they saw as the 
majority, would maintain a “Communist country that cares about individual freedoms.”43 
However, there was a specific difference in Britten’s private and public responses to the 
invasion. The Czech conductor Rafael Kubelík—who was participating in the Edinburgh 
Festival—requested that Britten sign a denouncement of the Soviet action in Prague, and Britten 
refused.44  
While Britten, as a signatory on Lord Russell’s open letter to The Times, urged caution to 
the USSR before the invasion, he stopped short of publicly criticizing the occupation once it 
commenced.45  Kubelík’s protest was also published in The Times and included the signatures of 
thirty-four musicians, including Pierre Fournier, Otto Klemperer, Yehudi Menuhin, Jacqueline 
du Pré, Arthur Rubinstein, Georg Solti, Isaac Stern, Igor Stravinsky, and William Walton (but 
not Britten). Kubelík’s petition condemned the invasion outright as a violation of the signatories’ 
humanitarian ideals and called for a complete boycott of cultural relations with the entire 
Warsaw Pact until foreign troops withdrew from Czechoslovakia and its government was 
restored to govern without outside intervention.46 Britten explained to Kathleen Mitchell in 
private that such an action would not convince the USSR to change its course and it would only 
sever connections between the West and Soviet audiences and musicians. Britten privately 
believed that these cultural connections could leave a positive impression on the USSR and its 
allies, and might eventually make some impression on their policies.47  
 
43 Kathleen Mitchell, “Edinburgh Diary 1968,” in On Mahler and Britten: Essays in Honor of Donald 
Mitchell on his Seventieth Birthday, ed. Philip Reed (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 1995), 199. 
44 Ibid., 202-03. 
45 A.J. Ayer, C.M. Bowra, Sidney Brenner, and others, Untitled Advertisement, Times, 23 December 1965, 
5; and Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Keith Baxter, Jill Bennett, and others, “Dissociate Britain,” Times, 30 March 1967, 3 
and 5. 
46 It should be noted that Warsaw Pact member Romania was included in the boycott, even though it took 
no part in the invasion. “Musicians Announce Boycott,” Times, 27 August 1968, 5. 
47 Mitchell, “Edinburgh Diary 1968,” 202-03. 
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Five days after the invasion, the British Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Harold 
Wilson recalled the House of Commons from summer recess.48 In his address to the House, he 
reasoned that the USSR feared liberalization among its allies, had taken a calculated risk in 
invading Czechoslovakia, and was already prepared for the worsening of relations between itself 
and the West. Wilson, with the support of the leaders of the Conservative Party, determined that 
the UK would take a proportional response. They agreed that a total boycott of cultural 
exchanges in tandem with the use of economic sanctions would only exacerbate the problem by 
increasing Eastern Europe’s dependency on the Soviets.49 Nonetheless, Wilson specified that 
some of the upcoming exchanges would have to be canceled if they carried political overtones, in 
order to demonstrate to the international community that the British did not tolerate the Soviet 
action in Czechoslovakia. In the House of Commons soon after the beginning of the occupation, 
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart indicated that: 
[We] cannot go ahead with the Anglo-Soviet Historical Exhibition in Moscow. That was 
to depict Anglo-Russian relations since the Middle Ages. But unless we can put into that 
exhibition a special section dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations in the last five days, I do 
not think that it would be appropriate to hold it. I also think that we should avoid contacts 
with clear political overtones, and which are of such a nature that the very fact one has 
such a contact could be quoted as evidence that Britain really did not care what had 
happened.50 
 
He then stated that the upcoming tour of the UK by the Red Army Choir was a problematic 
cultural exchange for the above reasons: “it would [also] be totally wrong for the Red Army 
Choir to come to this country, and this has been made clear to the impresario concerned.”51 The 
 
48 Wilson served as prime minister on two separate terms from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1976. 
49 Hugh Noyes, “Soviet Action Condemned by Both Houses,” Times, 27 August 1968, 5. 
50 “Mr. Wilson Rejects ‘Relapse’ into Cold War, Need to Maintain NATO Defenses, Moscow Exhibition 
Cancelled, MPs’ Visits Inappropriate,” Times, 27 August 1968, 10. 
51 Ibid., 10. 
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impresario was Victor Hochhauser, who had contracted the Soviet Red Army Choir to perform 
in Britain in 1968.  
The cancellation of the Choir’s British tour resulted in the Hochhausers becoming a 
target for anti-Soviet protests. It was made apparent in these protests that the Hochhausers were 
seen as complicit with the Soviet action. One such protest took the form of a banner outside of a 
concert hall which read: “Red Army Ensemble: Now Appearing in Prague.” In the 2010 
Guardian interview discussed above, Victor Hochhauser voiced his frustration regarding British 
protests against the performances of Soviet musicians:52 
It was always a bit of a tragicomedy… That is, it would have been funny if it was 
happening to you, but not to me. For me, it wasn’t quite so funny because I was a private 
enterprise being affected by government matters. The fur trade or timber trade didn’t 
seem affected, but music seemed acceptable to attack as a public manifestation.53 
 
Victor Hochhauser made very few public comments regarding the Prague Spring and its 
suppression. Like Britten, he was undoubtedly aware at the time that direct criticism of the 
USSR on such issues would result in the loss of his Soviet contacts. However, the Hochhausers’ 
rationale for preserving Soviet contacts differed from Britten’s.  
Britten was interested in the Russian classical musical tradition—which had a profound 
influence on his own musical style—and was concerned with protecting his personal and creative 
relationships with Soviet musicians and audiences, believing that such connections could 
possibly help the USSR change its policies for the better. He did not depend on the USSR for his 
livelihood.54 In a 2014 interview with The Daily Telegraph, Victor Hochhauser indicated that his 
company never received subsidies or support from the British government for his company’s role 
 
52 See Wroe. 
53 See ibid. 
54 By 1968, Britten had long ascended into the upper class. His music was in high demand, and he had 
many sources of support for his endeavors such as the Aldeburgh Festival and the English Opera Group. Kildea, 
Benjamin Britten, 408; and Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of Kildea, Selling Britten. 
336 
 
in negotiations with the USSR.55 As a result, the success or failure of the exchange of musicians 
had a direct impact on the Hochhausers’ own income and livelihood.56 At the time of the 
invasion, thirty thousand tickets had already been sold, and all of these tickets were to be fully 
refunded as a result of the tour’s cancellation. The Daily Mail reported that Victor Hochhauser 
bore the full cost of these refunds, as well as the hotel reservations for the one-hundred-man 
choir. The newspaper also indicated that Victor Hochhauser had said that, “There should be no 
ban on other Russian artists like Oistrakh and Rostropovich. But I accept that the Red Army is 
something else.”57 The nature of the relationship with the USSR was fundamentally different for 
the Hochhausers and Britten, and the primary difference was the question of livelihood. 
As mentioned above, the British parliamentary consensus was to find a proportional 
response to the Soviet occupation and to prevent the presentation of explicitly pro-Soviet 
political cultural manifestations taking place in the UK. In 1969, Victor Hochhauser strove to 
resume the visits of large Soviet ensembles, such as the Bolshoi Ballet. However, a new political 
crisis was already developing. The British teacher Gerald Brooke, who was teaching in the 
USSR as part of the cultural exchange agreements, was accused of disseminating anti-Soviet 
literature and being a spy. In response to calls from the press that the tour should be canceled, 
Victor Hochhauser argued that, while he had complete sympathy with Brooke’s plight, 
performers should not be “used as pawns in a political game.”58 The British government kept to 
its position that it had intervened to cancel the Red Army Choir after the invasion only because 
 
55 See Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser.” 
56 The Hochhausers also represented British performers, but they were far fewer and less prestigious than 
the clients of their larger UK counterparts. What set the Hochhausers apart from these larger firms was their ability 
to negotiate with Goskontsert and contract famous Soviet ensembles and musicians. 
57 “Stewart Warns the Red Army Choir ‘Keep Out,’” Daily Mail, 27 August 1968, 1. 
58 “Bolshoi Stars ‘not Political Pawns,’” Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1969, 19. 
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of the involvement of members of the Soviet armed forces in the ensemble, and did not seek to 
ban non-military ensembles in response to the Brooke crisis.59 
 The British government’s refusal to admit the Red Army Choir would prove not to be 
permanent or even long-lasting. The singers were allowed to perform in the UK in 1970.60 The 
concerts took place less than two years after the invasion, when Czechoslovakia was still 
undergoing the forced process of “normalization” under its new conservative pro-Soviet 
leadership. The Daily Mail journalist Bernard Levin, in particular, found the British 
government’s response to Czechoslovak occupation to be both weak and fleeting, and he used 
his platform to advocate for a more definitive demonstration of solidarity with the Czechoslovak 
plight.61 It is very possible that Goskontsert placed the Hochhausers in a difficult position during 
negotiations by making the Red Army Choir tour a very high priority. If Goskontsert gave the 
Hochhausers an ultimatum that they would only do business with them after the Choir’s future 
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61 Bernard Levin, “Bernard Levin,” Daily Mail, 2 April 1970, 8. The Daily Mail is a historically right-wing 
British newspaper, especially so during the tenure of Robert English (1971-1992) who was a supporter of Margaret 
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Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the Panov Affair, and the Bolshoi Ballet 
After the death of Stalin, and particularly after the Hungarian crisis in 1956 and during 
the tenure of Nikita Khrushchev, Western sentiments regarding the USSR had generally 
improved. While the USSR still presented itself as the standard bearer of a political ideology, 
economic system, and military presence that rivaled the powers of the West, Khrushchev’s 
administration appeared to be a more sympathetic departure from the Stalinist past, and it 
seemed to be committed to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. While war scares were still 
possible—the most notable being the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis—and proxy wars were still 
being fought, Cold War tensions had been appearing to loosen throughout the early and mid-
1960s due to the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. The invasion of Czechoslovakia had 
arguably put an end to this period of relative ease among Westerners, as it made apparent the 
limits of Soviet tolerance to deviances such as the Prague Spring, and the Soviet state’s 
subsequent crackdown on dissidence in the intelligentsia.62 The next major crisis that affected the 
USSR’s standing in Western opinion stemmed from revelations of systemic anti-Semitism within 
the USSR and, particularly, the repression of Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel throughout the 
early 1970s.  
Jewishness was characterized as a nationality in the USSR, and separate from Baltic, 
Caucasian, Central Asian, and Russian nationalities.63 Anti-Semitism was somewhat common in 
the USSR, and there were periods when it was encouraged by the Soviet government. During the 
 
62 Ludmilla Alexeyeva’s memoirs, The Thaw Generation, provide an excellent account of the beginnings of 
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anti-cosmopolitan campaign from 1949 to 1953, the government professed that it was 
combatting foreign influences that sought to undermine the state. In fact, it was a thinly veiled 
repression of perceived cosmopolitans: Jewish people. In his book Creative Union, Tomoff 
explains how Khrennikov and the leadership of the Composers’ Union attempted to shield the 
careers of their Jewish members during the government crackdown.64 Elizabeth Wilson—who 
was a student of the Moscow Conservatory during the 1960s—believes that while discrimination 
was less evident in the 1960s than earlier, it was still present. She herself did not witness the 
mistreatment of Jews at the conservatory, and many of her Jewish friends were only of Jewish 
descent: they did not practice the Jewish faith and identified culturally as Russian. Nevertheless, 
she remembers that there was a prevalent atmosphere of casual racism, which manifested in 
hundreds of Jewish jokes. She recalled that many people believed that Russian musicians were 
favored over their Jewish contemporaries in Soviet competitions, and that some Jewish 
musicians even considered changing their names to more “Russian-sounding” names to avoid 
such discrimination.65 
Shostakovich, whose social circle included several Jewish friends, began incorporating 
Jewish characteristics in his music during the mid-1940s. Examples of works that include such 
influences include the finale of the Piano Trio No. 2, Op. 67 (1944), Songs from Jewish Folk 
Poetry, Op. 79 (1948), and the first movement of the Symphony No. 10 in E minor, Op. 93 
(1953). Shostakovich’s growing sympathy for the Jewish plight was evident during late-
Stalinism. In 1948, around the time his music was being criticized during Zhdanovshchina, he 
visited the family of the Jewish actor Solomon Mikhoels on the day he was killed by the NKVD 
(the Soviet security agency). When Soviet anti-Semitism intensified during the anticosmopolitan 
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campaign in the final years of Stalin’s life, Mikhoels’ son-in-law was arrested and Shostakovich 
wrote to Lavrenti Beria, the head of the NKVD, to intercede for his release. Stalin died a month 
later, and Beria released many of those recently arrested, including Mikhoels’s son-in-law.66 The 
movement “Babi Yar” in the Symphony No. 13 in B-flat minor, Op. 113 (1962), which set 
Yevtushenko’s poem to music, was Shostakovich’s most explicit musical attack on Soviet anti-
Semitism, as well as anti-Semitism in general. The work was premiered during the aftermath of 
the scandal at the Manezh Gallery,67 and the state, including Khrushchev himself, pressured 
Shostakovich, Yevtushenko, and the performers to withdraw it. The performance went on as 
planned, and was enthusiastically received by the audience.68 
According to the American Jewish Year Book, the year 1970 was marked by near 
continuous and organized protests against Soviet anti-Semitism in the UK.69 Several associations 
based in university campuses and Jewish communities, such as the Universities Committee for 
Soviet Jewry and the Glasgow Jewish Action Group, organized large and sustained anti-Soviet 
protests. While these protests usually took the form of peaceful marches in public civic spaces, 
universities, and near Jewish spaces such as synagogues, some of the anti-Soviet demonstrations 
took on a more militant character. Moreover, any manifestation of Russian or Soviet culture, 
history, or identity within the UK became a target for protest.70 Lionel Kochan and Miriam 
Kochan, authors of the “Great Britain” entry in the American Jewish Year Book, indicated that: 
A spokesman for the Front for the National Liberation of Soviet Jewry, a splinter group 
of the Universities Committee which picketed an exhibition marking the centenary of 
[Vladimir] Lenin’s birth in May [1970], said it would be called into action when Soviet 
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methods warranted militant reactions. He claimed that at least 1,000 of the 5,000 to 6,000 
students who usually participated in the committee’s peaceful marches were ready for 
more militant methods.71 
 
Two examples of more militant activism include the following: Jewish students trespassing on 
and vandalizing Soviet-owned property in London in response to the arrest of Jews in the USSR; 
and bricks bearing the message “struggle for Soviet Jewry, these trials are a mockery of justice” 
being thrown through the windows of the London offices of Aeroflot—the Soviet state-owned 
airline—in protest to the death sentences passed on Mark Dymshits and Eduard Kuznetsov in 
Leningrad.72 These more violent demonstrations were a step too far for the mainstream members 
of the movement, and were promptly denounced by the Board of Deputies of British Jews.73 
The Board of Deputies itself took another approach: it concentrated on lobbying the 
British government, and on directly communicating with high-ranking Soviet officials. The 
strategy apparently focused on the advocacy for change through the influence of policy makers, 
as well as appealing to British public opinion through large-scale peaceful demonstrations. 
Nonetheless, it did not attempt to undermine the USSR through more militant activism. The 
Board of Deputies’ response to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromko’s October 
1970 visit to London was three-fold: the group organized a peaceful protest march, attempted to 
present a letter regarding the British Jewry’s concern about the arrests of Soviet Jews applying to 
emigrate to Israel, and lobbied the British government to address their concerns. Efforts to 
communicate directly with Soviet officials yielded few, if any, tangible results: the Board’s 
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delegation was not able to relay the letter to Gromyko, and the Board’s November letter to the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet head 
of state, Leonid Brezhnev, apparently received no confirmation of receipt or response.74  
The Board’s appeals to British high-ranking officials appear to have been more 
successful. Prime Minister Edward Heath (1970-1974) indicated to the Board that he had 
personally discussed the Soviet repression of its Jewish population with Gromyko. In addition, 
British Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home informed the British section of the World Jewish 
Congress of the British government’s concerns regarding the plight of Soviet Jews and its 
commitment to pressing the Soviet government to improve their situation:75 
The [British] government [has] made plain the fact that [it deplores the] violation of 
human rights and the denial of religious freedom wherever these occur. These views, 
which of course apply to the conditions of Soviet Jews, have repeatedly been stated at the 
United Nations by our representatives, as well as to representatives of the Soviet 
Government.76 
 
While it is clear that British Jewish advocates generally had more success appealing to the 
British government than to the Soviet administration, it is not evident that the UK had any real 
influence over the Soviet treatment of its own citizens. In addition, it is possible that such an 
impasse spurred some of the activists to interpret such tactics to be ultimately ineffectual and to 
seek more drastic measures against the USSR. 
 Jewish activists who considered the Soviet state to be an anti-Semitic regime, which 
actively repressed Jews and prevented them from emigrating to Israel, found Jewish concert 
agents, such as Sol Hurok and Victor Hochhauser, who continued to work with it to be compliant 
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with the Soviets and traitorous to their own people. Radical members of the Jewish Defense 
League (JDL), which opposed the importation of Soviet artists to the US, bombed Hurok’s New 
York offices on January 26, 1972. The bomb killed Iris Kones, one of Hurok’s receptionists, and 
injured thirteen others, including Hurok. The attack also revealed rifts in the JDL’s membership. 
The bombing was carried out by a few militant members, three of whom were charged with 
Kones’s murder, while the League’s leadership denounced the attack.77 No such attempt was 
made on Victor Hochhauser’s life, but he was very possibly aware of the assassination attempt 
on his American contemporary and of the physical risks resulting from his own business 
relationship with the USSR. 
British popular discontent over anti-Semitism in Soviet domestic policy focused in part 
on the personal plight of Valery and Galina Panov. According to a FCO report, Valery Panov 
was a principal dancer of the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad, a recipient of several state honors, 
renowned by Soviet and foreign critics, and Jewish. The report also indicates that in 1959, at the 
age of nineteen, Panov had toured the US, but was called back early with the news that his 
parents had been killed in a car accident. Upon his return to the USSR, he learned that his parents 
were still alive, and no explanation was given regarding the false report of his parents’ death or 
for his early departure from the tour. This proved to be the only time Panov was allowed to travel 
outside of Russia. (His wife, Galina Panov, was also an award-winning dancer and had recently 
became one of the other soloists of the Kirov Ballet.78) The FCO commentator suggests that 
Valery Panov felt “great frustration” in the awareness that his fellow-dancers were able to travel 
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and perform internationally, and that he chafed against the limits on creative freedom in the 
USSR.79 
Following the negotiations for the 1972 Days of Soviet Music Festival,80 the 
Hochhausers set in motion negotiations for soloists of the Bolshoi and Kirov Ballet companies to 
perform in London (in 1972). Goskontsert signed a preliminary contract with the Hochhausers, 
but repeatedly postponed the London tour over the next couple of years apparently in order to 
arrange tours to other countries. The Hochhausers voiced their frustrations with Goskontsert in 
the following letter in June 1973:81 
Despite repeated promises this tour was postponed by cable at the last minute to 1973 
causing enormous financial losses to us to the amount of which we have already sent to 
you. During a visit to Madame Furtseva in September 1972, she again promised us the 
groups for 1973 and this was subsequently confirmed during the festival by Mr. Golovin. 
During a visit to Moscow in January last we were informed that the Bolshoi and Kirov 
were busy this year in Japan and West Germany. The groups’ visit had to be postponed 
again. To our great surprise we now find that the group is available and is, instead of 
coming to England, going to the United States. This has caused us enormous 
embarrassment and loss of face with the theater and public. May we now have your 
assurance that it is your intention to re-establish normal cultural contacts with this 
country and to honor existing contracts with us?82 
 
According to a preliminary contract drafted by Goskontsert in January 1973, the original plan for 
a tour consisting of soloists from both the Bolshoi and Kirov companies was scrapped in favor of 
a much more extensive, month-long summer season presented by the Bolshoi Company.83 It is 
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80 The Days of Soviet Music Festival was held in London in November 1972, and it was part of the same 
cultural agreement as the 1971 Days of British Music Festival. At the festival, David Oistrakh performed, and 
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very likely that this document was drafted during Victor Hochhauser’s aforementioned visit to 
Moscow in January 1973. Not long after Victor Hochhauser’s June 1973 letter, Soviet 
Ambassador Lunkov personally assured the Hochhausers that the Bolshoi Ballet would commit 
to giving a series of performances at the London Coliseum in the summer of 1974. The 
Hochhausers, apparently wary of yet another postponement or cancellation, and anxious to 
officially secure the theater, pressed Goskontsert to send an official confirmation as soon as 
possible.84 
The year 1972 also fell within a period when many Soviet Jewish citizens were applying 
to emigrate to Israel, and when Valery and Galina Panov applied for exit permits. According to a 
FCO report, their applications were rejected, and it is possible that the Soviet government 
considered their request to be a thinly veiled attempt to defect for professional reasons (i.e. to 
perform in the West). Valery was removed from the Kirov Ballet and his union, and was 
denounced as a traitor by his former colleagues. Galina was demoted to the corps-de-ballet, she 
resisted pressure to divorce Valery, and, as a result, she resigned from the Kirov in protest. Her 
mother withdrew permission for Galina to emigrate, after the former was given a state pension 
and renewable annual free vacation pass. Later that year, Valery was imprisoned for three days 
for allegedly spitting on a policeman’s sleeve; the couple had also been harassed by the KGB, 
and threatened with further arrests for various trumped-up charges. After a brief hunger strike, 
Valery was offered an exit visa; however, Galina was told that she could not leave the USSR as a 
result of her mother’s dependence on her. Valery refused to leave without his wife. In 1973, he 
was warned that if he did not leave, he could be deported or prosecuted. As of 1974, the Panovs 
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were unemployed, living in their Leningrad apartment, and unable to dance professionally as a 
result of Valery’s expulsion from his professional union.85  
The Panovs’ situation would become the focal point for both activists demonstrating on 
behalf of Soviet Jews and British theatrical professionals acting out of solidarity for foreign 
colleagues. The former was represented organizations such as the 35s (Womens’ Campaign for 
Soviet Jewry), Stop the Bolshoi Ballet Committee, and the Committee for the Release of Valery 
and Galina Panov (CRP); and the latter included the British Actors Equity Association (Equity), 
which is the trade union for British actors. Both bodies lobbied the British prime minister, 
Parliament, the FCO, Sadler’s Wells, and the Soviet ambassador to prevent the Bolshoi Ballet 
from performing in London unless the Panovs were allowed to emigrate or resume their careers 
in the USSR. The British actress Pamela Manson, one of the leaders of the CRP, took a 
particularly hard line toward the Soviets regarding the Panovs; the CRP called for a total 
shutdown of cultural exchanges both to and from the USSR until the Panovs were allowed to 
emigrate.86 Anti-Soviet demonstrations coincided with the appearances of Soviet performers in 
the UK, including the Days of Soviet Music Festival in 1972 and the Georgian State Ensemble of 
Dance’s tour of England and Ireland in 1973.87 Meanwhile, the individual representatives in the 
British parliament did not have a united position on the Panov situation and on the Bolshoi tour, 
and the divide seemed to fall along party lines, as some Conservative Party members of the 
House of Commons protested on behalf of the Panovs,88 while Labour Party members (several of 
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whom served in the FCO) supported the principle of keeping cultural ties with the USSR open.89 
The above criticisms of Sadler’s Wells, and of the government’s apparent compliance with the 
tour, took the form of public demonstrations, petitions, open letters in the press, meetings with 
representatives of both the British and Soviet governments, and private letters sent directly to the 
FCO and the Prime Minister.90  
Several of these letters addressed to the members of Parliament and to the Office of the 
Prime Minister, which are preserved in FCO records, recalled recent incidents when the British 
government canceled cultural exchanges and trade agreements due to human rights concerns, and 
they accused the government of hypocrisy in its current refusal to ban the Bolshoi. These 
instances of canceled exchanges include the British Lions’ rugby tour of South Africa and the 
sale of Bulldog training aircraft to Chile. The former was canceled due to Apartheid-era human 
rights violations, and the latter was in reaction to General Augusto Pinochet’s coup that replaced 
a democratically elected government with a military dictatorship.91 Moreover, a proposed 
American tour of Kirov performers was canceled in response to the Panov situation, an event that 
galvanized British activists. The pro-Panov supporters argued that the British government had 
acted on behalf of human rights victims in the past through curtailing cultural exchanges and 
trade, and that this instance was no different.92 
 
89 However, Labour Member of Parliament Roderick MacFarquhar expressed the concerns to the Minister 
of State David Ennals (also of the Labour Party) that the Party could potentially be accused of hypocrisy in the field 
of human rights by appearing to support the Soviet regime at a time when it was repressing its Jewish population. 
MacFarquhar to Ennals, 18 May 1974, FCO 34/2604, GB-Lna. 
90 The Panov scandal (1972-74) overlapped the tenures of two British prime ministers: Edward Heath (June 
1970 - March 1974) and Harold Wilson’s second period in office (March 1974 - April 1976). Heath was the leader 
of the Conservative Party and Wilson was the leader of the Labour Party. 
91 See FCO 34/274-75, GB-Lna. 
92 Examples of correspondence between representatives of the FCO and Prime Minister’s office and British 
advocates for the Panovs, as well as critics of Soviet anti-Semitism, are preserved within files FCO 28/2602-06 and 
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In their responses to the above organizations, Prime Ministers Heath and (later) Wilson 
and the FCO strictly adhered to the following four positions: 1) that the government considered 
the Soviet treatment of the Panovs to be a violation of their human rights; 2) that it would 
continue to lobby the Soviet government for their release; 3) that it was not able to directly 
intervene in another country’s domestic matters; and 4) that it was unable to influence what was 
a private business agreement between the Soviets and Sadler’s Wells. While they did not claim 
that anti-Semitism was absent in the USSR, they stopped short of defining it as part of an official 
policy. They argued that South Africa and Chile were in a different category, due to those 
countries’ official endorsement of Apartheid and the military coup, respectively. Furthermore, 
governmental representatives argued that it would be hypocritical to argue for the free travel of 
Soviet artists while preventing a Soviet ballet company from traveling to the UK. They also 
argued that a governmental intervention in order to force the tour’s cancellation would only 
exacerbate the political situation, weaken cultural ties with the USSR, and would not result in an 
improvement in the Panovs’ situation. Finally, the British government maintained that the only 
hope of influencing the USSR toward a more liberal position on human rights was through the 
continuation of cultural exchanges such as the Bolshoi Ballet’s London season.93  
Nevertheless, the above representatives of the British government pledged to continue to 
advocate for the Panovs using whatever means they deemed appropriate. Regarding the possible 
attendance of British government ministers at performances, the government also took a non-
committal stance by indicating that it would neither encourage nor discourage representatives to 
attend.94 Prime Minister Wilson himself declined the Soviet Embassy’s invitation to attend the 






solidarity with the trade union Equity’s opposition to the event.95 British Secretary of State in the 
FCO James Callaghan also refused the Soviet Embassy’s invitation. The Soviet Embassy 
considered the Bolshoi Ballet London season to be a major manifestation of Anglo-Soviet 
cultural relations, and interpreted the refusal of both high-ranking officials as a grave insult.96 
The British and Soviet governments, Sadler’s Wells, and the Hochhausers were not 
certain whether the Panov activists could do much harm to the tour beyond holding public 
demonstrations and making public statements. Both Lord Harewood, the managing director of 
the Sadler’s Wells Opera, and Victor Hochhauser warned that Equity might be able to use its 
influence to convince the stage workers to disrupt the performances by withdrawing their labor, 
which could ultimately cause the entire Bolshoi series to end prematurely.97 The question of 
whether Equity would attempt to sabotage the performances through industrial action was 
rendered moot by the fact that the Bolshoi Ballet brought its own stage workers.98 After Prime 
Minster Wilson declined the CRP’s request to block the Bolshoi tour in May 1974, Equity 
lobbied Employment Secretary Michael Foot to refuse the Bolshoi Ballet performers work visas 
until the Soviets granted exit visas to the Panovs.99 This request was denied in the House of 
Commons in order to prevent setting a parliamentary precedent for the political manipulation of 
the visa process.100  
The CRP’s and Equity’s strategy was to lobby the British government to block the 
Bolshoi from traveling to London. In response to the government’s decision to leave the matter 
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in the hands of Sadler’s Wells and the Soviet government, Equity General Secretary Peter 
Plouviez, in his letter to Secretary of State in the Home Office Robert Carr, pressed the 
government to intervene and prevent the tour via any means necessary. Equity’s attempt to 
convince Parliament to withhold work visas to the company was a result of this line of 
thinking.101 After Michael Foot declined Equity’s request, Plouviez assured Wilson that Equity 
would respect the government’s decision and not organize demonstrations within and outside the 
London Coliseum or harass the Soviet performers in any way.102 However, Manson and the CRP 
pledged to continue demonstrations and to make the performers of the Bolshoi feel as 
unwelcome as legally possible.103 Equity member Lawrence Olivier in an interview with The 
Daily Mail appeared to disagree with the CRP’s and Equity’s leadership regarding its position on 
the Soviet tour. While Olivier participated in public demonstrations denouncing the Soviet 
treatment of the Panovs, he stopped short of requesting that the government prevent the ballet 
company from traveling to London. Olivier argued that preventing the travel of artists in 
response to the restriction of other artists’ right to travel was hypocritical, and that such an action 
would prevent the free exchange of ideas, which resulted from the travel of artists. Nevertheless, 
he pressed for the British public to make it clear to the Soviets that this was not to be interpreted 
as an approval of its domestic policies in relation to the treatment of its Jewish population.104  
The UK’s major cultural export to the USSR at this time was a tour by the Prospect 
Theater Company from April 22 to May 12, 1974.105 The tour preceded the Bolshoi visit, the 
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company consisted mainly of Equity union members, and the visit was plagued by difficulties. A 
few of the actors were chastised for drunken conduct, and one of them was “roughed up” by 
hotel security for his use of foul language with the receptionist. On the other hand, their Soviet 
interpreter consistently referred to the company members as Jews and homosexuals, another 
interpreter constantly asked them to sell their clothes—possibly in order to later accuse them of 
illegal profiteering—and their overall accommodations and treatment were deemed second-rate 
in comparison with other British cultural visits. Jane Edgeworth, a representative of the British 
Council Drama Department, informed the FCO that Equity had considered canceling the tour due 
to the Panov scandal, but decided against this action so as not to withdraw employment from 
their members. While the actors were advised not to contact the Panovs, several members of the 
Prospect Theater sought them out and met them at their home. Also, the Panovs attempted to 
greet the actors at their hotel before the company’s departure. When the police refused the 
Panovs access, several members of the theater crossed the barrier to shake hands with them in a 
public display of defiance.106  
Meanwhile, the Soviet Ambassador and representatives of the Ministry of Culture 
maintained that the British activists were fabricating an artificial connection between the Bolshoi 
Ballet’s London season and the Panovs’ situation. They also held to the position that Valery 
Panov was free to emigrate, and that Galina could not due to unrelated family issues. In one 
instance, Soviet Ambassador Lunkov explained that Galina’s elderly mother was dependent on 
her for her own wellbeing, and thus refused Galina permission to emigrate.107 This point was in 
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direct contradiction to the aforementioned FCO report, which states that Galina Panov had a 
sister, and that their mother was much closer to this other sister than to Galina.108 Manson argued 
that in any case, the permission of Galina’s mother was legally irrelevant, because Galina had 
already come of age.109 
The Soviet Embassy and the Minister of Culture voiced their concerns regarding the 
success of the Bolshoi tour and the safety of the company throughout the entire negotiation 
period. On multiple occasions, they asked the British government for their assurance that it 
would prevent demonstrations from putting either of these two aspects at risk. In response to 
Ambassador Lunkov’s concerns that the “Zionists’” dissemination of anti-Soviet rhetoric could 
damage Anglo-Soviet cultural connections, the FCO assured Lunkov that the British government 
would do everything in its power to provide normal conditions for the tour.110 However, the FCO 
also took the position that peaceful demonstrations were protected under the law but would not 
be allowed to harm the safety of the touring members of the Bolshoi or their property. In 
addition, the decision whether to intervene would be left to British law enforcement.111 The 
Hochhausers, Sadler’s Wells, and the FCO informed the Soviet government that demonstrations 
at the concert venue were to be expected, and the Soviets accepted this as an inevitability and 
resolved not to cancel the tour.112  
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Some British diplomats expressed concern that the Soviet government would be 
expecting stricter controls on demonstrators than those the British police would be willing to 
implement. In a conversation between the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, M. 
Smith, and representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Culture, Smith indicated that the British 
authorities were prepared to keep order, but that they could not completely protect the safety of 
the Soviet performers. Furthermore, he warned that Equity’s opposition to the tour could be 
problematic for Anglo-Soviet cultural relations and could endanger the exchange or performers 
with the USSR in the future.113 A few days before the Bolshoi Ballet’s London season, in a 
conversation between C.J.R. Meyer of the FCO and Semenov of the Soviet Embassy, the latter 
expressed his concerns regarding the likelihood of anti-Soviet demonstrations and his apparent 
frustrations with the British government: 
[Semenov] said that the kind of assurance which he sought was something broader than 
simple instructions to the police, with whom the [Soviet] Embassy security office had in 
any case already been in touch. I asked Semenov to be more explicit: did he mean that we 
should ban all demonstrations? If so, he knew perfectly well that in Britain 
demonstrations in themselves were not illegal, and that any assurances that we might give 
could only be within the possibilities of the law. Semenov replied peevishly “you are the 
Government and you should govern.”114  
 
Semenov also handed Meyer copies of threatening letters that the Embassy had received 
from activists. The Special Branch of the FCO also learned of upcoming protests by Jewish 
organizations (including the Jewish Defense League and the Board of Deputies of British Jews) 
and Ukrainian nationalist groups coinciding with the performances near the theater, on Trafalgar 
Square, and of a brief protest on the stage before the first performance. The Special Branch 
considered the on-stage protest as inappropriate and planned to prevent it. The FCO was not 
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aware of any plans to incite violence or to directly obstruct the performances, but it ensured that 
extra police officers would be present on the opening night.115  
 
The Release of the Panovs and the Extent of the Hochhausers’ Involvement 
The Soviet authorities decided to allow both Valery and Galina Panov to emigrate to 
Israel a few days before the Bolshoi Ballet’s arrival in London.116 The timing of their release 
strongly indicated that the Soviet government sought to appease the Panov activists, and thus 
undercut anti-Soviet sentiment in London in order to prevent political demonstrations at the 
concerts. It is possible that the consistent barrage of demonstrations around, and cancellations of, 
Soviet international tours since the invasion of Prague in 1968 played a part in convincing the 
Soviet government to make concessions in exchange for a cultural victory overseas. Moreover, it 
seems likely that Goskontsert, the Ministry of Culture, and the Soviet Embassy took the council 
of the Hochhausers and the British government to heart, and agreed to the release as a gesture of 
good faith in what they implicitly perceived as an exchange quid pro quo. For example, Jane 
Edgeworth—the British Council representative who accompanied the Prospect Theater on their 
tour in the USSR—explicitly assured Golovin of Goskontsert in Moscow that if the Soviets 
carried out the release, it would possibly result in a demonstration-free tour.117 
While the Soviet decision to release the dancers was lauded by pro-Panov activists or at 
least quieted their protests, demonstrations still commenced when the Bolshoi Ballet arrived and 
threats were still made to disrupt the performances. In a conversation with Ambassador Lunkov, 
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Prime Minister Wilson said he was hopeful that the Soviet decision to release the Panovs would 
prevent major demonstrations from taking place and said that the current disruptions were being 
carried out by a small, but well-organized, minority.118 As would become apparent during the 
course of the tour, however, the release of the Panovs succeeded only in appeasing activists who 
were solely interested in the Panov affair. The Soviet concession would have no effect on the 
activists who protested Soviet anti-Semitism in general. To add insult to injury, Prime Minister 
Wilson was still unwilling to attend even one of the Bolshoi Ballet’s performances.119 
The confluence of the postponement of the Bolshoi Ballet’s London season, British 
popular anti-Soviet sentiment in response to Soviet anti-Semitism in general, and the Panov 
situation in particular, placed the Hochhausers in a difficult position. The Hochhausers had 
already committed their resources to the tour and had given their word to Goskontsert. A refusal 
to go ahead at this point would have spelled a financial disaster, a damaged reputation in 
London, and could have risked future contracts with the Soviets. As discussed earlier, the 
Hochhausers enjoyed no stable position with the British or Soviet governments; thus, they were 
in constant danger of being replaced. In addition, it was growing apparent that the Bolshoi Ballet 
would be regarded as a surrogate for the USSR by anti-Soviet critics and demonstrators. While 
Victor Hochhauser acknowledged that this position was understandable in the case of the Red 
Army Choir’s British tour in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia—the reason being that 
the choir would have been considered a direct representative of Soviet military power—he 
believed that the Bolshoi Ballet should be treated differently. In the 2010 interview with The 
Guardian, Victor Hochhauser explained this position:  
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The persecution of Jews was a terrible thing, but my point was that it was nothing to do 
with these artists. Some of them were Jews themselves and while they might have been 
Russians, they were first and foremost artists who really do belong to the world.120 
 
The Hochhausers thus maintained a conceptual divide between the cultural performance of the 
Soviet ballet and the political actions of the Soviet government, and took the position that the 
Bolshoi Ballet should not be considered responsible for, or a direct representative of, Soviet anti-
Semitic policies. 
In order to avoid the controversy plaguing the tour, the Hochhausers had attempted to 
minimize their participation in it and to keep their names out of the event’s publicity as much as 
possible. The most telling omission was the absence of their firm’s slogan, “Victor Hochhauser 
Presents,” which appeared typically at the top of every advertisement for their concerts. This was 
to shield themselves and their business from political backlash. As a result, even the fine print of 
the advertisements mentioned only the venue, the London Coliseum, and its parent institution, 
the Sadler’s Wells Trust.121 See Figures 3 and 4. 
 
120 See Wroe. 
121 The Sadler’s Wells Theater Ballet was not involved in these performances. Bolshoi at the London 
Coliseum, f. 3162, op. 2, d. 52, RGALI.  
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In an earlier meeting with the British Ambassador in Moscow, Terence Garvey, Victor 
Hochhauser reported that he had assured the Foreign Relations Department of the Soviet 
Ministry of Culture that he would fulfill his side of the contract. However, he then asked the 
ministry to consider canceling or postponing the tour in light of the current circumstances. 
Garvey believed that Victor Hochhauser had wanted to give the Soviet authorities the impression 
that it would be best for them to release the Panovs in order for the Bolshoi tour to succeed. In 
Garvey’s opinion, while Victor Hochhauser believed that Equity’s influence over other trade 
unions was the greatest threat to the tour, he knew that the demonstrators’ techniques, which had 
been used to disrupt the 1973 performances of the Georgian Folk Dance Ensemble—namely 
loud noise outside of the theater and demonstrators buying tickets and jumping up on stage—
were to be expected if the Soviets failed to release the Panovs.124  
There had been a fair amount of inconsistency in the Hochhausers’ professed rationale 
for keeping their involvement hidden. In conversation with Ambassador Garvey in Moscow in 
February 1974, Victor Hochhauser stated that he did not expect much difficulty from the 
demonstrations of British Jews.125 Nonetheless, he still decided to minimize his involvement 
with the venture, and to assign his rights under the contract with Goskontsert to Lord Harewood 
and Sadler’s Wells, but to continue serving his contractual obligation as a financial guarantor.126 
Even before the official announcements, Victor Hochhauser had been approached by people who 
assumed that he was organizing the upcoming Bolshoi Ballet performances in London; they were 
concerned about the Panov scandal, and hoped that he would cancel the events. He denied his 
involvement, became concerned for his own and Lilian’s safety, and set the condition that his 
 





name be struck from all of the tour’s press releases, programs, and publicity.127 It is possible that 
the decision not to advertise his involvement in the Soviet tour stemmed from his desire not to 
exacerbate the public reaction to an already politically controversial event, and from his concern 
for physical safety after the bombing of Hurok’s offices two years earlier.  
However, Victor Hochhauser’s claims of noninvolvement in the negotiations with 
Goskontsert are contradicted by the records preserved in Goskontsert’s archives. These 
documents demonstrate that the Hochhausers were instrumental in the planning for the tour and 
still had a financial interest in its success. As with other tours, they served as the negotiators for 
the venue (the Coliseum) and for the Sadler’s Wells Trust, while Goskontsert negotiated on 
behalf of the Bolshoi Ballet. The Hochhausers were involved in the setting up of the 
performances and compensation, the selection of repertoire and personnel, the scheduling of 
rehearsals, and they served as an intermediary between Goskontsert and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, which offered to film a performance of the Bolshoi in exchange for a fee. The 
Hochhausers’ negotiations with Goskontsert regarding the Bolshoi’s London season continued 
well into the second week of the tour.128 
The decline of British popular sympathy toward Soviet domestic and international policy 
since the Prague Spring had resulted in the USSR becoming a frequent target in the British press. 
The Daily Mail continued its anti-Soviet stance throughout the Panov crisis,129 and its articles on 
the subject were routinely discussed by the FCO in order to monitor British public opinion. Nigel 
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Dempster’s 1974 Daily Mail article placed judgement on Lord Harewood’s efforts to invite the 
Bolshoi Ballet in light of the Soviet treatment of the Panovs (which had resulted in the 
Americans canceling a tour by the Kirov Theater), criticized the FCO’s stance as noncommittal, 
and called on the Russians’ sense of decency to not expose the Bolshoi to all but certain 
demonstrations.130 Furthermore, the fact that the newspaper often quoted Manson’s views and 
presented them as “the final word” on debates led one FCO representative to suggest that 
Manson had a direct line to The Daily Mail.131 
The Hochhausers’ attempts to distance themselves from the Bolshoi Ballet and 
Goskontsert were not successful in deterring criticism from the press. As a result of Victor 
Hochhauser’s de facto monopoly on the import and export of Soviet musicians over the last two 
decades, Bernard Levin rightly assumed that the concert agent had organized this tour, as he had 
the others, and was trying to cover his tracks.132 In his Times investigation, Levin sought to 
expose Victor Hochhauser’s position as the person responsible for the tour, and to make public 
the concert agent’s attempts at covering up his involvement. Two years earlier, Levin had proved 
to be a critic of the British foreign policy of resuming and continuing cultural exchanges with the 
Soviets after the Prague Spring. In his aforementioned 1970 Daily Mail opinion piece, he had 
ridiculed the roughly two-year-long ban against the Red Army Choir as an insufficient gesture of 
solidarity with the Czechoslovak plight.133 Regarding the Bolshoi Ballet scandal, Levin’s 
strategy was to record Victor Hochhauser’s claim of noninvolvement, and then to confront him 
with evidence that contradicted his claim in order to force a change of position. This evidence 
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took the form of the quotation of an anonymous source, who knew that Victor Hochhauser had 
been involved in the tour’s negotiations since the beginning, and that he had persuaded the 
Sadler’s Wells Trust to announce that the Trust was the sole organizer, that he had no 
involvement, and that he would not profit from the tour. Victor Hochhauser, however, held his 
ground and argued that the evidence was false.134  
In response, Levin appealed to Sadler’s Wells for confirmation of Hochhauser’s denial. 
He contacted the managing director, Lord Harewood, and the chairman of the Sadler’s Wells 
Trust, Kenneth Robinson. They refused to comment, which Levin interpreted as proof that they 
were both under some sort of non-disclosure agreement and unwilling to lie. In his article, Levin 
indicated that a few hours after he had made his request, he was informed that Sadler’s Wells and 
Victor Hochhauser would make some sort of joint statement. This statement took the form of a 
letter (probably written in early June) from the concert agent to Levin, which Levin included in 
his article for The Times. Victor Hochhauser’s statement to Levin is quoted in full below: 
I wish to make absolutely clear my organization’s role in connection with the 
forthcoming visit of the Bolshoi Ballet Company.  
 
In 1972, Lord Harewood appealed to us to obtain the Bolshoi Ballet for a season at the 
London Coliseum, in view of the fact that Sadler’s Wells Trust had sustained substantial 
losses resulting from the cancellation by the Russians of the ballet season that year, after 
the expulsion of the 105 Soviet diplomats.135 Because of the Panov situation and the 
troubled question of Jewish immigration, we later expressed doubts about the timing of 
such a visit and we signed the contract in 1973 only on the understanding that Sadler’s 
Wells Trust present the season under their own name, to which they agreed. 
 
From informal discussions we had with the Russians, we were hoping quite sincerely that 
the situation would improve. However, in the light of developments, we spoke many 
times with the Soviet authorities and with Lord Harewood and his chairman [Kenneth 
Robinson] reiterating our doubts about the visit and warning them repeatedly of the 
strength of public feeling. On April 16th, before the season was officially announced, we 
had a meeting with the Soviet chargé d’affaires expressing our serious misgivings about 
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the visit unless the Panovs were allowed to emigrate, but when it became clear that their 
situation would not change, we wrote a letter on April 19th to Sadler’s Wells stating “we 
have now completely withdrawn from this particular presentation of the Bolshoi Ballet.” 
 
My organization has no further responsibilities, except, of course, to maintain its 
financial guarantee to the Trust, from which it cannot properly withdraw. Otherwise we 
have no further connections with this season.136 
 
Levin voiced his skepticism that this letter provided the whole truth of the matter. Particularly, 
he had difficulty believing that Victor Hochhauser and the representatives of Sadler’s Wells had 
doggedly voiced their concerns regarding the British political backlash, and he doubted that they 
had advocated for the emigration of the Panovs. Levin’s most damning criticism was leveled at 
the concert agent’s supposed greed. The letter appeared to circumvent the issue as to whether he 
would profit from the tour. Levin interpreted the evasion of this matter as confirmation that 
Victor Hochhauser and his business were still completely involved in the materially lucrative, yet 
morally problematic, venture.137  
It is interesting to consider why Levin took such a hard stance on Victor Hochhauser’s 
involvement in the Bolshoi Ballet’s tour. It is important to reiterate here that both Levin and 
Victor Hochhauser were Jewish, and that this fact likely influenced the journalist’s opinion of the 
concert agent. From Levin’s articles discussed in this dissertation, it seems that Levin considered 
the USSR to be a belligerent empire that repressed both its allies (such as Czechoslovakia in 
1968) and its own Jewish minority. In the case of the former, he criticized the British Parliament 
for lifting its ban on the Red Army Choir only two years after the Soviet intervention in the 
Prague Spring. He also considered Victor Hochhauser’s secret continuation of his business 
relationship with the Bolshoi Ballet, despite his awareness of systemic anti-Semitism in the 
Soviet Union, to be a moral failing. In summation, Levin charged him with enabling the Soviets 
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(by giving them access to British audiences), and with positioning his own material greed above 
the needs of fellow Jews. 
 Meanwhile, Victor Hochhauser interpreted Levin’s article as a blatant attack on his 
character and livelihood based on generalizations and misinformation. In a meeting with the 
FCO after the tour’s conclusion, he reiterated that the tour had been originally intended for 1972, 
and was postponed twice to 1974. From his position, the decision to go ahead with the tour was 
largely between Sadler’s Wells and the Soviet cultural apparatus. When the uproar over the 
Panovs developed, he decided to minimize his involvement as much as possible, let Sadler’s 
Wells take over the publicity of the tour, and advocate privately for the Panovs’ release to reduce 
the public backlash. Furthermore, Victor Hochhauser had learned the identity of Levin’s 
anonymous sources, one of which was Lord Harewood’s second and present wife, who was 
either not completely aware of the situation or who deliberately sought to minimize her 
husband’s involvement in the matter. Lady Harewood had since written him a “long and 
emotional” letter explaining that she felt that her husband was under attack and had acted 
accordingly. Victor Hochhauser, on the other hand, believed that Lady Harewood effectively 
diverted potential criticisms of her husband’s involvement toward himself.138 
Nevertheless, it was evident that the tour simultaneously reaped the benefits of, and was 
plagued by its connection to, the political image of the USSR. Soviet cultural exports capitalized 
on Western perceptions of the USSR as an exotic other (this was particularly evident in the 
performances of folkdance ensembles such as the Georgian Folk Dance Ensemble), and as a 
bastion of high-art refinement and technical perfection.139 Despite the scandal and subsequent 
demonstrations and boycotts, Soviet ensembles still performed very well at the box office. For 
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example, the ban on the Red Army Choir lasted for roughly two years, and the ensemble arrived 
in London in 1970. Reportedly, all but one of the tour concerts were sold out in advance.140 On 
the face of it, the demonstrators’ actions did not generally affect the financial viability of the 
performances of what was possibly the most politically controversial Soviet ensemble in 
London. 
 
The Bolshoi Ballet Tour and Anti-Soviet Demonstrations 
During the course of the Bolshoi Ballet’s season at the London Coliseum from June 9 to 
July 21, 1974, anti-Soviet protesters regarded the performers as surrogates for the entire USSR 
and its policies. The British demonstrators considered the performances to be a cultural 
representation of the same Soviet regime that was repressing its own Jewish population, and to 
be a cynical effort to present a pleasant smokescreen of Russian high culture in order to distract 
the British populace from Soviet tyranny. However, the Soviet state propagated the narrative that 
the Londoners were invited to a presentation of depoliticized aesthetic enjoyment, and thus to 
admire the Soviet patronage of the arts. One method utilized by the protesters to depoliticize the 
festivities comprised the handing out counterfeit programs in the venue. The first few pages 
included the usual ballet synopsis and cast list, but they were followed by biographical and 
autobiographical accounts of Soviet Jews who were imprisoned in jails and work camps, or put 
under house arrest, and who or whose family members had been refused permission to 
emigrate.141 Figure 5 below exhibits the exact point of transition in the counterfeit program from 
a seemingly normal concert program to the politically activist denouncement of the Soviet 
repression of its Jewish minority. See Figure 5. 
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The program also included the following text:  
Welcome to the Bolshoi Ballet. The Bolshoi are enjoying their freedom to perform here 
while Russian Jews are being persecuted for the “crime” of asking for the same freedom 
of cultural expression. The Bolshoi are showing their freedom to dance Russian ballet 
while their government has denied Russian Jews the right to learn and practice the 
tradition and culture of their ancient people. The Bolshoi are enjoying their freedom to 
return to their families in Russia, while thousands of their countrymen who are denied 
this same precious right, are in danger of being imprisoned today for merely asking to 
rejoin their families in Israel. Will all lovers of freedom have the courage to speak out 
against this cruel repression? The USSR sponsors the Bolshoi and the persecution of 
Jews.143 
 
The protesters’ overall strategy was intended to confront both the Soviet performers and the 
British concertgoers with the political reality: that by taking part in the performances, they were 
complicit in Soviet tyranny.  
It is not surprising that this connection was not made in the Bolshoi Ballet’s official 
report of the tour to Goskontsert. Obviously, political criticism on Soviet policy would have been 
absent from any official statement. The report indicated frankly that protesters had organized 
demonstrations on nearly every day of the London season, but the commentator did not attempt 
to explain the rationale behind the protests or to humanize the protesters. They were considered 
to be simply and completely anti-Soviet and Zionist; their defining characteristic was deemed an 
irrational and unprovoked hatred of the USSR; and they were construed as a nuisance at best, 
and a danger to the performers at their worst. The commentator generally described the 
demonstrations as a belligerent attack on innocent dancers for arbitrary, misplaced, and unrelated 
political grievances.144 
The report also states that the protesters disseminated anti-Soviet pamphlets and carried 
signs in both English and Russian languages, which included the following: “Soviet Union 
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conducts the Bolshoi Theater tour and the political oppression of Jews,” and “KGB, liberate the 
Jews [translation mine].”145 As with the 1970 protests, some of the demonstrations blurred the 
line between peaceful disobedience and violent resistance by attempting to harm the performers 
psychologically and physically. During one of the Bolshoi Ballet’s performances of Spartak, 
some of the protesters reportedly threw eggs, leaflets, and screws on the stage, and released 
white mice in the auditorium during the intermission. Some protesters with signs managed to 
sneak past the police stationed at the front door and to infiltrate the performers’ hotel. Moreover, 
a bomb threat was sent to the hotel. In addition to the demonstrations protesting Soviet anti-
Semitism, there was a demonstration of Ukrainian nationalists at the front of London Coliseum. 
An anti-Soviet protest also awaited the company at the airport as they prepared to depart for the 
USSR.146 
According to the Bolshoi Ballet report, Victor Hochhauser limited his involvement with 
the embattled tour as much as he could. He reportedly refused to accompany the ballet regularly, 
appeared only three or four times at the theater, and forwarded all attempts to communicate with 
him to the theater administration. He attempted to explain his distance from the production to the 
performers, by arguing that his presence would only exacerbate the demonstrations and possibly 
lead to the abrupt cancellation of the tour. Meanwhile, Lilian Hochhauser was able to visit the 
theater more frequently and meet with the company backstage. The report complimented the 
administration of the Coliseum for arranging the hotel accommodations, tours to London art 
museums, a visit to a British ballet academy, and a meeting with the UK-USSR Association. The 
crew was also provided tours to British factories that produced electronics and special 
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equipment. In conclusion, the report indicated that the Soviet performers did not yield to panic 
and proceeded to give splendid performances. Furthermore, the dancers were rewarded by a 
thunderous ovation at every performance. A large part of the audience expressed their admiration 
to the Bolshoi Ballet and their indignation at the protesters in the form of letters sent to the 
company.147 
Many aspects of the Bolshoi report were corroborated by the FCO’s internal 
correspondence, which indicated that the police detachment was insufficient to contain the 
demonstrators, to keep them away from the theater, and to prevent them from insulting and 
physically jostling those associated with the performances.148 The FCO also discussed the 
demonstration at Heathrow Airport. Roughly forty members of the 35s dressed as ballerinas, and 
five members of the Herut Party dressed as white mice—which was described here by the FCO 
as a Jewish militant youth movement—attempted to approach the company and were detained by 
police; one of the Herut members fought with the police.149  
The Soviet Embassy voiced its concerns to the FCO regarding the above demonstrations 
at the Bolshoi Ballet’s performances, on the streets, and at the performers’ hotel. Furthermore, 
Ambassador Lunkov had been confronted while he was a spectator at the Henley Regatta.150 In 
response, the FCO continued its earlier position: that critical political speech and peaceful protest 
were to be allowed:151 
The line [the FCO has] been taking in reply to these protests is that the British authorities 
have done and will continue to do everything in their power to maintain the law and 
ensure the safety of the Soviet artists, but that many things which would be prohibited in 
the Soviet Union are permitted under English law.152 
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In a conversation with Lunkov, Harold Wilson sought to clarify that the action of allowing the 
demonstrations to take place was not the same as condoning them. Wilson assured the 
ambassador that he considered the protests at the performances to be outrageous, and that the 
general public was happy to welcome the Bolshoi. Wilson also promised to laud the Soviet 
decision to release the Panovs during an upcoming London reception for the Panovs with Israeli 
Ambassador Gideon Raphael. Lunkov expressed his dismay that the Panov case—which he still 
considered to be artificially linked to the Bolshoi tour—was used as an excuse for many people 
to strike at the Soviets, and that the British government had failed to send a representative to any 
of the performances. He also said that the Soviet leadership would consider Wilson’s presence at 
the Panov reception at the Israeli Embassy to be an insult. Wilson denied the second point, 
maintaining that the government did not discourage anyone from attending, but left the decision 
to the representatives themselves. After the conversation, Wilson decided not to risk further 
damage to Anglo-Soviet relations and did not appear at the reception. He later explained to 
Ambassador Raphael that his ability to intervene and help Jewish-Soviet citizens depended 
solely on his standing with the Soviet leadership.153 
 As discussed earlier, there were signs that the Soviet leadership considered the Panov 
release a concession to ensure a more hospitable reception for the Bolshoi Ballet, which 
contradicted its own official position that the Panovs and the Bolshoi were not connected. As the 
above records demonstrate, several highly placed British officials thought this was the case and 
argued to the Soviet Embassy that such a release would prevent major demonstrations from 
taking place. The fact that the Bolshoi Ballet’s tour was plagued by demonstrations led some 
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representatives of the FCO to doubt whether the Panovs’ release had achieved any tangible 
results. In a conversation with Julian L. Bullard of the FCO, Victor Hochhauser remained 
adamant that releasing the Panovs before the Bolshoi Ballet’s arrival had “knocked quite a lot of 
the stuffing out of the hostile groups” and definitely saved the tour from being canceled in the 
middle of the season.154 Even if this sentiment that the Panov release did significantly reduce the 
amount of British activism confronting the tour was correct, the reduced amount was still 
unacceptable to the USSR.  
Earlier, in February 1974, Victor Hochhauser had gone to Moscow to discuss the 
situation surrounding the upcoming Bolshoi tour with Goskontsert and the Ministry of Culture. 
Despite the general difficulties in dealing with the current situation, Victor Hochhauser was 
already planning the future travel of Soviet performers such as Yevgeny Svetlanov, Kirill 
Kondrashin, David Oistrakh, and Maxim Shostakovich to the UK, and he had signed a 
preliminary contract for the London Philharmonic Orchestra (LPO) to tour Moscow and 
Leningrad in October 1975.155 After the conclusion of the Bolshoi tour, he confessed in a July 
1974 meeting with the FCO that its London season was very tense and unhappy, the dancers 
were nervous, the Soviet authorities feared defections, the demonstrations were much worse than 
in other centers (he remarked that the Moiseyev Folk Dance Ensemble performed in New York 
without any troubles), and that Goskontsert was not likely to send another opera or ballet 
company to the UK in the near future. In any case, Victor Hochhauser noted that he was not 
interested in handling another large-scale Soviet tour, but that he would continue to present the 
elite soloists Richter and David Oistrakh (who were also his personal friends).156 
 
154 Bullard to Killick, 29 July 1974, FCO 34/275, GB-Lna. 
155 Garvey to Bullard, 19 February 1974, FCO 34/274, GB-Lna. 
156 Bullard to Killick, 25 July 1974, FCO 28/2606, GB-Lna 
372 
 
The End of the Hochhausers’ Business Relationship with the Soviet Union 
Over two decades of working with the Soviet Ministry of Culture and Goskontsert, the 
Hochhausers would have learned which actions displeased Soviet officials. Up to 1974, they 
successfully preserved their business relationship with the USSR by avoiding any political 
actions and severing ties to any performers that emigrated or fell out of Soviet favor. As was 
apparent in the scandal resulting from the Panovs’ eventually successful efforts to emigrate to 
Israel, the USSR considered any attempt by its elite performers to leave as an attack on its 
credibility as a cultural superpower.157 The émigré was a living rebuttal of the USSR’s 
intentions: he or she was an individual willing to relinquish all of his or her supposed advantages 
by starting anew abroad. Émigrés raised doubts about the success of the Soviet system by 
attempting to escape it. 
As mentioned earlier, the Hochhausers’ position as negotiator in the Anglo-Soviet 
exchange of performers was not reinforced by any official arrangements or institutional 
affiliations. Essentially, the agents maintained a freelance relationship with the USSR that could 
have been severed at any time and for any reason. There is some evidence that as early as 1973, 
some representatives of Goskontsert were considering the possibility of working with other 
concert agents in addition to the Hochhausers. In a transcription of translator N.M. Ivanova’s 
report to Goskontsert director N.M. Aleshchenko on the Georgian State Ensemble of Folk 
Dance’s tour in Ireland and England, Ivanova indicated that Goskontsert would need to begin 
working with other British concert agencies in order to widen Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange. It 
is argued that the USSR needed to move beyond working with only one concert agency to reach 
a wider British audience. Nevertheless, the report also lists the aforementioned 
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counterarguments: Victor Hochhauser had the support of both the British government and the 
Soviet Embassy in London and was a professional, reliable, and trustworthy business partner. 
The Hochhausers’ trustworthiness was then set in contrast to British firms such as London 
Management. While London Management had more extensive financial resources than the 
Hochhausers, the embassy expressed concern that these firms would be less cooperative 
regarding the financial aspects of concert planning.158 It is evident in this report that the Soviet 
aversion to risk was a primary factor in maintaining the Hochhausers’ monopoly over Anglo-
Soviet cultural exchange up to that point, but we also know that this aversion would weaken in 
subsequent years. 
The Hochhausers described their estrangement from the USSR as a sudden reaction to 
their support of Rostropovich as well as their close relationship with the state of Israel. The 
historical reality, however, appears to have been more of a gradual decline of contractual 
agreements with Goskontsert. For example, the Hochhausers were still the primary concert 
agents behind David Oistrakh’s UK tour as conductor and violinist in 1974, and the London 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s USSR tour in 1975.159 Tragically, Oistrakh died of a heart attack on 
tour in Amsterdam a few days before he was expected to arrive in London.160 Lilian Hochhauser 
traveled to Moscow in October 1975 to prepare for the LPO’s Soviet tour later that month.161 
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While the tour was completed without incident,162 she had lost a major ally in Oistrakh and 
would have difficulty negotiating with Goskontsert for future performances. 
While contact between Goskontsert and the Hochhausers began to lessen, the Soviet 
institution increasingly turned to other concert agents. Signs of the estrangement became readily 
apparent to the FCO by the end of 1974. In November, Cultural Attaché Michael Llewellyn-
Smith reported that Robert Paterson of International Entertainment Ltd. had traveled to Moscow 
to speak with Goskontsert. Llewellyn-Smith believed that Paterson was one in a series of concert 
agents whom Goskontsert was “grooming” to take the Hochhausers’ place. Meanwhile, Paterson 
saw the venture as an opportunity to begin arranging the performances of Soviet classical 
musicians and ensembles (including Gilels, the violinist Leonid Kogan, the Bolshoi Opera, and 
the Moscow Chamber Orchestra) at events and venues such as the Proms, the Edinburgh 
Festival, Covent Garden, the Coliseum, and Drury Lane Theatre. Also, British popular music 
artists such as Shirley Bassey, Petula Clark, and Tom Jones were discussed as possible options 
for future tours in the USSR.163  
It is very possible that the Hochhausers came to view Paterson’s company as a threat to 
their monopoly with the Soviets, and sought to undermine his efforts to become Goskontsert’s 
favored British intermediary. According to a March 1975 FCO report, Goskontsert authorized 
Paterson to contract the Moscow Chamber Orchestra for a tour of the UK during a recent visit to 
Moscow. According to Alla Butrova of the Ministry of Culture, Victor Hochhauser then 
undermined Paterson’s efforts by contacting Rudolf Barshai, the director of the orchestra, 
directly by phone. He had introduced Barshai to the West, and accused the director of disloyalty 
for choosing to work for a new and inexperienced agent. Later, Paterson told Llewellyn-Smith 
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that he was considering litigation against the Hochhausers, while the Hochhausers insisted that 
they remained on good terms with Paterson. Llewellyn-Smith doubted that the latter’s statement 
was sincere, but thought that it would only be a matter of time until Paterson would disappoint 
the Soviets, which he thought would then restore the Hochhausers’ monopoly.164  
At the same time as Lilian Hochhauser’s preparations for the LPO’s Soviet tour in 
autumn 1975, the Cultural Attaché to the Soviet Embassy in London asked the FCO in August 
1975 whether the British government would protest if the Soviets dealt with someone other than 
the Hochhausers. In response, the FCO indicated that the British government did not favor any 
concert agent, and that agents were all treated alike.165 A few days later, Andrei S. Parastaev of 
the Soviet Embassy in London informed the FCO that Paterson would be returning to Moscow 
shortly to continue negotiations, and that Goskontsert would consider other concert agents to 
discuss the importation of British popular musicians into the USSR.166 During this transition 
period, the Hochhausers still had active contacts with the USSR, but their monopoly crumbled as 
Goskontsert diversified its contacts with English concert agents and began to program popular 
music (which was outside the Hochhausers’ purview). 
While the LPO’s Soviet Tour was a great success, Lilian Hochhauser was disappointed in 
the lack of prospects in contracting Soviet artists for future visits. In an August 1975 
conversation with W.T. Hull of the FCO’s Cultural Exchange Department, she expressed her 
concerns regarding Goskontsert’s favorable treatment of Victor Louis, another British concert 
agent, who may have become the USSR’s favored contact for classical music. Lilian Hochhauser 
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suspected that the Soviet authorities were distancing themselves as a result of the 1974 Bolshoi 
Ballet London season and of the Hochhausers’ friendship with Rostropovich, who had recently 
left the USSR. Hull reported to the FCO that he believed that Lilian Hochhauser was trying to 
enlist the agency’s help, but he himself believed that the Hochhausers were capable of looking 
after themselves. In his report, he indicated that it was well known that the Soviets had been 
looking for an alternative to the Hochhausers for some time, and that it would not be harmful for 
them to compete with other concert agents.167 
The loss of Soviet prospects, which was a significant fraction of their income, forced the 
Hochhausers to find new contacts elsewhere. While their connection with Soviet performers had 
never been their exclusive source of income, it was still a crucial part of their performance 
network. In the early 1970s, the Hochhausers realized that cultural relations with China were 
beginning to open, which paralleled the cultural thaw in the USSR twenty years earlier, and they 
began negotiating for the interchange of touring performers to and from China. Starting in 1973, 
they had begun inviting the Chinese Acrobats of Shanghai to the UK; and in the late 1970s, they 
arranged for the Chinese tour of the London Festival Ballet. Mick Brown of the Daily Telegraph 
noted that this was the first appearance of a Western company in China since the beginning of 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966.168  
The loss of access to Soviet artists meant that the Hochhausers no longer had to comply 
with the Soviet restrictions on working with Soviet émigrés. The ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev 
was a prime example. Nureyev was the principal dancer of the Kirov Ballet, and he had 
participated in the Kirov’s 1961 performances in Paris. He became a great popular and critical 
success, and the Soviet authorities believed that they were losing control of him. They ordered 
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him to return to the USSR, but he escaped and defected. The Hochhausers—who had arranged 
for the next stage of the Kirov’s tour in the London—were instructed by the Soviet government 
never to contract Nureyev. In order to prove their loyalty to the Soviet cultural establishment, the 
Hochhausers severed all contact with Nureyev, who was pursuing a soloist career in the West.169 
The concert agents complied with this directive to avoid jeopardizing their access to Soviet 
artists and ensembles. Once this directive became irrelevant, Nureyev became one of the 
Hochhausers’ most prized assets.170 
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the Hochhausers began facilitating the emigration 
of Soviet artists in the mid-1970s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Hochhausers aided 
Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya after their departure from the USSR. Also, FCO files indicate 
that they offered to arrange a leadership position with a British orchestra for the Soviet violinist 
Mark Lubotsky.171 In addition, in February 1975, Victor Hochhauser discussed the emigration 
prospects of the Soviet violinist Gidon Kremer. He described Kremer as a young Tchaikovsky 
Prizewinner who was anxious to move to the West, and compared his case with that of 
Rostropovich. At this point, Victor Hochhauser had a clear plan for potential émigrés: apply for 
temporary exit visa, live and perform in the West for roughly a year, and then decide whether to 
stay in the West permanently or return to the USSR. It should be noted that this method of 
emigration was possible only for Soviet musicians able to pursue a solo career in the West, and 
not every émigré could successfully forge such a career.172 The events and negotiations leading 
 
169 Caute, 483-89. 
170 See Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser.” 
171 J.A.L. Morgan to Cartledge, 6 August 1975; and J.I. Wilmot to I.J.M. Sutherland, 8 August 1975; FCO 
34/291; GB-Lna. 
172 W.T. Hull of the FCO’s Cultural Exchange Department reported Victor Hochhauser’s statements in his 
correspondence to Meyer. In this letter, Hull made two errors: he spelled Kremer’s first name as “Gideon” (it is 
usually written as “Gidon”), and he referred to Kremer as a Tchaikovsky Prize-winning pianist. Kremer was won the 
prize as a violinist. W.T. Hull to Meyer, 25 February 1975, FCO 34/290 Cultural Policy of UK towards Soviet 
Union, GB-Lna. Also, it is important to consider that the prospect for Kremer to temporarily leave the USSR was 
378 
 
up the emigration of Rostropovich, Vishnevskaya, and the Panovs, as well as the Bolshoi Tour, 
were happening nearly simultaneously in the period from 1972 to 1975.  
In an April 1977 interview with the Daily Telegraph, Victor Hochhauser claimed that the 
Soviet Ministry of Culture had effectively mandated a boycott against him and his business for 
the political reason of contracting “artists they do not approve of:” émigrés. The final straw 
appeared to be the Hochhausers’ organization of a ballet festival in June and July of the previous 
year in honor of Nureyev—whom the Soviets had forbidden them to contract sixteen years 
earlier—which included performances by Nureyev and the dancer Natali Makarova. Nureyev 
had emigrated in 1961, and Makarova had left the USSR in 1970. The Hochhausers also 
contracted performances by Rostropovich—who left the USSR on a temporary visa in 1974—
and the conductor and violist Rudolph Barshai, who emigrated to Israel in 1976.173 In response to 
these performances, the Soviet Ministry of Culture canceled the Soviet tour of the English 
Chamber Orchestra, which was due to occur in March 1977.174 On face value, it is unclear why 
the Hochhausers decided to begin contracting émigré artists, which clearly violated the terms of 
their business relationship with the USSR. In a more recent interview, however, Victor 
Hochhauser confessed that after collaboration with Goskontsert became untenable, he was free to 
contract those performers—such as Nureyev and Rostropovich—who had already left the 
USSR.175 One can be certain that the Hochhausers were aware of the risks that these actions 
might result in the end of their business relationship with the USSR, but that they decided to take 
 
based on the concept that the Soviet musician had a visa and would continue to be a Soviet citizen, and would thus 
be able to return to the USSR. This plan would prove to be unfeasible in 1978, when Rostropovich and 
Vishnevskaya had their Soviet citizenship revoked despite their efforts to keep their visas renewed. Wilson, 
Rostropovich, 343. 
173 Tully Potter, “Rudolf Barshai Obituary,” Guardian, 4 November 2010, accessed 7 March 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2010/nov/04/rudolf-barshai-obituary. 
174 Keith Nurse, “Impresario Boycotted by Russia,” Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1977, 2. 
175 See Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser;” and Wroe. 
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them anyway for the simple reason that the widespread emigration of elite Soviet performers had 
resulted in an increasing number of famous émigré performers in relation to the decreasing 
number of well-known Soviet performers who chose to remain in their home country. It is not 
difficult to argue that the Hochhausers’ weakening adherence to Soviet directives was a result of 
the lowering financial value of officially sanctioned Soviet performers. 
The Hochhausers have never publicly indicated whether they expected such a reaction 
from the USSR when they lent support to Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya. It is very likely that 
in providing aid to the Soviet musicians, the Hochhausers took a calculated risk that the Soviet 
authorities might sever relations with them. Nonetheless, the fact that they continued their 
attempts to negotiate with Goskontsert after sheltering Rostropovich meant that they believed 
that they could do both: provide support for Rostropovich and continue working with the USSR. 
Perhaps they rationalized that since Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya had left on temporary 
visas—which they would renew in 1976—they were not really émigrés.176 In any case, the 
Hochhausers proved unable or unwilling to continue their balancing act to placate the Soviet 
authorities into the mid-1970s. It is very possible that their personal loyalties to Rostropovich 
and Vishnevskaya led them to risk their professional access to other Soviet musicians and to the 
USSR itself as a business partner and destination for British performers. If this is correct, then 
the collapse of their relationship with the USSR was the result of neither a failure to defend 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations against British political critics nor a failure to maintain a public 
façade of political neutrality, but a decision to knowingly support émigrés for personal rather 
than larger political issues. 
 
176 Around the time they would attempt to renew again in 1978, Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s Soviet 
citizenship was revoked.  
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The Hochhausers attempted to rekindle their business relationship with the Soviets. In a 
May 1977 conversation with W.T. Hull of the FCO’s Cultural Relations Department, Victor 
Hochhauser interpreted the lack of communication and prospects between himself and 
Goskontsert as a result of the latter contracting the services of other British concert agents. He 
also questioned whether he even still wanted to resume negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of 
Culture and Goskontsert.177 The Hochhausers soon realized that this business relationship was 
completely irretrievable. Using his British Council connections, Victor Hochhauser had arranged 
a meeting with Eliseyev of Goskontsert and Tikhomirovna of the Ministry of Culture—who were 
visiting London to meet with British concert agents and managers—at their hotel (in London).178 
His account of the meeting, which was recorded in his letter to the FCO, is quoted below: 
Some days later Barrie Iliffe [of the British Council] telephoned back saying that they 
had agreed to meet us towards the end of their London stay and I immediately telephoned 
Miss Tikhomirovna at the Central Park Hotel. She was extremely friendly and after 
exchanging pleasantries, confirmed that they would both be most happy to see us towards 
the end of their London visit, as their schedule of engagements with impresarios and 
managers made an early appointment impossible. I suggested that we also fell into this 
category and would, therefore, like to meet and, following some consultation, she 
promised to telephone me back. As I suspected, they were simply playing for time as no 
telephone calls were made. 
 
Last Thursday morning, I called Miss Tikhomirovna in the hotel to remind her of the 
promise made to me and to Barrie Iliffe to meet whereupon she said categorically, “I am 
sorry, it was all a misunderstanding as no promises were made and we are too busy to see 
you.”179 
 
In his interpretation of these events, Victor Hochhauser indicated that the Soviets were unwilling 
to resume their business relationship, and that neither the Ministry of Culture nor Goskontsert 
 
177 The conversation between Victor Hochhauser and Hull—which was referenced in this letter—occurred 
on May 19, 1977. Hull to William Marsden, 31 May 1977, FCO 28/3151 Cultural Relations between UK and Soviet 
Union (hereafter cited as FCO 28/3151), GB-Lna. 
178 Eliseyev’s and Tikhomirovna’s first names do not appear in Victor Hochhauser’s letter. Victor 




provided him with an explanation to justify their treatment of him. As he undoubtedly surmised, 
the retraction of Tikhomirovna’s “promise” could be interpreted as the result of her consultations 
with colleagues and/or superiors regarding the Hochhausers’ official status and their collective 
refusal to restore the concert agents’ position in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges.180 
In the aftermath of his failed attempts to restore his business relationship with the USSR, 
Victor Hochhauser claimed in his conversations and correspondence with the FCO that the 
Soviets did not provide him with any explanation for their lack of cooperation.181 However, in 
his 1977 interview with The Daily Telegraph, he surmised that the Soviet boycott of his business 
was the result of his performance contracts with émigrés. This interview indicates that he was 
aware that he had knowingly violated the inherent rules of their arrangement with the USSR.182 
As discussed above, the Hochhausers had earlier severed ties with émigré performers, 
and had taken an apolitical stance regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
Soviet anti-Semitism of the early 1970s. However, by the mid-1970s, they had begun to contract 
and even aid émigré performers in leaving the USSR. Why did the Hochhausers change their 
position, and seemingly sabotage their relationship with the USSR after strictly avoiding 
politically sensitive matters? There appear to have been two major reasons: 1) the emigration of 
internationally famous Soviet performers, and 2) the Soviet patronage of other concert agents. 
Firstly, the emigration of several prominent Soviet performers led to a changing dynamic that 
meant it was becoming easier and more financially lucrative to contract internationally famous 
former-Soviet artists than the artists who remained in the USSR. Goskontsert was an infamously 
difficult organization: it habitually arranged terms that maximized its own profits to the 
 
180 Ibid. 
181 Hull to William Marsden, 31 May 1977, FCO 28/3151, GB-Lna. 
182 Nurse, 2. 
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detriment of both foreign agents and venues, as well as its own artists; and it would cancel or 
reschedule performances and tours at a moment’s notice, both with and without a political 
rationale. Once the Hochhausers were able to contract the USSR’s and, arguably, the world’s 
most eminent cellist without negotiating with Goskontsert, they did. Secondly, while it is 
difficult to ascertain who started breaking the monopoly, it appears that the Soviets began 
pursuing contracts with other concert agents in around 1973, which was before the Hochhausers 
began contracting émigré performers. While this statement could be contradicted by the 
appearance of a presently undetected piece of evidence, it is still evident that both sides violated 
the terms of their business relationship in the first half of the 1970s. Moreover, any violation of 
these terms would have undermined the strength of the agreement, and, thus, led to further 
infractions by the other party. In other words, once Goskontsert contracted other concert agents, 
the Hochhausers considered themselves free to contract Soviet émigré performers. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined how the business relationship between the Hochhausers and the 
USSR functioned, how they became the de facto intermediaries in Anglo-Soviet cultural 
relations in the mid-1950s, and how their relationship collapsed in the mid-1970s. While the 
Hochhausers’ firm was much smaller in comparison to major firms such as Ibbs & Tillett and 
Harold Holt, they specialized in the import and export of musicians to and from the USSR. This 
relationship was mutually beneficial for both the Hochhausers and the Soviets. The former 
gained almost exclusive access to contract the most prominent Soviet ensembles and performers 
for tours in the UK, and as a result, they profited financially. The latter, meanwhile, gained 
access to British venues, audiences, and, subsequently, foreign currency. The USSR took the 
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opportunity to present itself as a benign and cultured entity through the performances of its elite 
ensembles and musicians. In order to maintain this arrangement, the Hochhausers were expected 
not to embarrass the USSR by discussing Soviet domestic and foreign policy, and by not 
contracting performers who had defected from the USSR. If the relationship between these two 
parties remained mutually beneficial, it would continue to be stable.  
As the Hochhausers consolidated their position as intermediaries in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s, they faced very few political complications. It is important to note that this period 
was not free of political controversy, since both the British and Soviet governments were 
embroiled in military interventions in 1956: the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis. 
While both of these events resulted in international condemnation, they had a limited effect on 
cultural exchanges and did not result in major interruptions. The first major test of the 
Hochhausers’ political loyalty occurred in 1961 with the defection of Soviet ballet dancer Rudolf 
Nureyev, when they behaved as expected to preserve their business relationship with the Soviets 
by severing ties with the ballet star. Throughout the 1960s, Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges 
were free to develop in relative serenity; however, this calm was broken by the Warsaw Pact’s 
intervention in the Prague Spring in 1968. This action arguably sparked a reevaluation of the so-
called Soviet political “thaw,” and led to increased Western scrutiny of both Soviet domestic and 
international policy.  
For many Western critics of the USSR, the Prague Spring and the Soviet government’s 
resistance to Jewish emigration in the early 1970s led to the conflation of the political and artistic 
spheres. The Hochhausers were criticized by British activists and journalists for their continued 
cooperation with the USSR, and for arranging the performances of those whom they deemed to 
be Soviet cultural representatives: musicians and dancers. At the time of the invasion, they were 
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in the unfortunate position of being responsible for the upcoming British tour of the Red Army 
Choir, which was canceled by the British government in the occupation’s aftermath. Victor 
Hochhauser, himself a Czech immigrant to London, held firm in refusing to speak out politically 
on the Soviet-backed occupation of Prague in order to ensure the stability of his business 
relationship with the USSR. 
The rise to international prominence of the Soviet dissidence movement—personified by 
gulag survivor and author Alexander Solzhenitsyn—the continued emigration of Soviet artists 
and intellectuals, and the Western acknowledgement of Soviet anti-Semitism profoundly shaped 
the Western perspective of the USSR in the early 1970s. Again, the Hochhausers attempted to 
distance themselves from the political ramifications of their occupation by stressing the 
separation of artistic performance and Soviet politics during the 1974 London season of the 
Bolshoi Ballet. In the early 1970s, his own identity as an Orthodox Jew placed him in an 
awkward position during the Soviet repression of Jewish citizens attempting to emigrate to 
Israel. Again, he publicly held an apolitical stance regarding Soviet anti-Semitism, and stressed 
the concept of separation between artistic expression and politics.  
Goskontsert had three major goals for artistic exchange: the promotion of the USSR as a 
benign superpower, the demonstration that a socialist state was a patron of the arts, and the 
importation of foreign currency. The first and second goals were political in that they involved 
the demonstration of soft power: to win the hearts and minds of Westerners through dance and 
music. The third was purely financial. The Hochhausers were not interested in the promotion of 
Soviet soft power, but they did strive to create a mutually beneficial financial relationship with 
the Soviet state. Their position rested on the separation between politics and the arts. They 
sought to create a depoliticized space for audience members to aesthetically appreciate the 
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dancers and musicians they contracted. However, critics and demonstrators, who acted in 
response to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Soviet anti-Semitism, attempted to 
confront both the Hochhausers and their audiences with the political reality that by patronizing 
Soviet art, they were complicit in Soviet tyranny.   
It is possible to see the relationship between the Hochhausers and the Soviet state in 
Gramscian terms: the Hochhausers acted as subordinate actors whose expertise the Soviet 
hegemonic cultural establishment needed in order to access British audiences and venues. As 
long as the Hochhausers observed the terms of their mutually beneficial agreement, their 
relationship could continue. However, once Goskontsert became interested in expanding its 
connections beyond the Hochhausers, and the Hochhausers began contracting émigrés, 
Goskontsert found use for the expertise of other concert agents and gradually severed its 
relationship with the Hochhausers. Thus, the Hochhausers’ story in this chapter illustrates the 
limits of their agency (they crossed too many lines), how their capital as negotiators proved to be 
insufficient in the mid-1970s, and how they were eventually replaced.
386 
 
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
 
The Russians are interested also in Tom Jones, who is fantastically popular here but 
almost certainly beyond their means. However, [British concert agent Robert] Paterson 
undertook to make some enquiries about Jones. 
 
- Cultural Attaché to the British Embassy in Moscow Michael J. Llewellyn-Smith 
reports to the British Council that Goskontsert expressed interest in a new concert 
agent and in popular music.1 
 
 
End of a Generation and the Solzhenitsyn Effect 
This study of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations began with the gradual opening of cultural 
contacts after the death of Josef Stalin, which culminated in the first Anglo-Soviet Cultural 
Exchange Agreement of 1960-61. Although cultural exchanges continued to feature in 
subsequent agreements until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, this study ends in the mid-
1970s. It is difficult to select an end date without having a pivotal major event as a marker. 
However, the several foundational aspects that provided a conceptual framework for the 
exchanges shifted at asynchronous points in the mid-1970s, which cumulatively led to a very 
different environment for Anglo-Soviet exchanges starting in the late 1970s and lasting until 
perestroika and the eventual collapse of the USSR. These shifts included: 1) the death, 
emigration, or retirement of the generation of music professionals who had participated in the 
exchanges since the death of Stalin; 2) the decline of classical music’s cultural prestige in both 
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom; and 3) the decline in British government funding in 
the arts. In this later period, two new factors changed the framework for Anglo-Soviet cultural 
 
1 Llewellyn-Smith to J.F.H. Villiers, 22 November 1974, FCO 34/275 Exchanges of Performing Arts 
between UK and Soviet Union: Tour of Bolshoi Ballet and Panov Case (FCO 34/274 and 275 are both titled 
Exchanges of Performing Arts between UK and Soviet Union: Tour of Bolshoi Ballet and Panov Case and will be 




relations: the emergence of official Soviet interest in British popular music, and the Soviet 
adoption of the Universal Copyright Convention.  
The transfer of generations was inevitable, and the Soviet adherence to international 
intellectual property law merely changed the conditions for the transfer of scores and recordings. 
The decline of classical music’s agreed-upon value (and the reduction in state funding that 
resulted from it), as well as the rise of a form of music that had categorically more sway with the 
general public, resulted in a tectonic shift in the foundation of Cold War cultural exchange, in 
which the sphere of classical music was used to demonstrate prestige through the interchange of 
musicians and intellectual property. Arguably, classical music (and the high arts in general) 
never really held a large amount of influence among the general public. Historically, its prestige 
among the powerful in society gave it its esteemed place. However, once this prestige became 
questionable, it ceased to be something valuable to be shared to cultivate greater understanding 
between peoples or to function as an indicator of cultural prowess in Cold War competition. 
Classical music would continue to have an impact on Anglo-Soviet cultural relations in the 
second half of the Cold War, but it did so under very different circumstances.  
While it is possibly overreaching to suggest that the mid-1970s constituted an end of an 
era, it is possible to notice the fading of the generation of music professionals who took part in 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations. As discussed earlier, the concert agents Victor and Lilian 
Hochhauser, who first presented David Oistrakh in London in 1956, became estranged from the 
USSR in the mid-1970s. Moreover, Oistrakh died of a heart attack while on tour in Amsterdam 
in 1974. Arthur Bliss, who was among the first British musicians to visit the USSR after Stalin’s 
death and who wrote his Cello Concerto for Rostropovich,2 died in 1975. The 1960 London 
 
2 See Page 243. 
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premiere of Dmitri Shostakovich’s First Cello Concerto featuring the dedicatee Mstislav 
Rostropovich with the Leningrad Philharmonic resulted in the meeting of these two Soviet 
musicians and Benjamin Britten, which sparked enduring friendships and advocacy for each 
other’s music. By the mid-1970s, all three of these musicians were no longer involved in Anglo-
Soviet cultural relations: Rostropovich left the USSR in 1974, Shostakovich died in 1975, and 
Britten died in 1976. Vishnevskaya left alongside Rostropovich in 1974. Alan Bush continued 
being a loyal advocate for the USSR until its collapse, but his interest in facilitating the Soviet 
performance of his operas appears to have faded after the Odessa production of The Sugar 
Reapers in 1973.3 Of the Soviet musicians discussed, only Gennady Rozhdestvensky, Djemal 
Dalgat, and Sviatoslav Richter continued to perform in the USSR and in the post-socialist 
Russian Federation. Rozhdestvensky left Russia only for temporary positions with tenures that 
spanned less than ten years each with the Stockholm, BBC, Iceland, and Vienna symphony 
orchestras until his death in June 2018. Dalgat, who had been a major advocate for Britten’s 
music in the USSR, died in a fire in 1991.4 Richter continued to be a Moscow-based performer, 
touring throughout Russia and abroad, until his retirement in 1995 and death in Moscow in 
1997.5 In a 2014 interview with Mick Brown of the Daily Telegraph, Victor Hochhauser 
remarked that the loss of the Soviet connection was softened by the realization that many of the 
Soviet soloists he was interested in signing had either died or emigrated by the mid-1970s. If 
 
3 Bush to Shneerson, 5 November 1976, MS Mus 440 Correspondence with the musicologist Grigori 
Mikhailovich Schneerson, British Library. 
4 Lyudmila Kovnatskaya, “’Peter Grimes’ at the Kirov Theatre,” trans. Nick Winter, Melos 19/20 (5 August 
1997), 66. 
5 Bruno Monsenzhon, Rikhter. Dnevniki. Dialogi. [Richter. Diaries. Dialogs.], trans. O. Pichugin (Moscow: 
Klassika-XXI, 2007), 426-39. 
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anything, losing access to Goskontsert meant that he no longer had to worry about catering to 
Soviet politics or refusing to work with Soviet émigrés and critics of the Soviet regime.6 
**** 
While the passing of the above generation signaled a pivotal moment in Anglo-Soviet 
cultural relations in classical music, there had been signs for some time that a shift in the nature 
of cultural exchange was already underway. One major proponent of this change was the 
emergence of a Soviet dissidence movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, namely the Soviet 
intelligentsia’s adverse reaction to the Soviet 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and to the 
government’s repression of the historian Roy Medvedev, the scientists Zhores Medvedev and 
Andrei Sakharov, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko, and the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Denis 
Kozlov explains that throughout this period, the Party became more conservative as the limits of 
de-Stalinization and the so-called thaw became apparent. In other words, the reforms of de-
Stalinization could only go so far before the Party considered them to be a risk to the Soviet 
system. Reformist voices in the USSR, such as the literary journal Novyi mir, came under greater 
criticism from Pravda for apparently “lagging behind the times,”7 the Party youth organization 
Komsomol denounced the journal for pessimism, and Alexander Tvardovsky, the Novyi mir 
editor who had approved the publication of reformist literature (including Vladimir Dudintsev’s 
Not by Bread Alone, Ilya Ehrenburg’s The Thaw, and Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich), resigned in 1970.8 
 
6 Mick Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser: Exclusive Interview,” Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2014, 
accessed 15 July 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/dance/10988191/Victor-and-Lilian-Hochhauser-
exclusive-interview.html. 
7 The wording of the Pravda article demarcated the reformist movement as against the party line because it 
was pursuing the reinterpretation of Soviet history and culture at a pace that the Party considered to be destabilizing 
and reckless. The standard label for something against the party line was “regressive,” because the Party was always 
assumed to be “progressive.”  
8 See Chapter 10 of Denis Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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During de-Stalinization, Khrushchev had upheld Solzhenitsyn as a critic of the Stalinist 
cult of personality and of the gulag system. However, the conservative shift, and Solzhenitsyn’s 
own change of position to criticize not only Stalin but the Soviet system as a whole, resulted in 
his ostracization. His transition from a critic of Stalinism who was lauded by a Soviet 
government undergoing de-Stalinization in the early 1960s to a dissident poised against the 
system in the early 1970s set in motion a chain of events that caused the Soviet government to 
obstruct the actions of, and repress the personages connected to, the disgraced writer. The Soviet 
cultural intelligentsia was an interconnected community. It appears that after one person was 
affected by government repression, the others who came to that person’s aid were promptly 
repressed as well. In turn, these “Good Samaritans” were placed under scrutiny, received help 
from their own allies, who then faced repercussions of their own. This constituted a chain 
reaction, which radiated through the social networks of the intelligentsia and thus affected 
international cultural connections.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Rostropovich and Galina Vishnevskaya were faced with the 
undermining of their privileged status as elite Soviet musicians after they offered shelter to 
Solzhenitsyn.9 In 1969, the author had been removed from the Writers’ Union—which meant 
that he could no longer be gainfully employed in his trade—and was essentially left to die in 
poverty. He had been a critic of Stalinism during the early 1960s, which was a time when such 
criticisms were possible, but still controversial. Gradually, his criticisms became more far 
reaching: he began to criticize the Party, the Soviet system, and, eventually in The Gulag 
Archipelago (which circulated secretly in the USSR), Lenin himself.10 Solzhenitsyn pointed out 
 
9 See Page 243. 
10 Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, 
trans. Thomas P. Whitney and Harry Willets, abr. Edward E. Ericson, Jr. (New York: Harper, 2007), 21-24. 
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that it was Lenin, the first Soviet leader, who had started the vast prison camp system, and that 
Stalin only intensified it. Moreover, he showed that the camps developed alongside the USSR, 
and that the prison camps had expanded, not to protect the USSR from internal enemies, but to 
gather more raw materials for economic gain through forced and uncompensated labor.11 To use 
Yurchak’s conceptual framework of late socialist Soviet society—which split Soviet people 
between the vast majority of ordinary citizens pragmatically living the Soviet experience and the 
very small population of idealist pro-Soviet activists and anti-Soviet dissidents—it seems clear 
that Solzhenitsyn would have been marked as a dissident. Yurchak also observed that the general 
population, which made small performative compromises with the Soviet state in their everyday 
existence, distrusted both the activists (who took socialism too seriously) and the dissidents (who 
took their anti-Soviet crusade too seriously).12  
It is possible to envision how Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s position changed in the 
USSR as a result of their support of Solzhenitsyn by combining Yurchak’s concept of Soviet 
political alignment as a continuum between dissidence and activism, and Bourdieu’s concept of 
cultural capital. In Figures 6 and 7 below, Yurchak’s political continuum forms the “X” axis and 
Bourdieu’s continuum of cultural capital forms the “Y.” The majority of Soviet citizens lived 
their lives between the dissident and activist political extremes, but they lacked the cultural 
capital of elite musicians. Before their involvement with Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich and 
Vishnevskaya were clearly situated in the political majority of Soviet society. In this way, they 
were also part of the collective experience of the Soviet citizenry. However, they were 
 
11 Ibid., 193-98. 
12 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 102-08. 
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internationally famous musicians who had significant cultural capital, and, as a result, they 
benefited from generous state patronage. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s Political Alignment and  
Cultural Capital before Solzhenitsyn 



































However, once they aided Solzhenitsyn—and continued to do so despite the protests of the 
Ministry of Culture—their political transition to dissident status began. In response to the state’s 
repression of Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya wrote an open letter to the editors of 
four major Soviet newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiya, Literaturnaia gazeta, and Sovetskaia 
kul’tura.13 This letter led to the gradual curtailing of Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s 
privileges and the loss of the cultural capital that they had spent their whole careers cultivating. 
Even after Solzhenitsyn was forced to emigrate, their privileges were not restored. See Figure 7. 
 
13 See Page 244. 
 
 






Figure 7: Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s Political Alignment and  
Cultural Capital after Solzhenitsyn 



































Even after they lost a significant amount of their cultural capital, Rostropovich and 
Vishnevskaya were still international celebrities and had enough remaining influence to secure 
their temporary exit visas in 1974. According to Vishnevskaya’s memoirs and Adam Clymer’s 
biography of US Senator Edward Kennedy, the senator and his wife, Joan Kennedy, spoke to 
Brezhnev on Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s behalf during a visit to Moscow and persuaded 
the Soviet leader to facilitate their departure.14 Even in their diminished state after being branded 
 
14 Ibid., 467-68. American composer and conductor Leonard Bernstein asked Joan Kennedy to advocate for 
Rostropovich. On the Kennedys’ trip to the Soviet Union, the senator’s primary objectives were to discuss the 
reduction of nuclear arms and testing and the plight of Soviet Jews attempting to emigrate to Israel. There, they both 
raised the issue of Rostropovich’s difficulties with Furtseva and Brezhnev. Clymer explains that Brezhnev was 
evasive, that he thought that Rostropovich had already left and rationalized that the cellist’s training was provided 
by the Soviet people and that “he should perform for all of them before appearing in the United States.” Ultimately, 
the Kennedys’ trip was largely successful, despite their interest in discussing the Soviet treatment of dissidents and 
Jews. At the conclusion of the trip, Brezhnev informed them that he would approve Rostropovich’s exit visa. Adam 
Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography (New York: Harper, 2009), 219-21. 
 
 






dissidents, Rostropovich’s and Vishnevskaya’s international stature resulted in them still having 
significantly greater cultural capital than the majority of Soviet citizens. 
The chain reaction deriving from connections with Solzhenitsyn also affected the 
Hochhausers as a result of their support for Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya. After leaving the 
USSR, they lived with the Hochhausers in London for approximately a year as they began 
frequently performing in the West as free agents independent of the Soviet concert planning 
apparatus. By opening their house to Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya, the Hochhausers may 
have offended the Soviet Ministry of Culture in the same manner of Rostropovich, when the 
cellist sheltered Solzhenitsyn. Victor Hochhauser recalls that his concert-planning relationship, 
which had been maintained for over twenty years with the USSR, soon unceremoniously 
ended.15 The collapse of these business relations in the mid-1970s signaled a major milestone in 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations. 
 
Erosion of Socialist Realism and of the Cultural Value of Classical Music 
As discussed in Chapter 2, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the leadership of the Soviet 
Composers’ Union habitually voiced its opposition to Western modernist influences and to the 
generation of unofficial Soviet composers that demonstrated such tendencies in their music. 
However, as we have seen, openness to avant-garde experimentation cannot be reduced to a 
generational conflict of the progressive young versus the conservative old. Boris Schwarz 
observes that the Composers’ Union tolerated, but still did not accept, serialism as early as the 
mid-1960s, while the vast majority of composers experimented with at least some avant-garde 
 
15 See Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser.” See Page 372 for a discussion of the end of the 
Hochhausers’ business relationship with the USSR. 
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techniques in a largely tonal framework.16 While the younger generation of Denisov, 
Gubaidulina, Schnittke, and Pärt experimented in the 1960s and 1970s, establishment composers 
such as Khrennikov and Shostakovich continued their public opposition to Western and Soviet 
modernism, despite their own gradually increasing proclivity to experiment with atonal and 
serial elements in their own compositions.17 Throughout the 1970s, the Composers’ Union would 
continue to criticize Western modernism and popular music, while an increasing number of 
composers continued to disregard socialist realist dictates with impunity.18  
Ever since the establishment of the creative unions, the Soviet Communist Party had 
dedicated many of its resources to the ideological capital of the collective high arts. As Tomoff 
explains in A Creative Union, the Party allowed the creative intelligentsia to define what socialist 
realism meant in practice and disciplined the intelligentsia when it perceived that the unions had 
strayed too far from orthodoxy.19 Under this system, the arts in the USSR bore the responsibility 
of representing socialism in international ideological competition. As time passed, however, the 
ideological responsibility lessened as the field of competition gradually shifted from the cultural 
to the economic field, and as the cultural power of the high arts in general began to recede as an 
indicator of overall superiority.20 
 The erosion of the cultural prestige of the high arts in the USSR occurred in tandem with 
a rising patronage of Western popular music. Joanna Bullivant’s description of the tension 
between the East German state and the high demand for Western dance music is also relevant to 
 
16 Boris Schwarz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 
448-50. 
17 Ibid., 492-95. 
18 Ibid., 590-601. 
19 Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composer, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 2-5. 
20 Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 
1945-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 178-83. 
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the situation in the USSR. Bullivant noticed that the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
(Socialist United Party of Germany or SED) feared the influence of Western popular music 
because it represented commercialism, individuality, and sexual liberation to the younger 
generation. Nevertheless, the SED could not simply oppose it. Similar to other examples 
discussed in this dissertation, the SED developed a flexible stance toward popular music: the 
SED tolerated it in order to prevent increased unrest and emigration, and it kept it within specific 
bounds in an attempt to keep its perceived negative aspects under control. Furthermore, the SED 
recognized that popular music was culturally powerful and sought to find ways to harness it to 
serve socialism. As in the USSR, such a flexible relationship was subject to periods of relative 
tolerance and repression.21 Yurchak indicates that the Soviet government’s position on Western 
popular culture constantly oscillated between tolerance and rejection. The government attempted 
to jam foreign radio and prevent foreign recordings from entering the USSR, while also making 
shortwave radios, tape recorders, and televisions available. Yurchak argues that Soviet citizens 
subconsciously made a compromise that considered the consumption of Western music and 
fashion acceptable in moderation.22  
 Tomoff considers the cultural Cold War as the soft-power competition between the 
American and Soviet imperial systems. In this context, the Soviets invested heavily in a cultural 
apparatus that trained and exhibited virtuoso musicians, who dominated international 
competitions. Nonetheless, he points out that these efforts in high culture were directed at 
relatively small, highly educated audiences, while popular music (jazz and, later, rock) was 
aimed at mass audiences. Moreover, by the 1970s and 1980s, rock musicians had completely 
 
21 Joanna Bullivant, Alan Bush, Modern Music, and the Cold War: The Cultural Left in Britain and the 
Communist Bloc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 206-07. 
22 See Chapter 5 of Yurchak. 
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eclipsed ballerinas and violinists in their ability to influence foreign cultures. The United States 
capitalized on these factors by broadcasting jazz and rock music to the USSR, and eventually 
sending popular music performers to the Soviet cities on U.S. State Department-funded tours.23 
Until the early 1970s, Goskontsert resisted demand for popular music, and allowed only 
ideologically acceptable groups that performed classical, folk, and jazz music to tour in the 
USSR. As late as 1973, repeated attempts to propose Soviet tours for British rock artists Eric 
Clapton24 and the Rolling Stones25 were summarily deemed impossible by Goskontsert. Starting 
in 1974 and 1975, a drastic shift occurred in the acceptability of popular music. It is possible that 
declining interest in classical music throughout the 1960s and early 1970s led to the Ministry of 
Culture and Goskontsert becoming more receptive to the prospect of importing popular artists. 
Eventually, Goskontsert capitulated and began inviting “light” music performers such as Moira 
Anderson and “pop” music performers such as Tom Jones, Cliff Richard, and Yusuf Islam.26 It 
should be noted that these musicians had more in common with Soviet estrada performers than 
with the blues-inspired rock music and the more controversial lifestyles of musicians such as 
Clapton and The Rolling Stones. In any case, the British government monitored its Soviet 
counterpart’s tolerance of popular music and stimulated demand for it there by sending 
 
23 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 183-84. The nature of the American government’s Cold War musical 
diplomacy with the USSR (and other countries) has been thoroughly investigated by Danielle Fosler-Lussier’s 
monograph on the subject. See Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2015). 
24 Harlech to N.M. Aleshenko, 6 February 1973; Harlech to Aleshenko, 2 March 1973; Harlech to 
Aleshenko, 20 March 1973; V. Golovin to Harlech, 21 March 1973; f. 3162, op. 1, d. 1641 Dokumenty ob 
organizatsii articheskogo obmena s Velikobritaniei v 1973 g. [Documents on the Organization of Artistic Exchange 
with Great Britain, 1973], vol. 1 (f. 3162 op. 1, ds. 1641 and 1642 Dokumenty ob organizatsii articheskogo obmena 
s Velikobritaniei v 1973 g., vols. 1 and 2 (hereafter cited as f. 3162 op. 1, d. 1641 and 1642, respectively), Russian 
State Archives of Literature and Art (hereafter cited as RGALI). 
25 Jean-Claude Kaufmann to Goskontsert Director, 8 September 1973; Kaufmann to Goskontsert, 12 
October 1973; Kokonin to Kaufmann, 18 October 1973; f. 3162, op. 1, d. 1642, RGALI. 
26 Moira Anderson (born 1938) is a classically trained vocalist whose style evokes Scottish folksong 
traditions. Before his conversion to Islam and his departure from the music profession in 1977, Yusuf Islam was 
commonly known by his stage name, Cat Stevens. In 2007, he resumed performing under the mononym, Yusuf. 
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recordings of popular song musicians (such as Anderson and Richard) once official attitudes had 
begun to shift.27 Furthermore, some representatives of the FCO believed that some political 
advantages could be gained from the occasional Soviet tour by British popular musicians.28 
For the entire span of Anglo-Soviet cultural relations, the importation of foreign classical 
music into the USSR carried a degree of financial risk. Even Britten’s 1964 English Opera Group 
tour in Leningrad, which was lauded by the Soviet musical establishment, was seen as a financial 
failure by that city’s branch of Goskontsert due to insufficient takings at the box office.29 Such 
performances garnered cultural prestige, but were inconsistent in drawing audiences. Examples 
such as the EOG’s 1964 Soviet tour, which enjoyed high cultural prestige but suffered from low 
financial value, resulted from choices that were dependent on the perceived value of these two 
factors in relation to each other. In other words, the question was: was cultural prestige or money 
more important in defining success in the USSR? Lilian Hochhauser recalled that Goskontsert 
focused on setting the most advantageous financial terms for every cultural exchange,30 yet its 
parent organization, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, made cultural prestige its primary concern. 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the high arts, and not popular forms of expression, had been 
deemed acceptable for cultural exchange. When the cultural power of the high arts as an 
ideological and societal force slipped into decline and the population became increasingly 
interested in consumerism, it followed that the balance would shift toward prioritizing exchanges 
that were less prestigious and more profitable.  
 
27 Llewellyn-Smith to J.F.H. Villiers, 20 March 1974, FCO 34/274, GB-Lna. 
28 Cultural Exchange Department of the FCO, Record of a Meeting at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office at 1 PM on 23 September to Discuss East/West Exchanges, 25 September 1975, FCO 34/291 Cultural Policy 
of UK towards Soviet Union, GB-Lna. 
29 Tikhantovsky to Agadzhanov, 8 February 1965, f. 355, op. 2-2, d. 271 Perepiska s Goskontsertom SSSR 
po voprosu organizatsii gastrol’nykh poesdok za rubezhom i poezdok zarubezhnykh artistov v nashu stranu 
[Correspondence with USSR Goskontsert Regarding the Organization of International Tours and Travel of Foreign 
Artists to our Country], Central State Archives of Literature and Art, St. Petersburg. 
30 See Brown, “Victor and Lilian Hochhauser.” 
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Moreover, the aesthetic tastes of high-ranking Soviet officials, both inside and outside the 
Ministry of Culture, were also shifting from classical to more popular music: Llewellyn-Smith 
reported to the British Council that: 
[Vinogradov of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs] immediately commented that he 
would [favor] a visit by the Scottish singer, Moira Anderson. Obviously, Miss Anderson 
made a great impression on him when he was in London with her television appearances. 
I don’t think I have ever seen her. Perhaps you would consider whether she might make a 
tour here.31  
 
This suggests that interest in British light and pop music was not solely confined to the younger 
generation or the general public, but that it was also shared by high-ranking representatives of 
the Soviet government.  
The entry of popular music into Anglo-Soviet exchanges proved to have its own 
difficulties. Other than the aforementioned issue regarding perception of low cultural prestige, 
the two most prominent obstacles were cost in Western currency and Soviet notions of propriety. 
Throughout 1974, representatives of Goskontsert and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed 
interest in several British pop stars. When considering which musicians would be suitable for 
performance in the USSR, the British Council and the FCO said it believed that the Soviets 
would not be able to afford stars such as Tom Jones,32 and that Yusuf Islam’s hair length and the 
chronic insobriety of his musicians would be unacceptable to Soviet sensibilities.33 Moira 
Anderson and Cliff Richard, on the other hand, were seen by the British Council and the FCO to 
be more acceptable in both cost and propriety for Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange.34 
 
31 Llewellyn-Smith to Villiers, 11 September 1974, FCO 34/275, GB-Lna. 
32 Llewellyn-Smith to Villiers, 22 November 1974, FCO 34/275, GB-Lna. 
33 Villiers to Llewellyn-Smith, 24 October 1974, FCO 34/275, GB-Lna. As mentioned earlier in Footnote 
26 in this chapter, this was when Islam was known as Cat Stevens. 
34 Jane King to Llewellyn-Smith, 18 November 1974, FCO 34/275, GB-Lna. 
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Popular music exchanges did not fully replace exchanges in classical music, but their 
very inclusion meant that a paradigm shift had occurred in Soviet cultural politics. Moreover, the 
systems of non-currency-based compensation and unauthorized use of intellectual property 
discussed in Chapter 4 were becoming irrelevant due to the Soviets joining the Universal 
Copyright Convention in 1973. The most significant difference between the Berne Convention 
and the UCC is that the latter has a much shorter term of protection after publication. The Berne 
Convention mandated protection for the artist’s life plus fifty years, while the UCC only required 
twenty-five years after a work’s publication. This concession was intended to facilitate the 
involvement of the US—a country with traditionally lax copyright protections—in 1955.35 
Interestingly, this concession attracted the Soviets for the same reason. After the USSR signed 
onto the UCC, use of the intellectual property of another member state required both the 
permission of, and the remuneration to, the copyright holder under Soviet law. At the 
negotiations for the 1975-77 Anglo-Soviet Cultural Exchange Agreement, Parastaev insisted on 
the inclusion of a new article in the agreement to facilitate cooperation between British and 
Soviet copyright organizations.36 The following is the official text of the article on cooperation 
on copyright matters: 
Both parties shall encourage the establishment and development of cooperation between 
appropriate organizations of their countries to ensure the mutual protection of copyright 




35 American copyright law followed the old English model which only provided copyright protection for a 
limited time after publication before intellectual property lapsed into the public domain. See Janice T. Pilch, “U.S. 
Copyright Relations with Central, East European, and Eurasian Nations in Historical Practice,” Slavic Review 65, 
no. 2 (Summer 2006): 325-48. 





Such actions would not have been capable of ending piracy, but they removed the legal blind 
spot that allowed foreign protected works to be in the Soviet public domain, and they set the 
groundwork for the enforcement of British copyright in the USSR and vice versa.  
By the mid-1970s, economic pressures within the UK forced a sharp decrease in 
government spending, which in turn forced organizations such as the British Council to cut back 
on its budget. This development complicated an already difficult relationship with the USSR, 
which routinely insisted on setting terms as profitable as possible for itself while often causing 
logistical difficulties for the British side. For example, the Soviet insistence on reciprocity, which 
in theory was to maintain a balance in exchanges, resulted in its own imbalance in favor of the 
USSR. All Soviet ensembles and performers carried out performance orders from Goskontsert, 
while the British government was unable to order its musicians to travel to the USSR. Although 
concrete plans on the Soviet side could be made well in advance, the British had to negotiate for 
each performance individually, which took more time and involved some uncertainties. Also, 
several British institutions and performers were not interested in working with the Soviets for 
either ideological or financial reasons. The other side of this issue arose from the difference in 
negotiation procedures. Goskontsert was free to organize commercial tours through British 
concert agents, and, as a result, to exploit the British popular demand for Soviet artists to acquire 
large quantities of foreign currency. Yet, the British side could only work through Goskontsert, 
which kept strict control over the negotiation of the financial terms of performance contracts, 
which it could set in its favor.  
This decrease in British arts funding in combination with Goskontsert’s routine practice 
of seeking the most cost effective and profitable touring conditions placed the British Council, 
and by extension the FCO, in the position that it could subsidize far fewer large projects such as 
402 
 
the touring of large ensembles. In order to adjust to the financial reality, the British Council 
essentially sought to do more with less. When working with the Cultural Exchange Agreement, 
the British Council sought to focus on the exchanges of students and professionals, which they 
believed would have more tangible results than the more “ephemeral” effects that were generated 
by musical tours. Starting in the mid-1970s, it was agreed that exchanges in the performing arts 
were a vital part of Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange and should continue, albeit at a reduced 
capacity.38 The end result of all of the above factors was the decline in the value of classical 
musicians in international exchange, which manifested in the reduction of their cultural capital 
and, in turn, their agency both at home and abroad. 
 
Final Reflections on Agency, Access, and Advocacy in Cultural Exchange 
 During the Cold War, particularly in its first three decades, classical music played a very 
important role in the reduction of tensions, the formation of connections between two different 
hegemonic systems, and as cultural competition between them. That competition was an exercise 
of soft power used to influence the public opinion of each side’s countries alongside 
demonstrations of athletic, intellectual, and scientific prowess. The exchanges were largely 
subject to two major principles: reciprocity and economic demand. The former was the primary 
mandate for intergovernmental exchange: the cultural exchange agreements were founded on the 
practice of both sides sending comparable numbers of performers and ensembles to each other 
over an extended amount of time: a Soviet symphony orchestra in exchange for a British one, an 
opera troupe for another, etc. The governments of both sides attempted to maintain a delicate 
balance between encouraging more open relations to increase their influence on the other side, 
 
38 R.M. Auty to I.J.M. Sutherland, 14 January 1975, FCO 34/292 Cultural Negotiations between UK and 
Soviet Union, GB-Lna. 
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while seeking to prevent an excess of foreign influence in their own countries. The latter ideal 
incentivized the Soviet government to send its musicians to the West to gain valuable foreign 
currency for the state; however, no such financial incentives existed for Western musicians 
because Soviet currency was useless outside of the USSR. Both of these principles— 
 intergovernmental reciprocity and the gathering of foreign currency—operated ideally without 
explicit political connotations: governments discouraged clear displays of foreign propaganda in 
their own countries, and political demonstrations of foreign political systems had little sway with 
the general public (and might even be shut down by the local governments). Yet, both sides 
understood that propagandist value was still present implicitly through the display of artistic 
excellence, which could then be interpreted as representative of the visiting artists’ socio-
economic system or national culture. 
 Classical music professionals, such as concert agents, composers, performers, and 
publishers, who were involved in Cold War cultural exchange operated within this framework, 
but they did so to pursue their own goals, which may or may not have coincided with those of 
their own governments. Some of these professionals did see themselves as representatives of 
their country’s interests or promoters of their own political ideology, but it appears that most of 
the British and Soviet personages discussed in this dissertation were primarily interested in 
gaining access to something or someone on the other side. While it was true that Soviet artists 
profited immensely from their performances in the West in gaining access to foreign currency 
(even after their governments took ninety percent of their earnings) and consumer goods, their 
primary means of income was still derived from salaried positions such as serving as a 
conservatory professor or ensemble director. There was little to no financial incentive for 
Western professionals to participate in Anglo-Soviet cultural exchange during the early Cold 
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War, due to the inconvertibility of Soviet currency and the Soviet refusal to participate in 
international intellectual property law. Ernst Roth of Boosey & Hawkes was interested in 
building a mutually beneficial business relationship with the USSR by first loaning and 
eventually selling Britten’s operatic scores to Soviet opera houses. Once it became apparent that 
such a relationship was not forthcoming, Roth lost interest in working with the USSR.  
While Victor and Lilian Hochhauser were also interested primarily in financial gain, this 
was only possible by gaining access to elite musicians through their connections with the Soviet 
government. What resulted was a mutually beneficial business relationship between Western 
concert agents and Goskontsert. Roth had attempted a similar arrangement regarding Britten’s 
operas. If the Soviet opera houses and the Ministry of Culture had been more receptive to Roth’s 
plans, then such a relationship could have been formed. Goskontsert and the Ministry of Culture 
proved to be more cooperative in the exchange of performers than in the exchange of intellectual 
property. As discussed earlier, the flow of performers was primarily directed from the USSR to 
West due to financial incentives, and Goskontsert realized that working through independent 
concert agencies was much more cost-effective than through other means such as the friendship 
societies. Concert agents who specialized in cultural exchange with the USSR such as the 
Hochhausers and the American-based agent Sol Hurok ran agencies that were much smaller than 
Ibbs & Tillett, Harold Holt, and Columbia Artists Management; however, they developed their 
own niches derived from presenting the performances of Soviet artists. These larger companies 
maintained exclusive contracts with far more performing artists, but they did not develop as 
close connections with the Soviet cultural establishment as the Hochhausers and Hurok did. 
Mutually beneficial relationships also resulted from the transfer of intellectual property 
from the UK to the USSR. The majority of intellectual property transfers between the USSR and 
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other countries took the form of long-term agreements between Mezhknig and a select group of 
foreign publishers for the sale of Soviet musical scores. These agreements, which existed before 
the Soviet entry into international intellectual property law, gave Western publishers the right to 
sell Soviet music under their own imprint within their respective countries. While such purchases 
ensured that it was possible to perform Soviet music throughout the world, they did not ensure 
that there would be demand for such works. Henry Wood was one of the first advocates for the 
performance of Soviet works in the UK, and it can be argued that he had a crucial role in 
building an audience for both Russian classics and Soviet contemporary music at the Promenade 
Concerts in London (which were also broadcast nationally).39 Also, his close connection with the 
Soviet cultural establishment, which resulted from his advocacy, placed him in the position to 
gain access to new important works such as Shostakovich’s Leningrad Symphony and to 
introduce them to British audiences. 
The creation of a Soviet audience for Britten’s works also developed through the 
advocacy of musicians. Unlike the arrangement between Mezhknig and Western publishers, no 
such procedure was developed for the Soviet import of foreign intellectual property, which in 
turn necessitated the unauthorized Soviet use of such property or non-legally-binding agreements 
to facilitate the transfer of British scores. Soviet advocates often proved to be responsible for 1) 
making possible such transfers (which circumvented the difficulties resulting from the Soviet 
government’s refusal to observe international copyright law); 2) the defense of such works from 
criticism among their performers and the Ministry of Culture; and 3) the cultivation of a Soviet 
 
39 This was true both before and after the Proms were taken over by the BBC in 1927. Under the auspices 
of the BBC, Wood, as conductor, still had a great deal of agency in the decision-making process for the season’s 
repertoire. Every year, he submitted a preliminary program, and then these selections would be amended by a series 
of meetings between Wood and BBC officials. Jenny Doctor, “A New Dimension: The BBC Takes on the Proms, 




audience for such works. The Soviet advocates for Britten’s music Gennady Rozhdestvensky, 
Djemal Dalgat, and Mikhail Chulaki each used their agency as conductors and/or directors to 
acquire and perform Britten’s orchestral and stage works with the Bolshoi and Kirov Theaters as 
well as orchestras such as the Leningrad Philharmonic. Rostropovich bears special consideration 
for using his agency and abilities to enter a creative collaboration with Britten, which resulted in 
the largest contribution to the cello solo repertoire since J.S. Bach.  
Britten, meanwhile, benefitted from Soviet advocacy by gaining wider dissemination of 
his music through access to an entirely new audience in the USSR, an audience which he had 
respected as part of the Russian classical music tradition. His orchestral music was performed by 
premier Soviet symphony orchestras and his operas were performed in the most prestigious 
Soviet opera houses. He was also treated as a guest of honor by the cultural establishment, which 
included elite musicians, the Composers’ Union, and the Ministry of Culture. His tireless Soviet 
advocates brought his music into the USSR, and, in some cases, translated and republished it in 
Soviet editions. He also gained access to three of the most esteemed performers at the time: 
Richter, Rostropovich, and Vishnevskaya; they became regular guests of his music festival in 
Aldeburgh, they performed alongside him, and he composed for them.  
However, this access also had more negative connotations that conflicted with Britten’s 
core values. While Britten respected the Soviet state’s commitment to supporting music 
education and performance, he chafed at the state’s interference in artistic matters. He was 
dismayed when he learned that in his 1963 interview with Pravda the Party mouthpiece spun his 
words to fit Soviet ideology.40 Afterwards, Britten considered this interview to be a breach of 
 
40 See “The Artist—to the People,” trans. unknown, Pravda [Truth]; and Benjamin Britten, “On Pravda, 
Art and Criticism,” trans. Paul Kildea; in Britten on Music, ed. Paul Kildea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
233-35 and 236-40, respectively.  
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trust and refused all invitations for a second interview with Pravda.41 The Soviet suppression of 
the Prague Spring troubled the pacifist composer; however, like the Hochhausers, he felt unable 
to publicly criticize the USSR or show support for Czechoslovakia because that would have 
jeopardized his access to Soviet musicians and audiences.42 Instead, he took the position that he 
should communicate his dissatisfaction privately to Minister of Culture Furtseva,43 and keep his 
connections open in the hope that they would have some influence on the USSR, its government, 
and its people. The Soviet treatment of Rostropovich in the aftermath of the cellist’s support for 
the dissident author Solzhenitsyn appears to have been a major blow to his relationship with the 
USSR. As Elizabeth Wilson explains in her article on Britten’s last visit to the USSR for the 
Days of British Music Festival in 1971, Britten had become demoralized by the Soviet state’s 
repression of the cellist. Over the next couple of years, Britten’s access to Rostropovich was 
curtailed as the latter was refused permission to travel to Aldeburgh to premiere the former’s 
Third Cello Suite (which had to wait until Rostropovich left the USSR in 1974).44 Britten still 
had other means to ensure the Soviets had access to his music. Dalgat, for example, made efforts 
to include The Prince of the Pagodas in the Kirov Theater’s repertoire in 1972.45 
Regarding the appropriateness (or not) of Western collaborators, the fact that Soviet 
priorities shifted from ideological compatibility and Party loyalty to aesthetic taste and 
international prestige was clearly evident in the favoring of Britten’s music over that of Bush in 
 
41 Peter Pears, The Travel Diaries of Peter Pears, 1936-1978, ed. Philip Reed (Woodbridge, Suffolk: 
Boydell, 1995), 141. 
42 Humphrey Carpenter, Benjamin Britten: A Biography (London: Faber, 1992), 483. 
43 Britten to Furtseva, 28 September 1968, Russian Correspondence, Britten-Pears Foundation Archives. 
44 See Elizabeth Wilson, “Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part I,” Musical Opinion 136, 
no. 1494 (May-June 2013): 10-17; and Elizabeth Wilson, “Recollections of Britten’s Last Visit to Russia – Part II,” 
Musical Opinion 136, no. 1495 (July-August 2013): 18-25. 
45 Thornton Miller, “Striking a Compromise: Britten, British Publishers, Soviet Theaters, and the Premieres 
of Peter Grimes and The Prince of the Pagodas,” in Benjamin Britten Studies: Essays on An Inexplicit Art, eds. 
Justin Vickers and Vicki Pierce Stroeher (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2017), 399-401. 
408 
 
performance opportunities within the USSR. Bush had visited the USSR before the Second 
World War, sought to fully comply with Soviet dictates in music (including the 1948 Zhdanov 
decrees), represented the UK at the Second Congress of the Soviet Composers’ Union, and was a 
loyal communist who always spoke positively of the USSR, while rejecting any and all 
criticisms of the socialist state. Yet he had difficulty, despite his best efforts, in securing Soviet 
performances of his operas. Britten was not a communist; however, he was certainly left-leaning, 
interested in Russian culture, and had been sympathetic to the USSR since the 1930s (arguably 
so until the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the repression of Rostropovich). 
Importantly, when the Soviet cultural establishment distinguished between progressive and 
regressive Western musicians, Britten’s status as a progressive composer of the British national 
style who experimented within the bounds of tonality was publicly announced by Shneerson and 
Shostakovich. These endorsements—which were primarily based on his musical style rather than 
an affiliation to international socialism—facilitated the performance of his music in the USSR. 
It is interesting to note that the three opera houses that were among the most prestigious 
in the USSR—the Bolshoi, Kirov, and the Riga— had all rejected Bush’s requests and instead 
invited Britten to send his scores. It is possible that Britten was chosen over Bush because of the 
aesthetic tastes of the musicians who had sway over the repertoire choices of their respective 
theaters, and because Britten was an international celebrity. Moreover, the political content of 
Bush’s operas could have been more of a liability than an asset, because Britten’s compositions 
were derived from literature and poetry that fit Soviet conceptions of British (or more generally 
Western) high art.  
In summation, the concept of prestige played an essential role in both the explicit (to 
reduce tensions through the development of greater cultural understanding) and implicit (to 
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demonstrate cultural superiority) objectives of Cold War cultural exchange. To succeed at both 
objectives, the two sides needed to display their greatest artists, quintessential compositions, and 
discerning audiences. The artists who were considered the most prestigious by their cultural 
establishments were also needed by their governments to demonstrate their excellence as cultural 
ambassadors. Some of these artists were interested in pursuing political goals (on behalf of either 
the West or the USSR), while the majority seemed interested in gaining access to something held 
by the other side, which could not be obtained in their own country. In any case, these 
professionals were needed by these institutions in order to carry out cultural diplomacy, which 
afforded them some degree of agency in a Gramscian compromise. The majority of these 
professionals then used this agency to gain access to the audiences, intellectual property, 
musicians, and/or venues of the other side, and, as a result, these individuals were able to further 
their own personal and career-based aspirations. The music professionals who did not compose 
or perform firsthand garnered prestige through the composers or performers to whom they were 
connected: artistic directors to their theaters and ensembles, publishers to the intellectual 
property of composers, and concert agents to their contracted musicians and their connections to 
the musical establishments. 
While the above elements were present among music professionals in both Western and 
Soviet states, there were key differences between the performers of both sides. Soviet musicians 
were adept at leveraging their agency in order to pursue their own goals within the USSR on a 
practically daily basis, and they continued exercising this agency to gain access to their Western 
contemporaries and their intellectual property, as well as to Western currency and consumer 
goods. At the same time, Western musicians used their own positions—which could be 
manifested through their cultural prestige in their own national arts establishments and in the 
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international arts community—to gain access to Soviet performers and audiences. The fact that 
close collaborative and personal connections were formed between the musicians involved in 
Anglo-Soviet cultural relations should not be surprising. Soviet musicians had restricted access 
to contemporary music due to internal political and aesthetic restraints, and the impasse in 
international intellectual property law. These difficulties resulted in the need for personal 
connections to overcome these issues. Also, advocacy developed on both sides as musicians 
sought to cultivate an appreciation of the music that they valued from the other side. This 
advocacy also led to collaborative and personal relationships between distant musical 
communities.  
Cold War cultural relations can be visualized as having a background of large economic 
and governmental institutions as well as broad economic and legal conditions, and a foreground 
comprised of music professionals who dealt with these institutions and conditions in order to 
serve these institutions or to pursue their own interests. Due to the importance of cultural capital 
in the form of prestige, the background institutions needed the professionals in the foreground to 
participate. However, it should be noted that these professionals were not always passively 
carrying out the will of these larger institutions. A few of these professionals and the 
collaborative relationships that formed between them were able the obtain the agency needed to 
influence (or at least negotiate with) the background institutions and navigate the local 
conditions at home and abroad, which made it possible for music professionals to actively 
instigate cultural exchange in the shape of new tours; transfers of intellectual property; and the 
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